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Abstract 
 
To achieve Value-for-Money (VfM) outcomes during operational phases of Public 
Private Partnerships (PPPs), contract oversight must be prudently managed by the 
public partner.  Although it is the responsibility of the private partner to deliver agreed 
services, the public partner is ultimately responsible for ensuring that these services 
are actually carried out and that they (at least) meet minimum standards. As no 
contract will cover every eventuality of something going wrong, effective partnership 
relations between the public and private partners are important for dealing with 
unforeseen performance issues as and when they arise.   
 
Other types of uncertainty are inherent in PPP.  Uncertainty is associated with risk. 
For the public partner, one of the main benefits sought from PPP is risk transfer – or 
more explicit allocation of risks between the public and private partners; however, 
not all risks can be transferred during operations.  Therefore, governments should 
accept and manage their risk positions. PPP are also expected to deliver real 
benefits to communities throughout their operational performance. The public partner 
should be pro-active in taking necessary and timely corrective action to encourage 
better operator (private partner) performance when necessary to ensure that planned 
social outcomes are achieved in practice. Thus, the active management of 
partnership, risk and performance by the public partner during the operational phase 
of PPPs is crucial.  
 
This research has two main objectives. The first is to examine how PPP operational 
phase partnership, risk and performance management practices can be improved to 
achieve better VfM outcomes. This involves developing a generic conceptual 
integrating model, intended to assist government decision-makers to allocate and 
make better use of public sector resources during the operational phase of PPPs, 
that may have significant and / or long-term consequences for achieving strategic 
objectives using an integrated partnership, risk and performance management 
approach. The second objective is to test the logic and sufficiency of the model by 
exposing it to industry practitioner review and comment.    
 
The underlying research methodology is phenomenology, and divides into two main 
phases using qualitative mixed methods commencing with literature review to 
facilitate the initial conceptualisation of the proposed model. Semi-structured 
interviews were then used to gather the data required for development. A second 
iteration of the model was presented to an expert focus group for scrutiny and 
comment, and feedback from this group was used to refine the third and final 
iteration of the model.  
 
The research sample was drawn from eligible persons from the Australian 
Government, three Australian state jurisdictions, the Government of the United 
Kingdom, as well as selected private sector participants. Fifty invitations were 
distributed and 34 people agreed to participate in the formal interview process.  
Twenty-three participants were from the public sector and 11 were from the private 
sector. Seven respondents took part in a second interview involving a different 
management discipline i.e. partnership, risk or performance management, bringing 
the total to 38 interviews (three interviews involved interviewing two participants at 
the same time and one of these respondents took part in a second interview). Many 
v 
 
of these participants have substantial experience working in Australian and 
international PPP markets.  Ten public sector PPP experts (selected from the 
research sample) were then contacted to elicit their interest in taking part in a focus 
group. Of the 10 contacts, seven respondents agreed to participate. 
 
The most significant findings for this research are two-fold.  First, there is a link 
between the public partner’s contract management style for achieving VfM and 
organisational culture i.e. ‘give and take’ relationship management and ‘black letter’ 
contract enforcement. The give and take-type approach accords with a culture that 
places a premium on quality of the contract management function as well as 
embracing a solutions-based approach fostered through a strong belief in the value 
of relationship management. This contrasts with a black letter approach which is 
likely to manifest in a strong compliance-orientated culture. Organisational culture, 
however, is not always driven by the preferred contract management style of the 
public partner: ‘you get what you pay for’. This suggests public partner’s decision-
making can be influenced by the size of the private partner’s financial margins, which 
could then influence the extent to which the concessionaire may ‘go the extra mile’, 
or alternatively, the degree to which ‘corners could be cut’ by the operator. 
 
Second, sufficiently skilled and experienced public partner employees are critical for 
achieving VfM outcomes. This research demonstrates that over-reliance on 
expensive contractors and consultants; failure of public employees to understand the 
commercial and legal underpinnings of the concession deed; ineffective knowledge 
management practices; inadequate succession planning; and poor communication 
may all undermine value for the state over the longer-term or lead to an adverse 
change in the public partner’s risk profile. Therefore, failure of governments to attract 
and retain high calibre employees can have a detrimental effect on achieving desired 
outcomes.   
 
This research contributes to the advancement of the ‘body of knowledge’, with 
respect to public partner governance of PPP in the operating phase.  This includes: 
identifying critical success factors that lead to the achievement of VfM outcomes, 
thus building upon existing partnership, risk and performance management 
knowledge, policy and guidance for PPPs; and developing an Integrated 
Management Model as a tool – that supports the contract administration manual – to 
enhance the development of internal and external improvement plans as well as 
improving the operational management of partnership, risk and performance 
elements.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
 
 1.1 Introduction  
 
This Chapter introduces the concept of privatisation and Public Private Partnership 
(PPP) as a form of procurement.  The research problem, research questions and the 
objectives of the research are presented together with a synopsis of the research 
design.  The limitations of the research are discussed, followed by an outline of the 
structure of the thesis.    
 
 
1.2 Privatisation and Public Private Partnership 
 
Privatisation has been a common policy directive and development for Western 
governments (Broadbent and Laughlin 2004) for combating rising national budget 
deficits (Cavaliere and Scabrosetti 2008); increasing state revenues (Price 
Waterhouse in Megginson and Netter 2001); promoting the development of financial 
markets (Cavaliere and Scabrosetti 2008) and competitive behaviour (Fafaliou and 
Donaldson 2007); reducing government involvement in economic activity (Price 
Waterhouse in Megginson and Netter 2001); increasing efficiency (Cavaliere and 
Scabrosetti 2008); and fostering wider share ownership (Price Waterhouse in 
Megginson and Netter 2001) for investors.   
 
In Australia, privatisation gained momentum during the early 1990s e.g. the part-
privatisation of the Commonwealth Bank (Quiggin 2004) and the privatisation of 
Telstra (English 2006) as a way to tackle perceived public sector inefficiencies – it 
was heralded as a key microeconomic reform designed to “liberalise” the Australian 
economy (McKenzie 2008; Gray, Broadbent, and Lavender 2009).  Coinciding with 
the emergence of privatisation, ‘New Public Management’ was championed as a 
means to modernise government and to bring its machinations in line with the 
principles of market-based competition in order to improve government and public 
administration practices (Diefenbach 2009; Groot and Budding 2008) and was seen 
as a refinement to earlier, less successful attempts at privatisation (International 
Monetary Fund 2004: p.4). A key element of privatisation has been the development 
of PPPs.   
 
Although there is no all-encompassing definition for PPP (English 2008: p.2; Urio 
2010: p.26), for this research it is characterised as a collaborative endeavour (Smyth 
and Edkins 2006) involving the public and private sectors, developed through the 
expertise of each partner in order to meet identified public needs through appropriate 
resource, risk and reward allocation (The Canadian Council for Public Private 
Partnerships 2009). These time and cost-specific ventures (English 2007) are 
normally constituted under long-term contractual arrangements (Infrastructure 
Australia 2008a: p.3) whereby the private partner agrees to build infrastructure (or 
engage in the provision of facilities or services) on behalf of the public sector (Lewis 
2001) under specified terms and conditions (Grimsey and Lewis 2004: p.6) and for 
an agreed concession period. Characteristic of the latter has been a long-term (20 
plus years) intent.   
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The private partner contracted in by government, known as ‘consortia’, typically 
consist of a group of commercially focused stakeholder organisations (Savas 2000: 
p.248) which include project financiers and project contractors. Fig. 1.1 below 
outlines a conventional PPP relationship structure.   
 
Private Partner
Project Contractors Project Financiers
Government
Consortia
Contractual Agreement
Public Partner
 
 
Fig. 1.1 A Typical Relationship Structure Between Public and Private 
Partners in PPP. 
From a public sector perspective, Value-for-Money (VfM) propositions that benefit 
communities through improved service delivery should be the primary focus of all 
PPPs (Sampath 2006). This concept of VfM is defined within an Australian state 
government context as “getting the best possible outcome at the lowest possible 
price” (New South Wales Treasury in English 2006) and means that public sector 
endeavours can be undertaken without increasing public borrowing or raising 
taxation levies (Osborne in Nisar 2007).  The avoidance or minimisation of public 
debt remains a primary reason for Private Finance Initiative (PFI) projects (PFI is a 
term that can be used interchangeably with PPP (English 2008: p.2)) in the United 
Kingdom (UK), for example, where its absence from local authority balance sheets 
(or adherence to recommended limits) satisfies the stringent accountability demands 
of central government.   
 
Other benefits of PPP include transferring service delivery (including service delivery 
risk) to consortia so that government can focus on delivering its core services to the 
community (Commonwealth Department of Administration and Finance 2006: p.2; 
Shen, Platten and Deng 2006) e.g. public health and education initiatives 
(Partnerships Victoria 2001a: p.5) whilst potentially obtaining large cost savings 
throughout project lifecycles (Commonwealth Department of Administration and 
Finance 2006: p.2). In practice, however, neither health nor education services 
provision has been entirely exempt from attempts at privatisation, and the ‘core 
services’ argument is thus substantially weakened; although the power / influence of 
health and education sector unions should not be underestimated in some countries 
e.g. the UK.   
 
A more likely but less acknowledged benefit of using PPP might relate to political 
strategies to reign in public sector staffing expansion and cost as well as potential 
efficiencies derived from private sector technical and management expertise (Ahadzi 
and Bowles 2004; Asian Development Bank 2008: p.3-5).  This latter point is a 
somewhat weak argument, since it is likely that, if the public sector were to retain 
responsibility for project delivery and operations, it would also employ suitably 
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qualified and experienced personnel to do so.  Thus the desire to contain public 
sector staffing costs (including the long-term future liability of funding employee 
benefits such as superannuation) is likely to be a compelling ‘hidden’ driver for PPP. 
 
PPPs are also perceived by governments to be an attractive option due to the use of 
the ‘payment for performance’ principle, whereby payment by the public partner to its 
private partner is dependent upon the latter achieving specified (and hopefully 
enforceable) standards (Garvin and Bosso 2008).  In other types of PPPs such as 
toll roads, the ‘user pays’ approach secures direct payment to the private partner in 
the form of toll charges or fares (subject to the accomplishment of investment and / 
or operational targets e.g. safety targets). These arrangements may be subject to 
royalty payments from the concessionaire to government, and making periodic 
increases in such charges (according to annual inflation rates or sector indexes) and 
fares subject to the final approval of government.  
 
Although this method of procurement is seen to be effective and desirable by its 
supporters, it is not without criticism.  Failures can result (in the case of Economic 
Infrastructure projects, for example) from poor allocation of risk (The Asian 
Development Bank 2008: p.2), sub-standard contract design and inadequate bid 
criteria leading to underinvestment by consortia which may culminate in inefficient 
service user charges and the exposure of taxpayers to unintended project risks, 
whilst shifting profits to project “promoters” (Ergas 2009).  Human factors such as an 
insufficient skill base and poor relationship management can also lead to project 
failures (Yuan et al 2009; Koppenjan 2005). None of this is intended to argue that 
PPP failure is predominantly attributable to drafting, documentation and 
management shortcomings on the part of the public partner. There is little evidence 
for that. However, all these aspects place a substantial burden on the public partner 
in the procurement, delivery and operational phases of PPP projects which, if not 
effectively managed, can impact upon the achievement of VfM outcomes. 
 
 
 1.3 Research Problem 
 
Broadly speaking, Western governments are advanced in the design and delivery 
methods of PPP as a viable, alternative form of procurement, thought to be suitable 
for a range of large-scale infrastructure projects. Whilst advanced in the early phases 
of the project lifecycle, most Australian state governments (since PPPs tend to be 
secured at state, rather than at federal level in Australia), as with many other 
governments around the world, are still developing effective approaches to achieving 
VfM outcomes during the operational phase of PPPs. To date, this has proved 
difficult because of the long-term nature of these arrangements (typically lasting 
upwards of 20 years) and the fact that few contracts have yet reached maturity in 
terms of the original concession period.   
 
To achieve VfM outcomes during operational phase, PPP contract oversight 
(governance) must be prudently managed by the public partner.  Although it is the 
responsibility of the private partner to deliver agreed service(s), the public partner is 
ultimately responsible for ensuring that these services are actually carried out and 
that they (at least) meet minimum standards. As no contract will cover every 
eventuality of something going wrong, effective ongoing partnership relations 
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between the public and private partners are important for dealing with unforeseen 
issues as and when they arise.   
 
Other types of uncertainty are inherent in PPP.  Uncertainty is associated with risk. 
For the public partner, one of the main benefits sought from PPP is risk transfer – or 
more explicit allocation of risks between the public and private partners; however, 
not all risks can be transferred during operations.  Therefore, governments should 
accept and manage their risk positions. PPP are also expected to deliver real 
benefits to communities throughout their operational performance. The public partner 
should be pro-active in taking necessary and timely corrective action to encourage 
better operator (private partner) performance when necessary to ensure that planned 
social outcomes are achieved in practice.  The active management of partnership, 
risk and performance by the public partner during the operational phase of PPPs is 
thus important.  
 
 
1.4 Research Questions  
 
From the above exposition of the problem, the main research question can be 
formulated as:  
1. “How can partnership, risk and performance management practices be better 
utilised by the public sector to improve the operational performance of PPP, 
leading to improved VfM outcomes?” 
This question disaggregates into logical introductory and process sub-questions and 
a synthesising question.   
Introductory questions arise from the current basic socio-political paradigm for public 
service delivery: 
2. “What is privatisation?” 
3. “What are PPPs?” 
4. “What is VfM?” 
 
Process sub-questions and their justifications are as follows:  
5.  
a. “What are the principles, processes and problems associated with 
partnership management?” 
 
b. “How does partnership management relate to PPP?”  
 
A review of stakeholder management highlights a need for the development of an 
operational model that embraces “critical success factors” (Yang, Shen and Ho 
2009) for partnership management. Improving relationships has the potential to 
enhance VfM outcomes (Wilson, Pelham and Duffield 2010).  Therefore, attention 
should be directed towards understanding the collaborative processes of PPP, 
extending to, for example, the content of interactions, how partners deal with change 
over time, how disputes are managed and what types of competencies and skills are 
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needed to achieve desired outcomes (Weihe in Hodge, Greve and Boardman 2010: 
p.519).  This should include a combination of formal and informal processes and the 
dynamic interplay between them (Bresnen and Marshall 2002).   
 
6.  
c. “What are the principles, processes and problems associated with risk 
management?” 
 
d. “How does risk management relate to PPP?” 
 
In Australia, the Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance (2007b: p.3) asserts 
that although government agencies are legally bound to adhere to risk management 
practices that relate to project operations, risk considerations could be applied more 
broadly.  Moreover, the Victorian Auditor-General (2007b: p.15-16) concludes that 
government agency risk assessments should be better aligned with corporate goals 
and place more emphasis on risk management processes. In the main, these 
assertions are consistent with international PPP experience (see National Audit 
Office 2009b; Edwards et al 2004: p.63 as examples). 
   
7.  
e. “What are the principles, processes and problems associated with 
performance management?” 
 
f. “How does performance management relate to PPP?”  
 
Performance monitoring within the public sector can be difficult to manage. Issues 
may arise from a lack of management know-how (Domberger and Fernandez 1999). 
Allied to this, the National Audit Office asserts that methods of achieving potential 
benefits from PFI are not always incorporated into realisable action plans (National 
Audit Office 2009b: p.20) and therefore lessons learned may not be applied to their 
full potential in practice. 
 
8. “How can partnership, risk and performance management be synthesised into 
a model of better practice management that will lead to improved VfM 
outcomes in the operational phase of PPP?” 
 
Using literature review, partnership, risk and performance management issues have 
been identified that may hinder or prevent the achievement of VfM outcomes for 
PPP.  The research will explore whether or not these issues can be used to develop 
a model that can assist government decision-makers to allocate and make better use 
of public sector resources during operational phases of PPP – a model which 
focuses upon decisions that may have significant and / or long-term consequences 
for achieving strategic objectives.   
 
 
 1.5 Research Objectives  
 
As implied above, this research has two main objectives.  The first is to examine how 
PPP operational phase partnership, risk and performance management practices 
can be improved to achieve better VfM outcomes. This will involve developing a 
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generic conceptual integrating model intended to assist government decision-makers 
to allocate and make better use of public sector resources during the operational 
phase of PPPs that may have significant and / or long-term consequences for 
achieving strategic objectives using an integrated partnership, risk and performance 
management approach.  This includes: 
− Establishing and maintaining effective partnership relations between public 
and private partners;  
− Identifying and managing public sector risks (both threat and opportunity risk); 
and  
− Modifying (improving) and then maintaining service delivery performance 
standards of operators, and where appropriate, the oversight role of 
government or its delegates.    
 
The second objective is to test the logic and sufficiency of the model by exposing it 
to industry practitioner review and comment.    
 
 
 1.6 Research Design Overview 
 
A more extensive explanation for, and argument to support, the research 
methodology is provided in Chapter 2 but a brief overview is given here.  
 
Crotty’s (1998) Social Research Design Framework will be applied to this research 
as it provides clear direction based upon the theoretical assumptions that underpin 
the choice of the research problem, the research questions, the research aim and 
objectives, and points to a methodology and method.  Fig. 1.2 below illustrates the 
stances that have been selected and thus form the foundation for the research 
design.  
  
Constructionism
Phenomenology
Interpretivism
Phenomenological 
research
Focus groupInterviewSampling Data analysis
Purposive / snowball Semi-structured Phenomenological analysis
Theoretical Perspective
Methodology
Methods
Epistemology
 
Fig. 1.2 Research Design Overview. 
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 1.7 Limitations of the Research  
 
This research adopts an intentional perspective on the operating phase of PPP and 
the public partner’s involvement in this.  It focuses on the elements of partnership, 
risk and performance management. This means that other factors that may 
contribute towards achieving VfM outcomes for PPP are excluded from the deeper 
investigation, although they may be dealt with to some extent in the literature review 
chapters.  Moreover, PPP for this research is considered as a means for augmenting 
other procurement methods. The research is not intended to support a view that PPP 
is a panacea or replacement for alternative procurement types. Nor is it intended to 
promote PPP as the ‘ideal’ method of procurement for the delivery of assets and 
public services.     
 
 
 1.8 Thesis Structure  
 
Following this introductory first chapter, the thesis adopts a logical and sequential 
structure. 
 
Chapter 2 positions the research within appropriate epistemological and theoretical 
perspectives. It commences with a re-statement of the research questions. The 
nature of the primary data required to address the research questions is discussed. 
A comprehensive research approach is presented that includes methodological 
justification, which points forward to appropriate techniques for carrying out the 
research. 
 
Chapter 3 uses literature review and places PPP in the context of privatisation and 
associated government reforms that took place during the 1980s and 1990s.  This 
includes an overview of the economic and regulatory reform drivers that have led to 
the use of PPP, particularly in the state of Victoria, Australia. Different variations of 
PPP and selected features of policy frameworks are noted.   
 
Chapter 4 uses literature review and establishes partnership, risk and performance 
management as elements within a PPP administrative environment.  It provides 
relevant definitions; theoretical frameworks underlying the application of these 
techniques – presented from a public sector perspective; and outlines relevant 
principles and practices.    
 
Chapter 5 employs case studies to explore the presence of partnership, risk and 
performance management issues (identified in Chapters 3 and 4) in the context of 
real PPPs.  The six case studies all relate to Australian PPP experiences. Three are 
Social Infrastructure projects and three are Economic Infrastructure projects; four are 
based in Victoria and the remaining two in New South Wales.  The case study data 
derives from publically available sources.  For each case study project, the extant 
evidence is examined to explore the presence and nature of partnership, risk and 
performance management issues identified in the preceding literature review; and to 
reveal any additional concerns associated with these three management disciplines. 
Relevant generic issues arising from each case study are presented.  
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Chapter 6 commences by identifying partnership, risk and performance management 
factors that may contribute towards achieving VfM outcomes for the public partner 
during the operating phase of PPPs; along with a range of documentation and / or 
actions that can potentially be used as a foundation to assess whether VfM 
outcomes are being achieved in practice. The issues established in the theory and 
case study chapters – those that may detract from the achievement of intended VfM 
outcomes – are first re-stated along with suggested treatment actions. The concept 
of a generic integrated PPP operational model that embraces each of three 
management perspectives (partnership, risk and performance management) is then 
explored. 
 
Chapter 7 describes the concept for, and development of, an Integrated 
Management Model (IMM) for the public partner to use in the PPP operating phase. 
The model is developed from the issues / sub-issues and treatment actions 
discussed and tabulated in Chapter 6. The purpose and justification for use of the 
model is considered; together with its significance and the implications for 
implementation. The main design features of the model are presented and 
discussed.   
 
Chapter 8 discusses the design, testing and administration of the data collection 
instrument for use in semi-structured interviews. It outlines the processes used for 
categorising and analysing the interview transcript data; and presents findings 
relating to the concept of ‘VfM’ as well as for the partnership, risk and performance 
management disciplines. A second iteration of the IMM is presented, based on 
information gathered during the interview process.    
 
Chapter 9 deals with the design and administration of materials for a focus group, 
tasked to consider the completeness of the IMM. It describes the process used for 
categorising and analysing participant feedback, and discusses the findings. A third 
and final iteration of the model is presented.   
 
Chapter 10 presents the main research findings. The contribution of an integrated 
management model, towards achieving VfM for the public partner in PPP, is 
discussed. Recommendations are made for practice, in terms of public governance 
of PPPs, and for further research. The achievement of the research objectives is 
considered through the processes by which the research questions have been 
addressed.  The contribution to knowledge made by the research is shown and the 
research journey is reviewed.     
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter positions the research within appropriate epistemological and 
theoretical perspectives. It commences with a re-statement of the research 
questions. The nature of the primary data required to address the research questions 
is discussed. A comprehensive research approach is presented that includes 
methodological justification, which points forward to appropriate techniques for 
carrying out the research.   
 
 
2.2 Research Questions  
 
As indicated in Chapter 1, partnership, risk and performance management are 
essential elements within a PPP administrative environment. To achieve VfM 
outcomes during the PPP operational phase, each element must be prudently 
managed by each partner.  Although it is the responsibility of the private partner to 
deliver agreed services, the public partner is ultimately responsible for ensuring that 
these services are actually delivered and that they (at least) meet the minimum 
standards.   
 
The main research question was formulated in Chapter 1 as: 
  
“How can partnership, risk and performance management practices be 
better utilised by the public sector to improve the operational 
performance of PPP, leading to improved VfM outcomes?” 
 
This question was disaggregated into logical basic introductory questions, process 
sub-questions, and a synthesising question. Table 2.1 indicates the question order 
and status. In the main, sub-questions are those that must be addressed in the 
process of satisfactorily answering the main question. The nature of each question 
will influence the type of information needed to answer it; and the type of information 
required will determine how the data should be collected.  
 
Table 2.1 Research Questions. 
Question 
Number Research Questions 
Nature of Data 
Required 
2 “What is privatisation?” 
 
Secondary 
data 
3 “What are PPPs?” 
 
Secondary 
data 
4 “What is VfM?” Primary and 
secondary data 
5a “What are the principles, processes and problems associated with 
partnership management?” 
Primary and 
secondary data 
5b “How does partnership management relate to PPP?”  Primary and 
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Question 
Number Research Questions 
Nature of Data 
Required 
 secondary data 
6a “What are the principles, processes and problems associated with 
risk management?” 
Primary and 
secondary data 
6b “How does risk management relate to PPP?” 
 
Primary and 
secondary data 
7a “What are the principles, processes and problems associated with 
performance management?” 
Primary and 
secondary data 
7b “How does performance management relate to PPP?”  
 
Primary and 
secondary data 
8 “How can partnership, risk and performance management be 
synthesised into a model of better practice management that will 
lead to improved VfM outcomes in the operational phase of PPPs?” 
Primary and 
secondary data 
 
Essentially, Table 2.1 describes the data requirements anticipated for the research. 
Secondary data will largely be gathered through literature review and reference to 
publicly available documents. Primary data will require unique collection methods 
and these will be elaborated more extensively in Chapter 8.  First, however, the 
overall research design must be positioned within epistemological and 
methodological perspectives. 
 
 
2.3 Research Design  
 
‘Research design’ involves developing a set of plans and procedures that 
encompass a wide array of research considerations, from the broadest philosophical 
assumptions to detailed, practical matters such as data capture and analysis 
(Creswell 2009: p.3).  In its widest context, this research is socially framed, since it 
explores how people should act in the particular environment of managing PPPs in 
their operating phase.  According to Crotty (1998: p.2), there are four elements that a 
social research design must address: epistemology, theoretical perspective, 
methodology and method.  
 
Table 2.2 below sets out a social research design framework.  The framework has 
been adopted for this research as it provides clear direction based upon the 
theoretical assumptions that underpin the choice of the research problem, the 
research questions, the research aim and objectives (see Chapter 1), and points to a 
methodology and method.  The stances bolded in the Table are those that will form 
the foundation for the design of this research.   
 
 Table 2.2 A Social Research Design Framework (Source: Crotty 1998).  
 
[Table removed due to copyright restrictions] 
 
The remainder of section 2.3 outlines different perspectives – it justifies the chosen 
approaches and explains why others are considered less suitable.   
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2.3.1 Epistemology 
 
The theory of knowledge, otherwise known as epistemology, is the branch of 
philosophy concerned with the nature of knowledge, its possibility, scope and 
general basis (Hamylin in Honderich 2005: p.260; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 
2002: p.31).  Although it can be argued that an extensive range of epistemologies 
exist (Crotty 1998: p.8), they can, as part of the social research design framework, 
be classified into three stances: objectivism, subjectivism and constructionism.   
 
Objectivist epistemology assumes that there is an objective, meaningful reality 
beyond what is known through human perception and which therefore exists 
independently of consciousness (Davis et al 1993; Crotty 1998: p.8).  This implies 
that meaning and truth reside in reality as objects (Crotty 1998: p.5-6) and that 
through applying scientific principles and methods, true essence can be uncovered.  
Objectivism for this research has been discounted because it will involve the 
exploration of selected mental and social constructs of those who are affected by 
abstract concepts that pertain to PPP operations such as VfM outcomes, partnership 
management, risk management and performance management, for which no single 
reality or way of doing things exists.   
 
In sharp contrast with objectivism, subjectivism holds that objects actually have no 
meaning in themselves (Crotty 1998: p.9). Instead, meaning is derived from the 
different perceptions, choices, experiences, etc of people and it is these factors that 
determine our starting point in developing (and communicating) reality (Foss et al 
2008).  Therefore, meaning and truth are concepts that have shared meaning and 
are not rigidly determined by externalities (Foss et al 2008).  For this research, 
however, even though the subjectivist paradigm embraces mental and social 
constructs, this worldview is excluded because subjectivism is considered to be 
individualistic, where realities are not necessarily built upon and shared as cultural 
norms (Creswell 2009: p.8).  The management of PPPs relies less upon individuals 
than upon the effective functioning of groups and their interactions.  
 
The third epistemology is constructionism.  This perspective rejects objectivism as 
adherents claim that meaningful reality cannot exist without a mind (Crotty 1998: p.8) 
i.e. there is no objective meaning just waiting to be discovered.  Constructionism 
shares a view with subjectivist epistemology in that reality is socially constructed, 
thus derived from interactions between people and our world (Crotty 1998: p.8), but 
differs in the belief that meaning is developed through the shared experience of 
historical and cultural norms (Mannheim 1976: p.52, 76; Creswell 2009: p.8).  
Constructionism is where subject and object emerge together in constructing 
meaning so attention must be given to the use of language as well as the exchange 
of information between people (Crotty 1998: p.9; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 
2002: p.34) including specific contexts in which people live and work (Creswell 2009: 
p.8).  This epistemological position suits the management context of PPPs. 
 
As implied, the task for researchers that adopt a constructionist stance is to 
disregard the notion of ‘facts’, or so-called objective knowledge (Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe and Lowe 2002: p.30) and instead focus on appreciating the diversity of 
constructions and meanings that people place upon their own experiences 
(Mannheim 1976: p.52) in the situation(s) in which they are being studied (Creswell 
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2009: p.8; Crotty 1998: p.43).  Questions asked of research participants should be 
broad so that they can construct the meaning of a situation, which typically involves 
personal interaction with other people (Creswell 2009: p.8).  Moreover, researchers 
should be aware of the impact that their own experiences have on the research e.g. 
how their backgrounds may shape its direction and outcome (Creswell 2009: p.8).     
 
Ontology is excluded from the social research design framework.  Ontological inquiry 
relates to the study of ‘being’ (van Manen 1990: p.183) and the assumptions made 
about the nature of reality (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 2002: p.31).  Crotty 
(1998: p.10) asserts that matters of ontology and epistemology emerge together – 
the construction of meaning equates to the construction of meaningful reality.  If 
ontology was introduced into the framework, he says, it would dovetail with 
epistemology, in that it informs the theoretical perspective (Crotty 1998: p.10).  
Moreover, if ontology were to be integrated into the framework, relativist ontology 
would complement the constructionist position as this view points towards the 
existence of multiple realities (Denzin and Lincoln 2003: p.35). From a 
methodological and methods position, relativist ontology supports a range of 
perspectives and data sources (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 2002: p.42) that 
could be applied to this research.     
 
2.3.2 Theoretical Perspective  
 
The theoretical perspective is the philosophical stance that justifies the selection of 
methodology and methods by providing context for the assumptions we make about 
research, including the process involved and the basis for grounding its logic and 
criteria (Crotty 1998: p.3, p.7).  Choosing a theoretical perspective is to attempt to 
make sense of the world in a certain way through knowledge.  It is therefore about 
understanding how we know what we know (Crotty 1998: p.8). 
 
Positivism flows from the objectivist paradigm (Crotty 1998: p.12). It is akin to natural 
science research and it is predicated on the notion that social reality is made up of 
objective facts that can be measured using experiments to test causal theories 
(Neuman 2007: p.42; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 2002: p.34).  The positivist 
position therefore assumes that reality exists independently of consciousness and 
that the role of the researcher is simply to identify the universal truth or essence of 
what is being explored (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 2002: p.34; O’Leary 2005: 
p.5).  However, positivism is rejected as the theoretical perspective for this research 
because of its objectivist nature (Crotty 1998: p.12).   
 
Critical inquiry, feminism and postmodernism have also been considered for this 
research. Critical inquiry is identified with the Marxist legacy of attempting to 
reconcile a “dialectical synthesis of philosophy” with a view of society that is 
established by scientific principles (van Manen 1990: p.176). It draws upon 
knowledge with an aim to advance political-moral ends (Neuman 2007: p.44) and 
ultimately, emancipation (van Manen 1990: p.176) e.g. the attainment of social 
justice, and thus, critical inquiry is not suitable for this research undertaking.   
 
Similarly, feminism is concerned with power imbalances but is orientated towards 
gender inequality (Babbie 2007: p.38) although it is thought to encompass the 
advancement of knowledge more generally (Neuman 2007: p.14). While gender 
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inequality forms no part of this research, power imbalances may arise as an 
important factor, so relevant aspects of this stance will be considered in the research 
design.  Postmodernism, in terms of defining it within context of the social research 
design framework, represents literary and cultural movements / trends contiguous to 
the research problem (Milner in Crotty 1998: p.191) in the arts sense and therefore 
does not embrace the subject matter of this research which has no literary / cultural 
implications.   
 
Interpretivism is a view that social reality is derived from cultural and historical 
interpretations of people (Crotty 1998: p.67; O’Leary 2005: p.10) in a societal sense.  
Not only does it involve engaging in the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of reality, it is also centred 
on how people construct their experiences in a methodical way and how they 
arrange meaning of ‘institutional life’ that informs and influences the activities they 
take that make up their reality (Gubrium and Holstein in Denzin and Lincoln 2003: 
p.215). This approach complements the ‘theoretical frameworks’ that underpin the 
‘management principles’ identified in Chapter 4 (see for example, Quinn et al (2007) 
for the Competing Values Framework; Kasperson et al (1988) for The Social 
Amplification of Risk Framework; Renn (in Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt 2009) for The 
Risk Governance Framework; Kaplan and Norton (1996) for The Balanced 
Scorecard; and Neely, Adams and Kennerley (2002) for The Performance Prism). 
These frameworks have been socially constructed through cultural and historical 
interpretation with an aim to achieving specific ends which people can then apply to 
their institutional settings to affect change.   
 
Three variants of Interpretivism are acknowledged as part of the theoretical 
perspective of the social research design framework: hermeneutics, symbolic 
interactionism and phenomenology. Hermeneutics involves interpreting texts in order 
to develop our understanding of the social world (Crotty 1998: p.87), where meaning 
is based upon consensual community validation (Patton 2002: p.114). This research, 
however, not only involves interpreting literature texts and industry reports to gain an 
understanding of operational issues relevant to PPP, it also requires speaking with a 
range of industry professionals to gain their insights into these matters.  Therefore, 
hermeneutics is not selected.   
 
In contrast, symbolic interactionism involves the study of social symbols, most 
notably, language (Berg 2007: p.10). Thus it is through dialogue that shared 
meaning can be obtained (van Manen 1990: p.186; Crotty 1998: p.75).  Although 
symbolic interaction does involve interacting with people, it is not considered 
appropriate from a methodological viewpoint as the researcher cannot completely 
divorce himself as a subject from the nature of the study (Bonner 1994).     
 
The variant of interpretive methodology that best suits this research is 
phenomenology. The aim of phenomenology is to gain a profound understanding of 
the meaning of experiences, acts and their correlates (Husserl 1931: p.42-43; van 
Manen 1990: p.9) which involves determining their fundamental nature as portrayed 
by the research participants themselves (Patton 2002: p.106; Creswell 2009: p.13).  
Put differently, phenomenology seeks to systematically examine, explain and 
analyse the meaning of lived experience (Marshall and Rossman 2011: p.19; van 
Manen 1990: p.10) by laying aside what we know about phenomena and then 
revisiting our immediate experience in order to gain a new / enhanced meaning or to 
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validate the existing meaning (Moustakas 1994: p.58; Crotty 1998: p.78) of the 
phenomena and to discover what “essentially is” (Sanders 1982).  This involves both 
interacting with people and reviewing literature, where the latter can be useful, for 
example, in providing context for why the research problem is being asked, providing 
background for who else has studied the topic as well as discovering who else has 
attached significance to studying the phenomena (Creswell 2009: p.26).   
 
Phenomenologists acknowledge that ‘culture’ can act as an enabler that permits 
researchers to emerge from their immediate environment and reflect upon it.  It can 
also be useful for understanding the past i.e. reflecting on our experiences (van 
Manen 1990: p.10) as well as planning for the future (Crotty 1998: p.81).   
Phenomenology involves setting aside existing meanings of phenomena to explore 
what emerges from their study which may result in new understandings that stand in 
stark contrast with the former ones (Crotty 1998: p.82). With this said, 
phenomenology does not offer the possibility of constructing social theories that can 
be used to describe and / or control the world; instead it presents an opportunity to 
develop insights that can bring people into “more direct contact with the world” (van 
Manen 1990: p.9) thus providing new depth and richness to our existing level of 
understanding (van Manen 1990: p.11). 
 
Phenomenology is therefore not only the chosen theoretical perspective for this 
research, it is also adopted as the methodology. This is discussed in the 
methodology section below.   
 
2.3.3 Methodology 
 
From a philosophical standpoint, methodology can be described as a paradigm that 
underpins research (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight 2004: p.59; O’Leary 2005: p.85).  It is 
the design (strategy and rationale) that that sits behind the use of particular 
techniques used to enquire into a specific situation (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and 
Lowe 2002: p.31) in order to achieve a desired outcome (Crotty 1998: p.7).   
 
Before discussing methodologies, it is useful to make a distinction between 
quantitative and qualitative perspectives, as these concepts offer a basic framework 
for separating out the “knowledge camps” (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight 2004: p.60).  It 
is at the methodological level of the social research design framework where a 
distinction is made between these approaches (Crotty: 1988: p.14).  Quantitative 
research involves establishing causal relationships between variables and analysing 
objective and statistically valid data (Denzin and Lincoln 2003: p.13). Thus, this 
perspective is typically associated with objectivism / positivism and therefore does 
not complement this research.   
 
On the other hand, the qualitative approach is consistent with the epistemology and 
the theoretical perspective chosen for this research. Qualitative research relates to 
the examination of social phenomena (Marshall and Rossman 2011: p.3; 
Labuschagne 2003) and involves constructing, investigating and reinforcing the 
understanding that people have about their social traditions and / or institutions 
(Neuman 2007: p.43), typically using non-numeric data (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight 
2004: p.64).  Thus, the task for qualitative researchers, according to Patton (2002: 
p.21), is to develop a framework for people for which they can best respond about 
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the world and how they relate to it e.g. through describing situations, events, 
interactions, etc (Labuschagne 2003) that are pertinent to them. 
 
Other reasons for disregarding the quantitative approach are that that it is better 
suited to studying the extent i.e. the magnitude to which variation and diversity 
occurs rather than exploring the variation and diversity of values, beliefs, 
perceptions, etc (Kumar 2011: p.104); quantitative methods tend to ask standardised 
questions and use a limited number of pre-determined categories in recording 
responses as opposed to studying selected phenomena in-depth, where much 
attention is afforded to detail, context and nuance (Patton 2002: p.227); and 
qualitative research typically seeks the agreement of respondents in the 
interpretation of data, whereas this is not necessarily the case with quantitative 
research (Kumar 2011: p.104).  
 
Turning to the specific methodologies, experimental research has been discarded for 
this research as it exemplifies the quantitative approach as well as the objectivist / 
positivist philosophical traditions by adhering to the logic and principles of natural 
science research (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight 2004: p.67; Neuman 2007: p.20).  It is 
differentiated from action research which is defined as collaborative effort (between 
people), where research is systematically undertaken to resolve issues or challenges 
(Berg 2007: p.224) by developing and then testing alternative courses of action to 
resolve a problem (Kumar 2011: p.131), particularly in the workplace (Blaxter, 
Hughes and Tight 2004: p.67).  Action research has been discarded because within 
the field of management, it is considered to be quasi-experimental research (Gill and 
Johnson 2002: p.71) and is therefore analogous with the quantitative approach. 
Action research also requires the active involvement of the researcher in the 
exploration and testing of alternative solutions. This is impractical in the context of 
PPPs, given their complexity and longevity.  
 
Ethnography is the study of culturally shared perceptions (Brewer in Cassell and 
Symon 2004: p.312; O’Leary 2005: p.118) of day-to-day occurrences (van Manen 
1990: p.177) i.e. people’s beliefs, motivations and behaviours (Tedlock in Denzin 
and Lincoln 2003: p.166).  It involves the immersion of the researcher into the setting 
of the research participants (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 2002: p.49) and 
developing detailed accounts of members’ explicit and tacit cultural knowledge to 
understand meaning and significance (Neuman 2007: p.277; Gill and Johnson 2002: 
p.123), primarily through the method of participant observation (Patton 2002: p.81; 
Gill and Johnson 2002: p.123).  Although qualitative, this methodology will not be 
fully taken up for this research as the subject matter under study involves PPP 
operational matters that are strategic in nature, where the key concepts such as VfM, 
partnership management, risk management, performance management, etc are 
abstract and not necessarily visually identifiable.  Nevertheless, relevant aspects of 
ethnography will be used.  
 
Grounded theory entails the use of systematic, inductive principles for collecting and 
examining research findings e.g. through the development of themes, codes and 
categories to develop theoretical frameworks that offer new meaning (Charmaz in 
Denzin and Lincoln 2003: p.249-250, p.269).  However, the methodology has been 
set aside as this research adopts a phenomenological theoretical perspective and 
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thus rejects the possibility of constructing these types of social theories from the 
research data.   
 
Discourse analysis is a methodology that relates predominantly to the analysis of the 
written (or spoken) word (Marshall and Rossman 2011: p.93; Dick in Cassell and 
Symon 2004: p.203).  As previously stated, this research will utilise literary texts, 
industry reports and interviews with subject matter experts relevant to PPP.  
 
Feminist standpoint research is characterised by the feminist theoretical perspective 
(Kumar 2011: p.132) and, as already argued, is not totally suitable.   
 
Survey research involves asking people questions where answers are recorded 
either in a written questionnaire or during an interview (Neuman 2007: p.20).  
Although the application of survey research is appropriate for this research, 
phenomenology is the preferred methodology, with semi-structured interviews being 
used for deeper investigation.   
 
Phenomenological research is chosen because of its logical fit with the selected 
theoretical perspective and epistemological positions. As previously stated, 
phenomenology involves examining, explaining and analysing the meaning of lived 
experience  to gain a new / enhanced meaning or to validate the existing meaning of 
phenomena to discover what ‘essentially is’.  A key aspect of phenomenology is 
‘intentionality’. This notion refers to the experience of consciousness in which we 
dwell in thought, perception, judgement, etc in order to comprehend essences of 
objects or constructs (this is what Sanders (1982) refers to as what “essentially is”) 
(Sokolowski 2000: p.8; Moustakas 1994: p.55).  Thus the essence of phenomena is 
known through the use of ‘intentional’ analysis (‘intentional’ referring to the total 
meaning of an object / construct) of the relationship between the ‘noema’ and the 
‘noesis’ (Sanders 1982).  Noema can be described as the object / construct as it is 
perceived to be (Moustakas 1994: p.70) i.e. the total meaning of what is expected, 
whereas noesis is the way in which that object / construct is experienced (Moustakas 
1994: p.69) i.e. the act of the experience. 
 
There are two additional concepts integral to phenomenological methodology for this 
research: ‘epoché’ and ‘eidetic reduction’.  Epoché (or ‘bracketing’ as it is also 
known) (Sanders 1982) involves temporarily suspending the researcher’s personal 
biases, judgements, beliefs, etc about the object / construct under investigation by 
putting his or her preconceptions into brackets (Crowell in Wrathhall and Dreyfus 
2011: p.77; Sokolowski 2000: p.49) in order to arrive at the vision of what ‘essentially 
is’. Bracketing allows researchers to see the world in new ways and thus as a means 
to derive new knowledge (Moustakas 1994: p.33, 85) about what is being studied.  
The other concept is ‘eidetic reduction’, a procedure used for abstracting the 
essence from experiences (Crowell in Wrathhall and Dreyfus 2011: p.57) which 
relies upon intuition and reflection to establish new patterns (or confirm existing 
ones) (Sanders 1982; Moustakas 1994: p.95).  It essentially requires the researcher 
to look and describe the object / construct, again and again (each time with new 
understanding) until its essence is uncovered (Moustakas 1994: p.95). Relevant 
aspects of both of these concepts will be incorporated into the research design to 
strengthen the phenomenological approach.   
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Finally, Sanders (1982) suggests that a phenomenological research design 
comprises three key elements:  deciding the scope of whom and what the research 
will focus upon, collecting the data and analysing the data.  The first two elements 
are discussed in the method section (see 2.3.4) and the third component forms 
section 2.4, ‘Data Analysis Method’.   
 
The last methodology to be discussed in this section is heuristic inquiry.  This draws 
upon intense, personal experiences of the researcher and co-researchers e.g. 
loneliness, jealousy, etc (Patton 2002: p.234), where the combination of experience 
and intensity of the subject matter under study leads to understanding the 
phenomenon’s essence (Patton 2002: p.107).  Douglass and Moustakas (in Patton 
2002: p.108) assert that phenomenology is distinct from heuristic inquiry: heuristics 
focuses on connection and relationship whereas phenomenology involves greater 
detachment in analysing experiences; and with heuristics, the research process ends 
with a creative synthesis that is implicit with the researcher’s intuition and 
understanding, whereas phenomenology is concerned with developing a distillation 
of the structures of experience.  Heuristic inquiry for this research is discounted as it 
does not seek to understand intense, personal experiences and synthesise them 
intuitively.   
 
2.3.4 Method 
 
Method is about selecting individual techniques to collect information (Blaxter, 
Hughes and Tight 2004: p.59; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 2002: p.31).  From 
a qualitative perspective, the selection of method(s) must be appropriate for 
capturing deep and detailed data (Patton 2002: p.14) and is thus suited to open-
ended interviews, direct observation or methods derived from the use of written 
documents (Labuschagne 2003). As this research adopts a phenomenological 
stance, interviews and observation are the most suitable methods (Sanders 1982).   
 
Techniques commonly associated with quantitative data, such as statistical analysis 
which is used to make generalisations about the characteristics derived from a 
sample population (Cooper and Emory 1995: p.116), measurement and scaling, 
where mathematical properties are typically used to attach values to findings and 
data reduction which reduces numerical or alphabetical information to patterns, are 
all discarded. Moreover, Sander’s (1982) assertion regarding the choice of 
techniques also implies that qualitative methods (apart from interview and 
observation) that comprise the social research design framework have limited 
application for phenomenological research, and for this reason, are also dismissed.   
 
Techniques such as conversation analysis (that involves analysing complete 
transcripts of conversations (Babbie 2007: p.383)), narrative (the analysis of 
personal stories (Fraser 2004)), case study (the method of organising data by case 
for in-depth study and comparison (Patton 2002: p.447; Hartley in Cassell and 
Symon 2004: p.323)) each have some bearing on this research.  Therefore, relevant 
aspects of these stances will be considered in the research design.  As stated, 
observation is relevant for phenomenological research (Sanders 1982) and 
encapsulates a variety of systematic and selective (Kumar 2011: p.140) activities 
including observing, documenting and analysing phenomena (Marshall and 
Rossman 2011: p.139; Blaxter, Hughes and Tight 2004: p.178). It is, however, 
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considered less appropriate for this research undertaking because the key concepts 
under study e.g. VfM, partnership management, risk management and performance 
management cannot always be directly observed or experienced (Patton 2002: p.22-
23) due to their abstract nature.  
 
The remainder of this section discusses the sampling technique selected for this 
research.  It also presents the main methods that will be used for collecting data, 
consisting of a two-phase approach.  In the first phase, secondary data will be used 
to identify issues that will inform the development of a conceptual PPP management 
model for partnership, risk and performance management. This model will be 
developed from the literature review and case study findings (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) 
through an integrating process (Chapter 6). Primary data will then be collected to 
validate the model, through feedback obtained from selected industry 
representatives (Chapter 8). The second phase of the research will use this 
feedback to create a second iteration of the model that will be subjected to focus 
group validation. Primary feedback from the focus group will then inform a third and 
final iteration of the model (Chapter 9).  
 
Sampling:  
 
Qualitative researchers favour non-probability sampling techniques (Berg 2007: p.43; 
Neuman 2007: p.141).  These techniques are utilised when a sampling frame for a 
population is unknown or when a probabilistic approach is not required (Blaxter, 
Hughes and Tight 2004: p.163) and are beneficial for accessing difficult to reach 
study populations (Berg 2007: p.43).  According to Kumar (2011: p.206), there are 
five types of non-probability designs: quota, accidental, expert, purposive and 
snowball.  Each is outlined, in turn.   
 
‘Quota’ involves the selection of a sample that contains pre-specified characteristics 
e.g. race, gender and deciding how many people will be placed into each category 
(Babbie 2007: p.185; Neuman 2007: p.142).  ‘Accidental’ sampling is simply based 
upon availability of research subjects e.g. those who are close at hand or are easily 
accessible (such as a class of students)  – there are no other defining characteristics 
of the sample population (Kumar 2011: p.207; Berg 2007: p.43).  ‘Expert’ involves 
the researcher using his / her own ability to judge who constitutes being an ‘expert’ in 
a field of study and thus selects them as part of a sample on this basis (Kumar 2011: 
p.206). 
 
The sampling techniques selected for this research are ‘purposive’ and ‘snowballing’.  
The aim of purposive sampling is to obtain specialised information from participants 
– which is similar to expert – but where the desired study population is difficult to 
reach (Kumar 2011: p.206; Neuman 2007: p.143).  There are two main reasons for 
choosing purposive sampling. The first is that the approach is consistent with 
phenomenological research in that interviewees will provide reliable information 
about the phenomena being studied (Sanders 1982), and secondly, the approach 
enables the researcher to source participants from the literature and case study 
references as well as from personal, professional networks.  ‘Snowball’ entails the 
use of networks – this is where a number of people are selected by the researcher 
that share characteristics of interest, data is collected from them, and then they are 
asked to identify other people for interview that have these same characteristics 
19 
 
(Babbie 2007: p.184; Berg 2007: p.44).  Snowball will be used to some extent since 
interviewees will be asked to suggest other suitable contacts.   
 
The sample size will be determined retrospectively, when ‘saturation’ is reached in 
terms of information concerning the issues explored, i.e. when no further significant 
issues are revealed. The point of absorption will therefore depend on the diversity of 
the answers provided (Richards 2005: p.135-136; O’Leary 2005: p.114).  
 
Interviews (Phase 1):  
 
An interview can be defined as a conversation that takes place between two or more 
individuals, where the interviewer initiates a direction for the discussion or pursues 
subjects raised by the interviewee (Kumar 2011: p.144; Babbie 2007: p.306).  They 
are a useful way of accumulating data about the experiences of people from their 
own perspectives (Patton 2002: p.341).   
 
Interviews can range from unstructured, consisting of open-ended questions that are 
few in number and designed to draw out the views and opinions of research 
participants (Creswell 2009: p.181), to highly structured where a formal protocol is 
used and strictly adhered to (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 2002: p.86; Cooper 
and Emory 1995: p.299). The latter generally comprise a larger number of questions 
and are constructed to elicit a narrow range of responses. Semi-structured interviews 
fit somewhere along this continuum, and adopt a guided approach with the flexibility 
to diverge quite widely from it (where this is appropriate and promises to yield richer 
data).  This research will adopt this flexible approach to enable the researcher to 
understand the broader issues about PPP operations whilst having the capacity to 
ask direct questions about aspects of the subjects’ experiences to obtain more detail 
(Cooper and Emory 1995: p.299; Kumar 2011: p.144). Interviews will therefore be 
semi-structured, to ensure adequate coverage of topics, but sufficiently ‘open’ to 
allow the ‘stories’ of interviewees to emerge.   
 
Phenomenological interviewing emphasises that information obtained from research 
participants be meticulously captured and described (Patton 2002: p.104).  Therefore 
tape recording and transcribing interviews will form an integral part of this research 
(Sanders 1982) which will be conducted face-to-face and carried out at locations 
convenient to the interviewees.  Where this is not possible due to geographical or 
other restrictions, telephone interviewing or Internet communication systems will be 
employed.   
 
A key advantage of using the interview method is that an interviewer has an 
opportunity to explain and elaborate on questions that might otherwise be difficult to 
answer (Gill and Johnson 2002: p.103). It is possible to address vague responses 
and / or allay the concerns and misunderstandings of research participants (Hoyle, 
Harris and Judd 2002: p.102; Kumar 2011: p.149-150). There are also other 
advantages including:  
− High response rates. Researchers that employ the interviewing technique can 
typically expect high response rates for take-up, sometimes in excess of 80 
per cent (Hoyle, Harris and Judd 2002: p.102; Babbie 2007: p.264), but 
obviously the rate will depend on the nature of the research and availability 
and motivation of participants;  
20 
 
− Control. Researchers can control the order in which questions are asked (and 
therefore answered) (Creswell 2009: p.179) which may be important for 
contextual or historical reasons; and 
− Rapport-building. Interviewing provides a platform by which the interviewer 
can establish rapport with interviewees which may motivate them to answer 
questions (Hoyle, Harris and Judd 2002: p.102) more fully or in greater depth. 
 
The acquisition of data should begin with informal pilot testing to assess the 
feasibility of research plans and for making adjustments to them (Blaxter, Hughes 
and Tight 2004: p.42-43).   
 
Focus group (Phase 2):  
 
In qualitative studies, focus groups are typically used in conjunction with other 
research techniques (Marshall and Rossman 2011: p.142).  They are closely related 
to the interview method which is selected as the primary data collection technique for 
this research.  A focus group essentially involves interviews / discussions with a 
small number of participants, ranging from four to 15 people (Marshall and Rossman 
2011: p.149; Babbie 2007: p.308).  They are undertaken with the expectation that 
participants will yield new insights into the topic through discussion (Blaxter, Hughes 
and Tight 2004: p.172).  The purpose of using a focus group for this research is to 
provide an opportunity for selected participants (from the Phase 1 interviews) to 
comment upon a penultimate iteration of the proposed integrated partnership, risk 
and performance management model.  The advantage of using a focus group is that 
it will allow any previously misunderstood or unanticipated issues to be resolved 
(Berg 2007: p.148; Marshall and Rossman 2011: p.149), and generate thinking into 
previously unexplored areas (Berg 2007: p.148).   
 
 
2.4 Data Analysis Method  
 
Beyond the understanding gained from analysis of secondary data obtained from the 
literature, reports and case studies, data analysis will involve taking the raw primary 
data gathered from interviewees and focus group participants, and organising them 
into important themes, categories and case examples. With regard to 
phenomenological analysis, data can be broken down into four discrete levels or 
steps (Sanders 1982).  These are outlined in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3 Phenomenological Analysis of Data (adapted from Sanders 1982). 
Step Question  Action Purpose / Explanation 
1 How can the phenomenon 
or experience under 
investigation be described? 
Transcribe interviews Transcribed narratives identify 
and describe the qualities of 
human experience and 
consciousness  
2 What are the themes 
emergent in the 
descriptions? 
Identify the themes that 
emerge from the 
descriptions 
Themes refer to 
commonalities present within 
and between narratives. 
Themes are identified based 
on the importance and 
centrality accorded to them 
rather than on the frequency 
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Step Question  Action Purpose / Explanation 
with which they occur 
3 What are the subjective 
reflections of the themes? 
Develop  noetic / noematic 
correlates 
Noetic / noematic correlates 
represent the individual's 
perception of the reality of the 
phenomena under 
investigation.  Interpretation of 
these correlations is 
fundamental to the 
identification of essences or of 
what an experience 
‘essentially is’ 
4 What are the essences 
present in the themes and 
subjective reflections? 
 
Abstraction of essences or 
universals from the noetic / 
noematic correlates 
Abstraction is accomplished 
through intuition and reflection 
or eidetic reduction. If noema 
is described as the ‘what’ of 
experience and noesis as the 
‘how’ of experience, then 
essence may be described as 
the ‘why’ of experience 
 
As previously discussed and in conjunction with the steps outlined in Table 2.3, this 
research involves transcribing interviews with the edited transcripts being returned to 
the interviewees for validation before including the data as part of the research 
project (as per step 1) (also see section ‘2.5 Research Validity and Reliability’, 
below).  Following the advice of Saldaña (2011: p.45), transcripts will exclude 
informal and broken speech e.g. ‘ahs’ and ‘ums’ as well as influent speech strings 
e.g. ‘there was a kind of a…’, unless considered by the researcher that these types 
of speech patterns contain insightful inferences.     
 
To assist with the data analysis process outlined in steps 2, 3 and 4, the software 
application NVivo (version 10) will be deployed (Richards 2005: p.106).  As analysis 
proceeds, data can be expanded from transcripts and summaries into more detailed 
descriptions and where data and commentary can be inter-weaved (Richards 1999).  
This will aid the development of the integrative partnership, risk and performance 
management model process.   
 
This research will use the open coding technique at Step 2 to identify themes from 
the interview transcriptions. This will involve developing initial classifications / 
labelling of concepts during a preliminary attempt to condense the acquired data into 
categories (Babbie 2007: p.385; Neuman 2007: p.330).   
 
Axial coding will then be used during steps 3 and 4 to test the need for regrouping 
the data (forming a justification for changes that may be made to the data e.g. 
reducing the number of codes developed during open coding, the development of 
new codes, etc) (Saldaña 2009: p.160; Neuman 2007: p.330), as well as for 
identifying core concepts from the data (Babbie 2007: p.386). During axial coding, 
the following may be considered: potential causes and consequences, conditions 
and interactions, strategies and processes, and categories that could be merged 
together (Neuman 2007: p.331).  Data analysis for this research will generally follow 
these four steps. Chapter 8 (see ‘8.4 Data Analysis Processes’) expands upon the 
thematic development logic, which will be based on appropriate research questions 
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from the data collection instrument (refer to ‘8.2 Design and Testing of the Data 
Collection Instrument’). 
 
Analytic memos may be used at any / all steps outlined in Table 2.3.  This involves 
keeping a record of pertinent thoughts that may contribute towards developing and 
refining data interpretations (Saldaña 2011: p.98) as well as establishing a 
foundation for validating the analysis (Richards 2005: p.62, p.74).  Reflection may 
extend, for instance, to how the researcher relates to the interviewees and the 
phenomena under study; emerging patterns and concepts; possible linkages, 
connections and overlaps; problems with the research and their ethical implications; 
and future directions for the study (Saldaña 2009: p.34-38).  All memos will be given 
an appropriate heading and dated accordingly (Saldaña 2011: p.98; Richards 2005: 
p.75).   
 
 
2.5 Research Validity and Reliability 
 
For qualitative research, validity is about ensuring that the research instruments 
actually relate to the issues under investigation (Kumar 2011: p.184; Blaxter, Hughes 
and Tight 2004: p.221).  Put differently, if researchers cannot demonstrate a logical 
fit between the broader research design and the choice of methods, the research will 
be invalid (Neuman 2007: p.115).  Validity can be tested by asking participants to 
confirm and approve their interview transcripts (Marshall and Rossman 2011: p.42; 
Kumar 2011: p.278).  Ideally, and according to Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 
(2002: p.135), this should occur during the pilot stage but as this research adopts a 
phenomenological stance, each interview transcript will be validated (Sanders 1982).  
Furthermore, validity trails will be established (Richards 2005: p.143-144) to provide 
increased assurance in the research process.  This will include:  
− Analytical memos (see Attachment A as an example);  
− An account of the research as a “whole” or a “pattern” through which concepts 
and ideas have been drawn together (see Chapter 6); and 
− Draft research models (see the Integrated Management Model: Chapters 7 
and 8).  
 
Reliability, on the other hand, is a factor that contributes to the achievement of 
validity (Cooper and Emory 1995: p.153) and is confirmed when the research 
findings e.g. patterns, themes, worldviews, etc (Labuschagne 2003) can be 
repeatedly used by other researchers which lead to similar results (Kumar 2011: 
p.184; O’Leary 2005: p.59).  
 
The constructionist approach adopted for this phase of the research recognises that 
all research participants will construct meaning according to their individual 
preconceived positions. Such research will always contain bias, both from the 
researcher and from the subjects of a study. It is anticipated that the effect of these 
biases can, at least to an extent, be mitigated by reflecting on assumptions made by 
the research participants (Kapoor 2004) and by the researcher referring back to 
original text to ensure the iterative process of the research is maintained.   
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2.6 Ethics  
 
Researchers have an ethical responsibility towards their research, and particularly 
towards anyone invited to participate in it. This includes promoting and upholding the 
integrity of the research by carefully considering the extent to which subjects will be 
critically questioned, how the data could be interpreted (Creswell 2009: p.90-91) and 
protecting those who partake in it (including the organisations they represent) 
against potential or actual misconduct and impropriety (Israel and Hay in Creswell 
2009: p.87).  This research complies with RMIT University’s Human Ethics Advisory 
Network’s requirements for conducting research. The endorsed ‘Application for 
Ethics Approval of Research Involving Human Participants’ is appended as 
Attachment B.   
 
 
 2.7 Summary  
 
This Chapter has presented the research design.  It is informed by the main research 
problem and research questions.  
 
Epistemological and theoretical perspectives are argued and selected, along with the 
methodology and methods. The epistemological position adopted is constructionism, 
with a phenomenological methodology and qualitative approach.  Literature review is 
used to frame the specific contexts for the research. Semi-structured interviews and 
focus group will be used to collect primary data from participants in a purposive and 
snowball sample that will comprise public sector executives and senior managers 
working in the PPP environment within Australia and internationally.  
Phenomenological analysis is presented as the analytical tool, and data validity and 
reliability are discussed.  Research ethics approval is confirmed.   
 
The next chapter places PPP in the context of privatisation and associated 
government reforms that took place during the 1980s and 1990s.  This includes an 
overview of the economic and regulatory reform drivers that have led to the use of 
PPP.   
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Chapter 3: Privatisation, Reform and the 
Development and Use of Public Private Partnership 
in Australia 
 
 
 3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, PPP is placed in the context of privatisation and associated 
government reforms that took place during the 1980s and 1990s.  This includes an 
overview of the economic and regulatory reform drivers that have led to the use of 
PPP, particularly in the state of Victoria, Australia.  Different variations of PPP and 
selected features of policy frameworks are noted.   
 
 
 3.2 Privatisation and Government Reform  
 
Privatisation can be described as “the act of reducing the role of government or 
increasing the role of the other institutions of society in producing goods and 
services and in owning property” (Savas 2000: p.3).  This can be achieved by de-
nationalising industries, including through initial public offerings, by divestment, 
competitive tendering and ‘contracting out’ services traditionally undertaken by the 
public sector (Gray, Broadbent, and Lavender 2009) e.g. public transport and the 
utilities industry.  This has been a common policy directive and development for 
Western governments (Broadbent and Laughlin 2004) for combating rising national 
budget deficits (Cavaliere and Scabrosetti 2008); increasing state revenues (Price 
Waterhouse in Megginson and Netter 2001); promoting the development of financial 
markets (Cavaliere and Scabrosetti 2008) and competitive behaviour (Fafaliou and 
Donaldson 2007); reducing government involvement in economic activity (Price 
Waterhouse in Megginson and Netter 2001); increasing efficiency (Cavaliere and 
Scabrosetti 2008); and fostering wider share ownership (Price Waterhouse in 
Megginson and Netter 2001) for investors.   
 
Although it is reported that privatisation has been embraced by governments since 
the 1950s (Fafaliou and Donaldson 2007), it is claimed by Price (2007) that a 
significant shift towards private control did not occur until its adoption by the Regan 
and Thatcher administrations (in the United States (US) and the UK respectively) 
until the 1980s.  This reform was wide-reaching in Britain (McCartney and Stittle 
2008) and by 1987, privatisation had become a “central plank” of the UK’s economic 
policy (Gray, Broadbent and Lavender 2009), extending to, for instance, the aviation, 
electricity and gas industries (McCartney and Stittle 2008), and later, perhaps due to 
its complex nature, the railway industry (McCartney and Stittle 2008).   
 
Privatisation in Australia gained momentum during the early 1990s as a way to 
tackle perceived public sector inefficiencies.  Privatisation in this country was one of 
a number of microeconomic reforms that were designed to “liberalise” the Australian 
economy (McKenzie 2008; Gray, Broadbent and Lavender 2009) including the 
introduction of National Competition Policy, Competitive Neutrality and 
Commercialism (Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2007: p.75).   
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Despite the claimed liberalisation aim, examples of large-scale privatisation 
developments initiated by the Federal Government in Australia are few.  They can be 
traced back to 1990 and include the part-privatisation of the Commonwealth Bank 
(Quiggin 2004) and the privatisation of Telstra (English 2006).  State governments 
have been far more active in terms of actual projects (although in Victoria, 
privatisation extended to the State Electricity Commission and the Gas and Fuel 
Corporation).  Later in the decade, the New South Wales State Government used 
privatisation to procure the construction of the Sydney Harbour Tunnel (Quiggin 
2004).   
 
In Victoria during the early 1990s, and in addressing what was claimed to be the 
“under-developed market” by Maguire and Malinovitch (2004), the Victorian State 
Government, in promoting infrastructure procurement to the private sector, offered 
developers indemnities and assurances to guarantee rates of return whilst retaining 
much of the associated project risks (Maguire and Malinovitch 2004) in order to 
encourage private investment.  However, this financing model was considered by 
some public sector decision-makers to be inefficient, as ultimately some outcomes 
led to poor VfM for taxpayers (Maguire and Malinovitch 2004).  
 
Coinciding with the emergence of privatisation as a major force in government 
reform in the US and the UK (Groot and Budding 2008) (and arising from what the 
Australian Public Service Commission (2003) and the Australian Task Force on 
Management Improvement (1993) claim has resulted from a reassessment of public 
sector values in Australia), ‘New Public Management’ was championed as a means 
to modernise government and to bring its machinations in line with the principles of 
market-based competition and to improve government and public administration 
practices (Diefenbach 2009; Groot and Budding 2008) beyond the scope of 
management ‘by financial indicator’ mentality (Jansen 2008).   
 
The central tenets of the New Public Management movement appear to be broadly 
consistent with that of privatisation.  According to Diefenbach (2009), this includes 
delivering VfM outcomes, being responsive to the needs of stakeholders and closer 
orientation towards addressing service user needs.  Changes within the public sector 
itself are claimed to have been characterised by a more business-like approach to 
working practices that involve, for example, better resource (and arguably, risk) 
management, an increase in the use of commercial contracts, improved 
management techniques and the use of performance management (Hood 1995; 
Lapsley 1999) to achieve greater results (or at the very least, to introduce verifiable 
performance standards for the delivery of services) (Grimsey and Lewis 2004: p.53).  
Allied to this, it is stated by English (2006), that partnerships between government 
and private sector contractors grew to become an established feature of New Public 
Management during this era.   
 
As mentioned earlier, a feature of the Australian public policy landscape during the 
beginning of the 1990s was National Competition Policy which formed part of a 
range of microeconomic reforms of that time (Hollander 2006).  This federally 
initiated policy, it is claimed, was designed to remove unnecessary barriers to 
commercial competitiveness and to open up government monopoly to competition 
(Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2007: p.75) in order to encourage economic growth 
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through the belief that the private sector could provide public services more cost 
effectively (O’Neill in Lilley and De Giorgio 2004).   
 
Closely associated with National Competition Policy (Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 
2007: p.75), Competitive Neutrality and Commercialism were introduced during 1992 
to ensure that the Federal and state governments in Australia are not favourably 
treated in the marketplace simply because of public sector ownership (Althaus, 
Bridgman and Davis 2007: p.75) and to make the commercial workings of 
government more transparent (Charles 2001).   
 
 
 3.3 The Emergence of Public Private Partnership 
 
As previously stated, the procurement of public services, assets and projects through 
the use of PPP is claimed to be an extension of the liberalisation agenda of New 
Public Management (Grimsey and Lewis 2004: p.52).  PPP began to emerge as a 
serious alternative to more conventional methods of public procurement during the 
1990s, becoming popular in countries such as Chile, Ireland, Mexico, and the UK 
(International Monetary Fund 2004: p.3) at least in part due to increasing demands 
on the provision of public services, and the ever-increasing financial burden of 
maintaining and replacing ageing public infrastructure and other assets.   
 
PPP can be viewed as a refinement of earlier attempts at privatisation (International 
Monetary Fund 2004: p.4) although other factors have been credited by 
commentators such as Ahadzi and Bowles (2004) and the Asian Development Bank 
(2008: p.3-5) as being drivers behind its uptake.  These they say, include further 
reducing government budget deficits, the need for smaller cash outlays and a 
decrease in the number of subsidies offered to private developers; the desire to 
introduce more market-based competition in the economy whilst retaining its 
regulatory and supervisory roles as part of partnership arrangements; and the 
achievement of greater efficiency and skill developments claimed to be obtainable 
through engaging superior private sector technical and management expertise.  This 
latter point is a somewhat weak argument, since it is likely that, if the public sector 
were to retain responsibility for project delivery and operations, it would also employ 
suitably qualified and experienced personnel to do so.  Thus the desire to contain 
public sector staffing costs (including the long-term future liability of funding 
employee benefits such as superannuation) is likely to be a compelling ‘hidden’ 
driver for PPP.  
 
Also occurring in 1992, the then Conservative Government in Britain implemented 
the PFI, a private finance panel established within Treasury (Spackman 2002), 
intended to progress private sector investment in public services and infrastructure 
(Quiggin 2004) through the use of PPP (PPP being a term that is interchangeable 
with PFI (English 2008: p.2)).  Over the next years, PFI, as well as being viewed by 
parliamentarians and public sector officials as a vehicle for reducing levels of 
government borrowing through cross-sector investment and service delivery, it 
became a model for the ‘efficient’ allocation of project risk (Quiggin 2004; Li et al 
2005), although in practice, its application has led to questionable results.  
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In the UK, PFI continued under the New Labour Government in 1997 (and still 
continues under the Conservative Government in 2014), expanding its reach into the 
health and education sectors (Broadbent and Laughlin 2004; 2005) as well as 
delivering services and infrastructure within other industries.  In the main, belief in 
the value of PPP in Australia, and in particular, Victoria and New South Wales, has 
been influenced by experiences in the UK (Partnerships Victoria 2001a: p.4; New 
South Wales Treasury 2002: p.11).   
 
It should be noted that this form of privatisation (in contrast with other reforms such 
as de-nationalisation) has been largely embraced and continued by both the 
conservative / liberal and socialist shades of government in the UK and in Australia. 
Whether this paradox is ascribed to genuine political philosophy, or is more 
pragmatically driven by the practical difficulties of unbundling complex long-term 
contractual arrangements already in place, is largely a moot point.  The important 
feature is that PPP, by their very nature, have survived political change. They are a 
distinguishable feature of the macro- and micro-economic landscape in many 
countries, even where command-economies are the norm. 
 
 
 3.4 Public Private Partnership 
 
There is no all-encompassing definition for PPP (Department of the Parliamentary 
Library 2003: p.2; New South Wales Parliament 2006: p.9) within general discourse 
or scholarly literature (English 2008: p.2; Urio 2010: p.26).  There is, however, a 
plethora of characterisations. Some, in the context of this thesis, highlight the 
transactional nature of PPP, whereby contracts are entered into between the public 
and private partners with consortia partners typically providing design, financing and 
/ or construction and the delivery of services in exchange for publically-owned assets 
or user fees (Bloomfield 2006; Leiringer 2006). Other interpretations, whilst 
acknowledging the transaction base, broaden the scope to include a ‘working 
together approach’ that relies upon co-operation to meet objectives in return for 
mutual gain through the sharing of risks, costs, resources and responsibilities (Klijn 
and Teisman 2003; Koppenjan 2005).  For this research, PPP is characterised as a 
collaborative endeavour (Smyth and Edkins 2006) involving public and private 
partners, developed through the expertise of each partner in order to meet identified 
public needs through appropriate resource, risk and reward allocation (The Canadian 
Council for Public Private Partnerships 2009).    
 
These time and cost-specific ventures (English 2007) are normally constituted under 
long-term contractual arrangements (Infrastructure Australia 2008a: p.3) whereby the 
private partner agrees to build public infrastructure (or engage in the provision of 
facilities or services) on behalf of the public sector (Lewis 2001) under specified 
terms and conditions (Grimsey and Lewis 2004: p.6) and for an agreed concession 
period.  Put another way, PPP is a method of procurement that typically relies upon 
private sector capitalisation to deliver outcomes for government agencies 
(Commonwealth Department of Administration and Finance 2006: p.1).   
 
The Public Sector Comparator (PSC) is a hypothetical financial model used by 
governments to establish advantages (if any) of using private finance (National Audit 
Office 2009b: p.46; Department of the Parliamentary Library 2003: p.7) including 
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estimating the total cost of a project’s construction and operations (Allen Consulting 
Group 2006: p.19) against the expected costs of using other procurement methods 
(Grimsey and Lewis 2004: p.137) to determine the best VfM proposition 
(Infrastructure Australia 2008a: p.35).  It is based on the most efficient (New South 
Wales Government 2001: p.45) and / or recent (Partnerships Victoria 2001b: p.6) 
method of determining VfM proposals (New South Wales Government 2001: p.45).   
 
PSC assessment which is undertaken alongside the development of a project brief, 
contract and project specifications (Partnerships Victoria: 2001b: p.6) takes account 
of the likely project risks that are expected to be transferred to the private partner as 
well as those anticipated to be retained by the public partner (New South Wales 
Government 2001: p.45; Partnerships Victoria 2001b: p.7).  In terms of operations, 
this means operating risk is transferred to the service delivery provider(s).  The 
decision to accept these risks by the government’s partner may be encouraged 
through the use of incentives (Commonwealth Department of Administration and 
Finance 2006: p.2) such as defined quarterly service payments.   
 
The assessment discounts the cash flows to a present value (Allen Consulting Group 
2006: p.19) before calculating the Net Present Value or Net Present Costs 
(Partnerships Victoria 2001b: p.6) associated with the cash flow streams anticipated 
under a PPP deal (Allen Consulting Group 2006: p.19) on the assumption that the 
project is capable of being carried out in the public sector (Grimsey and Lewis 2004: 
p.139).  A competitive neutrality adjustment is then made to ensure that no financial 
advantage exists between public and private sector ownership options (Partnerships 
Victoria 2001b: p.6).  If the PPP option is deemed to be cheaper in comparison with 
alternative procurement models at the completion of the test, a PPP contract will be 
awarded to the private consortium that makes the best bid.   
 
From a public sector perspective, VfM propositions that benefit communities through 
improved service delivery should be the primary focus of all PPPs (Sampath 2006).  
As with PPP, there is no single definition that fully encapsulates the concept of ‘VfM’.  
For the private partner, it may simply represent the size of its profit margins in 
delivering contracted services.  However, for government, VfM is based on the 
delivery of planned social outcomes.  The UK Treasury (2006: p.7) offers the 
following definition: “VfM is defined as the optimum combination of whole-of-life costs 
and quality (or fitness for purpose) of the good or service to meet the user’s 
requirement”.  This depiction of VfM is broadly consistent with the one supplied 
within an Australian state government context as “getting the best possible outcome 
at the lowest possible price” (New South Wales Treasury in English 2006) which is 
the favoured definition for this research. Moreover, Siemiatycki and Farooqi (2012) 
argue that VfM is defined as a measure against the level of cost savings that could 
be achieved when compared against more traditional public infrastructure project 
methodologies e.g. as determined by a PSC.  Consideration of price and cost of 
service delivery is therefore fundamental for public authorities however VfM 
determination may be beyond mere calculation of monetary units. The need for 
consideration of intangibles such as ‘uncertainty’ may, and often does, preclude the 
adoption of simple economic metrics.  
 
As implied, the achievement of VfM outcomes is considered to be one of the greatest 
drivers of risk transfer between the partners (Partnerships Victoria 2001a: p.4).  Over 
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time, this can lead to considerable cost savings throughout project lifecycles 
(Commonwealth Department of Administration and Finance 2006: p.2) of between 
five and 66 % depending on how well the PPP project phases are integrated and the 
extent to which assets are effectively managed (AECOM 2007: p.41).  These claims 
are complementary to a study undertaken by Cambridge Economic Policy 
Associates (2005:  p.39) which found that 96 % of contractors and 85 % of 
government officials believed that operational risks had been properly allocated.  
However, efficient allocation may not always be realised (The Asian Development 
Bank 2008: p.2).  Ergas (2009) claims for instance that poorly allocated risk may 
unintentionally see potential cost savings turn into profits for project “promoters”, 
whist another commentator argues that the cost of ‘transferring’ financial risk to the 
private partner may actually be built into partnership deals (at the tendering stage) 
(Davidson 2006) which would obviously detract from accomplishing genuine VfM 
outcomes, particularly during operational phases should ongoing under-performance 
occur.   
 
Moreover, the concept of VfM is based on hypothetical calculations that may fail to 
fully account for unforeseen cost overruns or adjustments perhaps due to technical 
failures, obsolescence or lower than expected service user numbers (Grimsey and 
Lewis 2004: p.167; National Audit Office 2009b: p.46-48; Edwards et al 2004: p.9).  
There may also be failure by government to provide comprehensive and realistic 
pricing of all quantifiable and material risks.  Grimsey and Lewis (2004: p.144) state 
that in their view, these risks are often misjudged and should be part of wider risk 
management practices. And of course, all procurement relies on human judgement, 
skills and experience (National Audit Office 2009b: p.47) and thus becomes subject 
to the errors, imperfections and biases of people.  
 
Another feature of PPPs (from an operational perspective) is the use of the ‘payment 
for performance’ principle, whereby payment by the public partner to its private 
partner is dependent upon the latter achieving specified (and hopefully enforceable 
(Garvin and Bosso 2008)) performance standards (Commonwealth Department of 
Administration and Finance 2006: p.2).  Failure to meet targets will normally (but not 
always) result in abatement (Hodge and Greve 2005: p.75) being applied by the 
public partner.  Challenges that have been identified in this area include inadequate 
contract monitoring and enforcement systems and the exposure of taxpayers to 
unintended risks.  In their study into evaluating operations relating to roads and 
hospitals, for example, Edwards et al (2004: p.63) highlighted a concern that public 
partner contract management monitoring skills need to improve in order to achieve 
intended VfM outcomes.   
 
In recent times, PPP arrangements have become a commonly adopted method of 
providing infrastructure and services by governments in developed economies 
(Joyner 2007) including Australia (Jin and Doloi 2008), especially in relation to 
transportation needs (English and Guthrie 2006: p.3; Department of the 
Parliamentary Library 2003: p.5).  According to Infrastructure Australia (2011: p.1), 
PPP can be divided into two categories: Economic Infrastructure and Social 
Infrastructure (although in some instances, individual PPPs may combine selected 
principles of both models).   
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Economic Infrastructure projects are based on a demand-risk transfer payment 
model that typically relate to toll roads but can be applied to a range of other 
infrastructure that includes water treatment and energy generation facilities 
(Infrastructure Australia 2011: p.1).  Under this type of arrangement, service users 
and consumers are normally charged by the private partner within a regulated 
payment framework for the full term of the contract (Infrastructure Australia 2011: 
p.1).   
 
Economic Infrastructure differs from Social Infrastructure in that the latter are based 
on an availability payment model.  This means that government pays the charges on 
behalf of service users through regular service payments to its private partner for the 
duration of the contract term (Infrastructure Australia 2011: p.1) e.g. for the operation 
of correctional facilities, hospitals, public transport etc. Under this model, and with 
regard to the risk transfer component of obtaining VfM for government, the 
arrangement is thought to be beneficial to the public partner because it enables 
government to focus on delivering its core services (Commonwealth Department of 
Administration and Finance 2006: p.2) to the public, which are defined by the 
Victorian Government as services that should not be undertaken by the private 
partner (judged on a case-by-case basis by the Government). Such core services, 
for example, are likely to relate to the work of doctors and nurses within public 
hospitals, the independence and behavior of judges within courts and the activities of 
teachers within the public education system (Partnerships Victoria 2001a: p.5). In 
practice, however, neither health nor education services provision has been entirely 
exempt from attempts at privatisation, and the ‘core services’ argument is thus 
substantially weakened; although the power / influence of health and education 
sector unions should not be underestimated in some countries e.g. the UK and to an 
extent, Australia.   
 
Within the setting of economic and Social Infrastructure projects, a number of 
procurement arrangements are available.  These include:   
− Build Operate Transfer (BOT). This is a form of PPP used to attract capital 
from the private sector in order to develop public infrastructure 
(Kumaraswamy and Zhang 2001) and it is suitable for large-scale projects 
(Shen, Platten and Deng 2006). This type of arrangement involves the 
temporary transfer of a government-owned asset (e.g. land) into the hands of 
the private partner who then takes responsibility for financing and constructing 
the facility as well as operating and maintaining it.  Then, after a defined 
period of time, the developed asset is returned to public sector control 
(Malone 2005).  Ownership (i.e. possession of real property rights) remains in 
public hands throughout, so the PPP is more like a concessionary or 
franchising agreement. After the concession period has expired, the public 
entity is entitled to re-negotiate another agreement with the original private 
partner, form a new partnership arrangement, or operate the asset itself.    
− Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT). This is a variation of BOT and a 
dominant form of PPP in Australia (Hodge and Greve 2005: p.64-65).  The 
public partner grants a franchise to its private partner to finance, design, build 
and operate a project for a defined period of time.  This arrangement differs 
from BOT in that it gives the private party ownership of the facility and land on 
which it is built i.e. securing long-term property rights under lease (Savas: 
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2000: p.245) after which ownership is transferred back to government 
(Partnerships Victoria 2001a: p.43; Deloitte Research 2006: p.5).  BOOT has 
been used in Australia for projects such as the Spencer Street (Southern 
Cross) Station re-development (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008: p.21), 
EastLink (Leighton Holdings 2010), the new Royal Children’s Hospital project 
(Partnerships Victoria 2011) and CityLink (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008: 
p.49) in Victoria; and the New Schools Privately Financed Project (New South 
Wales Department of Education and Training 2003: p.3) and Cross City 
Tunnel (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008: p.11) in New South Wales.     
− Build Own Operate (BOO). This approach functions similarly to BOOT (Davies 
and Fairbrother 2003: p.6).  It operates under a franchise arrangement that is 
subject to regulatory constraints on pricing and operations (Savas 2000: 
p.244) but is akin to outright privatisation as there is typically little to no 
provision for returning the asset to public sector ownership (Williams 2003: 
p.10), although according to Smith (in Williams 2003: p.9), existing contracts 
can potentially be re-negotiated.  The operating revenue risks arising from this 
method rests solely with the private partner (AECOM 2007: p.15).   
 
It should be noted that English (2008: p.2) claims that BOT, BOOT, Partnerships 
Victoria projects and Privately Financed Projects are all interchangeable with the 
broader use of the PPP term.  
 
Selected aspects of Infrastructure Investment Policy for Victoria, Partnerships 
Victoria, Working With Government frameworks (the latter covers Privately Financed 
Projects) as well as the National PPP Policy and Guidelines are summarised in 
section 3.5, below.   
 
 
3.5 Selected Public Private Partnership Policy Frameworks 
 
The state governments of Victoria and New South Wales have been instrumental in 
the development and uptake of the PPP procurement model in Australia.  This 
section outlines specific features of policy frameworks for these jurisdictions that 
build upon variants of PPP that are outlined in the section above and to provide 
background for the partnership, risk and performance management theory presented 
in Chapter 4.    
 
3.5.1 Infrastructure Investment Policy for Victoria 
 
Private sector funding in public infrastructure in Victoria has been used since 
the1990s (Parliament of Victoria Public Accounts and Estimates Committee 2003: 
p.6) (e.g. Victorian Railways (V/Line)) and the State has had a PPP program in place 
for more than 20 years (The World Bank 2007: p.51). Only more recently, since 2000 
(Partnerships Victoria 2006a: p.4), has Partnerships Victoria, a dedicated unit within 
the Department of Treasury and Finance, been responsible for the procurement and 
delivery of PPP.   
 
The period between the early 1990s and the end of that decade included the delivery 
of CityLink, and like other PPP of that time, was characterised by an increase in 
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private sector involvement in public infrastructure due to (an unsubstantiated) belief 
that competitive spirit, fostered within the private sector, could lead to the delivery of 
more efficient and effective services (Maguire and Malinovitch 2004). Although there 
are similarities prior to, and post 2000 in terms of process / procedures (Partnerships 
Victoria 2006a: p.5), there are also key differences.  Maguire and Malinovitch (2004) 
state that PPP of this earlier era was synonymous, for instance, with high levels of 
risk transfer, payments being withheld until service delivery commenced, no 
government guarantee on returns and limited benchmarking activity (some of these 
claims are backed-up by the Parliament of Victoria Public Accounts and Estimates 
Committee (2003: p.8)).  The formation of Partnerships Victoria has led to a greater 
emphasis on Government managing core services i.e. the physical delivery of public 
services (such as clinical health services), the introduction of the PSC, contract 
management and the standardisation of commercial principles (Partnerships Victoria 
2006a: p.5).  
 
3.5.2 Partnerships Victoria 
 
During 2000, the Bracks Labor State Government established Partnerships Victoria, 
an adaptation of the existing PPP framework favoured by the State (Partnerships 
Victoria 2006a: p.4).  This new program was developed as part of the Government’s 
commitment to build world-class infrastructure across Victoria (Brumby 2004: p.2) 
with an aim to become a yardstick for PPP policy development and implementation 
(Brumby 2004: p.1; The World Bank 2007: p.52), both within Australia (Brumby 
2003: p.10) and internationally (Treasurer of Victoria 2003).  
 
The Partnerships Victoria policy applies to the provision of public infrastructure and 
related services (Partnerships Victoria 2006a: p.4) where the present value of 
Government and / or consumer payments amounts to more than $10 million 
(Partnerships Victoria 2006b: p.4).  All proposed projects must pass a public interest 
test (the PSC) (Department of Treasury and Finance 2007a) which in this jurisdiction 
focuses on quality, quantity and timeframe outputs (Partnerships Victoria 2006a: 
p.4).   
 
Although there is no single preferred form for PPPs, most share a number of 
common characteristics (Partnerships Victoria 2006b: p.5).  These include:   
− Risk transfer. There should be clear allocation of risk with appropriate penalty 
clauses (Partnerships Victoria 2006b: p.5). For pricing and management 
reasons, risk is assigned to the party considered to be best placed to manage 
and control it at least cost (Partnerships Victoria 2006a: p.11; Department of 
Treasury and Finance 2007a).  
− Governance and accountability. Full accountability of the private party to 
government is to be achieved through well defined governance structures that 
include clarifying key roles and responsibilities, risk and evaluation 
frameworks (Partnerships Victoria 2006b: p.5; Partnerships Victoria 2006a: 
p.12). 
− Performance standards. A specification of flexible, measurable and practical 
standards should be put in place. These standards incorporate Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) that are linked to incentives for meeting or 
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exceeding targets (Partnerships Victoria 2006b: p.5; Partnerships Victoria 
2006a: p.11). 
− Payment structure. Where relevant, payment (by instalments) should be 
linked to successful delivery of services (Partnerships Victoria 2006b: p.5).  
Payments can be adjusted if performance standards are not met, and new 
controls put in place (Partnerships Victoria 2006a: p.11).   
− Performance monitoring. Arrangements should define responsibilities of 
government with respect to monitoring outcomes (Partnerships Victoria 
2006b: p.5) and ensuring a sufficient level of performance data is available in 
conjunction with the monitoring of KPIs (Partnerships Victoria 2006a: p.11). 
 
The purchasing of services should therefore give Government a degree of strategic 
flexibility whilst retaining control over performance deliverables (Partnerships Victoria 
2006a: p.4), improving the likelihood that sought after VfM outcomes are obtained. 
Moreover, and at a theoretical level, the best VfM outcomes occur when there is the 
ideal allocation of risk between the public and private partners (English 2007), and at 
a more practical level, it arises from significant and complex capital projects where 
there are opportunities for innovation and risk transfer (Brumby 2004: p.4).   
 
To date, PPP delivered in Victoria have ranged from Social Infrastructure projects 
including correctional facilities and hospitals (such as the new Royal Children’s 
Hospital project), to economic projects involving transport infrastructure 
(Partnerships Victoria 2006a: p.9) such as the EastLink toll road.  
 
3.5.3 Working With Government (New South Wales) 
 
The majority of Australian states have modelled their PPP approaches on 
Partnerships Victoria policy and guidelines (Quiggin 2004; English 2006).  Like in 
Victoria, the New South Wales Government has been using PPP arrangements for 
over two decades (New South Wales Treasury 2009: p.I) and both of these 
governments have worked together strategically to formulate a consistent 
methodology for the development of general policies and processes (New South 
Wales Treasury 2002: p.11).  According to the New South Wales Treasury, the 
similarities between Working With Government and Partnerships Victoria include 
their respective policy platforms, in particular the technical aspects underpinning the 
guidance material; and obtaining VfM outcomes for their communities (New South 
Wales Treasury 2002: p.1-2; Department of the Parliamentary Library 2003: p.5).   
 
Although there are similarities, it is claimed by the New South Wales Government 
that there are key differences (New South Wales Parliament 2006b: p.71) between 
the New South Wales and Victorian approaches to PPP.  Whereas Partnerships 
Victoria guidelines cover a broad spectrum of PPP, Working With Government is 
limited to Privately Financed Projects (PFP) (New South Wales Government 2001: 
p.III), a sub-set of PPP (New South Wales Parliament 2006b: p.XII).  This is due to 
so called “unique issues and risks” associated with private sector financing, 
ownership and long-term contractual obligations specific to the State of New South 
Wales (New South Wales Government 2001: p2). 
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In its guidelines document, the New South Wales Government states that PFP 
involves the creation of an asset – on the private sector side.  This extends to the 
financing and ownership of infrastructure for an agreed time period, and from the 
government side, the provision of land, resources, risk sharing, diversion of revenue 
or the purchase of services (New South Wales Government 2001: p.IV) and 
predominantly relates to Economic Infrastructure projects.  However, arrangements 
under PFP are structured differently in the case of Social Infrastructure projects.  In 
context of the New Schools Privately Financed Project and according to the New 
South Wales Auditor-General (2006: p.12), the service provider agreed to operate 
nine new schools under licence in exchange for payments received from the State.  
Under this agreement, the Government owns the school assets and the private 
partner bears no risk with regard to shortfalls in the number of children that attend 
each school as this particular risk is retained by the State (New South Wales Auditor-
General 2006: p.12).   
 
In addition to the example provided above for a Social Infrastructure project, 
Sydney’s Cross City Tunnel (the toll road), is an example of an Economic 
Infrastructure project.   
 
3.5.4 National Public Private Partnership Policy and Guidelines  
 
In November 2008, a national PPP policy and guidelines were endorsed by the 
Council of Australia Governments. These requirements, developed in conjunction 
with Commonwealth, State and Territory Government agencies (Infrastructure 
Australia 2008b: p.12) are intended to provide a unified approach for the 
procurement and delivery of PPPs in Australia (Infrastructure Australia 2008b: p.6, 
p.3). Individual jurisdictions must adhere to these requirements unless a government 
decision is taken in a jurisdiction to depart from them (which must then be approved 
by the appropriate authority e.g. Treasury or Finance) (Infrastructure Australia 
2008b: p.6).  In addition, there may be specific requirements that apply to each 
jurisdiction that differ from the national guidelines (Infrastructure Australia 2008a: 
p.1). In such circumstances, these requirements must be considered in conjunction 
with the national policy and guidelines (Infrastructure Australia 2012: p.3).   
 
This means, for instance, that all PPP projects released to the market in Victoria, 
commencing January 2009, are subject to the national policy and guidelines, and 
where they allow flexibility, requirements specific to Victoria apply (unless a 
government decision is taken to advise that other provisions will apply) 
(Infrastructure Australia 2012: p.38).  Although the national guidelines are broadly 
consistent with the pre-existing Partnerships Victoria framework, a new policy 
requirement for Victorian projects is the consideration of PPP as a procurement 
option for capital expenditure in excess of $50 million (Infrastructure Australia 2012: 
p.37) (although assets below this threshold can use a streamlined PPP approach if 
suitable VfM drivers are identified (Department of Treasury and Finance 2013: p.3).  
Moreover, the national policy and guidelines apply to all public infrastructure projects 
in Victoria where the estimated payments made by the State for the delivery of 
services that underpin the assets is in excess of $50 million (Infrastructure Australia 
2012: p.38).  For New South Wales, the new requirements under the New South 
Wales Guidelines supersede the Working with Government Guidelines for PFP 
(Infrastructure Australia 2012: p.15).   
35 
 
 
Although the procurement and delivery aspects apply consistently across all 
jurisdictions including Victoria and New South Wales, each is responsible for 
developing and applying methodologies for determining public interest matters, 
project implementation and delivering core services (Infrastructure Australia 2008b: 
p.3; Infrastructure Australia 2012: p.9).   
 
 
3.6 Summary 
 
This Chapter provides an overview of privatisation and government reform that took 
place during the 1980s and 1990s.  It outlines the economic and regulatory reform 
drivers that led to the use of PPP (including in Victoria, Australia), and outlines a 
range of PPP mechanisms, its benefits and potential limitations.  It also presents a 
variety of PPP models and selected features of policy frameworks. 
 
Given that PPP as a form of procurement is expected to continue under existing 
arrangements over the long-term and that their continued adoption and 
implementation is largely subject to their perceived ongoing attractiveness to 
government and the private sector, the main issue that emerges for PPP during the 
operational phase is effective governance.  
 
The next Chapter establishes partnership, risk and performance management as 
elements within a PPP administrative environment.  It provides relevant definitions; 
theoretical frameworks underlying the application of these techniques – presented 
from a public sector perspective; and outlines relevant principles and practices.    
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Chapter 4: Partnership, Risk and Performance 
Management Theory  
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Beyond the initial development of PPP, and in order to achieve (as opposed to 
forecast) VfM outcomes, contracts must be prudently managed during the operational 
phase. Although it is the responsibility of the private partner to deliver agreed services, 
the public partner is ultimately responsible for ensuring services are actually carried 
out and that specified delivery standards are met.   
 
As contracts are not designed to cover every eventuality of something going wrong, 
effective relations between the partners is important for dealing with issues as and 
when they arise in administering contractual provisions. A key benefit of PPP is risk 
transfer – or more explicit allocation of risks between the public and private partners.  
However, not all risks can be transferred to consortia during the operational phase.  In 
some situations government should (and often must) accept and manage its risk 
positions.  PPP are also expected to deliver real benefits to communities through the 
delivery of services. The public partner should take necessary and timely action to 
resolve service provider under-performance or non-performance whenever it occurs 
so that planned social outcomes are achieved. Thus active management of 
partnership, risk and performance by the public partner during the operational phase 
of PPPs is crucial.   
 
This Chapter establishes partnership, risk and performance management as elements 
within a PPP administrative environment.  It provides relevant definitions; theoretical 
frameworks underlying the application of these techniques – presented from a public 
sector perspective; and outlines relevant principles and practices. The aim is to 
establish the essential theory base for the development of the Integrated Management 
Model. 
 
 
4.2 Partnership Management  
 
This section outlines partnership management definitions, theoretical frameworks, 
principles and processes within context of PPP.  
 
4.2.1 Definitions 
 
Key definitions relate to: 
− Partnership; 
− Partner; 
− Stakeholder; 
− Private partner; 
− Consortia; and 
− Special Purpose Vehicle.  
 
Root (2005) suggests that partnerships are formed through agreements in which 
affected individuals or groups are brought together by mutually shared objectives.  
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Kernaghan (in Trafford and Proctor 2006) offers more complexity in his definition, 
describing the term as being “a relationship involving the sharing of power, work, 
support and / or information with others for the achievement of joint goals and / or 
mutual benefits”.  Both of these meanings differ from that of an Australian legal 
definition which describes ‘partnership’ as “relations that exist between persons 
carrying on a business in common with a view to profit” (Butt 2004: p.320) (where the 
persons, or perhaps organisations, may be connected only by their contractual 
relationship) (Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply 2013a). The preferred 
definition for this research adopts Kernaghan’s version.  This is primarily because the 
drivers that lead to PPP agreements (from a public sector point of view) involve VfM 
propositions that have an aim of benefiting the wider community and are therefore not 
limited to only supporting the profit motives of private interests.  However, Butt’s 
definition of ‘partner’ – “one who shares, associates or takes part with another or 
others in something” (Butt 2004: p.320) – is accepted for this research due to its 
alignment with Kernaghan’s view of ‘partnership’, as stated above.  
 
‘Stakeholder’ in a ‘partnership’ context can be conveyed to mean an individual person 
or group  who can influence or be influenced by the accomplishment of an 
organisation’s objectives (Freeman 1984: p.46) or alternatively, as those who have the 
power to be a threat or benefit (Gibson in Yang, Shen and Ho 2009) to the 
advancement / achievement of PPP outcomes. These definitions contrast Butt’s 
(2004: p.405) legal perspective which describes stakeholders in terms of conducting 
financial transactions between parties: “A person or corporation holding money as a 
deposit in a conveyancing transaction pending completion of the contract, or holding 
moneys pending determination of a wager or a claim”.  In context of PPP, and due to 
the fact that they are multi-faceted and involve multiple stakeholder interests, 
Freeman’s definition is the one that best complements this research.   
 
The preferred definition of ‘stakeholders’ can be deepened by separating them into 
external and internal as well as primary and secondary categorisations.  According to 
Cleland and King (1988: p.281), ‘external’ stakeholders include government, key 
contractors such as service providers, financial institutions and the general public.  In 
this definition, Cleland and King also include competitors.  Competitors, however, have 
been excluded for the purposes of this research as after a bid for a PPP project has 
been accepted by the public partner, service providers during the operational phase 
are entitled to deliver those services exclusively for the length of the contract.  Other 
stakeholders that may be considered ‘external’ are customers (Savage et al 1991) or 
otherwise defined as ‘service users’. According to Savage et al (1991), ‘internal’ 
stakeholders comprise management and employees.   
 
In describing ‘primary’ stakeholders, Freeman et al (2010: p.26) state that they include 
financiers, service providers, employees and customers.  For PPP this must also 
include the public partner.  As public sector managers and their employees are 
integral to PPP operations i.e. for providing contractual oversight, they are for this 
research, included as primary stakeholders and not classified as internal stakeholders, 
as stated by Savage et al (1991).   
 
Moreover, Freeman et al (2010: p.26) state that ‘secondary’ stakeholders are the 
groups (or individuals) that affect primary stakeholders and cite consumer advocates, 
special interest groups and the media as examples.  These definitions are generally 
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supported by Savage et al (1991), who claim that primary stakeholders are the groups 
that have formal, official or contractual relationships that have a direct economic 
impact on a project.  Secondary stakeholders on the other hand, are those who are 
not directly engaged in a PPP’s economic activities but can influence or be influenced 
by its outcomes.  For this research, partnership management relates to stakeholders 
that are external and primary to PPP agreements.   
 
The term ‘private party’ (broadly referred to as the ‘private partner’ in this research) 
can be defined as a private sector entity that is contracted-in by government 
(Partnerships Victoria 2001a: p.11) to fulfil a particular role or obligation, and Savas 
(2000: p.248) describes PPP ‘consortia’ (also known as ‘concessionaire’), as a group 
of commercially focused firms that provide complementary services and functions that 
aim to benefit the group of people that they represent e.g. shareholders.  Such 
consortia typically extend to bankers, investment bankers, professional design teams, 
construction companies and facility managers.  It should be noted that consortia may 
not be fixed for the full term of the concession – the composition of a consortium and 
the extent of involvement of particular groups will depend upon the progress made at 
each PPP phase as well as the specific circumstances of individual projects.  The 
definition of ‘consortia’ is also broadly comparable with that of ‘Special Purpose 
Vehicle’ supplied by Delmon (2011: p.231), a term commonly used in the UK (under 
PFI) to describe the private partner after the contract has been awarded and 
implementation responsibility accepted by the consortium for achieving desired 
outcomes (Greve and Hodge in Osborne 2010: p.157) e.g. for financing, building and 
operating / maintaining new infrastructure.   
 
4.2.2 Theoretical Frameworks  
 
The ‘partnership’ concept has connotations of singularity of purpose, with mutual 
benefits being achieved over a relatively long-term association. In this context, 
‘partnership management’ is considered distinct from the comparatively short-term 
nature and objectives of purely commercial transactions. PPPs, however, are framed 
in commercial terms, so the theory of partnership management is necessary for 
identifying what principles, processes and issues might arise for PPP projects. 
Understanding this places the development of an integrated management model on a 
firm theoretical base. 
 
People form views or beliefs about what managers in organisations should do (Quinn 
et al 2007: p.2).  These beliefs, within context of the study of management, are 
sometimes referred to as models and are characterisations of a more complex reality 
(Quinn et al 2007: p.2) – they can be useful for understanding, extrapolating and 
communicating complex ideas by applying them to real world situations.  With this 
said, applying models to real phenomena can be a double-edged sword.  We may 
select a certain model for a specific situation because we think that it will help us to 
achieve the best outcome.  However, our preferences or biases in choosing one 
model over another may lead to un-intended consequences or even a poor outcome.   
 
Management models are mental and social constructs. Quinn et al (2007: p.2) 
emphasise that due to shifts in social values, perceptions, practices, etc over time, 
new management models emerge. The ‘Competing Values Framework’ offered by 
Quinn et al (2007) is heavily influenced by four models that have been effective for 
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managing aspects of organisational performance since the early 1900s. These models 
form four critical components of the Framework.  Each is summarised as follows:  
− Rational Goal Model (Quinn et al 2007: p.4). The drivers of success for this 
model are productivity and profit (in the case of PPP they may relate to a 
contractor’s achievement of performance targets thus leading to VfM outcomes 
for government).  It is predicated on the assumption that clear direction leads to 
productive outcomes.  Clarity of goals, rational analysis and action-taking are 
important in achieving an organisation’s ‘bottom-line’ (or VfM outcomes).  Thus, 
the fundamental values of the Rational Goal Model are achievement and profit 
(or attainment of intended VfM).  An example of decision-making that typifies 
this model could be the replacement of a long-standing service provider due to 
a sudden and significant drop in its performance or failure to consistently meet 
its performance targets over a period time.    
− Internal Process Model (Quinn et al 2007: p.4). The effectiveness criteria for 
this model are stability and continuity.  Its core assumption is that systemisation 
of work activities lead to organisational stability (e.g. predictable outcomes) and 
therefore places a premium on efficient workflow practices. The Internal 
Process Model emphasises the need for developing organisational processes 
e.g. clearly defining staff responsibilities, developing and using performance 
measures and the careful documentation of existing procedures.  An example 
of decision-making that reflects this model is the increased application of 
organisational policies, frameworks and procedures for a public partner contract 
manager who is under-performing in his / her role.  
− Human Relations Model (Quinn et al 2007:  p.7). The central tenets of this 
model are commitment, cohesion and morale.  The key assumption is that 
participation leads to organisational commitment.  The values that relate to the 
model are involvement, conflict resolution and consensus building.  It also 
emphasises the need for equality and openness. An example of decision-
making in the application of the Human Relations Model is identifying and 
analysing the factors that have led a public partner contract manager to under-
perform in the job and then mentoring and facilitating the improvement of his / 
her performance.  
− Open Systems Model (Quinn et al 2007:  p.8). The effectiveness criteria for the 
Open Systems Model are adaptability and external support which are critical for 
organisations that operate in responsive, fast moving environments.  Its central 
assumption is that adaption and innovation leads to the acquisition and 
maintenance of external resources.  The important values attached to this 
model are political adaptation, creative problem solving, innovation, and change 
management.  A shared vision and common values are essential.  An example 
that relates to this model is the willingness / ability of the public partner to act in 
a timely manner if critical infrastructure is damaged (which is beyond the control 
of the operator), for instance, due to the effects of a force majeure event.  Here 
government may deploy its own resources temporarily as a step-in / 
containment measure for continuity purposes.   
 
As implied, none of these models offer a ‘one size fits all’ solution.  When working in 
complex operating environments, decision-makers need to tailor their approaches to 
meet specific circumstances – sometimes they may seek certainty, at other times they 
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may require change.  Quinn et al (2007:  p.11) argue that it is an imperative to move 
beyond “either-or decisions” i.e. choosing between the two.  They say that it is 
necessary to focus on “both-and assumptions”, suggesting that both behaviours may 
be needed to suit a particular situation.  They also state that these models are closely 
related and interconnected, meaning that they are considered to be four components 
of a larger construct of organisational effectiveness (although it may appear at face-
value that each model conveys a conflicting message).  It is this construct that the 
authors refer to as the ‘Competing Values Framework’.   
 
The Framework has two axes:  the vertical axis ranges from flexibility to control and 
the horizontal from internal to external, with each model being assigned to the 
quadrant that relates to the appropriate central action focus – create for Open 
Systems, compete for Rational Goal, control for Internal Process and collaborate for 
Human Relations. The Competing Values Framework is represented diagrammatically 
in Fig. 4.1.   
 
[Image removed due to copyright restrictions] 
 
Fig. 4.1 Competing Values Framework:  Effective Criteria  
(Source:  Quinn et al 2007). 
 
Each model, and each model segment, has a perceptual opposite. The Open Systems 
Model which is characterised by flexibility and an external focus contrasts sharply with 
the Internal Process Model that is defined by control and an internal focus (however, 
the two models can link effectively together, for example, through developing a 
scenario-based business continuity planning approach which may mean that the 
relevant plan may need only minor adjustments before or / and after its activation).  
The Rational Goal Model which is represented by control and an external focus is 
differentiated from the Human Relations Model in that it comprises flexibility and has 
an internal focus. The principles of these two models can also integrate e.g. under 
specific circumstances it may be preferable for operators to be given an opportunity to 
resolve operational lapses rather than the public partner applying abatement for all 
instances of under-performance to encourage and maintain positive working 
relationships.   
 
Parallels between the models are also important (Quinn et al 2007:  p.12).  The Open 
Systems and Rational Goal models have an external focus. The application of 
common principles from both models could lead to the private partner being highly 
motivated by financial or commercial incentives offered by the public partner, for 
instance, to develop innovative practices for existing or new service delivery 
arrangements that are expected to lead to improved VfM outcomes, whereas the 
Open Systems and Human Relations models both emphasise flexibility.  It is 
important, for example, for disputes that arise between public and private partners to 
be resolved as they can potentially lead to cost-overruns, service delivery under-
performance, etc.  Therefore the ability to adapt and to problem-solve can be critical in 
building consensus between partners and / or overcoming differences.   
 
Other parallels exist.  The Rational Goal and Internal Process models feature control.  
Contractual agreements, for example, stipulate that abatement will be applied for 
operator performance shortfalls and thus encourage consistent levels of service by 
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operators. Such clauses set the direction, as well as specific performance 
accountabilities under service agreements, for private partner performance.  The 
Internal Process and Human Relations models have an internal focus which may 
relate, for example, to the under-performance of a public partner contract manager i.e. 
failure to properly monitor service operator outputs.  The employee’s manager could 
thus assess the employee’s level of capability and expertise against specified duties, 
up-skill the employee and review his / her effectiveness over time, with regard to role 
accountabilities and compliance with relevant organisational policies, frameworks and 
procedures.   
 
4.2.3 Partnership Management Principles  
 
Power dynamics between the public and private partners can change over time 
(Loxley and Loxley 2010: p.36) e.g. the bargaining power of consortia may increase 
due to the knowledge that even if services are performed at a sub-optimal level, the 
public partner may decide not to enforce penalties / abatements (Edwards et al 2004: 
p.54, p.50).  These decisions may be taken by the public partner for instance due to 
the expected cost of remedial action / litigation (e.g. the risk of an adverse outcome 
being realised or the amount of time and funding that would be needed to resolve the 
matter) outweighing the value of an abatement.  For the private partner, failing may 
simply be cheaper than meeting performance criteria, despite the penalties / 
abatements applied.   
 
However, partnership management is about more than just adhering (or not) to legal 
obligations – a significant aspect of partnership management involves managing 
social interactions between people in administering contractual provisions.  Thus, to 
achieve PPP objectives, partners should work together.   
 
As discussed in section 4.2.1 (‘Definitions’), PPP is considered to be a multi-
stakeholder procurement system.  For this research, the key stakeholders (which are 
defined as being external and primary) are aligned with one of two partnership groups.  
The first is the government client which is considered as being the public sector entity 
(also referred to as the ‘public partner’ more generally in this thesis), and the second is 
its contracted-in private partner, called ‘consortia’ (or the comparable variations that 
have been used to describe this term).  Consortia are considered as a single unit (a 
partner) because companies that operate as part of a consortium are bound together 
under a long-term contract.  This means that members are encouraged to work 
together as failure of any one company could have a collective impact on the consortia 
as a whole (National Audit Office 2003: p.7).   
 
Essentially, decision-making between the partners can directly impact upon the 
achievement of objectives in a number of ways.  References from this literature review 
of partnership (and stakeholder) management suggests that the extent to which PPPs 
are successful depends on the development and continuation of a positive 
organisational culture, management commitment and support, employee capability 
and output, clear and open communication, relationship continuity as well as effective 
conflict management practices. It is acknowledged from a practical standpoint that 
these factors do not tend to occur in isolation from each other: rather, they are likely to 
have a collective impact on partner relations where the importance of one factor over 
another will depend on particular circumstances. The stated factors are not exclusive 
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to PPPs – any construction approach is likely to be affected by these. For the 
purposes of this research, each factor, including its potential consequences on PPP 
operations, is discussed separately. 
 
Organisational culture:  
 
Supporting the chosen definition of PPP involving collaborative effort between the 
public and private partners selected for this research, Weihe (in Hodge, Greve and 
Boardman 2010: p.520) asserts that, in order to achieve VfM outcomes, co-operative 
relationships between the partners must be established.  Put another way, un-
cooperative working environments (Klijn and Teisman 2003) can lead to operational 
difficulties between partners.  Therefore, partnerships should be based on establishing 
the “right” working culture (National Audit Office 2009b: p.55; Edwards, Bowen and 
Stewart 2005) that is beneficial to both partners and then maintaining good relations 
(AECOM 2007: p.75; Partnerships Victoria 2003a: p.16) over the life of the contract to 
deliver agreed outcomes. A study conducted by Cambridge Economic Policy 
Associates (2005: p.34) that focused on the evaluation and performance of PPP in 
Scotland, for instance, found that individual personalities can influence culture and can 
determine the extent to which successful partnerships are developed, stating that 
positive relationships produce profitable outcomes (although no practical examples 
were provided).   
 
There are other factors besides personalities that may impact upon the effectiveness 
of organisational culture including team building (and by extension, team working) and 
employee motivation (Jones and Noble 2008).  A crucial aspect of team building for 
managers and task leaders is to sometimes cross organisational boundaries to deal 
with staff over whom they may have little or no formal authority to get a job done 
(Thamhain in Cleland and King 1988: p.823).  This can lead to internal tensions within 
teams due to the blurring of lines between autonomy and accountability (Trafford and 
Proctor 2006; Forrer et al 2010) and can therefore be unproductive with regard to 
collective achievement which may impact to some degree on the achievement of 
intended outcomes.   
 
Performance-based incentives (or lack of them) and governance arrangements can 
affect employee motivation. PPP contracts should closely align incentives to 
performance (to alter behaviour to make it more productive) and governance 
frameworks should be properly socialised to improve the chances of effectively 
managing partnerships (National Audit Office 2009b: p.55).  These characteristics are 
an imperative as the National Audit Office in the UK claims that poor relationships and 
unsatisfactory performance go “hand in hand” (2009b: p.54).  This suggests for 
instance, that poorly motivated staff are less likely to strive to meet tightly scheduled 
milestones or KPIs and may result in penalties or abatement being applied to service 
providers for failing to meet performance targets.  With that said, the findings of a 
survey undertaken by Ernst & Young (2008: p.13) highlight that developing good 
working relationships between partners can decrease levels of corrective action that 
may otherwise be taken to improve contract management outcomes e.g. abatement.    
 
Furthermore, the Ernst & Young study points potentially to a significant advantage in 
creating cohesive relations between the partners: building such relations may improve 
long-term prospects of partnership outcomes thus avoiding, where possible, 
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“restrictive” and “mechanical” administrative practices that may rely too heavily on 
specific wording of contracts (2008: p.13) rather than trying to achieve better mutually 
agreed outcomes by engaging their opposite partner more effectively. This is 
important because the “end goal” for PPPs is not cost reduction (i.e. simply abating for 
under-performance) – it is ensuring the private partner performs to the agreed 
standards under the contract (HM Treasury 2011: p.15) and that VfM is being 
delivered as expected.  It is vital to note, however, that all government employees, 
including those who work in projects are obligated, when engaged in commercial 
transactions, to adhere to public sector codes of conduct and applicable standards i.e. 
finance legislation as well as being accountable to Parliament and subject to 
examination of Auditors-General for their decision-making (E W Russell & Associates 
2000: p.80-81). 
 
Management commitment and support:  
 
Management commitment and support is crucial for achieving successful outcomes 
(Harback et al in Chan et al 2004; Hope 2012).  This includes commitment and 
support given by public partner decision-makers to their employees.  This is important 
because it is senior management that controls additional resources e.g. finance, 
manpower (Cheng, Li and Love 2000), information and / or technology (Hope 2012) 
that may be needed to detect or address under-performance in the delivery of 
services.  For the public partner, the contract director may support the contract 
management team by providing additional resources e.g. employing more staff or 
allocating more time to enable the team to review and then report upon complex 
service delivery outcomes.  The findings from a study undertaken by Arthur Andersen 
and Enterprise LSE (2000: p.38) on VfM drivers in PFI echo the importance of 
management buy-in from a contract manager’s point of view.  Their research found 
that managers must make time and other resources available to ensure that the task 
of contract management is properly handled.  Furthermore, it is claimed that 
supportive management may be decisive in resolving difficulties (Pinto and Slevin 
1987) or disputes that could arise over, for example, the interpretation of contractual 
clauses, KPI wording or performance data that demonstrates whether performance 
targets have actually been met (conflict management is discussed as a theme in more 
detail, below).   
 
Employee capability and  expertise:  
 
Generally, delivering projects to budget and schedule as well as producing quality 
outcomes (Hatush and Skitmore 1997; Chua, Kog and Loh 1999) are major project 
goals.  The capability (Chua, Kog and Loh 1999) and expertise (Forrer et al 2010; 
Chua, Kog and Loh 1999) of staff representing both the public and private partners is 
therefore important in delivering PPP VfM outcomes over the concession period.  
Speaking about the public sector, Abidi (in Ernst & Young 2008: p.12) argues:   
 
“The public [partner] needs to closely monitor operations and services delivery. 
Projects do not run on auto-pilot. The public [partner] needs to invest resources 
in appropriate contract management if projects are to be successful.”  
 
A lack of staff capability or expertise (Hope 2012) can lead to tensions between public 
and private partners, and if not remedied, could lead to service delivery under-
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performance.  While it is easy to blame service operators when delivery outputs fail to 
meet minimum standards, it may not be reasonable to do so, particularly if public 
partner staff tasked with contract oversight do not fulfil their responsibilities properly. 
The quality of public partner contract management skills including monitoring 
performance targets should be improved if governments are to achieve VfM outcomes 
(Edwards et al 2004: p.63).  This view is shared by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (2007: p.20) which also claims that appropriate corporate 
experience among government employees is in short supply. A lack of understanding 
of commercial principles and practices may make it difficult for public partner contract 
managers to understand the nuances of the issues faced by their private partner and 
why certain decisions have been taken that lead to particular outcomes.  A lack of 
understanding could lead to ‘unfair’ penalties being applied by the public partner (in 
the view of service operators) and could damage relationships between them.  
Moreover, poor co-ordination and a lack of skill are factors that can impact negatively 
on the public partner’s ability to successfully manage PPP outcomes (Yuan et al 
2009).  
 
Evans & Peck (in Parliament of Victoria Public Accounts and Estimates Committee 
2012: p.47) state that decisions taken by government regarding what level of specialist 
skills and competencies should be retained by its staff and outsourced to the private 
sector is a significant and strategic decision “that strikes at the heart of the role of 
government and what can be delegated”.  In the view of Evans & Peck (in Parliament 
of Victoria Public Accounts and Estimates Committee 2012: p.45-46), pre-requisite 
public partner skills and competencies that may be necessary for major infrastructure 
projects during operating phases are presented in Table 4.1 below.   
 
Table 4.1 Definition of Best Practice Skills and Competencies Required for the 
Operational Phase of Infrastructure Projects (Source: Evans and Peck in 
Parliament of Victoria Public Accounts and Estimates Committee 2012). 
Project 
Activity Work Essential Competencies & Skills 
Contract 
management  
− Monitor and review contract 
performance 
− Report on contract performance  
− Manage contractor program delivery 
− Identify and resolving obstacles that 
could inhibit performance of the 
contractors  
− Identify trends or recurring issues 
which should be communicated to the 
whole of program  
− Identify process or policy changes that 
would assist program progress  
− Provide monitoring and reporting of 
Program progress as required  
− Ensure VfM is achieved  
 
− Demonstrated understanding of 
industry environment  
− Contract management skills  
− Hands on experience in management 
of significant contractor delivered 
projects (~10-15 years’ experience)  
− Good communication skills  
− Good stakeholder engagement and 
management skills  
− Strong analytical skills  
− Demonstrated strong commercial and 
contractual skills  
− Strong negotiation skills  
− Demonstrated understanding of 
procurement policies and 
requirements  
− Strong project management skills  
− Strong reporting capability 
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Project 
Activity Work Essential Competencies & Skills 
Controls  − Document control and information 
management  
− Management of change and the 
management of change system  
− Monitor, consolidate and report 
integrated budget and schedule, 
progress and gaps 
− Ensure compliance and optimised 
operation of established project 
policies, systems and management 
standards 
− Implementing established quality 
strategy, plan, procedures and 
auditing  
− Professional qualifications in a 
relevant discipline  
− Deep expertise in quality planning, 
assurance and control  
− Expert knowledge in project planning, 
scheduling and costing  
− Earned value analysis and reporting  
− Strong information analysis and 
reporting skills  
− Good communication, negotiation and 
advisory skills  
Evaluation of 
performance  
− services 
provided 
− investment  
− Identify and capture lessons learned 
against approved business case 
objectives  
− Recommend necessary improvements 
 
− Demonstrated understanding of 
industry environment  
− Strong communication and 
stakeholder engagement skills  
− Sufficiency of knowledge and 
awareness of the portfolio and service 
to be able to assess effectiveness of 
outcomes  
− Sufficient commercial and contractual 
knowledge to assess effectiveness of 
outcomes  
− Strong analytical skills  
 
Clear and open communication:  
 
Clear (and open) communication is key to successful partner relations (National Audit 
Office 2009a: p.10; Hope 2012) as information can be used to influence and alter the 
planning, direction and development of projects (Karlsen 2002). A lack of 
communication or miscommunication flowing from decision-making can lead to 
misunderstanding between PPP partners. If left unresolved, this could result in 
communication break-downs which can then reduce the level of trust that partners 
have in each other’s motives and thus impact on operational productivity.  This applies 
just as much to communication failures that are intermittent as to those that may be 
continuous.  Effective communication, on the other hand, can stimulate constructive 
exchanges of ideas, reduce the potential for misunderstanding and encourage trust 
(Cheng, Li and Love 2000).  The importance of clear and open communication in PPP 
operations should not be underestimated.  An anonymous respondent, surveyed as 
part of Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE’s (2000: p.46) research to determine VfM 
outcomes in PFI, offers the following advice in support of effective communication:   
 
“Establish frequent and open communications between the [public partner] and 
Supplier. It is extremely difficult for a legal contract to cover every issue that 
may arise. A strong partnership approach has to be supported by good 
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communication where open and honest exchanges of information promote a 
healthy working relationship between the two parties”. 
 
Relationship continuity:  
 
A lack of relationship continuity between PPP partners can impact upon the successful 
achievement of planned outcomes. For example, effective working relationships 
between service delivery personnel and public partner contract managers evolve over 
time.  Building these relationships can be important as personal influence can be used 
to obtain information and resolve day-to-day issues without having to resort to more 
formal means.  This approach can save partners time and money over the long-term 
and potentially prevent small issues from escalating into larger ones.  However, when 
new staff are appointed in partner-facing roles, they are unlikely to have the same 
level of situation-specific understanding of the operating environment or ease of 
relationship with their partner counterparts – knowledge must be gained and 
relationships built anew.   
 
Moreover, staff departures can result in vital knowledge being lost due to discontinuity 
(Jones and Noble 2008) e.g. a lack of continuity when transitioning from / into each 
lifecycle phase, or from information asymmetries (Hoppe and Schmitz 2013).  The 
former example relates to a research finding that demonstrates that once the 
procurement and delivery phases have been completed, project managers tend to 
return to their ‘day jobs’ before operations begin (Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE 
2000: p.38).  This may mean that partnership knowledge that could be used during 
operations is not being fully harnessed or shared across other PPPs (Arthur Andersen 
and Enterprise LSE 2000: p.50). Furthermore, it is claimed that public partner 
oversight is most effective when the experience learned in other PPPs is used to 
inform decision-making (Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 2005: p.34).  It has 
been argued, that to address such shortcomings, a “Centre of Excellence” for 
government could be established to act on behalf of agencies to manage PPP 
transactions (Bowditch 2007: p.5; Parliament of Victoria Public Accounts and 
Estimates Committee 2012: p.87, p.196). The intended benefits could therefore 
extend to the consolidation of better practice and process as well as tapping into and 
sharing existing pockets of expertise that may reside within individual agencies and 
may lead to improved relationships between partners (Bowditch 2007: p.5).  This could 
also lead to economies of scale resulting from an established “critical mass” of 
projects (Parliament of Victoria Public Accounts and Estimates Committee 2012: p.87, 
p.196) thus potentially making the transfer of knowledge and skills between people 
more effective.  While public and private partner staff changes are inevitable given the 
long concession periods of most PPPs, the negative impacts of such changes should 
be mitigated as far as possible.  Appropriate exit interviews, induction / orientation 
training and succession planning can all help. 
 
Conflict management:   
 
Conflict between public and private partners may be inevitable (Edwards et al 2004: 
p.55).  Broadly speaking, disagreements arise over timeframes, costs and quality 
issues (Leung et al 2004).  Apart from time and money, there are other factors can 
lead to disputes (Thamhain and Wilemon 1975).  These include project priorities (e.g. 
setting project priorities – see Hope 2012); manpower resources (e.g. a lack of skills to 
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deliver services to agreed standards); and personality conflicts (e.g. personal or 
professional differences that arise between individuals and which are primarily task-
driven or people-focused). Another pertinent factor is conflicting interpretation of 
contract requirements due to individual or organisational biases or preferences.  It is 
claimed by Cambridge Economic Policy Associates (2005: p.34-35) that the majority of 
their research participants that had been involved in disputes ascribed them to the 
interpretation of contractual provisions.   
 
Managing conflict is crucial because disputes can damage relationships.  Conflict 
should therefore be managed to reduce animosity and build understanding and trust.  
This is particularly true for PPP agreements as concessions tend to last upwards of 20 
years.  However, not all situations in PPP that give rise to conflict are likely to be 
actively managed, such as those that have little operational consequence e.g. 
achievement of KPIs that have little genuine impact on service outcomes (in other 
situations, conflict avoidance might occur that actually prevents differences from being 
settled).   
 
Decisions are made between public and private partners in advance of contractual 
agreements being finalised which stipulate the forms of dispute resolution to be used if 
conflicts occur.  Procedures to resolve these issues will depend on circumstances, but 
choices tend to involve consensual methods such as negotiation and mediation, and 
adjudicative methods such as arbitration or expert determination.  Litigation is usually 
viewed as the method of last resort (Global Legal Group Ltd 2007: p.12) due to high 
costs, adverse publicity and the length of time it typically takes before outcomes are 
reached (Partnerships Victoria 2001a: p.177).   
 
4.2.4 Summary of Partnership Management Issues  
 
In summary, PPP partnership management issues are:    
− Organisational culture.  Partnerships should be based on establishing the “right” 
working culture that is beneficial to both partners and then maintaining good 
relations over the life of the contract to deliver agreed outcomes as un-
cooperative working environments can lead to operational difficulties between 
partners.  Factors integral to effective organisational culture are team building, 
team working and employee motivation.  Poor relationships and unsatisfactory 
performance can go ‘hand in hand’.   
− Management commitment and support. Commitment and support from 
management may be needed to address under-performance. For the public 
partner, a contract manager may be supported through the provision of 
additional resources such as more staff or the allocation of more time to review 
and then report upon complex service delivery outcomes.   
− Employee capability and expertise.  A lack of staff capability or expertise can 
lead to tensions between public and private partners and, if not remedied, could 
lead to service delivery under-performance. Service delivery and the quality of 
public partner contract management skills, including monitoring performance 
targets, must be effective if governments are to achieve VfM outcomes.   
− Clear and open communication.  A lack of communication or miscommunication 
flowing from decision-making can lead to misunderstanding between PPP 
48 
 
partners.  If left unchecked, this could result in communication break-downs 
which can reduce the level of trust that partners have in each others’ motives 
and impact on operational productivity.   
− Relationship continuity.  Personal influence can be used to obtain information 
and resolve day-to-day issues without having to resort to more formal means.  
This approach can save partners time and money over the long-term and 
potentially prevent small issues from escalating into larger ones.  Situation-
specific understanding of the operating environment and ease of relationship 
with their opposite partner is often required to enable this to happen. Staff 
departures can result in vital knowledge being lost due to discontinuity.   
− Conflict management.  Conflict should be managed to reduce animosity and 
build understanding and trust.  Broadly speaking, disagreements can arise over 
timeframes, costs and quality issues.  Managing conflict is crucial because 
disputes can damage relationships and may impact on achieving VfM 
outcomes.   
 
 
4.3 Risk Management  
 
This section outlines risk management definitions, theoretical frameworks, principles 
and processes within the context of PPP.   
 
4.3.1 Definitions 
 
Key definitions relate to: 
− Risk; 
− Project risk;  
− Operating risk; and   
− Risk management.  
 
The concept of ‘risk’ is defined in many ways.  The Concise Oxford Dictionary for 
example, provides a range of contextual variations that relate to hypothetical situations 
or circumstances that give rise to danger, loss or something unpleasant happening 
(Pearsall 1999: p.1235).  Similarly, Hubbard (2009: p.8) in providing his interpretations 
of risk, describes risk negatively e.g. in terms of loss, disaster or other undesirable 
event but broadens the scope by introducing the concepts of ‘probability’ and 
‘magnitude’.  Other definitions such as the one provided by Camilleri (2011: p.195) for 
‘project risk’ also includes references to likelihood and consequence although it is 
different in that it introduces the possibility of risk being positive as well as negative, 
thus suggesting that there is an element of ‘uncertainty’ in  achieving objectives.  That 
description is akin to the definition favoured for this research:  the “effect of uncertainty 
on objectives” (ISO 31000, 2009: p.1).  According to ISO 31000, risk relates to all 
activities that an organisation undertakes (ISO 31000, 2009: p.V) and describes risk 
both in terms of likelihood and consequence.  The ‘neutral’ definition offered by ISO 
31000 thus embraces both ‘threat’ (negative) and ‘opportunity’ (positive) risk.  
However, public partner management of risk in the operational phase of PPP is 
discussed mainly from a threat risk perspective since the public partner’s objective is 
primarily to defend and protect VfM outcomes that have been agreed, and should be 
attained, by its private partner.  The connotation of ‘defend and protect’ is clearly 
against threat.  
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Other reasons for giving the ISO 31000 version preference is that it encompasses all 
organisational activities; the Standard has been adopted by the Whole of Victorian 
Government (Department of Treasury and Finance 2011b: p.3); and its use is 
encouraged by Suncorp Risk Services who provide strategic level risk management 
services on behalf of the New South Wales Self Insurance Corporation for government 
managed fund schemes for dealing with contracting risks (New South Wales Self 
Insurance Corporation 2010: p.14).     
 
Operating risks are risks that relate to the inputs into, as well as the delivery outcomes 
of, services that are contracted-out by the government client to its private partner 
(Partnerships Victoria 2001a: p.68; Grimsey and Lewis 2004: p.202) in terms of 
requirements, costs and timing (Ng and Loosemore 2006).  Put more simply, operating 
risk arises from the likelihood of occurrence of events occurring that could prevent 
services from being delivered as planned (Loxley and Loxley 2010: p.35). Again, this 
definition embraces only the negative implications of operating risks. 
 
‘Risk management’ is a method that can be used by managers to recognise, 
scrutinise, assess, treat and then monitor those risks that could impinge upon the 
realisation of defined goals from strategic, operational, financial and / or compliance-
related issues (Victorian Auditor-General 2007b: p.1) – and clearly contributes to the 
“demonstrable achievement of objectives and improvement of performance" (ISO 
31000, 2009: p.7). Effective risk management also entails good knowledge 
management practices so that risk learning is maximised.   
 
4.3.2 Theoretical Frameworks  
 
PPP procurement purports to include risk-sharing principles (through the clear 
allocation of risk between public and private partners). For the public partner, there are 
risks involved in operational governance / administration during long-term concession 
arrangements. Therefore, the theory of risk management is necessary for identifying 
what principles, processes and issues might arise for PPP projects. Understanding 
this places the development of an integrated management model on a firm theoretical 
base. 
 
As part of the human condition, people are driven to improve the way in which they 
live (Renn in Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt 2009: p.15).  To achieve our wants and 
needs, we often have to make decisions that involve taking risks.  Therefore, risk-
taking arises from a desire to make purposeful change in our lives, and that in 
pursuing our desires, there will be consequences to our actions; some may be 
intended (or tolerated) whilst others will be unintended.  However, consequences can 
actually outweigh the benefits of taking risks.  Renn (in Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt 
2009: p.15) says that risk assessment can be undertaken (typically balancing 
likelihood and consequence as well as risk and reward) to judge the acceptability (i.e. 
tolerability) of risks before embarking upon a course of action.  Risk management can 
then be used to prevent, lessen or modify the likelihood of occurrence of the risk event 
or its consequences by selecting the most appropriate option.  Thus, the application of 
risk assessment and risk management can influence our desires: it may lead to 
alternatives or allow a greater degree of control to be applied to certain aspects of the 
risk, that then makes risk targets less vulnerable to potential harm (Renn in Bouder, 
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Slavin and Lofstedt 2009: p.15-16).  This builds upon the notion that risk is subject to 
the belief that human action can prevent or at least mitigate harm from occurring 
(Renn in Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt 2009: p.21). 
 
However, risks are social phenomena – they are constructs that are developed in the 
minds of individuals (Renn in Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt 2009: p.21). These 
structures are built from our observations and experiences, and people therefore have 
the capacity to create different scenarios and futures.  Risk is not only experienced 
individually, it also occurs collectively in groups and by society more generally.  Risk is 
therefore a social construct.  Different perceptions that make up diverse communities 
can lead to complexity as stakeholder groups may form different views of what the 
risks are (to them) and likewise, how they should be managed (Renn in Bouder, Slavin 
and Lofstedt 2009: p.16-17). Moreover, people must consider organisational and 
institutional capabilities, including available resources and the opportunity cost of 
implementing risk management plans.  Political and cultural norms, rules and values 
should also be considered (Renn in Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt 2009: p.16-17).   
 
Communication is thus vital in representing differing views of what constitutes risk: if 
risk perceptions are not seen or heard they cannot easily be understood.  Kasperson 
et al (1988) offers a conceptual framework, the ‘Social Amplification of Risk 
Framework’, to explain the relationship between hazards and the psychological, 
sociological, cultural and organisational processes that may amplify or ease public 
concerns to risks.  This is important because, according to Kasperson et al (1988), 
stakeholder groups have competing views and each will want to shape public reaction 
in line with its own perceptions and desired outcomes.  Stakeholders can assert their 
influence, for instance through power of persuasion, through an in-depth 
understanding of particular risks and expertise in risk management.   
 
This ‘social amplification’ of risk can be represented diagrammatically in Fig. 4.2.   
 
51 
 
Indirect 
communication
Professional 
information brokers News media
Cognition in social 
context Social protest
Organisational 
responses
Evaluation and 
interpretation
Voluntary 
organisations
Intuitive heuristicsInformal social networksDirect communication
Cultural and social 
groups Decoding
Political and social 
action
Attitude changesAttention filterOpinion leadersIndividual sensesPersonal experience
Feedback and iteration
INSTITUTIONAL AND 
SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
INDIVIDUAL 
STATIONS
SOCIAL 
STATIONS
INFORMATION 
CHANNELS
SOURCES OF 
INFORMATION
Loss of confidence in 
institutions
Community concern
Increase or decrease 
in physical risk
Litigation
Organisational 
changes
Regulatory actions
Financial losses
Loss of sales
RIPPLE 
EFFECTS IMPACTS
Stakeholder 
groups
Society
Other groups
Society
Government agencies
AMPLIFICATION AND ATTENUATION 
Risk and risk events
Industry
Company
Directly
Effected 
persons
Professional 
groups
Local community
 
Copyright © 2006, John Wiley and Sons. 
Fig. 4.2 The Social Amplification of Risk Framework  
(Source:  adapted from Kasperson 1988). 
 
Although Fig. 4.2 excludes mention of ‘signals’, there is a direct relationship between 
sources of risk and signals (Kasperson et al 1988).  A risk source is where the risk 
originates from and where signals are used to form messages which are transmitted to 
or received through communications channels. These include personal networks, 
politicians, governments, the media, etc (Kasperson et al (in Slovic 2010: p.318)).  It is 
from these messages that Kasperson et al (1988) claim that our awareness of risk is 
triggered. Social amplification of risk represents the phenomenon by which information 
processes of risk, risk events and management systems influence the experiences of 
individuals and groups.   
 
Amplifications can potentially produce secondary social and political impacts which will 
then create third order impacts, and so on.  These types of impacts may arise from 
legislation, litigation, community opposition, investor attitudes, etc (Kasperson et al in 
Slovic 2010: p.319-320)).  The degree to which this ripple-effect occurs depends upon 
the level of social learning and interaction that stems from experience with particular 
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risks.  Ripples have the potential to spread to previously unrelated technologies or 
institutions depending on how effectively risks are communicated and how well they 
resonate with people (Kasperson et al in Slovic 2010: p.319-320).   
 
Direct experience can provide an understanding of the nature, extent and 
manageability of hazards which may lead to a greater capability of avoiding (or 
managing or taking) risks (Kasperson et al 1988).  In other words, not only can 
experience act as a risk amplifier, it can also serve to mitigate them – or at least inform 
the mitigation process.  However, as already implied, not all risks are experienced 
directly. This is why risk messages that are transmitted or received through 
communication mechanisms can have a considerable effect on influencing public 
responses to risks, thus acting as a major agent of amplification.  The validation of 
perception is more likely to occur through personal (or professional) networks whereas 
the interpretation and response to information that flows from social, institutional and 
cultural contexts are more likely to come from the media or other sophisticated 
platforms that have considerable reach (Kasperson et al 1988). 
 
The ‘Risk Governance Framework’ is an analytic framework that can be used to 
develop in-depth assessment and management strategies for handling risks.  This 
framework integrates scientific, economic, social and cultural characteristics to help 
make decisions about what should constitute ‘risk’ (Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt 2009: 
p.5).  Moreover, it takes into account different stakeholder perspectives that may 
require co-ordination and even reconciliation between the roles, outlooks, goals and / 
or actions of those involved (Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt 2009: p.5) as well as 
providing the more common elements of risk assessment, risk management and risk 
communication (Renn in Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt 2009: p.7).   
 
Another feature of the ‘Risk Governance Framework’ is that it offers a classification for 
risks based upon how difficult they may be to manage and how much is known about 
them, using the following categorisations – simple, complex, uncertain and ambiguous 
(Renn in Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt 2009: p.7).  However, it should be noted that the 
latter two groupings, i.e. uncertain and ambiguous, are similar in nature and the 
categorisations exclude the likelihood that some risks may be almost certain to occur.  
Renn (in Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt 2009: p.7) states that risks should be classified 
according to how difficult it is to establish a cause-effect relationship between ‘risk 
agents’ and the consequences of the risks being realised, the degree of certainty in 
the cause-effect relationship, and the level of controversy / meaning that risk 
realisation will have on those who are likely to be impacted.   
 
The major components of this Framework are ‘pre-assessment’, ‘risk appraisal’, 
‘tolerability and acceptability judgement’, ‘risk management’ and ‘communication’.  
Each is discussed in turn and represented in Fig. 4.3, below.   
 
[Image removed due to copyright restrictions] 
 
Fig. 4.3 The Risk Governance Framework  
(Source:  Renn in Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt 2009). 
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− Pre-assessment (Renn in Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt 2009: p.9-10).  This 
involves capturing the issues that stakeholders and society have about 
particular risks including identifying the factors that have led to the formation of 
these perceptions. This involves ‘framing’ risks so that a common 
understanding of them is developed between all risk participants; establishing 
early warning and monitoring mechanisms to indicate whether risk signals 
indicate their realisation; pre-screening to conduct preliminary probes into 
hazards / risks (that are based on priorities and the use of existing models for 
dealing with risks); and selecting the main assumptions, principles and 
procedures for assessing risks and emotions associated with them.   
− Risk appraisal (Renn in Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt 2009: p.10). This 
component is about providing a suitable knowledge base for which societal 
decisions can be made on whether or not to take risks and how they should 
then be managed.  This involves a scientific assessment of risk and its social 
and economic implications (a concern assessment) with an aim of linking the 
risk source with its potential consequences.  There are three main challenges 
associated with this component; ‘complexity’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘ambiguity’.  
Successful outcomes, Renn asserts, depend upon the transparency of the 
implications during risk assessment as well as throughout all subsequent 
phases when applying this Framework.    
− Tolerability and acceptability judgement (Renn in Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt 
2009: p.10-11).  This requires the characterisation and evaluation of risks to 
determine their acceptability and / or tolerability by assessing the broader 
value-based issues that also influence how the judgement is made.  Risks that 
tend to be judged as acceptable are limited to those that have negative 
consequences and can potentially be taken on without control or treatment 
actions being put in place, whereas risks deemed to be tolerable have some 
positive connotations.  In these cases, controls and / or treatments are used to 
mitigate potentially adverse consequences from arising that may prevent the 
benefits from being realised.    
− Risk management (Renn in Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt 2009: p.11-12). This 
involves the development and implementation of controls and treatment actions 
to best manage those risks.  Factors to consider during decision-making that 
lead to implementation include the information derived from the pre-
assessment, risk appraisal, and tolerability and acceptance judgement phases 
which can then be assessed against a range of other criteria such as efficiency, 
effectiveness, cost, sustainability, etc. The results from this assessment are 
then informed by a value judgement against each assessment measure.  After 
implementation, it is important to institute a regular program of monitoring and 
review to make necessary adjustments to performance.   
Renn notes that the dominant attribute of each of the four risk categories i.e. 
‘simple’, ‘complex’, ‘uncertain’ and ‘ambiguous’ should lead to the identification 
of a specific strategy for managing the risk.  Simple risks can be dealt with by 
using routine, traditional or best practice decision-making methods, as well as 
by trial and error.  Complex and uncertain risks are differentiated by strategies 
that deal with ‘risk agents’ on one side and those that are precaution-based and 
resilience-focussed, on the other.  Ambiguous risks rely upon strategies that 
54 
 
create tolerance and shared understanding of divergent perspectives and 
values that should aim ultimately to resolve these differences.   
− Communication (Renn in Bouder, Slavin and Lofstedt 2009: p.13-14). A critical 
component of the Risk Governance Framework, communication is central to the 
overall effectiveness particularly with regard to identifying and understanding 
others’ viewpoints, pinpointing options and managing risks. Risk communication 
can also promote tolerance for conflicting standpoints, provide a foundation for 
their resolution and lead to trust amongst stakeholder groups.   
 
These frameworks demonstrate that risk perceptions about PPP need to be managed 
within a communicable framework.  The ISO 31000 (2009), as stated, is the preferred 
risk management guidance document for this research.  It places a heavy emphasis 
upon communication. 
 
In addition, ISO 31000 (2009) encompasses all types of operating risks encountered 
in PPPs e.g. contract variation, contract termination, concession hand-over, etc that 
need to be managed by the public partner.  It is broad enough to encompass risk 
management plans and risk registers that can be tailored to meet specific needs (ISO 
31000 2009: p.1) throughout the operational phase of PPPs.  Thus, ISO 31000 (2009) 
can be a useful tool for public partner use to increase the likelihood of achieving PPP 
objectives by heightening the awareness of the need to identify and actively manage 
risks using a process-driven approach.    
 
This research assumes, however, that the most significant stages for identifying threat 
and opportunity risks are negotiated and built into PPP agreements during design and 
tender (National Audit Office 2003: p.9) periods (i.e. the procurement phase) and that 
with anticipated VfM achievement or economies of scale, this will perhaps be a 
legitimate reason (there could be many others) for awarding a contract to a particular 
bidder.  It is also assumed that there may only be a limited amount of scope for further 
opportunity risk identification during the operational phase e.g. through potential skill 
and technology transfers (Baker and McKenzie Solicitors 2006: Annexure N).  
Opportunity risk identification is also usually accompanied by limited capacity for 
exploitation. Even if opportunity risks are identified during operations, the potential for 
risk realisation will likely be tempered with incentive levels as set out under concession 
deeds as well as risk appetite for taking on additional risk (balancing the principles of 
‘risk’ and ‘reward’). 
 
Nonetheless, from a public sector perspective, risk management can be beneficial for 
standardising training opportunities and sharing knowledge across government 
departments and / or agencies (Department of Treasury and Finance 2007b: p.4), 
derived through real experiences of managing performance risk, by drawing on 
specific instances of under-performance in situations where different decisions could 
have led to better results.   
 
The risk management process is illustrated below in Fig. 4.4 and comprises the 
following elements:   
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Fig. 4.4 A Model for Risk Management  
(Source:  AS/NZS ISO 31000: 2009). 
 
− Establishing the context (ISO 2009: p.15). This involves defining objectives and 
setting limitations i.e. the boundaries for managing the risk, as well as setting 
the scope and criteria for the remaining process e.g. aligning PPP objectives 
with its operational scale, structure and delivery arrangements.  It also involves 
recognising the specific drivers (technical, physical, economic and social 
conditions and circumstances) that are likely to ‘shape’ the risks, i.e. affect 
assessments of the likelihood of occurrence of risk events and the nature and 
potential magnitude of their consequences. 
− Risk assessment (ISO 2009: p.17). Risk assessment comprises the overall 
process of risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation (see below). 
o Risk identification (ISO 2009: p.17). This process is about recognising 
risk; its impacts, events, causes and potential consequences.  
Appropriate risk identification tools and techniques should be applied 
and may include the assembly and examination of precedent risk 
management documentation such as contractual deeds, risk registers, 
risk profiles and organisational records that have been used in similar 
PPPs relating to planning or operational policy.  
o Risk analysis (ISO 2009: p.18). Analysis involves understanding the risks 
to provide an input into risk evaluation and into decisions involving risk 
treatments.  This part of the process involves examining the causes and 
sources of risks, defined by its consequences (the outcome of the event, 
described in terms of its impact on the achievement of objectives e.g. 
VfM) and likelihood (the chance of ‘something’ happening) of the risk 
occurring e.g. operator performance may not be reviewed as rigorously 
or in the same way by a new public partner employee after the 
retirement of a highly experienced contract manager.  This may lead to a 
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permanent loss of corporate memory due to a lack of succession 
planning, thus impacting on the attainment of VfM. 
o Risk evaluation (ISO 2009: p.18). Risk evaluation assists with decision-
making that is based upon the outcomes of the risk analysis stage and 
involves comparison between risk levels determined at the analysis step 
with risk criteria established when the context was considered and 
includes formulating potential risk treatments. In this process, risks may 
be strategically prioritised in terms of their comparative severity. 
− Risk treatment (ISO 2009: p.18-19). This focuses on selecting the best option 
for modifying risk and the implementation of controls to manage the risks.  Risk 
treatment can be described as a cyclical process of assessing treatments; 
deciding if further action is necessary to mitigate the existing levels of risk; and 
implementing new controls, if deemed necessary e.g. with regard to the 
example provided for ‘Risk analysis’, controls could include the design and 
implementation of co-ordinated succession plans for key roles and developing 
minimum standards for document management.  
− Monitoring and review (ISO 2009: p.20). Monitoring and reviewing risks should 
form an integral part of the process and ideally involve regular scrutiny – 
particularly in relation to the changing perception of risks and their controls, 
lessons learned from actual events and trends e.g. adding emerging risks to 
risk registers or modifying existing risks due to consistent and sizable 
decreases in service user volumes in Economic Infrastructure PPPs.  
− Communication and consultation (ISO 2009: p.14). This should take place 
between partners during all stages of the risk management process and include 
matters such as the risk itself, underlying causes, consequences and risk 
treatment actions.  Communication and consultation should also extend to 
providing stakeholders with an understanding of why particular decisions and 
actions should be taken e.g. testing and finalising contingency plans due to the 
possibility of major default by consortia.  
 
According to Edwards and Bowen (2005: p.97), these stages are better represented 
as a flow diagram (as illustrated below in Fig. 4.5) using a cyclical loop to show 
continuous learning and improvement (facilitated by knowledge capture) between 
projects or between project phases.   
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Reprinted with permission of Edwards and Bowen. Copyright © 2005. 
Fig. 4.5 A Cyclical Model for Risk Management  
(adapted from Edwards and Bowen, 2005). 
 
This loop, they claim, is particularly important during the monitoring and review stage 
as this is when new risks are typically identified or the circumstances of known risks 
change (Edwards and Bowen 2005: p.98).  They also note the importance of post-
project risk knowledge capture; an aspect not dealt with in the risk management 
processes reflected in ISO 31000. 
 
4.3.3 Risk Management Principles 
 
From a public partner viewpoint, the transfer of operating risk to its private partner is a 
key reason for entering into PPP agreements.  The ‘transferring’ of operating risk, 
however cannot be said to eliminate risk for the public partner because the private 
partner’s ability to manage operating risk is limited to its share of equity and may 
therefore be illusory (UK Parliament 2011).  This means that the public partner retains 
residual risk as its private partner cannot guarantee that it will fulfill its legal obligations 
for the life of the contract (Partnerships Victoria 2001a: p.68), and because of this, 
government remains ultimately accountable for the delivery of public services (UK 
Parliament 2011). The fact that the Clem7 Tunnel was put into receivership (Hepworth 
2011) due to consistently low traffic volumes demonstrates that PPP projects can be 
delivered within schedule and to budget but can suffer financially during operations 
because of inaccurate forecasting (The Australian 2010). 
 
Although extant approaches to risk classification tend to involve a blend of sources, 
trigger events and consequences (Edwards and Bowen 2005: p.26), references from 
this literature review of risk management of PPP suggests that contract variation, 
change of consortium members, contract termination, end of concession hand-over, 
skills transfer and reputation damage are issues that the government, as the public 
partner, should be concerned about, particularly in the operational phase of PPP.  
Each of these factors is discussed, in turn.   
 
The Cycle of Systematic Project Risk Management
(based upon AS/NZS ISO 31000: 2009)
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Contract variation:  
 
For agreements that last for 20 years or more, it is not unreasonable to expect that 
contract clauses will be modified from time to time.  Amendments (including re-
allocating risks) can potentially result from technical obsolescence e.g. tolling systems, 
new legal / political requirements e.g. health and safety, changes in service user 
demand (Partnerships Victoria 2001a: p.135; Edwards et al 2004: p.122), service 
provider under-performance (Partnerships Victoria 2001a: p.161) and from decisions 
to modify the length of agreements.   
 
In the case of under-performance, this means that the public partner has the right to 
intervene if the quality of services provided by the operator fails to meet its obligations 
(Partnerships Victoria 2001a: p.161).  This could arise from a breach of contract such 
as default (through continued acts of non-compliance) (Partnerships Victoria 2001a: 
p.148), a major default or in an emergency situation where the public partner may 
assume operational control for a period of time because the situation may be beyond 
the capability of the private partner to deal with it effectively (Partnerships Victoria 
2001a: p.161) e.g. major flooding.  With this said, it should be noted that force majeure 
events are uninsurable. The public partner may, however, provide for contract 
variations in these instances to give relief to its private partner because of 
unexpectedly high financial consequences (Partnerships Victoria 2001a: p.28).  
Moreover, financiers may impose similar caveats on their loans to the private 
consortium.  The public partner must be aware of and plan for this possibility.   
 
Change of consortium members:  
 
Sub-standard delivery of services or the failure to provide agreed services by a 
member of a private consortium may lead to its contract being terminated. Such 
situations may lead to the replacement of that member within the existing consortium 
or an amended contract if the provision of those services is no longer required.  
 
Contract termination:  
 
According to Partnerships Victoria (2001a: p.172), a key objective of contract 
management is to ensure that private obligations are met for the full contract term.  
Although considered as a last resort (Partnerships Victoria 2001a: p.172), contract 
termination can be enforced if an operator fails to meet its contractual responsibilities 
(Partnerships Victoria 2001a: p.25). In such situations, long-term government funding 
commitments and priorities may be put at risk unless an alternative service provider is 
found.   
 
As the public partner is ultimately accountable for the continued delivery of services 
under these circumstances, it can attempt to mitigate this risk by putting contingency 
plans in place (Partnerships Victoria 2001a: p.35; Edwards et al 2004: p.66).  Although 
this may seem an obvious thing to do, particularly in light of examples where operators 
have been placed into receivership (due to the knock-on effects of over-optimistic 
traffic estimates, for instance), research into the evaluation of PFI operations in the 
UK, shows that these types of plans are not always evident, in practice (Edwards et al 
2004: p.9). 
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End of concession hand-over:  
 
Edwards et al (2004: p.123) assert that the usability (condition) of PPP assets over 
their entire lifecycles can become a serious issue. If assets are not properly 
maintained, they can deteriorate prematurely and be rendered ‘unfit for purpose’.  This 
can reduce VfM outcomes particularly if the public partner has to absorb the cost of 
major repairs or replacements soon after concession hand-over is complete.  The 
public partner traditionally mitigates this type of risk by writing stipulations into 
concession agreements stating that assets must be appropriately maintained over the 
full life of the contract term.  Often, these clauses restrict / regulate the distribution of 
profits to consortia if assets are not appropriately maintained.   
 
The commencement of asset monitoring by the public partner before concession 
hand-over will depend on specifics but this can occur as much as five years before the 
contract end-date (Edwards et al 2004: p.123). If irregularities are uncovered during 
hand-over, the public partner can penalise and / or abate the operator to cover its 
costs and the acceptance of asset transfer will then be subject to the approval of a 
final inspection undertaken by the public partner.  An associated issue here is the 
practicability of determining in advance what the hand-back condition of an asset 
should be, and what penalties for non-compliance would be appropriate, for an event 
that might lie decades into the future.   
 
Although this approach to managing the concession hand-over risk can be effective, it 
may not neutralise it.  There remains a possibility of cost being passed to public 
partner after transfer takes place due to, for instance, the acquisition of technical 
expertise that may be required to monitor or solve highly complex technological 
matters e.g. the management of legacy systems.  If competing views from experts 
arise, for example, inexperienced public officials could be forced to take strategic 
decisions that have far reaching consequences affecting the future viability of assets.  
Moreover, hiring / commissioning external expertise can be costly and cumulatively, 
can impact on the achievement of VfM propositions (see ‘Skills transfer’ below).   
 
Skills transfer: 
 
As part of the PPP procurement model, governments can look to the private sector to 
provide knowledge and skills that lead to service innovation and technical know-how.  
This notion assumes that it is more efficient for government (at least initially) to 
purchase services from the private sector than to develop its own capabilities in-house 
(Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE 2000: p.33; Delmon 2011: p.16-17).  Failure to 
transfer skills from the private partner to the public partner can result in the latter 
having to pay expensive fees to external advisers for longer than necessary and 
prevent the broadening of public sector knowledge that might otherwise be expected 
to drive down costs and increase skill levels over the long-term.   
 
There are documented examples where governments that have been using PPP for 
well in excess of a decade have been heavily criticised for over-reliance upon private 
sector expertise and failing to manage skill transfers (UK Parliament 2011; Fitzgerald 
2004: p.36).  This includes project management (change management) skills.  In 
Victoria for instance, an independent review conducted on infrastructure provided 
under Partnerships Victoria policy, which examined project economics and contract 
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documentation, concluded that public sector project management skills were ‘spread 
thinly’ across Government and that it was imperative to focus upon developing its 
internal resources (Fitzgerald 2004: p.36).  This type of failing could potentially have 
flow-on effects for operational matters e.g. poorly developed corporate governance 
structures that apply to the identification, management and review of risks, particularly 
those that, if realised, might have a substantial impact on achieving intended 
outcomes.   
 
Reputation damage: 
 
Unanticipated events (Joyner 2007; Hodge and Greve 2005: p.110) during PPP 
operations can have unexpected consequences for the public sector.  Even though its 
private partner is responsible for service delivery, there may be potential for negative 
media attention (Karlsen 2002; Chung, Hensher and Rose 2010) to be misdirected to 
the public partner when things go wrong.  Furthermore, a government’s reputation can 
be damaged if governance, probity and compliance frameworks are not properly 
adhered to by its employees. 
 
4.3.4 Summary of Risk Management Issues  
 
The PPP risk management issues discussed in this section can be summarised as 
follows:    
− Operational innovation. This research assumes that the most significant 
opportunities for identifying opportunity risks (as distinct from threat risks) are 
negotiated and built into PPP agreements and with anticipated corresponding 
cost savings / economies of scale, this will be a legitimate reason for awarding 
a contract to a particular bidder. However, it is not readily known how much 
scope there is for opportunity risk identification and exploitation during 
operations due to a lack of publically available information on this subject.  This 
may be due to a perception that risk management is a ‘protective’, rather than 
‘exploitative’ technique, and is evidenced by the prevailing threat perspective 
adopted in the majority of the risk management literature. 
− Contract variation.  Amendments to concession deeds can result from technical 
obsolescence, new legal / political requirements, changes in service user 
demand, service provider under-performance and from decisions to modify the 
length of agreements.  The public partner retains a right to intervene if the 
quality of services provided by the private partner fails to meet its obligations.  
This could arise from a breach of contract such as default or due to an 
emergency situation where circumstances may be beyond the capability of the 
private partner to deal with the situation effectively.   
− Change of consortium members. Sub-standard delivery of services or the 
failure to provide agreed services by a member of a private consortium may 
lead to its contract being terminated.  Such situations, for example, may lead to 
the replacement of that member within the existing consortium or an amended 
contract if the provision of those services is no longer required.  
− Contract termination.  A key objective of contract management is to ensure that 
private partner obligations are met for the full contract period.  Although 
considered as a last resort, contract termination can be enforced if the service 
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provider fails to meet its contractual responsibilities or is placed into 
receivership. As the public partner is fully accountable for the continued delivery 
of services under these circumstances, it can attempt to mitigate this risk by 
putting contingency plans in place.   
− End of concession hand-over.  If assets are not properly managed or physically 
maintained, they can deteriorate prematurely and be rendered ‘unfit for 
purpose’.  This can reduce VfM outcomes particularly if the public partner then 
has to absorb the cost of major repairs or replacements after hand-over (expiry 
of concession) is complete.  The public partner can mitigate this type of risk by 
writing stipulations into concession agreements stating that assets must be 
appropriately maintained over the full life of the contract term. If irregularities 
are uncovered, the public partner can penalise and / or abate the private 
partner operator to cover its costs. An associated issue here is the practicability 
of determining in advance what the hand-back condition of an asset should be, 
and what penalties for non-compliance would be appropriate, for an event that 
might lie decades into the future.  
− Skills transfer.  Government looks to the private partner for knowledge and 
skills that lead to service innovation and technical know-how.  The failure to 
transfer skills from the private partner to the public partner can result in the 
payment of expensive fees to external advisers for longer than necessary and 
prevent the broadening of public sector knowledge that will typically drive down 
costs and increase skill levels over the long-term – benefits that could be 
applied to other PPPs.   
− Reputation damage. Unanticipated events during PPP operations can have 
unexpected consequences for the public partner. Even though its private 
partner is responsible for service delivery, there is potential for negative media 
attention to be misdirected to government when things go wrong.  The public 
partner may need to take proactive action in order to protect its reputation 
through awareness-raising initiatives or other means of direct action.   
Governments’ reputation can also be damaged if governance, probity and 
compliance frameworks are not properly adhered to by their employees. 
 
 
4.4 Performance Management  
 
This section outlines performance management definitions, theoretical frameworks, 
principles, processes and issues within the operational phase context of PPP.   
 
4.4.1 Definitions 
 
Key definitions relate to: 
− Performance management; 
− Performance evaluation. 
− Key Performance Indicators; and  
 
 
According to Mwita (2000), ‘performance management’ is a systems-based method of 
developing an ‘achievement culture’ by linking together organisational objectives 
through the modification of behaviours, outputs, and outcomes.  This definition is 
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similar to the perspective offered by Armstrong (in McAdam, Hazlett and Casey 2005) 
who emphasises the importance of inter-connectedness of people and information in 
achieving objectives, by stating: “[performance management is a] strategic and 
integrated process that delivers sustained success to organisations by improving the 
performance of people who work in them and by developing the capabilities of 
individual contributors and teams”.  This definition is closely aligned with the version 
chosen for this research, and one that has been adopted by the Australian 
Commonwealth Government – “Performance management in the [Australian Public 
Service] is the use of inter-related strategies and activities to improve the performance 
of individuals, teams and organisations” (Management Advisory Committee 2001: 
p.14).  Although it is in itself a broad statement, it does apply directly to government 
and can be used for PPP.   
 
A ‘Key Performance Indicator’ (KPI) or performance ‘measure’ / ‘indicator’ (Wall and 
Martin 2003), is a type of performance measure used to evaluate the success of the 
delivery of services and other endeavours in both public and private organisations.  
Pallister and Isaacs (1996: p.376) assert that KPI management is integral to long-term 
organisational success and that indicators should be used to identify both strengths 
and weaknesses. Operational indicators relate to the success and profitability of the 
supply of services including productivity and output. This differs from a view offered by 
Cox, Issa and Ahrens (2003): according to the latter, KPIs are used to assess task-
based employee performance. For this research, however, KPIs are defined as 
indicators that are used to evaluate the achievement of intended VfM outcomes, and 
are used for comparing actual performance against specified targets in terms of 
establishing the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery.   
 
Performance evaluation for this research is defined as a systematic (and continuous) 
process of gathering, monitoring and analysing data against KPIs to determine how 
well the private partner is performing against its contractual obligations (Australian 
National Audit Office 1996: p.3; Grimsey and Lewis 2004: p.159).  For public partner 
contract managers, evaluation includes preparing options that may be taken against 
under-performing service providers e.g. whether to apply penalties or abatement 
(Burney and Swanson 2010; Atkinson et al 1997). Without making comparisons 
between baseline measures and actual performance, it would be impossible to 
determine how well or poorly (Behn 2003) a service provider is performing.   
 
4.4.2 Theoretical Frameworks 
 
Performance management’ is usually understood as an intra-organisational 
requirement associated with the achievement of stated objectives, and in some 
instances, competitive benchmarking. It is therefore important to identify if the 
principles, processes and issues of performance management theory are applicable to 
the private partner’s performance in delivering agreed services under PPP 
arrangements. Understanding this places the development of an integrated 
management model on a firm theoretical base. 
 
‘The Balanced Scorecard’ approach, advocated by Kaplan and Norton (1996), can be 
applied to translate the aims, values and strategies of an organisation into a well-
defined set of performance measures.  These measures can be used as a framework 
for strategic management purposes that drive operational performance. The measures 
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developed using this approach extend both to external factors e.g. stakeholders and 
internal factors e.g. critical processes and employee learning and growth. They are 
balanced between an organisation’s historical efforts and what decision-makers hope 
to achieve in the future.  Also integral to the Scorecard is the development of a blend 
of outcome measures (lagging indicators) and performance drivers (leading indicators) 
(Kaplan and Norton 1996: p.31). Some of these will be objective (and simple to 
quantify) and subjective (often harder to evaluate and based upon personal judgement 
e.g. the extent to which ‘value’ has been achieved) (Kaplan and Norton 1996: p.10).   
 
Kaplan and Norton (1996) claim that the Balanced Scorecard approach will assist 
decision-makers to clarify and translate vision and strategy; communicate and link 
strategic objectives and measures; plan, set targets and align strategic initiatives; and 
enhance strategic feedback and learning.  An outline of each is provided below and is 
illustrated in Fig. 4.6:   
 
Strategic feedback and learning
• Articulating the shared vision
• Supplying strategic feedback
• Facilitating strategy review 
and learning 
Clarifying and translating the 
vision and strategy
• Clarifying the vision
• Gaining consensus 
Planning and target setting
• Setting targets
• Aligning strategic initiatives
• Allocating resources
• Establishing milestones
Communicating and linking
• Communicating and 
educating
• Setting goals
• Linking rewards to 
performance measures
Balanced
Scorecard
 
Reprinted with permission from "Translating Strategy into Action:  The Balanced Scorecard " by Kaplan, R.S., Norton, D.P.  
Copyright © 1996 by the Harvard Business School Press; all rights reserved. 
Fig. 4.6 The Balanced Scorecard as a Strategic Framework for Action  
(Source:  Kaplan and Norton 1996). 
 
− Clarify and translate vision and strategy (Kaplan and Norton 1996: p.10). At the 
highest level, this process involves the senior management group deciding 
upon and interpreting organisational strategy into specific strategic objectives 
and measures.  
− Communicate and link strategic objectives and measures (Kaplan and Norton 
1996: p.12-13). The objectives and measures must then be communicated to 
employees and other stakeholders, as appropriate.  Communication should be 
used as a signal for transmitting the message that for the strategy to succeed, 
the objectives must first be met.  
− Plan, set targets and align strategic initiatives (Kaplan and Norton 1996: p.13). 
The authors state that the Balanced Scorecard is most effective when it is used 
to drive organisational change. Therefore the senior management group should 
develop targets for the medium-term (between three and five years) to give 
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sufficient time to transform the organisation (however short-term targets should 
also be considered depending on how responsive the organisation has to be 
towards its stakeholder attitudes / current operating environment).  
− Enhance strategic feedback and learning (Kaplan and Norton 1996: p.15). The 
Balanced Scorecard allows the senior management group to monitor and 
modify the implementation of their strategy or make more significant changes to 
it, if necessary. This may have knock-on effects in terms of communicating 
changes to staff (or stakeholders more generally), (re)educating them and 
motivating them.   
 
The Balanced Scorecard can therefore assist decision-makers to measure their 
organisation’s value creation and how they can improve internal capabilities and 
investment in people, systems and procedures that lead to better performance (Kaplan 
and Norton 1996: p.8). It also enables senior executives to oversee short-term 
performance (via financial results) whilst simultaneously monitoring the organisation’s 
progress in developing its longer-term capabilities (Kaplan and Norton 1996: p.8).  In 
doing so, the Scorecard measures organisational performance across a range of 
balanced perspectives – financial, customer, internal business processes, learning 
and growth, and employee empowerment.  These components are illustrated below in 
Fig. 4.7 (using a limited number of hypothetical examples for the public partner in 
PPP) and comprise the following:   
 
Goals
Financial perspective
Measures
Maximise cost savings Value for Money ratios
Goals
Quality workforce
Employee empowerment perspective
Measures
Self assessment
Quality work environment
Executive leadership
Quality of work environment as 
defined by employees 
Quality and integrity of leadership 
as defined by employees 
Goals
Meet current  professional 
development goals
Learning and growth perspective
Measures
Professional development goals are 
achieved as per development plan
Goals
Timeliness
Customer (government’s view of service provider) perspective
Measures
Timely delivery by service provider 
defined by the contract
Goals
Effective contract management 
oversight 
Internal business perspective
Measures
Assessment of internal contract 
management processes
  Reprinted with permission from "Translating Strategy into Action:  The Balanced Scorecard " by Kaplan, R.S., Norton, D.P. Copyright © 1996 by the Harvard Business School Press; 
all rights reserved. 
Fig. 4.7 The Balanced Scorecard for the Federal Procurement System  
(adapted from Kaplan and Norton 1996). 
 
− Financial perspective. This involves linking an organisation’s financial 
objectives to its corporate strategy in order to improve its financial performance.  
Typically, these objectives underpin the objectives and measures contained in 
each of the other Scorecard perspectives (Kaplan and Norton 1996: p.47).   
In context of government, Kaplan and Norton (1996: p.180) claim that the 
financial perspective will rarely be the primary objective (this assertion, 
however, is difficult to reconcile as price / cost is undoubtedly a key factor in 
determining VfM propositions for PPP – see ‘3.4 Public Private Partnership’ for 
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‘VfM’ definitions).  Depending on circumstances, financial objectives for the 
public partner can be regarded either as enablers or constraints within which 
the government must operate (Niven 2003: p.34), with respect to delivering 
intended social outcomes through PPP mechanisms. 
− Customer perspective. This perspective of the Balanced Scorecard for a 
commercial firm is about deciding which customer groups and market segments 
it wishes to compete for and then aligning customer outcome measures with its 
financial measures for revenue generating purposes (Kaplan and Norton 1996: 
p.63).  According to Niven (2003: p.33-34), defining who ‘customers’ are for 
government can be “perplexing” due to a wide array of interested parties that 
seek to influence or gain from public sector decision-making.  In context of 
PPP, government can be viewed as the ‘customer-by-proxy’ in terms of service 
delivery arrangements secured and rendered on behalf of the state – however it 
is acknowledged that end users (for example) are intended beneficiaries of 
these services.  The public partner therefore acts as an agent on behalf of 
certain stakeholder interests in pursuing VfM outcomes for them. These 
propositions characterise the drivers and lead indicators for designing the 
customer outcome measures (Kaplan and Norton 1996: p.63).  
− Internal business process perspective. This is about identifying the processes 
that are vital for realising customer / stakeholder objectives (Kaplan and Norton 
1996: p.92).  These objectives and measures are normally designed after the 
financial and customer perspectives have been completed.  Developing them in 
this order enables the senior management group to focus their business 
process metrics on the “complete internal process value chain” to identify 
current and future stakeholder needs as well as service delivery improvements 
(Kaplan and Norton 1996: p.92).   
− Learning and growth perspective. The objectives that are established in the 
perspectives above form the basis for identifying what the organisation must do 
to achieve “breakthrough” performance (Kaplan and Norton 1996: p.126).  
Learning and growth objectives provide the means to support the achievement 
of the other perspectives’ objectives.  As government is focussed on attaining 
positive social outcomes, it can be heavily reliant upon the skills and 
commitment of its employees (and the tools they use) to deliver its goals (Niven 
2003: p.35).  
− Employee empowerment perspective. Kaplan and Norton (1996: p.136) assert 
that employees, even those who are highly skilled and have access to the 
information they need to do the job well, may not fully contribute to 
organisational success if they are not motivated to act in its best interests or if 
they are not given sufficient autonomy to make decisions and take actions (not 
being provided with the right resources could be another reason).  Section 
‘4.2.3 Partnership Management Principles’ provides examples of how these 
types of factors can impact upon public partner employees including the sorts of 
challenges they may face during PPP operations.   
 
A second framework that can be used by government is ‘The Performance Prism’.  
This is a flexible framework that has been deliberately designed to manage one or 
more components of an organisation’s performance, which can be applied for 
instance, to multi-stakeholder group interests or an individual business process 
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(Neely, Adams and Kennerley 2002: p.160).  The Performance Prism can be used to 
identify the key elements of strategies, processes and capabilities and then for 
developing an appropriate measurement system to satisfy stakeholder and 
organisational requirements (Neely, Adams and Kennerley 2002).   
 
According to Neely, Adams and Kennerley (2002: p.181), in order to fully understand 
‘performance’, it is necessary to view its numerous and inter-connected perspectives.  
This is possible, they say, through the application of The Performance Prism.  This 
framework consists of five inter-linked performance perspectives – Stakeholder 
satisfaction, Stakeholder contribution, Strategies, Processes and Capabilities.  Each is 
summarised below under Fig. 4.8:   
 
Stakeholder
satisfaction
Stakeholder
contribution
Strategies Capa
bilities
Processes
Stakeholder
demand
Satisfaction 
delivery
Strategic 
direction
Solutions 
development
 
“The Performance Prism: The Scorecard for Measuring and Managing Business Success”, Neely, Adams and  
Kennerley. © Pearson Education Limited 2002. 
Fig. 4.8 The Performance Prism  
(Source:  Neely, Adams and Kennerley 2002). 
− Stakeholder satisfaction. The senior management group must decide which 
stakeholder wants and needs will be represented. Thus, the foundation for 
deciding what to measure is based upon identifying who the organisation’s 
stakeholders are and ascertaining their requirements.  
− Stakeholder contribution. The authors stress this perspective is subtly different 
to ‘stakeholder satisfaction’. It is distinctive in the realisation that not all 
customers / stakeholders have a desire or need to be loyal or profitable.  
Instead, they may be more interested in, for example, purchasing superior 
services at an equitable price and obtaining a sense of satisfaction from the 
services that they use.  It is the organisation, they say, that ought to be 
concerned about issues such as loyalty (presumably for long-term profitability 
reasons for commercially-driven firms and the achievement of VfM outcomes 
for governments). Neely, Adams and Kennerley (2002) claim that by developing 
a sound understanding of the “dynamic tension” that exists between customers 
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/ stakeholders and the organisation – in this case, an understanding by the 
public partner of its private partner’s intentions, motives and operational 
challenges – it can be useful in developing or modifying its performance 
management system for assessing service delivery performance.  
− Strategies. Neely, Adams and Kennerley (2002) claim that the majority of 
performance measurement systems wrongly begin at the strategy definition 
stage.  The essential component of this perspective is to adopt strategies that 
accord best with stakeholder satisfaction and contribution. This involves 
developing a set of measures so that contract managers can monitor whether 
strategy implementation is actually being achieved in practice, use the 
measures to communicate the strategy throughout the organisation, applying 
the measures in a way that encourages and motivates the execution of the 
strategy, as well as analysing data to determine whether or not the strategy is 
being delivered as expected (and for the senior management team to make any 
necessary modifications to the strategy).  
− Processes. With regard to developing organisational processes, Neely, Adams 
and Kennerley (2002) assert that five aspects / features should be taken into 
consideration. The first is ‘quality’: this involves measuring consistency, 
reliability, and accuracy, etc. Second is ‘quantity’ which consists of volume, 
throughput and completeness. The third aspect is ‘time’ which can involve 
measuring factors such as availability and timeliness.  Fourth is ‘ease of use’ 
and comprises flexibility, convenience, accessibility, etc. The fifth aspect relates 
to ‘money’ – cost, price and value.  Many of these measures can be used by 
the public partner when monitoring the performance of PPP service providers; 
and the resulting data used as a basis for applying penalties or abatement for 
service under-performance.   
− Capabilities. Capability means bringing together an organisation’s employees, 
practices, technology and supporting infrastructure to meet the needs of 
stakeholders (as described above).  For PPP, for example, this may mean the 
achievement of government objectives i.e. the delivery of VfM outcomes 
through efficient and effective contract management. 
 
4.4.3 Performance Management Principles 
 
Traditionally, the use of performance management systems across the public sector 
has not been widespread and concerns have been expressed about their limited 
application (Management Advisory Board, Management Improvement Advisory 
Committee 1993).  More recently, pressure has been mounting on governments 
(Hoque 2008), including those in Australia (Heinrich 2008) to embrace better 
performance management practices.   
 
According to the Queensland Government’s Department of Public Works, managing 
and monitoring suppler performance is necessary for assessing VfM outcomes (2000: 
p.2).  In its purchasing guide (2000: p.3), the Department states that the purpose of 
effective contract management is to:  
 
 
 
68 
 
“[ensure] that the contracted goods and / or services are delivered in 
accordance with the specification and the terms of the contract, that all 
associated risks are identified and managed and that effective communication 
is maintained between all parties.” 
 
Performance management and monitoring practices should contribute towards the 
effective management of risk, the development of strategic relationships with its 
contractors as well as improving provider capability and their service delivery efforts 
(Department of Public Works 2000: p.2).  Furthermore, the Department emphasises 
the importance of aligning the level of performance monitoring with the risks involved 
in delivering services.  Contract managers should progressively anticipate, identify and 
facilitate potential or actual service shortfalls before supplier relationships are 
damaged and before VfM propositions are compromised (Department of Public Works 
2000: p.5).   
 
Performance management is an essential feature of these types of PPP agreements.  
Thus, performance systems should be used as a tool to ensure that the 
concessionaire is performing its contracted obligations and to give the government an 
understanding of sustainability of contract (Partnerships Victoria 2003a: p.47).  This is 
because the continuous achievement of performance targets by operators can be a 
reliable indicator that PPP objectives will be met.  By evaluating outputs (and 
outcomes), the public partner can take necessary and timely action to address under-
performance (Forrer et al 2010; National Audit Office 2007: p.7) or non-performance.   
 
A limitation for this research has been the inability to obtain much meaningful PPP 
operational data.  Two reasons for this are acknowledged.  The first relates to PPP as 
a form of procurement – PPP is relatively new compared with other forms of public 
service delivery and infrastructure asset acquisition.  Only a limited number of projects 
have yet reached operational maturity either in Australia or overseas.  It can therefore 
be difficult to develop a benchmark to determine how successful PPP actually is 
against more traditional forms of procurement. The second reason, and perhaps more 
pertinent for this research, is that performance data for individual projects is almost 
entirely protected by ‘commercial in confidence’ arrangements. This means that raw 
data tends to be unavailable for public consumption (as well as other sensitive 
information such as cost structures, profit margins and that which is protected under 
intellectual property agreements).   
 
There has been wide-ranging criticism of ‘commercial in confidence’ practices from a 
number of concerned PPP stakeholders ranging from the media (Davidson 2007); 
academics (Yuan et al 2009); to the Auditor-General for Australia (Barrett 2003: p.38).  
However from the viewpoint of this research, the limitation means that there is a lack 
of industry and academic studies to cite in the exposition of the establishment and 
application of performance management principles.  Nevertheless, issues that have 
been identified from this literature review on performance management are:  KPI 
modification, availability of performance data, contract management and the 
application of penalties / abatement.  Each is discussed separately.   
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KPI modification:   
 
Lee and Fisher (2007) assert that there is a strong correlation between the attainment 
of organisational objectives and effective performance management. Although 
optimum levels of performance are not prescribed by Partnerships Victoria in its 
guidance material for PPP (nor subsequently by Infrastructure Australia in the national 
PPP guidelines published in 2008), KPIs should be relevant, reliable and accurate 
(Partnerships Victoria 2003a: p.131).  Adhering to these principles may appear simple; 
however programs (or in this case the achievement of PPP objectives) can fail due to 
poorly defined KPIs (Evans and Bellamy 1995).  Ideally, but depending upon the 
nature of the contract, performance ranges for KPIs should be reviewed regularly in 
conjunction with the concessionaire.   
 
The need for KPI modification may arise for a number of reasons including:  
− KPIs may not be ‘fit for purpose’.  This may arise because the understanding of 
the public partner and concessionaire during the contract design stage is limited 
with regard to what the future operating environment will actually be like 
(Mandri-Perrott 2010: p.152; Brenninkmeijer in Urio 2010: p.93). A lack of 
information can increase levels of uncertainty.   
− There may be too many (or too few) KPIs that need to be evaluated 
(Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 2005: p.36); the former perhaps being 
driven by over-exuberance to oversee all perceived aspects of operational 
performance and the latter perhaps by a lack of engagement with detail or due 
to limitations of skill or resourcing.   
− Changes to service delivery requirements that may arise from contract 
variations e.g. the uptake of new or modified services by service operators or 
from government interventions (see section ‘4.3.3 Risk Management Principles’ 
for more information).   
− A lack of clarity.  Evidence shows that KPIs can be vague and thus open to 
interpretation (Edwards et al 2004: p.45). This can be exacerbated by changes 
of staff (Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 2005: p.36) and differing 
perceptions or interpretations of performance outcomes.   
 
Modifications should therefore be relevant, measurable, repeatable and achievable. 
 
Availability of performance data:   
 
For this research, the availability of effective performance data – that is data which 
allows informed judgement and decisions to be made about operational progress – is 
linked to the prior construction of appropriate KPIs.  If the KPIs are poorly designed, 
the data obtained from evaluating performance against these measures are likely to 
be of limited or no value.   
 
Contract management:  
 
The best way for the public partner to hold its private partner accountable for 
performance is through the continuous application of contract administration (AECOM 
70 
 
2007: p.84-85).  This is important because if performance is not well managed, it can 
put VfM outcomes at risk (National Audit Office 2009b: p.55).   
 
Edwards et al (2004: p.49) state that, without a strong understanding of the service 
delivery environment (e.g. lack of performance data as a reference to the 
establishment of KPIs), public partner contract managers will find it difficult to 
accurately evaluate operational performance.  Therefore contract managers should 
develop a hands-on role to ensure VfM propositions are maintained over time.  This, of 
course, will be tempered by the extent to which the private partner is required to report 
appropriately under contractual agreements (Partnerships Victoria 2003a: p.46).  In 
Victoria (Australia), regular monitoring is supplemented with periodic Gateway 
Reviews.  ‘Gate 6’ is a component of a formal review process, undertaken by the 
Department of Treasury and Finance or its nominees, that compares the benefits set 
out in project business cases with the achievement of these benefits at key points 
during operations (Department of Treasury and Finance 2009a: p.9).   
 
Performance evaluation should be ongoing in nature with the data collected being 
used potentially as a basis for developing further, or refining existing, control actions 
(Partnerships Victoria 2003a: p.47) and managing emerging risks (Partnerships 
Victoria 2003a: p.16).  This is particularly relevant where operators fail to maintain 
expected service standards as stipulated under concession deeds that then lead to 
penalty clauses being activated.   
 
Penalties and abatements:  
 
KPIs can be used as a mechanism to calculate the level of payment that will be made 
by the public partner to its private partner (Javed, Lam and Zou 2013), commensurate 
with the operator’s performance (Mandri-Perrott 2010: p.152).  If the desired levels of 
performance are not achieved, a warning notice or penalty points may be issued.  The 
accumulation of penalty points will typically lead to an abatement being applied 
although abatement can be enforced without consideration of points depending on the 
seriousness of the performance shortfall or breach of contract.   
 
The National Audit Office (2009b: p.56) states that historically in the UK, only a small 
percentage of penalties in practice have been applied for under-performance.  It is 
claimed that the rationale for non-enforcement can be justified on a number of fronts, 
but typically, penalties can be deferred to improve working relationships between the 
partners (or to prevent them from deteriorating further) or to off-set under-performing 
services with other services rendered (National Audit Office 2009b: p.56).  It appears, 
in practice, the threat of applying abatement may have the desired effect by providing 
“sufficient incentive” for the private partner to improve its performance in line with the 
contract and service specifications (Ernst & Young 2008: p.13), at least in some 
instances.   
 
4.4.4 Summary of Performance Management Issues  
 
The relevant issues of PPP performance management discussed in this section can 
be summarised as:    
− KPI modification.  KPIs should be relevant, reliable and accurate.  The need for 
modification may arise due to a number of reasons: KPIs may not be ‘fit for 
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purpose’; there may be too many or too few KPIs that need to be evaluated as 
part of service delivery arrangements; changes to service delivery 
requirements; and a lack of KPI clarity.   
− Availability of performance data.  If KPIs are poorly designed, the data obtained 
from evaluating performance against these measures will be of limited or no 
value.   
− Contract management.  The best way for the public partner to hold its private 
partner accountable for their performance is through the continuous application 
of contract administration.  Without a strong understanding of the PPP service 
delivery environment, public partner contract managers will find it difficult to 
accurately evaluate operational performance. Therefore contract managers 
should develop a hands-on role to ensure VfM propositions are maintained over 
time. Performance evaluation should be ongoing with the data collected 
potentially being used as a basis for developing control actions and managing 
emerging risks.   
− Penalties and abatements. If KPIs indicate that agreed service delivery levels 
are not achieved, penalty points may be issued. The accumulation of penalty 
points will typically lead to an abatement being applied.  However, abatement 
may be waived in favour of more strategic considerations.   
 
 
4.5 Summary 
 
This Chapter establishes partnership, risk and performance management as essential 
elements within a PPP administrative environment. It provides the definitions, 
theoretical frameworks, principles and processes for each element, using the 
perspective of the public partner in PPP.  It also provides context for the research 
problem by establishing a foundation that can be used for investigating these 
elements at an operational level that should lead to better VfM outcomes.   
 
Specific issues identified for PPP partnership management include: organisational 
culture, management commitment and support, employee capability and expertise, 
clear and open communication, relationship continuity and conflict management.   
 
For PPP risk management, the issues identified include: contract variation, change of 
consortium members, contract termination, end of concession hand-over, skills 
transfer and reputation damage.   
 
PPP performance management raises issues such as: KPI modification, availability of 
performance data, contract management and the application of penalties and 
abatement.   
 
The next Chapter examines the partnership, risk and performance management 
practices within the setting of selected case studies of Australian PPP, thus attempting 
to align theory of this Chapter with practice and enable a more meaningful 
understanding of the issues.     
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Chapter 5: Partnership, Risk and Performance 
Management in Practice – Selected Australian 
Examples 
 
 
 5.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter explores the presence of partnership, risk and performance 
management issues (that were identified in Chapters 3 and 4) in the context of real 
PPPs: 
− Spencer Street (Southern Cross) Station Re-development; 
− EastLink; 
− New Royal Children’s Hospital Project; 
− CityLink;   
− New Schools Privately Financed Project; and  
− Cross City Tunnel. 
 
The six case studies all relate to Australian PPP experiences. They have been 
selected due to the amount and range of publically available information on these 
projects including information that impacts directly on the operating phase. Public 
information about specific PPP projects is usually scarce; is rarely comprehensively 
objective; and seldom covers the operational phase. Four cases are based in 
Victoria and the remaining two in New South Wales. For each case study project, the 
extant evidence is examined to explore the presence and nature of partnership, risk 
and performance management issues identified in the preceding literature review; 
and to reveal any additional concerns associated with these three management 
disciplines. Relevant generic issues arising from each case study is presented which 
comprise examples from both Social and Economic infrastructure projects. 
 
A new sub-issue is identified that is applicable to, or has the potential to affect each 
of these case study projects: change to public partner’s agency authority.  To provide 
context for this sub-issue, PPPs in Australia are established under state government 
law (as distinct from Australian Commonwealth or Federal law). Typically for 
Economic Infrastructure projects, statutory authorities are established to enforce 
legislation in order to achieve government objectives. This includes managing PPP 
contracts on behalf of the state. Although largely dependent upon the structures and 
specific arrangements of each PPP, once projects move from procurement and 
delivery to operations, statutory authorities can be re-structured to incorporate other 
projects or functions under a single governance framework (e.g. to expand scope of 
responsibility, create efficiencies of scale, etc). This differs from most Social 
Infrastructure projects which are aligned with the government agency (the client) 
considered to have the greatest level of expertise in providing management 
oversight throughout the asset’s lifecycle e.g. the Victorian Department of Health for 
the new Royal Children’s Hospital Project and the New South Wales Department of 
Education and Training for the New Schools Privately Financed Project.   
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With respect to the case study projects presented in this Chapter, the Spencer Street 
(Southern Cross) Station Re-development (a Social Infrastructure project) is an 
exception.  The Southern Cross Station Authority was set up in 2000 to represent the 
Victorian State Government (Southern Cross Station Authority 2008: p.10) and was 
wound up in 2009, after the project had successfully transitioned into the operational 
phase (Department of Transport 2009: p.133). At that time, the Authority’s 
responsibilities were transferred to the Department of Transport, V/Line and MetLink 
with the assets and liabilities of the Authority being assigned to the Department with 
the latter’s commitments extending to 30 June 2036 (Department of Transport 2009: 
p.114). The responsibilities of the other statutory authorities (for the Economic 
Infrastructure projects) were also transferred after operations commenced (although 
this did not occur with regard to the Sydney Cross City Tunnel’s Roads and Traffic 
Authority until a much later time (it was merged with New South Wales Maritime at 
the end of 2011) and the functions of the CityLink’s Director, Melbourne City Link, 
were transferred to VicRoads in 2004, for example, due to legislative changes 
(Victorian Auditor-General 2004: p.62)).   
 
All this serves to counter any notion that the parties and concession periods are fixed 
in PPPs. Consortia members comprising the private partner may change; 
concession periods may be re-negotiated; and the responsibility for governance may 
be re-assigned within government. 
 
 
 5.2 Spencer Street (Southern Cross) Station Re-development 
 
The Spencer Street Station (now known as Southern Cross Station) re-development 
project was the Victorian Government’s centrepiece of a $700 million plan (Kestigan 
2005) intended to transform the existing railway station and bus terminus into a 
“world-class inter-modal transport facility” (Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p. 37), 
capable of managing 15 million commuters a year (Brumby and Batchelor 2002) and 
increasing to 45 million passengers annually by 2020 (Kestigan 2005).  The station 
serves metropolitan, regional and interstate rail and bus passengers. 
 
Specifically, the Government’s objectives (Department of Treasury and Finance in 
Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.37) were to:  
− Minimise public funding over the long-term with regard to construction, upkeep 
and operation (with the State investing $300 million of the $700 million total) 
into this enterprise, with the consortium paying $100 million in maintenance 
fees over the life of the contract (Brumby and Batchelor 2002); 
− Transfer risk to the private partner, where it represented VfM, such as the bulk 
of design, construction, finance and operational risks for the transport 
interchange and commercial development, as well as risks relating to the 
construction of the rail and signalling network (Victorian Auditor-General 
2007a: p.40);  
− Allow for cost-effective growth in patronage and new services for transport 
and infrastructure (such as the proposed $5 billion regional train connection 
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that would provide a link between Melbourne and the western suburbs (The 
Age 2012); and    
− Deliver the project using a transparent and accountable approach including 
upholding highest standards of integrity.   
 
During 2000, the Southern Cross Station Authority, a statutory body established to 
represent the Victorian State Government (until it was wound up during 2009 with its 
statutory powers transferred to the Department of Transport, V/Line and MetLink), 
was charged with managing the procurement and delivery phases of the Station re-
development (Southern Cross Station Authority 2008: p.10) and overseeing its 
operations. For this project, continuing operation of the existing station during 
construction was essential.  In 2002, a private sector consortium, Civic Nexus Pty 
Ltd, signed a Services and Development Agreement with the Authority to design, 
build and then take operational responsibility for the Station over a period of 30 years 
(Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.35).   
 
The consortium was made up from the following companies (Partnerships Victoria 
2003b: p.16):   
− ABN AMRO, the project financier;  
− Leightons Contractors, contracted to re-build the station and up-grade the 
station’s rail infrastructure;  
− Nicholas Grimshaw and Partners (in association with Daryl Jackson 
Architecture), engaged for architectural design;  
− Honeywell Limited, contracted to provide asset management services; and  
− Delaware North Australia, for providing operation and maintenance services.   
 
Construction of Southern Cross Station commenced during 2002 (Partnerships 
Victoria 2003b: p.15) with work scheduled to be completed by April 2005, at which 
time, the management of the Station’s operations would be handed to the 
consortium (Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.38).  In 2006, however, operational 
management of the Southern Cross Station was transferred to Civic Nexus Pty Ltd 
(Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.53) e.g. due to delays and contractual disputes 
(Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.38; Tomazin and Myer 2006). 
 
During hand-over, the Southern Cross Station Authority had responsibility for 
oversight of the Services and Development Agreement. Its key deliverables therefore 
became: monitoring and assessing the consortium’s management and operational 
delivery (based on agreed KPIs), managing a number of capital projects within the 
precinct and assuming its obligations relating the land it owns within the broader 
station precinct (Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.53).   
 
5.2.1 Partnership Management 
 
Management commitment and support:  
 
During transition into the operational phase, the Southern Cross Station Authority 
held the view that it was preferable that Civic Nexus Pty Ltd was given an 
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opportunity to resolve operational lapses rather than applying abatement for all 
instances of under-performance – it was expected that such decision-making would 
help to build a “positive ongoing working relationship” (Victorian Auditor-General 
2007a: p.59, p.60) between the partners. Thus, the Southern Cross Station Authority 
enforced only one abatement during the first year of operations even though the 
concessionaire failed to meet its performance targets in three out of four financial 
quarters (Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.59).  These decisions were taken on 
the basis of a commitment made by Civic Nexus Pty Ltd to improve its performance 
monitoring system capabilities (Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.60).  However, 
failure to follow through on the assurance would mean that abatement could be 
applied retrospectively (Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.60).   
 
As stated in Chapter 4, the UK’s National Audit Office (2009b: p.56) asserts that 
such penalties are rarely applied in practice (it may also be that decisions are taken 
by public partners not to enforce abatement in full) for service provider under-
performance.  It may be that, in some circumstances, public sector decision-makers 
view these situations as an opportunity to improve working relationships with its 
private partner or to off-set under-performing services with better performing services 
(National Audit Office 2009b: p.56).   
 
Employee capability and expertise:  
 
The 2007 audit undertaken by the Victorian Auditor-General’s Office identified a 
range of limitations and skill deficiencies in context of the Southern Cross Station 
Authority’s ability to successfully perform its management and oversight role of Civic 
Nexus Pty Ltd, e.g. the allocation of a single contract manager for monitoring all of 
the consortium’s performance outputs (Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.58).  The 
audit team found, for instance, that improvements could be made by the Southern 
Cross Station Authority through updating its asset management plans, clarifying / 
simplifying the KPI measurement regime, enhancing data integrity and addressing 
skill gaps of its staff (Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.58).  Generally speaking, if 
unresolved, this type of situation may test the public partner’s capacity (and therefore 
ability) to effectively manage the terms of the Services and Development Agreement.  
A lack of sufficient resourcing can make it difficult for contract managers to monitor 
the effectiveness of service provider performance, particularly over an extended 
period of time which may hinder the achievement of genuine VfM outcomes and 
compromise public safety.   
 
Conflict management:  
 
With construction of Southern Cross Station commencing during 2002 (Partnerships 
Victoria 2003b: p.15), work was scheduled to be completed by April 2005, at which 
time, the management of the Station’s operations would be handed over to the 
consortium (Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.38).  However, delays, cost overruns 
(Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.38) (e.g. the unanticipated costs of providing 
continuous 24 hour access required by rail operators during the construction phase), 
as well as contractual disputes (e.g. the threat of being forced to pay millions of 
dollars in liquidated damages (Das 2005)), all impacted on the attainment of project 
milestones and ultimately affected the parallel delivery of commuter services. On one 
occasion this led Wal King, the Chief Executive of Leightons Contractors, to 
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publically state that the company had a subservient “master-slave” relationship with 
the Government (Tomazin and Myer 2006), alleging the State had breached the 
‘spirit’ of the Partnerships Victoria guidelines and blamed inaction by the 
Government for delays and increased costs relating to the western section of the 
project (that were anticipated by Leightons Contractors to exceed $50 million) 
(Hannan 2004). A public sector spokesperson countered the accusation made by Mr 
King by denying that the Government had not co-operated with the company and 
was therefore not responsible for the cost blow-outs, and accused Leighton 
Contractors of trying to shift the blame (Hannan 2004).  However, during mid-2005, 
the Victorian State Government agreed to forgo potential damages claims in 
exchange for Civic Nexus Pty Ltd withdrawing its writ against the Government (Das 
2005).   
 
5.2.2 Risk Management 
 
Implementation of operational transition plan:  
 
Implementation of operational transition plan is an issue that has not previously been 
identified to date in the literature review. The audit undertaken by the Victorian 
Auditor-General’s Office in 2007 (Victorian Auditor-General 2007a) identified a 
number of issues with regard to the Southern Cross Station Authority’s performance 
management system (see Table 5.1, below).  Although (in context of this case study 
project) the matter is essentially presented as a performance management issue, 
there are also significant risk management implications.  These relate to incomplete 
asset management plans (e.g. that could give rise to wrong-doing, fraud or theft of 
assets), reliance upon inaccurate operational data as well as difficulties with KPI 
measurement and trend reporting (e.g. all potentially leading to poor decision-making 
and achievement of VfM outcomes).   
 
In responding to the audit team’s recommendation that the Southern Cross Station 
Authority should address these inadequacies, the Authority’s Chief Executive Officer, 
Tony Canavan, agreed with the finding, stating that the partners were committed to 
working together to improve operational performance (Victorian Auditor-General 
2007a: p.43). Commenting upon the management of Southern Cross Station 
Authority’s performance since operational handover to consortia, Mr Canavan 
remarked (Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.43):   
 
“It should be appreciated that the operating phase of the PPP commenced 
just over one year ago and for a significant portion of this period was in a 
transition phase…this settling-in period has been invaluable in establishing 
the groundwork for the future and enabling the development of an effective 
working relationship between the [Southern Cross Station Authority] and the 
concessionaire”. 
 
Change of consortium members / change to public partner’s agency authority: 
 
Change to the public partner’s agency authority was not previously identified during 
literature review.  See section 5.1 above, for details.   
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Reputation damage: 
 
Between 2006 and 2009, over 130 staff working at the newly-finished Southern 
Cross Station precinct complained that diesel fumes from idling trains were affecting 
their health (Lucas 2010; 2011).  However, the ‘cause’ of the complaints was 
rebuffed by a spokesman for the station operator, who cited a lack of evidence and 
claimed that since 2002, regular air quality testing showed that fumes were well 
within prescribed safety levels (Lucas 2010).  In spite of this, and in an apparent ‘U 
Turn’ implied by Lucas (2011), the Victorian State Government (through the 
Department of Transport) agreed to partially fund a proposal for installing extraction 
fans to improve air quality at the Station.   
 
This is an example of how unanticipated events (Joyner 2007; Hodge and Greve 
2005: p.110) – e.g. unsubstantiated ‘facts’ – may impact upon operational oversight.  
It could therefore be perceived (based on the information above) that the 
Government’s decision to intervene was driven by a need to be ‘seen to be doing 
something’ so as to avert prolonged negative media attention (Karlsen 2002) over 
this matter.   
 
5.2.3 Performance Management 
 
Contract monitoring systems modification:  
 
Contract monitoring systems modification is another issue that has not previously 
been identified during literature review.  According to the Victorian Auditor-General 
(2007a: p.55), the Southern Cross Station Authority had, by the time of the audit, 
commissioned a review of its performance management system, which was primarily 
used for recording KPI non-performance.  Table 5.1 below outlines the key issues 
identified.    
 
Table 5.1 Issues Arising From a Performance Management System Review. 
(Source: Victorian Auditor-General 2007a).  
Used with permission from the Victorian Auditor-General's Office. 
 
In response to the findings, the Southern Cross Station Authority, in its annual report, 
pledged that, over the course of the following year, it would continue to work with 
Issue Outcome  
Asset management plan is 
incomplete 
Only 800 of the approximately 3,000 assets are 
registered. This impacts the ability of the key service 
providers responsible for maintenance to effectively 
schedule maintenance and ensure compliance 
Integrity of data reported by the key 
service providers is unverified 
Documentation showed some instances of inaccurate 
data entered into the system by key service providers. 
There is potential for undetected or unreported incidents, 
as well as intentional fraud 
KPI measurement is difficult Many of the KPIs require physical attendance at the 
location and a manual survey 
Current reporting requirements do 
not allow for trend analysis 
Hinders the Southern Cross Station Authority’s ability to 
assess overall performance and VfM  
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Civic Nexus Pty Ltd to improve the services it provides to the State (Southern Cross 
Station Authority 2008: p.7; Southern Cross Station Authority 2009: p.7).   
 
KPI modification: 
 
As part of the Services and Development Agreement for managing the Station, Civic 
Nexus Pty Ltd is obliged to meet 15 service standards and 60 related KPIs as well as 
developing and maintaining a range of documentation including quarterly 
performance reports, operating manuals, quality assurance manuals, asset 
management plans and annual reports (Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.54).  As 
stated above, the audit found that a number of the service standards and KPIs were 
difficult to measure which impacted on the ability of the Southern Cross Station 
Authority to successfully monitor and review the consortium’s performance (Victorian 
Auditor-General 2007a: p.43, p.54). Thus, the audit team concluded that the 
Southern Cross Station Authority should make “demonstrable progress” in 
addressing its deficiencies (Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.36). This is important 
as without a robust KPI regime, the Southern Cross Station Authority may not have 
been able to enforce service provider under-performance (Victorian Auditor-General 
2007a: p.42).  
 
These findings illustrate a wider point about the need to review KPIs regularly.  
Depending on specifics, there may be a case for the public partner to review KPIs 
annually (in conjunction with service providers) to determine the extent to which 
service delivery is achieving VfM propositions as well as ensuring that KPIs remain 
relevant (Edwards et al 2004: p.45) over time. There may also be justification for 
conducting a more frequent KPI review (over and above the annual review) to 
assess the ongoing appropriateness of performance data including what should be 
used to inform trend analysis (Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.58) for 
performance and risk management purposes.   
 
Availability (and integrity) of performance data:  
 
Although ‘availability of performance data’ was identified as an issue in Chapter 4, 
(linking the availability of effective data with the formulation of appropriate KPIs) this 
case study project highlights the importance of data integrity.  Audit undertaken by 
the Victorian Auditor-General’s Office (2007a: p.58; Table 5.1) found there were 
reported instances of inaccurate data being entered into performance management 
systems by service providers. Such situations, according to the Victorian Auditor-
General, can potentially give rise to undetected or unreported incidents as well as 
fraud (Victorian Auditor-General 2007a: p.58), all of which could detract from the 
achievement of VfM outcomes.   
 
Contract management: 
 
Under the Services and Development Agreement, the role of the Southern Cross 
Station Authority contract manager is to monitor and review the consortium’s 
performance standards through the deployment of a performance management 
system that includes user surveys, scheduled reviews and inspections, transport 
operator and interchange user feedback, and also from audit (Baker and McKenzie 
Solicitors: 2006: p.125). Hence, the performance management system was designed 
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to capture outputs that do not meet stipulated standards as well as complaints 
lodged against the operator (Baker and McKenzie Solicitors 2006).  The data (the 
accuracy of which is self-certified by the concessionaire (Victorian Auditor-General 
2007a: p.57)) is provided to the Southern Cross Station Authority’s contract manager 
by Civic Nexus Pty Ltd on a quarterly basis (Baker and McKenzie Solicitors 2006) for 
assessment and decision on whether an abatement will then be applied (Victorian 
Auditor-General 2007a: p.57). These activities underline the importance of 
conducting regular performance reviews, particularly in instances where operators 
have a track record of failing to maintain expected delivery standards.   
 
Penalties and abatements:  
 
Under the partnership arrangement, Civic Nexus Pty Ltd is offered financial 
incentives to deliver an efficient operating service (Partnerships Victoria 2003b: p.15) 
i.e. in the form of regular structured payments from the State, and conversely, 
deductions are applied by the public partner (typically due to an accumulation of 
penalty points which are then used to calculate an abatement) for failing to meet 
KPIs (Brumby and Batchelor 2002; Baker and McKenzie Solicitors 2006) for 
instances of under-performance or non-compliance. The audit team from the 
Victorian Auditor-General’s Office (2007a: p.35) concluded that the reward and 
sanction regime was satisfactorily aligned to service requirements and performance 
weightings under the Services and Development Agreement and is therefore, fit-for-
purpose.   
 
5.2.4 Summary of Identified Issues  
 
Relevant generic issues arising from this case study are:    
− Management commitment and support.  Under specific circumstances it may 
be preferable for service providers to be given an opportunity to resolve 
operational lapses rather than the public partner applying abatement for all 
instances of under-performance to encourage positive working relationships.  
Failure to follow through on service improvement commitments, resulting in 
continued poor performance, should (although this is not always the case in 
practice) lead to abatement being applied, retrospectively.   
− Employee capability and expertise.  A lack of resourcing can make it difficult 
for public partner contract managers to monitor the effectiveness of service 
provider performance, particularly over an extended period of time. Skill 
limitations may also impact on the public partner’s ability to effectively 
manage contracts which may hinder the achievement of genuine VfM 
outcomes and compromise public safety.   
− Conflict management. Delays, cost overruns and contractual disputes can 
impact on the attainment of service delivery outcomes. Partners should seek 
to continue to work together under these situations to avoid further delays and 
costly litigation. Relationship breakdowns can have a significant effect on 
partnership relations due to the long-term nature of PPP contracts.   
− Implementation of operational transition plan.  Ineffective implementation of 
transition plans can impact on operational delivery (leading to delays or scope 
changes) as well as damaging relations between public and private partners.    
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− Change of consortium members / change to public partner’s agency authority.  
Re-structuring of the public partner entity could expose government to new 
and unintended risks (including how existing risks are managed / resourced) 
and corporate memory loss due to staff transitioning.   
− Reputation damage. Government may choose to intervene in operational 
matters (that they are not responsible for under concession agreements).  
They may do so to avert negative media attention directed towards the public 
sector for issues or mistakes that the private partner is legally accountable for 
resolving. 
− Contract monitoring systems modification. Contract monitoring regimes 
should be regularly reviewed to identify and manage performance / systems 
shortfalls.  These may include deficiencies that relate to, for instance, asset 
management plans, data integrity, KPI measurement and management 
reporting.   
− Availability (and integrity) of performance data. Inaccurate data can potentially 
give rise to undetected or unreported incidents as well as intentional fraud, all 
of which could detract from the achievement of VfM outcomes. 
− KPI modification.  If KPIs are difficult to measure, they can adversely impact 
on the public partner’s ability to successfully monitor and review service 
provider performance.   
− Contract management. Public partner performance management systems 
should be designed to capture outputs that do not meet stipulated standards 
as well as complaints lodged against operators. Regular performance reviews 
should take place (particularly in instances where operators have a track 
record of failing to maintain expected delivery standards).   
− Penalties and abatements.  Financial incentives are offered to operators (in 
the form of regular structured payments from the public partner) and 
conversely, deductions can be applied (typically due to an accumulation of 
penalty points which are then used to calculate an abatement) for failing to 
meet KPIs for instances of under-performance or non-compliance.  Penalties 
and abatements should be consistently applied unless there is a properly 
justified case for not doing so (e.g. to improve positive working relationships – 
see ‘Management commitment and support’).   
 
 
 5.3 EastLink  
 
EastLink was a $2.5 billion project (Linking Melbourne Authority 2009: p.3) built to 
ease urban traffic congestion and shorten vehicle travelling times along what was 
perceived to be a strategically important corridor between Mitcham and Frankston 
(Allen Consulting Group 2006: p.5) in Melbourne’s south-east. It was expected by 
the Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport Authority, the agency responsible for 
providing traffic projections, that the tollway would benefit one and a half million 
people, particularly those living in Melbourne’s eastern and south-eastern suburbs 
(Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport Authority 2008).  
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The project comprised 17 interchanges over 45 kilometres of dual carriageway multi-
lane toll road (Allen Consulting Group 2006: p.IV), 88 bridges (Partnerships Victoria 
2009) and six pedestrian overpasses (Allen Consulting Group 2006: p.IV). It also 
included four railway station upgrades (Office of the Premier 2005) and was the 
State’s second fully-electronic tollway after CityLink (Partnerships Victoria 2009).  At 
the time of construction, it was the largest development of its kind in Victoria 
(Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport Authority 2008) and one of Australia’s 
most significant PPPs in terms of project size (Partnerships Victoria 2009).  
 
The objectives of this venture included (Minter Ellison 2003: p.15):   
− Linking together Transit Cities and activity centres in the Mitcham-Frankston 
corridor;  
− Decreasing travelling times, whist improving travel time reliability in 
Melbourne’s east and south-eastern regions;  
− Improving access in manufacturing and industrial areas for commercial 
vehicle use in and around the Mitcham-Frankston corridor; 
− Reducing traffic build-ups in the surrounding area;  
− Incorporating state-of-the-art road safety facilities during freeway construction 
as part of an ongoing operational and safety program; and  
− Making provision for future integration of surrounding transport networks into 
the project.   
 
According to original projections, EastLink is expected to contribute $15.9 billion to 
the Victorian economy by 2031 through savings in travelling time and benefits to 
business (Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport Authority 2008).   
 
In 2003, the Victorian Government established the Southern and Eastern Integrated 
Transport Authority, a statutory body to manage the bidding process for contracting a 
private partner to procure, deliver, operate EastLink (Linking Melbourne Authority 
2009: p.1; Partnerships Victoria 2009).  Although the functions and powers of the 
Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport Authority have since been transferred to 
Linking Melbourne Authority and then to VicRoads (see ‘Change of consortium 
members / change to public partner’s agency authority’, below), they extended to, for 
example, the evaluation of private consortia tender submissions, administering the 
project’s legal and commercial agreements and ensuring compliance with the 
provisions of the Concession Deed (Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport 
Authority Act 2003: p.9-10).   
 
In 2004, ConnectEast, a private sector consortium, was awarded the concession for 
a period of 39 years (Linking Melbourne Authority 2009: p.1), after which the 
motorway and related assets will be handed to the State (ConnectEast 2009: p.26) 
at no cost.  ConnectEast was thus contracted to design, construct, operate, maintain 
and repair both tollway and off-tollway (Minter Ellison 2003: p.17).  The consortium 
partners consisted of:   
− Macquarie Bank, the project financier (Partnerships Victoria 2009);    
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− A partnership between Thiess and John Holland, engaged for the design, 
construction work and the provision of a tolling system (Southern and Eastern 
Integrated Transport Authority: 2008: p.10);  
− Sociedad Iberica de Construccionnes Electricas, a sub-contractor of Thiess 
and John Holland, hired to develop the tolling system (Benefiits Consulting: 
2008: p.4); and  
− Transfield Services (Australia) Pty Ltd, contracted to manage the highway and 
undertake associated repairs (Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport 
Authority 2009a: p.59).   
 
With work commencing during 2005, EastLink was completed in June 2008 
(Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport Authority: 2008: p.10), within budget 
and some five months ahead of schedule (Partnerships Victoria 2009).   
 
5.3.1 Partnership Management 
 
No partnership management issues have been identified through the collection and 
analysis of secondary data for this Chapter.   
 
5.3.2 Risk Management 
 
Change of consortium members / change to public partner’s agency authority: 
 
As stated in section 5.1, the responsibilities and powers of the Southern and Eastern 
Integrated Transport Authority were enacted during 2003 to oversee and manage the 
procurement phase and the initial operational stage (Southern and Eastern 
Integrated Transport Authority 2009b: p.5) on behalf of the Victorian Government.  In 
2009, its accountabilities were transferred to Linking Melbourne Authority to “better 
reflect [the latter’s] ongoing role in delivering [a range of road] projects which link 
communities, jobs and opportunities” (Linking Melbourne Authority 2010: p.6), thus 
incorporating the statutory role for EastLink into its existing portfolio of projects (for 
the Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport Authority, this change meant that it 
would assume responsibility for overseeing construction of the Peninsula Link inter-
change project (Linking Melbourne Authority 2010: p.6)). However, the following 
year, the obligations were again transferred to another statutory body – VicRoads – 
due to the introduction of Victoria’s Transport Integration Act 2010 (Linking 
Melbourne Authority 2010: p.5). Such changes may have the potential to expose 
government to unintended risks including corporate memory loss due to staff 
changes during critical hand-over periods.   
 
Reputation damage: 
 
Although EastLink became one of the busiest stretches of road in Victoria, with over 
50 million trips being made during its first year of operation (Southern and Eastern 
Integrated Transport Authority: 2009b: p.18), it is considered to be under-used 
(Hutton 2009: p.46) as estimated traffic flows have fallen well short of original 
predictions.  Lower than expected usage may be due, at least in part, to an apparent 
upward trend in the use of public transport (Kirby 2008) and a large volume of 
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commercial (and presumably private) vehicles bypassing the tollways, with drivers 
instead choosing to use local roads (Lucas 2009) to avoid paying toll costs.   
 
It was expected that the development of the new $6.5 million connection between 
Heatherton Road and the Princes Highway in Mulgrave would not only reduce 
travelling times for users whilst improving access to EastLink, but the project would 
directly impact upon drivers’ “need” to rat run through local streets (Minister for 
Roads and Ports 2009). However, the Victorian State Government’s intended 
outcomes for the new connection appear to have had a minor effect on users’ 
behaviour.  For example, figures released in the first half of 2010 by ConnectEast 
indicated that traffic numbers improved marginally, rising from 168,859 average daily 
trips in April to 177,227 in May (ConnectEast 2010a; 2010b) and then to 190,284 in 
May 2011 (ConnectEast 2011).  These user patterns (at least over the short-term) 
suggest that the risk of failing to achieve the original traffic volume forecast is high.   
 
5.3.3 Performance Management 
 
Contract management:  
 
As part of the Service Level Agreement, ConnectEast is obliged to deliver its 
services in line with prescribed KPIs (Linking Melbourne Authority 2009: p.5) that 
focus on customer service deliverables e.g. call centre performance, as well as on 
motorway maintenance e.g. incident response and lane availability, landscape 
appearance, and upkeep of the tolling system e.g. outputs of toll monitoring reports 
and customer complaints (Federal Highway Administration 2009).  ConnectEast 
must assess and report upon its performance, for example, which is benchmarked 
against ‘Operation and Maintenance Best Practices’ (Minter Ellison 2003: p.360).  
Depending on the findings, the State Government (through Linking Melbourne 
Authority) may impose the use of other assessment methods (Minter Ellison 2003: 
p.359).  Furthermore, the KPI regime is reviewed in conjunction with the statutory 
authority to ensure best practice is being maintained (Minter Ellison 2003: p.361), 
during every fifth year.   
 
5.3.4 Summary of Identified Issues  
 
Relevant generic issues arising from this case study are:    
− Change of consortium members / change to public partner’s agency authority.  
The transfer of statutory obligations to other statutory bodies or government 
departments has the potential to expose the public partner to unintended risks 
including corporate memory loss due to staff changes during critical hand-
over periods.   
− Reputation damage.  The government’s reputation can be tarnished if project 
benefits are not fully realised and / or the deliverables fail to meet service user 
expectations.  These types of outcomes can also adversely impact upon the 
general public’s perceptions of whether VfM has been obtained.   
− Contract management. VfM outcomes may not be achieved to their full 
potential unless service outputs are benchmarked against operational best 
practices.  Service delivery performance should therefore be continuously 
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monitored by the public partner.  KPI regimes should be regularly reviewed to 
ensure relevancy.   
 
 
 5.4 New Royal Children’s Hospital Project 
 
The new Royal Children’s Hospital project was a $946 million hospital upgrade 
(Partnerships Victoria 2011).  The project was the biggest re-development of its kind 
in Victoria and designed to improve the quality of the delivery of children’s health 
services (Partnerships Victoria 2008: p.1; Victorian Auditor-General 2009: p.11) 
across the State.  The project comprised a new 165,000 square metre hospital 
facility over seven levels that had the capacity to treat an additional 35,000 patients 
annually, an expansion of existing facilities such as accommodation for parents and 
childcare services, 2,000 car parking spaces, extra play areas and improved access 
to parkland, enhanced research and training facilities (Partnerships Victoria 2011) 
and utilised a range of environmental initiatives that may potentially lead to a 10 % 
reduction in overall energy savings (Lend Lease 2011).  
 
More specifically, the Government’s objectives related to (Partnerships Victoria 
2008: p.2-3):   
− Modern facilities e.g. supply of accessible, cost effective and high quality 
services;  
− Service delivery care e.g. that the provision of services remain operationally 
efficient;  
− People e.g. attraction and retention of high quality employees;  
− Future-proof and flexible e.g. supports adoption / transition to new 
technologies, addresses emerging trends in paediatric healthcare and 
changes to government policy, legislation and standards;  
− Teaching and research e.g. provision of facilities and an active learning 
environment for delivering teaching and research excellence;  
− Stakeholder relationships e.g. development and continuation of productive 
relationships with service users, staff and the community;  
− Value-for-Money e.g. delivery of project within budget and schedule; and  
− Sustainability e.g. adherence to government environmental policies and 
objectives.   
 
The Victorian State Government was the project’s contracting entity and signatory to 
the Project Agreement (Partnerships Victoria 2008: p.10) as well as the owner of all 
operating equipment (to be maintained and replaced by the concessionaire during 
the length of the contract’s operational term (Clayton Utz 2007b: p.202)).  The new 
Royal Children’s Hospital, on behalf of the Government and through the Department 
of Health, will continue to operate all core clinical services, employ and manage 
clinical staff as well as provide training and research facilities (Department of Health 
2012a; Royal Children’s Hospital 2012). The Department’s Major Projects Team is 
thus accountable for delivering the new Royal Children’s Hospital on behalf of the 
State and the new Royal Children’s Project Team is responsible to the Hospital for 
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the delivery of the project (Royal Children’s Hospital 2012). In November 2007, the 
Children’s Health Partnership, a private sector consortium, was awarded the Project 
Agreement to design, build, finance and then maintain the new Royal Children’s 
Hospital for a 25 year period (Partnerships Victoria 2011; Department of Health 
2012a). In December 2036, the facility will be handed back to Government at nil cost 
when the operational phase is complete (Partnerships Victoria 2008: p.19).   
 
The consortium consisted of: 
− Babcock and Brown International Pty Ltd, the project’s equity sponsor 
(Partnerships Victoria 2008: p.10);  
− Goldman Sachs and JBWere, underwriters of the debt finance component for 
the facility’s construction;  
− Bovis Lend Lease, contracted to design, build and commission the new 
amenities (Royal Children’s Hospital 2012); and  
− Spotless P&F Pty, for providing facilities management (Partnerships Victoria 
2011).   
 
Project delivery consisted of two stages. Site preparation for Stage One commenced 
in 2007 (Department of Health 2012b).  This involved the construction works for the 
new hospital as well as initiation of the operational phase (Partnerships Victoria 
2008: p.9) which was scheduled to begin in October 2011 (Royal Children’s Hospital 
2012; Department of Health 2012b).   
 
During that period (in 2008), and after approval from the Minister for Health, 
sponsorship control of the original equity requirement for the Children’s Health 
Partnership was sold by Babcock and Brown International Pty Ltd (the parent 
company) to its London Stock Exchange listed satellite fund called Babcock and 
Brown Public Partnerships (Victorian Auditor-General 2009: p.15) for commercial 
reasons (the fund now trades under the name ‘International Public Partnerships Ltd’ 
(Royal Children’s Hospital 2012)). In 2009, Babcock and Brown International Pty Ltd 
announced that its Australian listed entity, Babcock and Brown Limited had entered 
into voluntary administration (Victorian Auditor-General 2009: p.72).  After seeking 
legal advice, the Government confirmed there was no risk to the State as all equity 
funding had already been paid to the Children’s Hospital Partnership during 2007 
(Victorian Auditor-General 2009: p.71) and therefore neither Babcock and Brown 
International Pty Ltd or Babcock and Brown Public Partnerships were obliged to 
provide further funding (Victorian Auditor-General 2009: p.72) for construction costs 
under terms of the Project Agreement.   
 
The first stage of the project was delivered on time and on budget (Infrastructure 
Partnerships Australia 2012) and the hospital was subsequently judged by 
Infrastructure Partnerships in 2012 as being the best new project in Australia due to 
its “design excellence, engineering quality and its scale” (Infrastructure Partnerships 
Australia 2012). Stage Two is currently underway (commencing in 2012) and 
involves the demolition of buildings no longer required, the development of the 
commercial precinct, underground car park spaces, consulting suites and the current 
site reinstated as parkland (Department of Health 2012b). This final stage of the 
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project is scheduled for completion in December 2014 (Partnerships Victoria 2008: 
p.9).   
 
5.4.1 Partnership Management 
 
Conflict management:  
 
As stipulated under the Project Agreement and for disputes relating to “fact[s], 
matter[s] or thing[s]” in connection with the project, facility or the Agreement (Clayton 
Utz 2007b: p.271), and where the value of a determination is less than $15 million, 
an independent expert will be appointed to resolve the dispute. Under these 
circumstances, there will be no option for the issue to be referred to arbitration as the 
outcome reached by the independent expert will be final and binding (in accordance 
with Clauses 55 to 57) of the Project Agreement (Clayton Utz 2007b: p.274; Clayton 
Utz 2007b: p.271).   
 
The types of issues that give rise to the use of an independent expert are many but 
can include project delays, budget overruns (Leung et al 2004), conflicting project 
priorities, human resourcing (Thamhain and Wilemon 1975), interpretation of 
contractual provisions (Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 2005: p.34-35), etc.  
The determination of an independent expert is typically beneficial as the appointment 
of this person will be mutually agreed between the public and private partners, due to 
the speed of resolution (disputes can be resolved within days or weeks as opposed 
to months or even years – compared with some other forms of dispute resolution) 
and cost (depending on the nature of the dispute, litigious claims can escalate with 
settlements reaching tens of millions of dollars or more, thus detracting from the 
achievement of VfM outcomes).   
  
5.4.2 Risk Management 
 
Implementation of operational transition plan:  
 
In the case of the new Royal Children’s Hospital project, the specified length of the 
transition period (from the end of the construction phase to operational 
commencement) was three months (Clayton Utz 2007b: p.173).  Within this period, 
the operator, as part of the Project Agreement, was provided with 30 continuous 
days of uninterrupted access (subject to the transition plan) to perform its transitional 
activities such as familiarising employees with the facility and other responsibilities 
including those that relate to training, conducting emergency drills, etc (Clayton Utz 
2007b: p.173).   
 
More generally, and with consideration to other PPPs, the three month transition 
period may be satisfactory for identifying issues that have not been anticipated 
during planning and construction stages, whilst providing a reasonable timeframe for 
developing strategies to manage these situations e.g. those arising from technical 
complications.  Three months may be sufficient for the private partner to inform the 
public partner of matters that may prevent it from attaining agreed service delivery 
standards as well as giving the public partner enough time to deploy additional 
resources (if needed) to monitor the situation and adjust its contingency planning 
commitment.   
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Contract variation:  
 
The Children’s Health Partnership is obligated to inform the State if it is of the 
opinion that a force majeure event has occurred or is likely to occur (Clayton Utz 
2007b: p.239). In such circumstances, the consortium has a maximum of five 
working days to provide relevant details to the public partner that includes:  the basis 
on which the opinion was formed, the affected services and how long they will be 
impacted, measures that the concessionaire has undertaken to avoid or minimise 
disruption (and their associated costs) and insurance policy details (Clayton Utz 
2007b: p.239) e.g. relating to start-up delay and business interruption.  After issuing 
a force majeure notice, the consortium is obliged to provide relevant ongoing 
information to the public partner (Clayton Utz 2007b: p.240).  The possession of this 
type of information could be critical to State decision-makers as it may form a basis 
to temporarily assume full or partial control of service provision (Clayton Utz 2007b: 
p.257) where there is no better alternative.   
 
End of concession hand-over: 
 
As noted in Chapter 4, preparation for handover typically occurs towards the end of 
the contract expiry period. However, in the case of the new Royal Children’s Hospital 
project, the hand-over package is designed to assist the public partner’s contract 
administrator in ensuring operations continue if the Project Agreement is varied or 
terminated (Clayton Utz 2007a: p.26).  The package must therefore be regularly (at 
least annually) updated from the date of operational commencement (Clayton Utz 
2007a: p.26).  
 
Integral to the hand-over process is asset monitoring (Edwards et al 2004: p.123) to 
ensure assets are being properly maintained and the transfer of project 
documentation to ensure smooth transition to the public partner (Clayton Utz 2007b: 
p.266) or its nominee as well as uninterrupted delivery of services to users.  As 
implied above, timing of transfer will depend on the size and complexity of the PPP.  
Nonetheless, such activity can lead to improved VfM outcomes for other PPPs, 
including for example, standardising training opportunities (Department of Treasury 
and Finance 2007b: p.4).   
 
5.4.3 Performance Management 
 
Contract management: 
 
As part of the Project Agreement, the Children’s Health Partnership must develop 
and submit for endorsement to the State, a performance monitoring program that 
encapsulates all of its performance-related accountabilities to demonstrate that 
services are actually being performed and to prescribed levels (Clayton Utz 2007a: 
p.14).  Although the consortium is responsible for monitoring its own performance, 
service delivery outputs may be tested / validated by the public partner (and by 
independent advisors appointed by the concessionaire) via operational records, 
comparisons with agreed policies and procedures, work plans, user satisfaction 
surveys and hospital operator audits (Clayton Utz 2007a: p.15). With regard to 
reporting requirements, consortia must report against each KPI to the Department of 
Health and the contract administrator once every six months, with its performance 
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against individual KPIs reported as part of every second quarterly performance 
report (Clayton Utz 2007a: p.21). Moreover, asset management plans and work 
plans (five year and annual plans) must be prepared in accordance with the Service 
Specifications and submitted annually to the contract administrator (Clayton Utz 
2007b: p.196) as well as any identified risks that may impact on its ability to deliver 
the services (Victorian Auditor-General 2009: p.75).  
 
During audit of the new Royal Children’s Hospital project, the audit team from the 
Victorian Auditor-General’s Office found that a Departmental responsibility – the 
finalisation of the contract administration manual – had not been completed by the 
date stipulated in the Project Agreement (which was three months prior to the Stage 
One completion date) (Victorian Auditor-General 2009: p.76). The audit team 
recommended (as a high priority) that the Department of Health complete and 
endorse the manual (Victorian Auditor-General 2009: p.76). 
 
5.4.4 Summary of Identified Issues  
 
Relevant generic issues arising from this case study are:    
− Conflict management.  Managing disputes can be costly and time consuming.  
They may manifest in project delays or unfulfilled project objectives.  Types of 
issues that could give rise to the use of an independent expert (to resolve 
disputes without resorting to litigation) include conflicting priorities, human 
resourcing and interpretation of contractual provisions.   
− Implementation of operational transition plan.  Serious issues can arise during 
transition periods that were not envisaged during the project’s procurement 
and delivery phases.  The length of transition period may determine whether 
there is likely to be sufficient time for the private partner to manage such 
situations as well as giving the public partner enough time to deploy additional 
resources (if needed) to monitor these situations and adjust its contingency 
planning commitment.   
− Contract variation. Force majeure events have the potential to critically impact 
upon the service provider’s ability to perform its contractual obligations. Under 
such circumstances, governments may enact step-in powers and temporarily 
assume full or partial control of service provision.   
− End of concession hand-over.  Service delivery performance may falter during 
transfer of assets from consortia ownership to public partner control if hand-
over packages are not effective.  Difficulties that may arise during hand-over 
relate to asset monitoring (condition of assets) and the transfer of project 
documentation (e.g. operational knowledge).   
− Contract management. In circumstances where operators are responsible for 
monitoring their own performance (through self-certification arrangements), 
service outputs should still be validated by the public partner to confirm 
delivery standards and compliance with policies, procedures and plans. The 
public partner also has a responsibility to complete and keep contract 
administration manuals up-to-date.   
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 5.5 CityLink  
 
CityLink was a 22 kilometre, $2.2 billion motorway toll project (Infrastructure 
Partnerships Australia 2006) constructed to reduce traffic congestion (Muhammad 
and Low 2006: p.4), improve access to Melbourne and facilitate traffic flow around its 
central administrative district (VicRoads 2009b; Grimsey and Lewis 2004: p.38) by 
linking together routes between Melbourne Airport, the port and the city’s south-
eastern industrial centres (Infrastructure Partnerships Australia 2006).  The project 
consisted of two sections – the Western Link and the Southern Link.  The Western 
Link joins the Tullamarine Freeway with the Westgate Freeway and the Southern 
Link connects the Westgate and Monash freeways (Infrastructure Partnerships 
Australia 2006) and involved the development of new and existing roads and 
infrastructure, six kilometres of tunnels, and traffic management measures (Hodge 
2004).  CityLink was Australia’s largest public infrastructure project at the time of its 
construction in 1996 (Parliament of Victoria Public Accounts and Estimates 
Committee 2006: p.57).   
 
Towards the end of 1994, the Melbourne City Link Authority, a statutory body, was 
established.  Subsequently, its responsibilities were transferred to the Office of the 
Director, Melbourne CityLink (a unit within the Department of Infrastructure) in 2002, 
then to VicRoads in 2004, back to the Department of Infrastructure in 2007 before its 
statutory powers were finally returned to VicRoads in May 2010 (VicRoads 2012a)).  
VicRoads responsibilities are to:  
− Monitor the concessionaire’s safety regimes (including technical requirements 
with regard to safety, traffic management and reporting on maintenance and 
repairs, incidents and emergencies, material damage to CityLink and 
compliance with the law) (VicRoads 2012a);  
− Negotiate, document and manage any commercial issues (or other issues that 
may lead to contract amendments e.g. Government policy or legislative 
changes) that arise between the State and its private partner with regard to 
the toll road’s operations (VicRoads 2012a); and  
− Resolve disputes that arise under its contractual obligations and monitor 
developments of the tolling system (Office of the Director, Melbourne CityLink 
2002: p.49-51).  
 
During 1995, a private sector consortium, Transurban City Link (now known as 
CityLink Melbourne Ltd due to stock exchange flotation), was awarded a concession 
to own and operate the motorway toll initially for a period of 34 years (Infrastructure 
Partnerships Australia 2006), after which CityLink would be handed over in a fully 
maintained condition to the State (VicRoads 2009b), at no cost (Office of the 
Director, Melbourne CityLink 2002: p.6). 
 
The consortium consisted of:   
− A partnership between Transfield and Obayashi Corporation, contracted to 
finance (Cox 2000: p.6), design, construct (Infrastructure Partnerships 
Australia 2006) and operate CityLink assets (Cox 2000: p.6);  
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− Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering, sub-contracted by Transfield and 
Obayashi Corporation, to build the Western Link (VicRoads 2009b);  
− Translink Systems, sub-contracted contracted by Transfield and Obayashi 
Corporation, to supply the electronic tolling system (VicRoads 2009b); and  
− A partnership between Translink Operations and Egis, sub-contracted to 
provide emergency and environmental road management, incident response 
as well as routine maintenance (Infrastructure Partnerships Australia 2006).   
 
The construction of CityLink commenced during 1996 (Alonso, Brown and Rojo 
2003: p.3) and the tolling of the Western Link began in 2000, with the Southern Link 
being fully operational by 2001 (Transurban City Link 2001: p.3) due to minor project 
delays. 
 
5.5.1 Partnership Management 
 
Employee capability and expertise:  
 
In March 2001, the Minister for Transport announced that the Melbourne City Link 
Authority was undertaking a review of the public safety and traffic management 
aspects of CityLink (which was subsequently completed by the Office of the Director, 
Melbourne City Link) (Office of the Director, Melbourne CityLink 2002: p.III).  The 
purpose of this review was not only to assess the statutory authority’s ability to 
manage its public safety functions, but to advise on the structure and resources 
needed for the State to meet its obligations for the management of its contractual 
arrangements with Transurban City Link (Office of the Director, Melbourne CityLink 
2002: p.48), relating to, for instance, policy, transport, tolling and customer relations 
issues (Office of the Director, Melbourne CityLink 2002: p.49).   
 
The review concluded that to meet these obligations, the Melbourne City Link 
Authority would need to increase its scope to “reflect the significance of the State’s 
commercial relationship with the Transurban parties” (Office of the Director, 
Melbourne CityLink 2002: p.52), and thus, bolster its capacity for providing clear 
accountability for the ongoing management of existing contractual agreements, 
simplifying reporting arrangements (to the Minister) and ensuring appropriate 
“interface” between its concessionary responsibilities and wider departmental 
concerns (Office of the Director, Melbourne CityLink 2002: p.53).  Based on these 
requirements, four structures were presented to Government for consideration.  The 
option accepted was the creation of the statutory position (and associated functions) 
of the Director, Melbourne City Link, which was to become a unit within the 
Department of Infrastructure (Office of the Director, Melbourne CityLink 2002: p.53).  
As such, the Office was responsible for providing independent advice to Government 
on all matters relating to CityLink, the development of high level skills for the 
provision of legal, commercial, financial, engineering and policy advice, as well as 
the facilitation of the retention of corporate memory (Office of the Director, 
Melbourne CityLink 2002: p.52-55).   
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Conflict management:  
 
The Office of the Director, Melbourne CityLink, as part of its oversight 
responsibilities, appointed an accounting firm to undertake a two-stage inspection of 
the operator’s customer account records (Victorian Auditor-General 2004: p.64) 
(stage one took place during 1999, prior to tolling commencement).  This part of the 
review concluded that only 68 % of the records (93 accounts were examined in total) 
were complete and accurate.  The remainder contained processing errors e.g. 
mistakes made by the operator’s staff in entering customer data into company 
systems (determined through comparison with data supplied by customers on their 
account application forms) (Victorian Auditor-General 2004: p.64).   
 
Stage two of the review (that was supposed to begin two weeks after tolling started), 
intended to examine whether the operator was imposing the correct tolls was 
scrapped.  It is claimed that the operator strongly resisted the proposed scope of the 
of the inspection process (Victorian Auditor-General 2004: p.64).  Even though the 
State has enforcement powers under The Melbourne CityLink Act 1995, it decided 
not to exercise this right as the operator threatened that it would assess each 
request for information made by the public partner “on a ‘document-by-document’ 
basis and possibly obtain formal legal advice at every request” (Victorian Auditor-
General 2004: p.64). Despite these difficulties, the Victorian Auditor-General 
asserted that to be effective in monitoring the imposition of the tolls, the Office of the 
Director, Melbourne CityLink, should conduct periodic inspections of the operator’s 
tolling systems and records (Victorian Auditor-General 2004: p.65).   
 
In a separate matter, and during 2001, Transurban City Link (the private sector 
consortium) submitted a ‘Materially Adverse Effect’ claim of $35.8 million against the 
Victorian State Government (Minister for Transport 2001) claiming that construction 
works in Wurundjeri Way (Transurban City Link 2001: p.5) were resulting in a loss of 
revenue (Minister for Transport 2001) due to reduced traffic flows (based on 
Transurban City Link’s own traffic volume predictions (Minister for Transport 2002)). 
In order to resolve the dispute, the partners enacted a formal dispute resolution 
mechanism, resulting in the use of an independent expert (Minister for Transport 
2001). In July 2002, the Government announced that Henry Jolson QC (the 
independent expert) had found in favour of the public partner, stating that the original 
predictions relating to vehicle usage on the Bolte Bridge had been overestimated by 
Transurban City Link (Minister for Transport 2002). Thus, the finding saved the 
Victorian State Government a considerable sum of money.        
 
A third example relating to the issue of conflict management is that the service 
provider, under the conditions of the Concession Deed, is entitled to impose an 
administration fee on users that do not have an e-tag or display an e-tag that is a 
different classification compared with the vehicle they are driving (Victorian Auditor-
General 2004: p.60).  In July 2001, the operator increased this fee from $1.10 to 
$2.00.  The Victorian State Government claimed that it did not know about this 
increase until it was brought to its attention in January 2002 (Victorian Auditor-
General 2004: p.60). The Government believed that the amount ‘over-charged’ 
(allegedly amounting to $1.3 million (Gray 2004)), should have been refunded to 
customers (Victorian Auditor-General 2004: p.60), however, the State decided not to 
enforce its request (under the Concession Deed or through legal action as both 
92 
 
partners were unable to agree if the fee had been validly imposed).  The partners 
instead reached a compromise deal in May 2002 where it was agreed that 
reimbursements to affected users would be waived in return for the operator 
reducing the fee to $1.20, providing free travel on CityLink during Melbourne Cup 
day 2002, providing an additional two days to users after travelling on the motorway 
in which they could purchase a pass (without being additionally charged), as well as 
giving an undertaking that it would provide the public partner with 30 days notice 
before imposing a new fee or raising an existing fee in future (Victorian Auditor-
General 2004: p.60).   
 
5.5.2 Risk Management 
 
Contract variation:  
 
Contract variations (or amendments) can occur for many reasons including 
circumstances that give rise to new legal requirements e.g. health and safety 
(Partnerships Victoria 2001a: p.135). As part of its statutory responsibilities, the 
Office of the Director, Melbourne CityLink commissioned a public safety and traffic 
management review of CityLink during 2002 (VicRoads 2009a), which focused upon 
a number of inspections relating to road and tunnel safety, incident reports, assets, 
and simulated ‘desktop’ emergency management procedures (Transurban 2008: 
p.25; Office of the Director, Melbourne CityLink 2002).  The review found that “high 
standard[s] of [public] safety [were delivered] by CityLink and its contractors” 
(Transurban City Link 2003: p.15; Office of the Director, Melbourne CityLink 2002: 
p.IV) and therefore concluded that CityLink was “safe” to use (Office of the Director, 
Melbourne CityLink 2002: p.46). Although no serious issues were identified, adverse 
findings could potentially have led to changes to current practices.   
 
Reputation damage:  
 
During 1999, inter-state motoring bodies, the New South Wales motoring 
organisation, NRMA, the Royal Automobile Club of Queensland and the Royal 
Automobile Association of South Australia, raised concerns that visitors to Victoria 
were at risk of being unfairly fined as they did not understand the tolling system 
(Techapeeraparnich 2004).  As a response, in October 2000, the State Government 
negotiated with Transfield City Link for extended payment times for these motorists 
from inter-state who were first time offenders and put in place a campaign to raise 
awareness with the travelling public (Lally in Techapeeraparnich 2004).  
 
5.5.3 Performance Management 
 
Availability (and integrity) of performance data:  
 
The CityLink operator is obligated, for each financial quarter, to set vehicle toll 
charges including a maximum charge for a single trip.  It is also responsible for 
informing the public partner of pricing changes no less than one month before they 
take effect and advising the motoring public of them (Victorian Auditor-General 2004: 
p.63-64).  It is claimed by the Victorian Auditor-General’s Office (2004: p.64) that 
although these conditions were met by the operator, the Office of the Director, 
Melbourne CityLink, uncovered on a number of occasions, “rounding or indexing 
93 
 
errors” in the private partners’ toll calculations before the charges were published.  
However, and on each instance, the operator took responsibility for correcting its 
mistakes (Victorian Auditor-General 2004: p.64).   
 
5.5.4 Summary of Identified Issues  
 
Relevant generic issues arising from this case study are:    
− Employee capability and expertise.  Limitations relating to the structure and 
resources of public partner oversight can impact upon its ability to manage its 
contractual agreements, fulfil its ministerial reporting obligations, and may, in 
some instances, put public safety at risk.  Moreover, a lack of public partner 
employee skills can impact upon the overall quality of its advice and lead to 
corporate memory loss.   
− Conflict management. Conflict can arise between the partners over 
information requests.  Although the private partner is legally obligated to share 
operational data with its public partner on its request, it may not do so willingly 
and deploy tactics to discourage the public partner from obtaining information 
if consortia believes it may be financially or commercially disadvantaged.  
Failure to acquire and act on such information may have a detrimental impact 
on achieving VfM outcomes.   
− Contract variation.  New legal requirements such as those relating to public 
safety or the proposed introduction of new services (or enhancements to 
current services), may lead to existing agreements being varied. VfM 
outcomes may be impacted if the selected option for implementation (as with 
other options considered) is not based on, for example, clearly defined project 
benefits, properly justified costs / needs analyses, or assessments to 
determine consortia capability of providing the services in the most effective 
way possible.  
− Reputation damage.  Government may decide it is necessary to intervene in 
situations where there is a public perception that operators are treating their 
customers unfairly (even when consortia are acting within the terms and 
conditions of contractual agreements).  Under such circumstances, the public 
partner may, as a means to deflect unwarranted, negative media attention 
directed towards government, negotiate with the concessionaire to discount / 
waive service charges for a limited period of time.  Government may also 
conduct awareness raising campaigns (at its own cost) to inform users of the 
conditions of service.   
− Availability (and integrity) of performance data.  Service providers use their 
own performance data as a basis for decision-making. Hence, there is 
potential that data will contain errors or omissions either through human error 
or from wrong-doing.  If public partners are not vigilant in providing adequate 
oversight, operators could use inaccurate data for decisions that could lead to, 
for instance, user over-charging or the creation of unnecessary operational 
risks.   
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5.6 New Schools Privately Financed Project 
 
The New Schools Privately Financed Project (the first contract) was a $137 million 
(New South Wales Auditor-General 2006: p.10) schools development that was the 
first Social Infrastructure project commissioned as a PFP by the New South Wales 
State Government (New South Wales Treasury 2005a: p.1; Ross 2004: p.2).  The 
project consisted of the construction and maintenance of nine new schools (six 
primary, two secondary and one special needs school) (New South Wales 
Department of Education and Training 2003: p.1) in north-western and western 
Sydney, Illawarra and the Central Coast (New South Wales Treasury 2005a: p.1).   
 
Five schools (comprising Dapto Primary School, Ironbark Ridge Primary School, 
Kellyville Ridge Primary School, Sherwood Ridge Primary School and Tallowood 
Special School) were to be opened in 2004, with the remaining schools (John 
Edmundson High School, Shell Cove Primary School, Woongarah Primary School 
and Glenwood High School) to be opened in 2005 (New South Wales Auditor-
General 2006: p.10).  In addition (and as part of the contract), eight child care 
centres were to be built and run independently of the schools by a private operator 
(New South Wales Treasury 2005a: p.1; New South Wales Treasury 2005b: p.44).   
 
The objectives of this venture included (New South Wales Treasury 2005b: p.45; 
Ross 2004: p.2-3):   
− The construction of nine new schools; 
− Delivering the schools through a ‘packaging’ arrangement (whereby building 
and operational cost savings would be realised through economies of scale);  
− Freeing up school administrator resources to enable staff to concentrate on 
delivering educational services as opposed to managing day-to-day facilities 
problems;  
− Satisfying the Department of Education and Training’s technical requirements 
and performance standards over the full contract term; 
− Minimising environmental impact; and  
− Incorporating safety into the design of school buildings / facilities.   
 
The New South Wales Government is responsible for managing project oversight 
through its Department of Education and Training (Ross 2004: p.2; New South 
Wales Department of Education and Training 2003: p.4).  In December 2002, Axiom 
Education Pty Ltd, a private sector consortium, was awarded the contract to finance, 
design, build and then maintain the schools / facilities (e.g. cleaning, security, routine 
maintenance services, etc) for a 30-year period (New South Wales Department of 
Education and Training 2003: p.3; New South Wales Treasury 2005b: p.44).  In 
December 2032, the school buildings / facilities will be handed-over to the State 
(New South Wales Treasury 2005a: p.1; New South Wales Department of Education 
and Training 2003: p.8) at nil cost.   
 
The consortium partners consisted of (New South Wales Department of Education 
and Training 2003: p.4):   
95 
 
− ABN AMRO Australia Ltd, the project’s senior debt underwriter;  
− Hansen Yuncken Pty Ltd, engaged as the project’s co-construction contractor;  
− St Hilliers Contracting Pty Ltd, the project’s other co-construction contractor 
and designer; and  
− Spotless Services Australia Ltd, for providing schools / facilities management.  
 
Construction of the schools commenced during 2003 (Ross 2004: p.3). The first 
tranche was delivered as scheduled in 2004 and the second tranche in 2005 (New 
South Wales Treasury 2005b: p.44).  The child care centres opened “progressively” 
from late 2004 (New South Wales Treasury 2005b: p.44). 
 
5.6.1 Partnership Management 
 
Management commitment and support:  
 
Although not required as part of the project specification, the concessionaire 
provided each school with an onsite manager as a bonus resource (New South 
Wales Treasury 2005a: p.1-2) (i.e. at no cost to the State) to undertake a range of 
support services such as buildings maintenance, security, cleaning, pest control, etc 
(New South Wales Treasury 2005a: p.6).  It is expected over the long-term that the 
provision of these services will contribute to the VfM proposition under PFP, as 
traditionally, these services have been managed by general assistants employed by 
the Department of Education and Training, Department of Commerce and / or the 
schools themselves (New South Wales Treasury 2005a: p.6).  However, in practice, 
some overlap in service delivery has occurred between onsite managers and general 
assistants (it seems the latter have been employed by some schools to undertake 
additional support duties).  As part of its post-implementation project review, the New 
South Wales Treasury recommended that the role of general assistants should be 
reconsidered by the Department of Education and Training with a view to removing 
service duplications (New South Wales Treasury 2005a: p.6).    
 
Clear and open communication:  
 
The post implementation review undertaken by New South Wales Treasury (New 
South Wales Treasury 2005a: p.6, p.12) also highlighted a need to clearly articulate 
the differences in responsibilities under the contract between the Project Director 
and school principals. The review outcome stated that it was “important that 
principals are kept up-to-date with the operation of the contract and understand their 
rights and responsibilities at a PFP school” (New South Wales Treasury 2005a: 
p.12). 
 
In a separate matter, but raised during the same review, it was found that the 
helpdesk provided by Spotless Services Australia Ltd was at times closing off 
maintenance jobs even when the work had not been completed to the satisfaction of 
school principals (New South Wales Treasury 2005a: p.44).  In these instances, the 
helpdesk re-issued incomplete jobs under new job numbers (New South Wales 
Treasury 2005a: p.44).  It was recommended that the circumstances in which a job 
can be closed, re-opened and / or re-issued be clarified both with school staff and 
the service provider (New South Wales Treasury 2005a: p.44). 
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5.6.2 Risk Management 
 
Contract variation:  
 
With regard to child care provision, the Concession Deed stipulated (as part of a 
third-party user agreement) that these services would be run independently of the 
schools and by Axiom Education’s service provider (New South Wales Treasury 
2005a: p.1; New South Wales Treasury 2005b: p.44), including the delivery of out of 
school hours care on the school grounds and / or within the child care centre 
grounds (New South Wales Treasury 2005a: p.47).  Typically, this type of service in 
New South Wales is provided by not-for-profit organisations (under the oversight of 
school principals) but exceptions were made due to the nature of the PFP agreement 
(New South Wales Treasury 2005a: p.47). 
 
Soon after operations commenced, a number of parents raised concerns with the 
Department of Education over the quality of the contractor’s services (New South 
Wales Treasury 2005a: p.47).  After investing the complaints, the Department took 
steps to terminate the provision of out of school hours care services (triggering a 
variation to the contract).  This situation led to individual schools taking ownership of 
providing out of school hours care to their local ‘school community’ (New South 
Wales Treasury 2005a: p.47).   
 
Change of consortium members / change to public partner’s agency authority:  
 
See ‘Contract variation’ above as an example of a change to the original consortium.  
This demonstrates that sub-standard delivery of services or the failure to provide 
agreed services by a member of a private consortium can lead to its contract being 
terminated.  This also demonstrates that a removal of a consortium member can 
have an administrative burden on the public partner.   
 
Reputation damage:  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, sensitive financial and commercial information relating to 
PPPs such as cost structures, profit margins and intellectual property tend to be 
protected by ‘commercial in confidence’ arrangements. This often leads to criticism 
by public and academic commentators (see Barrett 2003: p.38; Davidson 2007; and 
Yuan et al 2009 as examples).  However, with the New Schools Privately Financed 
Project (as with other PPPs), there are exemptions to these restrictions, as specified 
under contractual arrangements. They include disclosures required by law, 
disclosures by the Department’s Project Director (or statutory authority depending on 
the nature of the agreement) to State government departments and their agencies 
and / or disclosures to prospective shareholders or other investors (New South 
Wales Department of Education and Training 2003: p.25). These types of 
disclosures, to an extent, may mitigate the impact of reputation damage to the 
government through the release of this information, thus leading to greater 
transparency in deals that have been struck between public and private partners.   
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5.6.3 Performance Management 
 
Contract management:  
 
The Concession Deed states that the service provider must, for each individual 
school, develop operations manuals (New South Wales Department of Education 
and Training 2003: p.13) and is obligated to provide operational performance and 
payment reports (monthly) to the Project Director (New South Wales Treasury 
2005a: p.43).   
 
The Department of Education and Training has an oversight responsibility to ensure 
that the plans and related documentation are put into place and that they are 
regularly updated by the contractor on an annual basis (New South Wales 
Department of Education and Training 2003: p.13; New South Wales Auditor-
General 2006b: p.37).  The manuals consist of asset management plans, operation 
plans, maintenance programs and environmental management plans (New South 
Wales Auditor-General 2006: p.37). These documents must be independently 
audited at least every 12 months against agreed quality standards (New South 
Wales Department of Education and Training 2003: p.16).  Table 5.2 below outlines 
what the manuals include.   
 
Table 5.2 Factors / Content That Comprise School Operations Manuals. 
(Source: New South Wales Department of Education and Training 2003).  
 
Over and above the stated review, update and reporting requirements, the contractor 
must conduct during every fifth year and on behalf of the Department, a 
benchmarking exercise to determine the relative quality and competitiveness of its 
services which should be comparable to those provided by similar organisations that 
have appropriate skills, resources, reputation and financial standing (New South 
Wales Department of Education and Training 2003: p.18).  The findings may, at the 
discretion of the Project Director, be subjected to competitive market testing.  In such 
circumstances, if the costs are found to be greater than five per cent either above or 
below the market cost of providing these services, the monthly fees paid to the 
contractor will be adjusted to reflect the difference.  No adjustment will be made if the 
difference is five per cent or less (New South Wales Department of Education and 
Factors / content of operations manuals (prepared and updated by the private partner) 
− Monitoring, auditing & reporting procedures − Waste management 
− Quality standards − Fire & emergency management 
− Benchmarking data  − Disaster plans  
− Staff vetting procedures  − Business continuity plans  
− Training plans − Staffing structures and responsibilities 
− ‘Help desks’ & information management − Costed maintenance & replacement plans 
− Document management  − Costed maintenance programs 
− Complaints & corrective action procedures − Energy management 
− Security provisions − Insurance provisions & procedures 
− Security incident reporting systems − “As built” & “as installed” drawings 
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Training 2003: p.18).  However, if the comparison demonstrates a cost differentiation 
in excess of 15 % (New South Wales Department of Education and Training 2003: 
p.18), the contractor will be replaced by the Department.   
 
The Department of Education and Training is also responsible for developing a 
contract administration manual which should be used, for example, to identify public 
sector resources and roles needed for successfully managing the contract as well as 
ensuring that the performance monitoring and reporting strategy is effectively 
implemented (New South Wales Auditor-General 2006: p.41).  However and even 
though the Department was advised about its responsibility during 2003 (before the 
operational phase began), the New South Wales Auditor-General found during its 
audit of the project in 2006, that the manual had not been completed (New South 
Wales Auditor-General 2006: p.41). The Auditor-General’s office therefore 
recommended that the manual’s completion be ‘expedited’ and then regularly 
reviewed and updated (New South Wales Auditor-General 2006: p.41).  
 
Penalties and abatements:  
 
Between the commencement of the operational phase and the end of 2005, 
Departmental records indicated that a very low level of abatement had been applied 
for under-performance (New South Wales Treasury 2005a: p.6), amounting to some 
0.04 % of monthly service fees (New South Wales Treasury 2005b: p.46), 
(presumably) due to high standards of service delivery and because of the newness 
of the buildings / facilities (New South Wales Treasury 2005a: p.6; New South Wales 
Auditor-General 2006: p.35).  Minor deductions had been made, for example, for 
reporting failures, unavailability of school spaces and for not addressing matters that 
gave rise to some occupational health and safety risks (New South Wales Treasury 
2005a: p.44).   
 
5.6.4 Summary of Identified Issues  
 
Relevant generic issues arising from this case study are:    
− Management commitment and support. ‘Duplication’ of services can be costly.  
Responsibilities of PPP operators should be adequately defined under service 
delivery agreements, particularly in circumstances where there is potential for 
overlap with support services delivered out-with the scope of PPP service 
agreements (i.e. other service arrangements implemented by government).       
− Clear and open communication.  If contractual responsibilities are not clearly 
articulated between key public partner employees and service providers, there 
may be potential for misunderstanding that could impact upon the effective 
use of resourcing and detract from the achievement of VfM outcomes.   
− Contract variation.  VfM achievement can be put at risk if public partners do 
not take timely and / or decisive action to manage service provider under-
performance.  Such situations may arise, for instance, due to the length of 
time it may take the public partner to investigate complaints or because 
business continuity plans are not sufficiently developed to address the issues 
faced. This may lead customers to seek out alternative services that are 
provided by ‘competitor’ organisations (therefore impacting on the attainment 
of project objectives and the use of tax payer funds).   
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− Change of consortium members / change to public partner’s agency authority.  
Sub-standard delivery of services or the failure to provide agreed services by 
a member of a private consortium may lead to its contract being terminated.  
Such situations, for example, may lead to the replacement of that member 
within the existing consortium or an amended contract if the provision of those 
services is no longer required.  
− Reputation damage.  Sensitive financial and commercial information relating 
to PPPs such as cost structures, profit margins and intellectual property tend 
to be protected by ‘commercial in confidence’ arrangements.  This can lead to 
criticism by public commentators who may accuse government, for example, 
of ‘dodgy deals’ whereby the private partner profits at the expense of tax 
payers or service users.   
− Contract management.  If public partners do not provide sufficient oversight of 
the currency of service provider operations manuals, service delivery 
standards may be compromised.  Oversight should include regular review of 
documentation including asset management plans, operation plans, 
maintenance programs and environmental management plans. Regular 
benchmarking exercises / competitive market testing should also take place to 
establish the relative quality and competitiveness of the services being 
provided.   
− Penalties and abatements. Public partners may not reap intended VfM 
outcomes if it does not consistently apply abatement for under-performance 
(particularly when viewed over the long-term – service contracts can last for 
20 years or more).  Deductions should be applied (depending on specific 
circumstances) for reporting failures, unavailability / partial unavailability of 
services and not addressing issues that give rise to occupational health and 
safety risks.   
 
 
 5.7 Cross City Tunnel  
 
The Cross City Tunnel was a $700 million project undertaken to reduce the volume 
of traffic flowing through Sydney’s central business district, improve surrounding 
environmental conditions and enhance traffic flows (Roads and Traffic Authority 
2008: p.1). It comprises twin 2.1 kilometre tunnels than run between Darling Harbour 
and Kings Cross, linking the Western Distributor to New South Head Road (New 
South Wales Parliament 2006a: p.9), and a connecting tunnel to provide a direct 
route for vehicles travelling from the eastern suburbs to the harbour crossings (New 
South Wales Parliament 2006b: p.13).   
 
More specifically, the objectives of this project included: 
− Decreasing city congestion, aiming to remove up to 90,000 vehicles from 
surface roads (New South Wales Parliament 2006c); 
− Reducing travelling times for motorists by allowing them to avoid 18 sets of 
traffic lights (New South Wales Parliament 2006c);  
− Improving public transport (Roads and Traffic Authority 2008: p.1);  
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− Improving air quality around the central business district (Roads and Traffic 
Authority 2008: p.3); 
− Providing better access within the city for pedestrians and cyclists (Roads and 
Traffic Authority 2008: p.3); and  
− Reducing traffic noise levels (New South Wales Parliament 2006c).   
 
The Tunnel itself was designed to be self-funded through cashless electronic tolling 
technology (Building Knowledge Nexus 2007). It was the first such system to be 
implemented on a tollway in New South Wales (Leighton Contractors 2009 p.1) and 
is now inter-operative with other Sydney motorways (Roads and Traffic Authority 
2006: p.20) and tolling systems in Victoria and Queensland.  Due to these and other 
factors (including those already mentioned), it was claimed that the challenge of the 
Cross City Tunnel was one of the most “technically and logistically complex” 
enterprises of its kind ever undertaken within Australia (Building Knowledge Nexus 
2007).   
 
Before the concession deed was awarded however (New South Wales Auditor-
General 2006: p.21), a decision to extend the length of the Tunnel was announced 
by then State Premier, Bob Carr,  in order to further recalibrate traffic flows (New 
South Wales Auditor-General 2006: p.18). In September 2000, the Roads and Traffic 
Authority (an operating agency within the New South Wales State Government 
transport portfolio, with responsibility for managing the State’s road networks, road 
capacity planning and maintenance, and improving road safety (Roads and Traffic 
Authority 2006: p.4)), invited private sector parties to submit Registrations of Interest 
(Roads and Traffic Authority 2008: p.4) in order to win the concession.  Towards the 
end of 2002 (New South Wales Auditor-General 2006: p.21), the Cross City 
Motorway Consortium, a private sector conglomerate, was awarded the concession 
for a period of approximately 30 years (Roads and Traffic Authority 2006: p.19). After 
this period, the ownership of the Tunnel was to be transferred to public sector 
ownership (Roads and Traffic Authority 2006: p.115).  
 
The Cross City Motorway Consortium consisted of:   
− Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Limited, Bilfinger Berger Aktiengesellschaft, and 
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft to design, construct, own, operate and 
maintain the Cross City Tunnel (New South Wales Parliament 2006a: p.14);  
− Connell Wagner, sub-contracted to provide engineering services (Building 
Knowledge Nexus 2007); and  
− Hyder, sub-contracted to verify the project design (Building Knowledge Nexus 
2007). 
 
Major construction of the project commenced in January 2003 (Roads and Traffic 
Authority 2006: p.115) and the facility was opened to traffic in August 2005 (New 
South Wales Auditor-General 2006: p.21), some two months ahead of schedule 
(Roads and Traffic Authority 2006: p.19), although associated road works were not 
completed until April 2006 (New South Wales Parliament 2006b: p.13).   
 
By December 2006, and with debts totalling $560 million, the Cross City Tunnel was 
placed into receivership (ABC News Online 2006). A spokesman for the 
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administrator, KordaMentha, stated that although the Tunnel would continue to 
operate ‘normally’, options to address vehicle usage would be pursued at a later 
stage (ABC News Online 2006).  The direct financial impact of the collapse was 
absorbed by the Cross City Motorway Consortium as a result of the transfer of 
patronage risk from the Government to its private partner (New South Wales 
Parliament 2006b: p. XII).  Tax payers were assured by the Roads Minister that the 
Tunnel would remain open for the full length of the original agreement (Baker, Irvine 
and Davies 2006).   
 
In 2007, a new consortium (Cross City Motorway Pty Ltd) led by ABN AMRO and 
Leighton Contractors was appointed as the operator (concessionaire) of the Tunnel 
under a PPP arrangement formed with the Government (ABN AMRO 2007: p.1; 
Productivity Commission 2007). The deal meant that ABN AMRO provided core 
financing and Leighton Contractors was responsible for the day-to-day management 
of the Tunnel (Sydney Morning Herald 2007).  These responsibilities extended to the 
full maintenance, operations and asset management services of the Cross City 
Tunnel that included the communication networks, mechanical and electrical 
systems, traffic safety, and the tolling system (Leighton Contractors 2009: p.2). 
 
5.7.1 Partnership Management 
 
Conflict management:  
 
After the new consortium took control of the Cross City Tunnel, a dispute arose with 
the Office of State Revenue over whether or not $60 million stamp duty should be 
paid for the purchase of the asset (Saulwick 2012; Haynes 2012).  The Office of 
State Revenue demanded that the concessionaire settle this liability by the end of 
February 2012 (Saulwick 2012). The new consortium, however, stated that it 
purchased the Tunnel based on an understanding that it was not required to pay the 
tax (Haynes 2012).  It was asserted that by forcing the toll road owner to pay the 
debt, the consortium could be tipped into receivership – a claim denied by Cross City 
Motorway Pty Ltd (Haynes 2012). As New South Wales tax payers are essentially 
unsecured creditors of the Cross City Tunnel, this means that the Tunnel’s 
shareholders would be given preference over tax payer interests if the road was to 
be re-sold (Haynes 2012) (thus potentially leading to a poor VfM outcome for the 
State).   
 
In September 2013, KordaMentha was appointed receiver for the Cross City Tunnel 
for the second time after Cross City Motorway Pty Ltd entered into voluntary 
administration.  Although the consortium defeated the Office of State Revenue in its 
bid to force the Tunnel’s owners to pay the stamp duty bill in the Supreme Court, the 
Office successfully appealed the finding (Sydney Morning Herald 2013b).  However, 
as a consequence of ongoing legal action, Cross City Motorway Pty Ltd was unable 
to refinance its $600 million debt and therefore pay the $60 million tax bill (Sydney 
Morning Herald 2013a; Sydney Morning Herald 2013b). A spokesperson for Roads 
Minister, Duncan Gay, stated that motorists would remain unaffected as the owners 
are still required to operate and run the motorway (Walsh 2013).  
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5.7.2 Risk Management 
 
Contract termination:   
 
See above for details that led to receivership / appointment of the new private 
consortium. As the matter is ongoing, it is unclear if (or to what extent) the public 
partner, and thus the tax payer, will be affected by change in Tunnel ownership.  
 
Reputation damage:   
 
Serious problems began to emerge for the Cross City Tunnel management team (the 
Cross City Motorway Consortium) (New South Wales Parliament 2006a: p.XI) during 
2005, soon after opening.  The operator was, for instance, accused of "one giant rip-
off" by a leading State-wide motoring body for overcharging vehicle users (Sydney 
Morning Herald 2005; New South Wales Parliament 2006a: p.XI).  In response, it 
was claimed that drivers were avoiding the Tunnel, and instead using previous 
routes to arrive at their chosen destinations (Smith 2005).  Perhaps to re-direct 
public anger from the public sector, the New South Wales Government made its 
position clear when a representative asserted that the State had no obligation to 
subsidise the operator’s performance shortfall (Smith 2005). Other difficulties 
included alterations made to some local roads in central Sydney, which led to 
“considerable” community anger due to street narrowing and the end of free access 
to the Harbour crossings (New South Wales Parliament 2006a: p.XI) (these changes 
related to the associated road works that were completed after the opening of the 
Cross City Tunnel).    
 
5.7.3 Performance Management 
 
Contract management:   
 
The Cross City Motorway Consortium (and its successor, Cross City Motorway Pty 
Ltd), was responsible for maintaining performance standards and handing the Cross 
City Tunnel to its public partner after the concession period expiry in agreed 
condition (Roads and Traffic Authority 2008: p.25). This arrangement included the 
implementation and maintenance of an Operation and Maintenance Plan, Operation 
and Maintenance Manuals and the preparation of an Operations Rail Safety Plan 
(Roads and Traffic Authority 2008: p.26). The responsibilities of Leighton Contractors 
(as a member of the consortium) extended to the full maintenance, operations and 
asset management services of the Tunnel, including the communication networks, 
mechanical and electrical systems, traffic safety, and the tolling system (Leighton 
Contractors 2009: p.2). These accountabilities are typically commensurate with 
concessionaire responsibilities for other such Economic Infrastructure projects and 
where the public partner has oversight responsibility for ensuring the documentation 
is complete and remains up-to-date.   
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5.7.4 Summary of Identified Issues  
 
Relevant generic issues arising from this case study are:    
− Conflict management.  Disputes can arise due to misunderstanding between 
partners. This may have significant implications with regard to achieving VfM, 
if, for instance, a replacement service provider (or concessionaire) is not 
secured or if shareholder interests on sale of PPP assets are given 
preference over wider community interests.   
− Contract termination. A receiver may be appointed by government (or a court) 
if consortia is unable to meet its statutory obligations and / or pay its debts.  In 
some cases, such situations may arise from the sustained financial impact of 
lower than expected service user demand.   
− Reputation damage.  Unless government takes action to quash or re-direct 
public concern over issues that are the responsibility of operators, it may be 
blamed (unjustifiably) for service delivery shortcomings. There may be 
occasions when government seeks to raise public awareness about its role in 
contractual agreements to assure tax payers, for example, that public funds 
are not being misused.    
− Contract management. The failure of public partners to effectively manage 
their oversight responsibility including seeking assurance that operator 
maintenance plans, operation and maintenance manuals, safety plans and 
asset management services have been implemented and kept up-to-date may 
lead to situations were operators fail to meet operational standards that 
increase risks to service users.   
 
 
 5.8 Summary 
 
This Chapter has explored the presence of partnership, risk and performance 
management issues (that were identified in the previous two Chapters) in context of 
six Australian PPPs.   
 
Generic issues identified for PPP partnership management are: management 
commitment and support, employee capability and expertise, clear and open 
communication and conflict management.   
 
For PPP risk management, the generic issues identified are: implementation of 
operational transition plan, contract variation, change of consortium members / 
change to public partner’s agency authority, contract termination, end of concession 
hand-over and reputation damage.   
 
PPP performance management raises the following generic issues: contract 
monitoring systems modification, KPI modification, availability and integrity of 
performance data, contract management, and penalties and abatements.   
 
Additional issues identified in the case studies include: implementation of operational 
transition plan, integrity of performance data, and contract monitoring systems 
modification.   
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The next Chapter explores the concept of a generic integrated PPP management 
model that embraces each of three management perspectives – partnership, risk 
and performance management.  It will identify factors that may contribute to VfM 
realisation from each discipline and outline documentation that can be used as an 
evidential foundation for developing improvement plans.  The key issues / sub-issues 
identified in the theory and case study chapters will be re-stated along with possible 
treatment actions.   
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Chapter 6: Integration of Key Issues and Concepts 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter commences by identifying partnership, risk and performance 
management factors that may contribute towards achieving VfM outcomes for the 
public partner during the operating phase of PPPs; along with a range of 
documentation and / or actions that can potentially be used as a foundation to 
assess whether VfM outcomes are being achieved in practice. The issues 
established in the theory and case study chapters – those that may detract from the 
achievement of intended VfM outcomes – are first re-stated along with suggested 
treatment actions. The concept of a generic integrated PPP operational model that 
embraces each of three management perspectives (partnership, risk and 
performance management) is then explored. 
 
 
6.2 Research Issues  
 
Pertinent issues relating to partnership, risk and performance management have 
been identified in the preceding theory and case study chapters.  These matters 
have the potential to hinder or prevent the achievement of VfM outcomes during the 
operating phase of PPPs from a public partner perspective. The issues are informed 
by the research questions which identify the essential context and content of the 
research problem.   
 
The literature review (Chapters 3 and 4) draws upon material in the form of 
secondary data that outline the key issues.  This information is supplemented with 
case studies (Chapter 5), selected to explore and confirm the presence of the issues 
in real PPPs.  Table 6.1 contains a summary of the issues identified and this is used 
to guide the research design.   
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Table 6.1 Issues Relating to Partnership, Risk and Performance Management in PPP. 
Management 
element 
Issues identified Literature and case study issue 
sources 
Sub-issues Relevant case study issues 
 
Partnership Organisational 
culture 
− HM Treasury (2011) 
− Forrer et al (2010) 
− Weihe (in Hodge, Greve and 
Boardman 2010) 
− National Audit Office (2009b) 
− Ernst & Young (2008) 
− Jones and Noble (2008) 
− AECOM (2007) 
− Partnerships Victoria (2006a) 
− Partnerships Victoria (2006b) 
− Trafford and Proctor (2006)  
− Cambridge Economic Policy 
Associates (2005)  
− Edwards, Bowen and Stewart (2005) 
− Klijn and Teisman (2003) 
− Partnerships Victoria (2003a) 
• Personalities 
• Team working 
• Motivation / incentives 
 
− None identified  
Management 
commitment & 
support 
− Hope (2012) 
− Victorian Auditor-General (2007a) 
− New South Wales Treasury (2005a) 
− Harback et al (in Chan et al 2004)*  
− Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE 
(2000) 
− Cheng, Li and Love (2000)* 
− Pinto and Slevin (1987)* 
• Negotiated outcomes 
• Acquisition and allocation of 
additional resources 
  
− Spencer Street (Southern Cross) Station 
Re-development:  Operator given an 
opportunity to resolve operational lapses 
rather than the public partner applying 
abatement for all instances of under-
performance to encourage positive working 
relationships 
− New Schools Privately Financed Project:  
All responsibilities of PPP operators should 
be adequately defined under service 
delivery agreements       
Employee 
capability & 
expertise 
− Hope (2012) 
− Parliament of Victoria Public 
Accounts and Estimates Committee 
(2012) 
− HM Treasury (2011) 
− Forrer et al (2010) 
− National Audit Office (2009b)  
• Roles and responsibilities 
• Subject matter knowledge and 
applicability 
 
− Spencer Street (Southern Cross) Station 
Re-development:  A lack of resourcing can 
make it difficult for public partner contract 
managers to monitor the effectiveness of 
service provider performance  
− Spencer Street (Southern Cross) Station 
Re-development:  Skill limitations may 
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Management 
element 
Issues identified Literature and case study issue 
sources 
Sub-issues Relevant case study issues 
 
− Yuan et al (2009) 
− Ernst & Young (2008) 
− Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (2007) 
− Victorian Auditor-General (2007a) 
− Edwards et al (2004) 
− Office of the Director, Melbourne 
CityLink (2002) 
− Chua, Kog and Loh (1999)* 
impact on the public partner’s ability to 
effectively manage service contract 
oversight which may hinder the 
achievement of genuine VfM outcomes and 
compromise public safety  
− CityLink:  Limitations relating to the 
structure and resources of public partner 
oversight can impact upon its ability to 
manage its contractual agreements, fulfil its 
ministerial reporting obligations, and may, 
in some instances, put public safety at risk 
− CityLink:  A lack of public partner employee 
skills can impact upon the overall quality of 
its advice and lead to corporate memory 
loss   
Clear & open 
communication 
− Hope (2012) 
− National Audit Office (2009a) 
− New South Wales Treasury (2005a) 
− Karlsen (2002)* 
− Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE 
(2000)  
− Cheng, Li and Love (2000)* 
• Shared understanding 
• Trust building  
 
 
− New Schools Privately Financed Project:  If 
contractual responsibilities are not clearly 
articulated between key public partner 
employees and service providers, there 
may be potential for misunderstanding that 
could impact upon the effective use of 
resourcing 
Relationship 
continuity 
− Hoppe and Schmitz (2013) 
− Parliament of Victoria Public 
Accounts and Estimates Committee 
(2012) 
− Jones and Noble (2008) 
− Bowditch (2007) 
− Cambridge Economic Policy 
Associates (2005) 
− Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE 
(2000) 
• Personal and professional 
influence  
− None identified 
Conflict 
management  
− Sydney Morning Herald (2013a) 
− Sydney Morning Herald (2013b) 
− Walsh (2013)  
• Resourcing 
• Values and beliefs 
 
− Spencer Street (Southern Cross) Station 
Re-development:  Delays, cost overruns 
and contractual disputes can impact on the 
attainment of service delivery outcomes 
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Management 
element 
Issues identified Literature and case study issue 
sources 
Sub-issues Relevant case study issues 
 
− Haynes (2012) 
− Hope (2012) 
− Saulwick (2012) 
− Brenninkmeijer (in Urio 2010) 
− Global Legal Group Ltd (2007) 
− Victorian Auditor-General (2007a) 
− Tomazin and Myer (2006) 
− Cambridge Economic Policy 
Associates (2005) 
− Das (2005) 
− Edwards et al (2004) 
− Hannan (2004) 
− Leung et al (2004)* 
− Victorian Auditor-General (2004) 
− Minister for Transport (2002) 
− Minister for Transport (2001) 
− Partnerships Victoria (2001a) 
− New Royal Children’s Hospital project:  
Managing disputes can be costly and time 
consuming.  They may manifest in delays 
or unfulfilled project objectives   
− CityLink:  Conflict can arise between the 
partners over information requests.  
Although the private partner is legally 
obligated to share operational data with its 
public partner on its request, it may not do 
so willingly   
− Cross City Tunnel:  Disputes can arise due 
to misunderstanding between public and 
private partners (as well as from 
interpretation of contractual provisions) 
Risk Implementation of 
transition plan  
− Victorian Auditor-General (2007a) 
 
• Project / integration challenges 
 
− Spencer Street (Southern Cross) Station 
Re-development:  Ineffective 
implementation of transition plans can 
impact on operational delivery as well as 
damaging relations between public and 
private partners    
− New Royal Children’s Hospital project:  
Serious issues can arise during transition 
periods that were not envisaged during 
procurement and delivery phases     
Contract variation − Transurban (2008) 
− New South Wales Treasury (2005a) 
− Edwards et al (2004) 
− Transurban City Link (2003) 
− Office of the Director, Melbourne 
CityLink (2002) 
− Partnerships Victoria (2001a) 
• Modification of existing 
services 
• Re-allocation of risk 
• Business continuity planning 
modification 
 
− New Royal Children’s Hospital project:  
Force majeure events have the potential to 
critically impact upon the service provider’s 
ability to perform its contractual obligations    
− CityLink:  New legal requirements may lead 
to existing agreements being varied   
− New Schools Privately Financed Project:  
VfM achievement can be put at risk if the 
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Management 
element 
Issues identified Literature and case study issue 
sources 
Sub-issues Relevant case study issues 
 
public partner does not take timely and 
decisive action to manage service provider 
under-performance   
Change of 
consortium 
members / 
change to public 
partner’s agency 
authority 
− Linking Melbourne Authority (2010) 
− New South Wales Treasury (2005) 
• Exposure to new risks 
(researcher assertion)  
− Spencer Street (Southern Cross) Station 
Re-development:  Re-structuring of the 
public partner entity could expose 
government to new and un-intended risks 
(including how existing risks are managed / 
resourced) and corporate memory loss due 
to staff transitioning  
− EastLink:  The transfer of statutory 
obligations to other statutory bodies has the 
potential to expose the public partner to un-
intended risks including corporate memory 
loss due to staff changes during critical 
hand-over periods   
− New Schools Privately Financed Project:  
Soon after operations commenced, a 
number of complaints were received by the 
Department of Education over the quality of 
a contractor’s services.  This led to the 
termination of out of school hours care 
services (triggering an amendment to the 
contract)  
Contract 
termination 
− Edwards et al (2004) 
− Partnerships Victoria (2001a) 
• Service provider failure 
 
− Cross City Tunnel:  A receiver may be 
appointed by government (or a court) if 
consortia is unable to meet its statutory 
obligations and / or pay its debts.  In some 
cases, such situations may arise from the 
sustained financial impact of lower than 
expected service user demand   
End of 
concession 
handover  
− Edwards et al (2004) • Knowledge transfer 
• Asset transfer  
− New Royal Children’s Hospital project:  
Service delivery performance may falter 
during transfer of assets from consortia 
ownership to public partner control if hand-
over packages are not effective 
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Management 
element 
Issues identified Literature and case study issue 
sources 
Sub-issues Relevant case study issues 
 
Skills transfer − Delmon (2011) 
− UK Parliament (2011) 
− Fitzgerald (2004) 
− Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE 
(2000)  
• Capability improvement  
• Broadening public sector skills  
− None identified 
Reputation 
damage  
− Lucas (2011) 
− Chung, Hensher and Rose (2010) 
− Lucas (2010a)  
− Hutton (2009) 
− Lucas (2009) 
− Minister for Roads and Ports (2009) 
− Joyner (2007) 
− New South Wales Parliament 
(2006a) 
− Hodge and Greve (2005)  
− Smith (2005) 
− Sydney Morning Herald (2005) 
− Lally (in Techapeeraparnich 2004) 
− Techapeeraparnich (2004) 
− Karlsen (2002)* 
• Governance, probity and 
compliance  
• Confidentiality 
• Un-anticipated / un-intended 
events  
  
− Spencer Street (Southern Cross) Station 
Re-development:  Government may choose 
to intervene in operational matters.  They 
may do so to avert negative media attention 
directed mistakenly towards the public 
sector for issues or mistakes that the 
private partner is legally accountable for 
resolving 
− EastLink:  The government’s reputation can 
be tarnished if intended benefits are not 
fully realised and / or the deliverables fail to 
meet service user expectations   
− CityLink:  Government may decide it is 
necessary to intervene in situations where 
there is a public perception that service 
operators are treating their customers 
unfairly   
− New Schools Privately Financed Project:  
Sensitive financial and commercial 
information relating to PPPs such as cost 
structures, profit margins and intellectual 
property tend to be protected by 
‘commercial in confidence’ arrangements.  
This can lead to criticism by public 
commentators  
− Cross City Tunnel:  Unless government 
takes action to quash or re-direct public 
concern over issues that are the 
responsibility of operators, it may be 
blamed (unjustifiably) for service delivery 
shortcomings 
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Management 
element 
Issues identified Literature and case study issue 
sources 
Sub-issues Relevant case study issues 
 
Performance  Contract 
monitoring 
systems 
modification  
− Victorian Auditor-General (2007a) 
 
 
 
• Performance management 
systems improvement 
• Performance management 
systems documentation 
(researcher assertion)  
 
− Spencer Street (Southern Cross) Station 
Re-development:  Contract monitoring 
regimes should be regularly reviewed to 
identify and manage performance / systems 
shortfalls  
KPI modification − Brenninkmeijer (in Urio 2010) 
− Mandri-Perrott (2010) 
− Lee and Fisher (2007)^ 
− Victorian Auditor-General (2007a) 
− Cambridge Economic Policy 
Associates (2005) 
− Edwards et al (2004) 
− Evans and Bellamy (1995)^ 
• Annual KPI review (researcher 
assertion) 
• Ongoing KPI review  
 
 
− Spencer Street (Southern Cross) Station 
Re-development:  If KPIs are difficult to 
measure, they can adversely impact on the 
public partner’s ability to successfully 
monitor and review service provider 
performance   
Availability (and 
integrity) of 
performance data 
− Forrer et al (2010)  
− National Audit Office (2007) 
− Victorian Auditor-General (2007a) 
− Victorian Auditor-General (2004) 
• Availability of performance 
data 
• Integrity of performance data 
 
− Spencer Street (Southern Cross) Station 
Re-development:  Inaccurate data can 
potentially give rise to undetected or 
unreported incidents as well as intentional 
fraud, all of which could detract from the 
achievement of VfM outcomes 
− CityLink:  Service providers use their own 
performance data as a basis for decision-
making.  Hence, there is potential that data 
will contain errors or omissions either 
through human error or from wrong-doing   
Contract 
management  
− Department of Treasury and Finance 
(2009) 
− National Audit Office (2009b) 
− Victorian Auditor-General (2009) 
− AECOM (2007)  
− Victorian Auditor-General (2007a) 
− New South Wales Auditor-General 
(2006) 
− Edwards et al (2004) 
− Partnerships Victoria (2003a) 
• Performance evaluation 
• Management reporting 
• Managing performance 
shortfalls 
• Opportunity (risk) 
implementation (researcher 
assertion)  
 
− Spencer Street (Southern Cross) Station 
Re-development:  Public partner 
performance management systems should 
be designed to capture outputs that do not 
meet stipulated standards as well as 
complaints lodged against operators   
− EastLink:  VfM outcomes may not be 
achieved to their full potential unless 
service outputs are properly benchmarked   
− New Royal Children’s Hospital project:  In 
circumstances where service operators are 
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Management 
element 
Issues identified Literature and case study issue 
sources 
Sub-issues Relevant case study issues 
 
− Department of Public Works (2000)* responsible for monitoring their own 
performance, service outputs should still be 
validated by the public partner to confirm 
delivery standards are being met and 
compliance with policies, procedures and 
plans   
− New Royal Children’s Hospital project:  The 
public partner has a responsibility to 
complete and keep contract administration 
manuals up-to-date   
− New Schools Privately Financed Project:  If 
the public partner does not provide 
sufficient oversight of the currency of 
service provider operations manuals, 
service delivery standards may be 
compromised 
− New Schools Privately Financed Project:  If 
the public partner does not complete and 
maintain its contract administration 
manuals, performance monitoring and 
reporting strategies cannot be effectively 
implemented that achieve genuine VfM 
outcomes  
− Cross City Tunnel:  The failure of the public 
partner to effectively manage its oversight 
responsibility may lead to situations were 
operators fail to meet service standards   
Penalties & 
abatements  
− Javed, Lam and Zou (2013) 
− Mandri-Perrott (2010) 
− National Audit Office (2009b) 
− Ernst & Young (2008) 
− Garvin and Bosso (2008) 
− Victorian Auditor-General’s Office 
(2007a) 
− Department of Administration and 
Finance (2006) 
• Applying penalties and 
abatements 
• Incentive revisions 
 
− Spencer Street (Southern Cross) Station 
Re-development:  Penalties and abatement 
should be consistently applied unless there 
is a properly justified case for not doing so   
− New Schools Privately Financed Project:  
The public partner may not reap full VfM if it 
does not consistently apply abatement   
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Management 
element 
Issues identified Literature and case study issue 
sources 
Sub-issues Relevant case study issues 
 
− New South Wales Auditor-General 
(2006) 
− Hodge and Greve (2005) 
− New South Wales Treasury (2005a) 
− Brumby and Batchelor (2002) 
*Generic project issues (non-PPP specific) / ^Public sector performance systems / information issues (non-PPP specific) which are applicable to PPP 
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6.3 Partnership Management  
 
Outlined in Table 6.2 below, from a public sector perspective, is a set of generic 
partnership management propositions that may contribute towards achieving VfM 
outcomes during the operational phase.   
 
Table 6.2 Proposed Contributors to Partnership Management VfM. 
 
The documentation and / or actions presented in Table 6.3 can potentially be used 
as a foundation to build a generic partnership management evidence-base to assess 
whether VfM outcomes are being achieved in practice.   
 
Table 6.3 Proposed Evidence-base Foundations for Partnership Management 
VfM. 
 
As discussed in earlier chapters (Chapters 3 to 5), a range of partnership 
management issues have been identified that have the potential to detract from the 
achievement of planned VfM outcomes. These are: organisational culture; 
management commitment and support; employee capability and expertise; clear and 
open communication; relationship continuity; and conflict management. This section 
re-states the main tenets of each issue and proposes possible treatment actions that 
may contribute to improved operational outcomes (in conjunction with examples 
provided in Table 6.2). ‘External’ considerations for sub-issues focus upon the 
accountabilities of service providers i.e. how consortia performance may be 
improved through public partner intervention.  An ‘internal’ focus relates to the 
responsibilities of government in holding consortia accountable for delivering 
contracted services, as well as attempting to improve the capability of its employees, 
systems and / or processes.  The rationale for integrating issues for the model is also 
presented.   
VfM contributors 
− Proposed corrective actions for under-performance are mutually agreed with the private 
partner and these actions are implemented as agreed   
− Development and continuation of productive relationships with service users, employees and 
applicable community groups  
− Consortia informs the public partner of emerging risks and performance issues that have the 
potential to impact upon the achievement of planned VfM outcomes 
− No occurrences of negligence, fraud and / or corruption  
− Public partner employees adhere to all accountabilities and responsibilities under governance, 
probity and compliance frameworks 
− Disputes are quickly resolved with little to no impact on service delivery obligations and 
litigation is avoided 
VfM evidence-base foundation 
− Progress made against partnership / stakeholder management strategies and plans e.g. 
assessing whether key messages between the public and private partners or internal project 
teams and their project control groups have been properly understood and complied with  
− Assessing public partner employees behaviour through staff appraisals to ensure they are 
effectively discharging their duties in line with project accountabilities and responsibilities e.g. 
the contract administration manual 
− Outputs comply with relevant industry standards e.g. assessing partnership relations that may 
relate to people involvement and competence 
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6.3.1 Organisational Culture 
 
Key issues:  
 
Un-cooperative working environments can lead to operational difficulties between 
public and private partners.  Poor relationships and unsatisfactory performance are 
acknowledged to go “hand in hand” (National Audit Office 2009: p.54). This 
suggests, for instance, that poorly motivated employees are less likely to strive to 
meet performance targets.  See Table 6.4 for identified sub-issues.   
 
Table 6.4 Sub-issues Arising From Organisational Culture. 
 
Treatment actions:  
Personalities  
Personalities can impact on performance.  Project directors, for example, should 
work with individual staff members to identify how their personality traits / strengths 
can lead to improved motivation and output levels.  For project directors, this process 
can act as an enabler for getting the best out of their employees through 
empowerment – by providing them with knowledge and resources that may assist 
them to grow into and flourish in their roles.  Moreover, this knowledge is likely to 
heighten employee awareness about how their behaviour impacts on other team 
members.  The requirement for such learning could be incorporated into employee 
skills appraisals / development plans which should be conducted every six months 
(or at the end of the three month probationary period for new employees).  
Personality compatibility testing could also be undertaken by prospective candidates 
who seek to be employed in key roles (e.g. positions that interface with senior private 
partner representatives).  This activity could be incorporated into existing recruitment 
practices to create / maintain positive workplace dynamics.   
 
Team working 
The effectiveness of teams can be impacted upon or be influenced by collective 
levels of knowledge, experience, interaction and resourcing. Factors that may 
contribute to the achievement of more effective teams include:  
− Articulation and reinforcement of PPP objectives, ensuring that work 
packages and outputs are / remain strategically aligned with those objectives;  
− Defining team member roles and responsibilities and ensuring duties are 
discharged in accordance with the concession agreement / project brief, 
service specifications, agreed accountabilities and governance requirements;  
− The extent to which employees are integrated into their teams;   
− Clear internal communication, dispute resolution and information sharing 
practices (all contributing to mature behaviour within teams);   
Sub-issues Generic case study findings 
− Personalities 
− Team working 
− Motivation / incentives  
− None identified 
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− Developing business processes and obtaining commitment from staff to use 
them; and  
− Ongoing monitoring and evaluation of team effectiveness measures and the 
implementation of strategies to improve overall team performance.   
 
Motivation / incentives 
Internally focused incentive programs should be aligned with the achievement of 
PPP objectives and thus be used to shape employee behaviour, increase motivation 
and improve productivity.  In particular, these programs could be considered when 
staff are expected to be ‘stretched’ for a certain period of time e.g. due to resourcing 
constraints. Employees should be consulted during program design to assist 
decision-makers with developing appropriate criteria including what should constitute 
‘reward’ and deciding what the rewards should actually be.  Although rewards are 
likely to be dependent on circumstances and specifics, it could include additional 
professional development opportunities, performing higher duties, etc.  It is important 
that internal KPIs are set at the optimal level (i.e. achievable but without being too 
easy or difficult to attain) and relate to specific goals.  This may, for instance, equate 
to a percentage increase in productivity ratios or the development of an innovative 
idea or practice that leads to economies of scale.  The effectiveness of incentive 
programs including reviewing employee outputs against achieving targets should be 
conducted monthly.   
 
Integrating arguments: 
 
− Personalities. No significant relationships have been established with either 
risk or performance management for this sub-issue.     
− Team working. Contract management teams are used to deliver intended VfM 
outcomes. Team performance should therefore be monitored with actions 
taken to ensure employees remain sufficiently motivated for achieving these 
outcomes. This establishes a link between partnership and performance 
management. 
− Motivation / incentives. Incentives should be used, as appropriate, to 
encourage public partner employees to achieve agreed outputs and 
outcomes.   
 
6.3.2 Management Commitment and Support 
 
Key issues:    
 
Without appropriate support from line management, small concerns can develop 
unnecessarily into serious issues.  Therefore appropriate concerns and / or problems 
should be escalated to decision-makers for evaluation and / or treatment.  
Supportive management may also be decisive for resolving difficulties (Pinto and 
Slevin 1987) and thereby avoiding disputes.  From a public partner perspective, for 
example, senior management may decide to support additional resourcing including 
employing more staff or allocating more time to review and then report upon complex 
service delivery outcomes. See Table 6.5 for identified sub-issues and case study 
examples. 
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Table 6.5 Sub-issues Arising From Management Commitment and Support. 
 
Treatment actions: 
Negotiated outcomes 
There may be instances when the application of penalty clauses are relaxed by the 
public partner for strategic reasons when its private partner under-performs e.g. to 
improve a deteriorating working relationship between the public partner and 
consortia or being responsive to new / emerging service delivery challenges.  The 
latter example may lead to the modification of contractual clauses e.g. extending the 
cure period by a certain amount of time to address service delivery shortfalls in 
return for a pledge or guarantee by the concessionaire to improve its service outputs 
beyond its existing KPI targets.  Such compromise may benefit taxpayers in terms of 
providing assurance to government of sustainability of contract, thus reducing the 
risk of service provider failure over the short-term.  However, the failure of the private 
partner to meet negotiated terms ought to result in abatement being applied 
retrospectively. The public partner could approve and regularly monitor the 
implementation of rectification plans on a monthly basis to ensure that milestones 
and adjusted KPIs are being met. From an internal perspective, negotiated outcomes 
may be sought, for example, when a contract manager needs to review and then 
report upon complex service delivery outcomes within a shorter than normal 
timeframe.  Compromise may be achieved through the use of an employee incentive 
program, for example, as part of a wider employee scheme (see ‘Motivation / 
incentives’ above).   
 
Acquisition and allocation of additional resources 
There may be occasions when management commitment and support is needed for 
obtaining additional resources that have not been costed during the current budget 
cycle e.g. the cost of designing and implementing a new contract management 
system to oversee private partner performance or additional expenditure to cover the 
cost of employing specialist communications staff to deliver targeted 
communications plans that were not anticipated as part of core business (see 
Chapter 3 – ‘Reputation damage’). Other resources may include time e.g. requesting 
an extension to a deadline because of competing (but less important) priorities. 
Funding proposals could be prioritised on the basis of need and demonstrate to 
decision-makers how additional resourcing will improve outcomes, and conversely, 
how the objectives would be impacted if requests are not met.  If proposals are 
declined, it may be necessary to make cutbacks in other areas within the project 
director’s control or seek support from the government client.     
Sub-issues Generic case study findings 
− Negotiated outcomes 
− Acquisition and allocation of additional 
resources  
− Operators given an opportunity to resolve 
operational lapses rather than the public 
partner applying abatements for all 
instances of under-performance to 
encourage a positive working relationship 
− All responsibilities and accountabilities of 
operators should be adequately defined 
under service delivery agreements (and 
service specifications)       
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Integrating arguments: 
 
− Negotiated outcomes. Performance outputs should be monitored to establish 
whether agreed standards are being met. Under specific circumstances, 
output levels may be renegotiated to make them achievable, thus resulting in 
win-win outcomes. This establishes a link between partnership and 
performance management. 
− Acquisition and allocation of additional resources. Performance should be 
monitored to establish whether additional resources are needed to achieve 
intended VfM outcomes. This establishes a link between partnership and 
performance management. 
 
6.3.3 Employee Capability and Expertise 
 
Key issues:    
 
A lack of capability or expertise can lead to tensions between public and private 
partners and, if not remedied, could lead to service delivery under-performance.  
Service delivery and the quality of public partner contract management skills 
including monitoring performance targets ought to be effective if governments are to 
achieve VfM outcomes (Edwards et al 2004: p.63).  It is claimed that there are cases 
of insufficient corporate experience among public partner employees and a lack of 
understanding of commercial principles (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 2007: p.20).  Furthermore, poor co-ordination skills have the 
potential to impact on the public partner’s ability to successfully manage PPP 
outcomes (Yuan et al 2009).  See Table 6.6 for identified sub-issues and case study 
examples.  
 
Table 6.6 Sub-issues Arising From Employee Capability and Expertise. 
 
 
 
Sub-issues Generic case study findings 
− Roles and responsibilities  
− Subject matter knowledge and applicability  
 
 
− The structure of government statutory 
authorities may impinge upon its ability to 
effectively manage its contractual 
responsibilities, fulfil its ministerial reporting 
obligations, and may, in some instances, 
put public safety at risk 
− A lack of resourcing can make it difficult for 
public partner contract managers to 
monitor the effectiveness of service 
provider performance 
− Skill limitations may impact on the public 
partner’s ability to effectively manage 
service contracts which could hinder the 
achievement of genuine VfM outcomes 
and compromise public safety. Losing key 
employees could lead to corporate memory 
loss  
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Treatment actions: 
Roles and responsibilities 
Poorly defined roles and responsibilities may impact on employee performance.  It is 
therefore important to clearly articulate what each employee is expected to do and to 
whom and what they will be responsible for. This extends to, for instance, developing 
tailored job descriptions for each position; defining employee tasks, functions and 
responsibilities; identifying critical success factors; and aligning employee 
competencies with job requirements.  Clearly defined plans may assist decision-
makers during the recruitment process (i.e. by attracting suitable candidates for 
interview), demarcating positional authority within teams, reducing the likelihood of 
duplicated efforts between staff members, as well as providing an objective basis for 
evaluating employee performance and future training needs (this could be 
undertaken biannually or at the completion of the probationary period).  Moreover, 
decision-makers could review work packages in conjunction with their employees 
annually to assess future business needs.   
 
Subject matter knowledge and applicability 
Assisting employees to develop their potential is vital for improving their morale, 
competency (resulting in increased productivity), and career satisfaction (leading to 
the retention of high performing staff and continuity of operations).  The nature of 
employee development programs should be adapted to fit project requirements as 
well as the needs of individual employee and team needs.  This may involve 
developing basic skills e.g. time management, report writing, etc; enhancing existing 
professional / technical knowledge and skills e.g. legal, commercial, financial, 
engineering, etc; and wider career goals e.g. supervision / management training, and 
be incorporated into employee development plans (see above).  Project directors 
should also continuously monitor employee compliance with internal policies, 
frameworks and procedures including taking remedial action for non-conforming 
behaviour.  Furthermore, project directors should distil and document key project 
learning from subject matter experts.  Such information could be used to augment 
existing team knowledge and skills and prevent corporate memory loss.   
 
Integrating arguments: 
 
− Roles and responsibilities.  No significant relationships have been established 
with either risk or performance management for this sub-issue.       
− Subject matter knowledge and applicability. By monitoring public partner 
employee performance and facilitating up-skilling processes where necessary, 
project directors can increase the likelihood that the contract management 
function will be properly oversighted, thus contributing to the attainment of 
intended VfM outcomes. This establishes a link between partnership and 
performance management. 
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6.3.4 Clear and Open Communication 
 
Key issues:    
 
A lack of communication or miscommunication flowing from decision-making can 
lead to misunderstanding between partners. If left unchecked, this could result in 
communication break-downs which may reduce the level of trust that partners have 
in each others’ motives and impact on operational productivity.  See Table 6.7 for 
identified sub-issues and case study example.  
 
Table 6.7 Sub-issues Arising From Clear and Open Communication. 
 
Treatment actions: 
Shared understanding 
For communication to be effective, messages need to be conveyed in a manner in 
which they are understood by intended recipients. This includes communicating both 
with employees in teams (internal) and between public and private partners.  A 
shared understanding should be founded on, and be consistent with, the PPP’s 
objectives; the beliefs, values and behaviours that decision-makers wish to promote; 
and the adoption of common language (e.g. of key concepts and processes).   
 
Trust building 
Messages that are designed to influence or change behaviour should be established 
on trust that exists between public partner decision-makers and their employees and 
/ or consortia. Trust can be increased by establishing and maintaining credibility.  
Collectively, trust levels may be strengthened through the pursuit of common goals; 
shared understanding (see above); management follow-through on actions agreed 
with employees and / or consortia partners; mandating and enforcing project-wide 
adherence to governance, probity and compliance frameworks, etc.  On an individual 
level, decision-makers can build trust with their employees, for example, by showing 
them respect, engaging them in decision-making processes, and where appropriate, 
delegating tasks and / or responsibilities.  
 
Integrating arguments: 
 
No significant relationships have been established with either risk or performance 
management for these sub-issues.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub-issues Generic case study findings 
− Shared understanding 
− Trust building  
− If contractual responsibilities are not clearly 
articulated between partners, there may be 
potential for misunderstanding that could 
impact upon the effective use of resources    
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6.3.5 Relationship Continuity 
 
Key issues:    
 
A lack of relationship continuity between partners can impact upon the successful 
achievement of planned outcomes. Building relationships can be important as 
personal influence can be used to obtain information and resolve day-to-day issues 
without having to resort to more formal means. Moreover, staff departures may result 
in vital knowledge being lost due to relationship discontinuity (Arthur Andersen and 
Enterprise LSE 2000: p.38).  See Table 6.8 for the identified sub-issue.   
 
Table 6.8 Sub-issues Arising From Relationship Continuity. 
 
Treatment actions:   
Personal and professional influence 
Although positional power (i.e. the authority derived from an employee’s position 
within a team) is a key enabler for getting things done, it may not always be enough 
to achieve desired outcomes (particularly when trying to manage upwards).  
Therefore, using personal influence in conjunction with positional authority can be 
crucial. Decision-makers’ ability to persuade can be improved by knowing in advance 
precisely what it is they want to achieve, attempting to understand the situation from 
others’ point of view e.g. presenting outcomes as win-win solutions, and 
communicating effectively with those who may be able to help.   
  
Integrating arguments: 
 
Personal and professional influence can be used to encourage improved 
performance which can contribute to achieving intended VfM outcomes. This 
establishes a link between partnership and performance management. 
 
6.3.6 Conflict Management 
 
Key issues: 
 
Conflict between public and private partners may be inevitable (Edwards et al 2004: 
p.55). Broadly speaking, disagreements can arise over timeframes, costs and quality 
issues (Leung et al 2004) as well as project priorities, human resources issues 
(Thamhain and Wilemon 1975) and the interpretation of contract requirements due to 
individual or organisational biases or preferences (Cambridge Economic Policy 
Associates 2005: p.34-35).  See Table 6.9 for identified sub-issues and case study 
examples. 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub-issues Generic case study findings 
− Personal and professional influence  − None identified 
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Table 6.9 Sub-issues Arising From Conflict Management. 
 
Treatment actions: 
Resourcing 
Decision-makers should attempt to resolve differences early before they escalate 
into more serious problems.  They should therefore attempt to understand the issues 
from the perspectives of the key people involved, as well as taking advice, as 
appropriate, from operations committees / working groups, subject matter experts, 
legal counsel, etc. Decision-makers or their nominees should then propose treatment 
options to resolve the dispute.  Although cure actions will largely depend on the 
nature / source of conflict, favoured outcomes may include, for example, re-
arranging priorities, re-allocating resources, amending documentation and taking 
disciplinary action / imposing training on under-performing employees.  Agreed 
outcomes could include progress review dates (e.g. monthly). If conflict remains 
unresolved, or if cure actions fail, dispute resolution specialists could be engaged (as 
specified under contractual agreements) to formally manage the determination 
process or reach a mutually beneficial outcome.   
 
Values and beliefs 
Different values and beliefs held by individuals, public partner contract management 
teams and PPP partners can lead to disputes.  See treatment actions above.   
 
Integrating arguments: 
 
No significant relationships have been established with either risk or performance 
management for these sub-issues.       
 
 
6.4 Risk Management  
 
Outlined in Table 6.10 below, from a public sector perspective, is a set of generic risk 
management propositions that may contribute towards achieving VfM outcomes 
during the operational phase.   
 
 
 
 
Sub-issues Generic case study findings 
− Resourcing 
− Values and beliefs  
− Managing disputes can be costly and time 
consuming.  They may manifest in delays 
or unfulfilled PPP objectives   
− Conflict can arise between the partners 
over information requests.  Although the 
private partner is legally obligated to share 
operational data with their public partner at 
its request, it may not do so willingly 
− Disputes can arise due to 
misunderstandings between public and 
private partners (as well as from 
interpretation of contractual provisions) 
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Table 6.10 Proposed Contributors to Risk Management VfM. 
 
The documentation and / or actions presented in Table 6.11 can potentially be used 
as a foundation to build a generic risk management evidence-base to assess 
whether VfM outcomes are being achieved in practice.   
 
Table 6.11 Proposed Evidence-base Foundations for Risk Management VfM. 
 
As discussed in the literature review and case study chapters, a raft of risk 
management issues have been identified that have the potential to detract from the 
achievement of planned VfM outcomes. These are: implementation of transition plan; 
contract variation; change of consortium members / change to public partner’s 
agency authority; contract termination; end of concession hand-over; and reputation 
damage. This section re-states the main tenets of each issue and proposes possible 
treatment actions that may contribute to improved operational outcomes (in 
conjunction with examples provided in Table 6.10). ‘External’ considerations for sub-
issues focus upon the accountabilities of service providers i.e. how consortia 
performance may be improved through public partner intervention.  An ‘internal’ 
focus relates to the responsibilities of government in holding consortia accountable 
for delivering contracted services, as well as attempting to improve the capability of 
its employees, systems and / or processes.  The rationale for integrating issues for 
the model is also presented.   
VfM contributors 
− Identified risks that may prevent business case or other defined strategic objectives from 
being met are appropriately managed   
− Service delivery is aligned / re-aligned with business case / project brief objectives, 
concession deed, service specifications and subsequent contract amendments 
− Service delivery is perceived by users and the wider community to represent VfM  
− Where appropriate, opportunity risk leading to improved VfM outcomes is implemented 
VfM evidence-base foundation 
− Confidentiality agreements are put in place e.g. reduce the likelihood that public partner 
employees will divulge sensitive project information to third parties for personal gain  
− Public partner employee compliance with governance, probity and compliance frameworks 
− No occurrences of negligence, fraud and / or corruption  
− Outputs comply with relevant industry standards e.g. those relating to business continuity 
planning, public health and safety and fraud control   
− Assessing public partner employees behaviour to ensure they are effectively discharging their 
duties in line with project accountabilities and responsibilities e.g. against the contract 
administration manual 
− Transition, operations, environmental, quality improvement, performance shortfall, asset 
management, end of concession hand-over plans, etc are developed and progress against 
them is monitored 
− Risk registers, business continuity plans, issue logs, etc are developed, kept up-to-date and 
used to mitigate identified risks 
− Service usage (e.g. volume / demand) and failure event reports / exception reports are used 
for trend reporting to identify emerging risks  
− Benchmarking / competitive market testing is undertaken as scheduled  
− Relevant audit findings / recommendations are implemented   
− Lessons learned logs are used and disseminated as appropriate e.g. to facilitate the 
broadening of project-specific and wider public sector project knowledge  
− Innovation registers are used e.g. to facilitate ideas that could lead to service user 
improvements and / or cost efficiencies   
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6.4.1 Implementation of Transition Plan 
 
Key issues: 
 
Unforseen project / integration challenges could arise during transition between the 
end of the construction stage and operational commencement.  These could occur, 
for example, when the completion of scheduled tasks / deliverables are delayed 
typically resulting from resourcing constraints and / or technical complications.  
These types of issues can impact on service delivery performance and detract from 
achieving VfM outcomes. See Table 6.12 for the sub-issue and case study examples 
identified.   
 
Table 6.12 Sub-issues Arising From Implementation of Transition Plan. 
 
Treatment actions: 
Project / integration challenges 
Although the length of transition depends on project specifics, it will typically last for 
up to three months (or until services are operational).  During this time, it is vital that 
the public partner closely monitors operator performance to track progress against its 
completion requirements. This means that the private partner should update and 
report on its risk registers, business continuity plans and issue logs to the public 
partner, at least fortnightly.  If a risk becomes an event (i.e. risk realisation) and it is 
expected to impact upon the planned delivery of services, the situation should be 
reported to the public partner sooner, within five days.  These actions should provide 
the public partner with enough time to respond accordingly with updating / managing 
its contingency measures, including abatement, if applicable.   
 
Integrating arguments:  
 
The public partner should monitor the accountabilities of its private partner as well as 
ensuring its own completion requirements are met. This establishes a link between 
risk and performance management. 
 
6.4.2 Contract Variation 
 
Key issues:   
 
Amendments for example, can arise from technical obsolescence, new legal 
requirements, changes in service user demand, service provider under-performance 
(Partnerships Victoria 2001: p.135, p.161; Edwards et al 2004: p.122) and from 
decisions to modify the length of agreements.  Government has the right to step-in if 
the quality of services provided by the operator fails to meet its obligations 
Sub-issues Generic case study findings 
− Project / integration challenges  − Ineffective implementation of transition 
plans can impact on operations as well as 
damaging relations between public and 
private partners    
− Serious issues can arise during transition 
periods that were not envisaged during the 
project’s design and construction stages     
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(Partnerships Victoria 2001: p.161) which could arise from a breach of contract such 
as default or due to an emergency situation where circumstances may be beyond 
the capability of consortia to deal with the situation effectively (Partnerships Victoria 
2001: p.148, p.161). See Table 6.13 for identified sub-issues and case study 
examples. 
 
Table 6.13 Sub-issues Arising From Contract Variation. 
 
Treatment actions: 
Modification of existing services 
Feasibility studies with an aim to amend existing agreements should be aligned (as 
appropriate) with original business case / project brief objectives, concession deed 
and service specifications (care should also be taken to ensure that modifications do 
not breach Government legislation or policy). Options explored should clearly 
demonstrate how proposed changes are expected to contribute towards the 
attainment of improved VfM outcomes.  Analyses could include factors relating to 
costs (e.g. financial cost to government including insurances coverage such as those 
relating to intellectual property; legal due diligence relating to specific alterations that 
would be made to contractual terms; and financial due diligence relating to changes 
that would be made to the financial model such as the payment mechanism), return 
on investment (e.g. to the taxpayer), the risks involved (e.g. consortia capabilities, 
impact of change on existing services or infrastructure, potential for further 
opportunity risk realisation) and how the achievement of VfM will be measured 
throughout the concession period.  The public partner (or its nominee) could conduct 
performance audits every two years to appraise the quality of services being 
provided by the concessionaire.  Audits could be conducted in conjunction with the 
active six-monthly review, testing and update of business continuity plans, with all 
business continuity planning and risk management policies, frameworks and 
procedures being reviewed and updated annually; and six-monthly reviews of 
identified opportunity risks.   
 
Re-allocation of risk 
The re-allocation of risk may relate to public partner ‘take-back’ e.g. the take-back of 
soft services from an existing arrangement or decisions to transfer certain functions 
provided by one member of a consortium to another.  From an internal point of view, 
Sub-issues Generic case study findings 
− Modification of existing services 
− Re-allocation of risk 
− Business continuity planning modification  
− Force majeure events have the potential to 
critically impact upon the service provider’s 
ability to perform its contractual obligations   
− New legal requirements may lead to 
existing agreements being varied.  VfM 
outcomes may be reduced if variations are 
not based on clearly defined benefits, 
properly justified costs / needs analyses, or 
assessments to determine consortia 
capability 
− VfM achievement can be put at risk if the 
public partner does not take timely and 
decisive action to manage service provider 
under-performance  
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treatment actions should broadly follow those outlined above.  From an external 
perspective, trend analysis (reported quarterly) could be undertaken to monitor 
service delivery performance of service providers and be used as a basis for 
identifying emerging risks.  Trend analysis could thus feed into the formal process for 
reviewing risk registers with relevant findings being incorporated into regular 
performance reporting that may lead to potential service efficiencies that may reduce 
the severity of the risk or eliminate the need to re-allocate the risk.  These treatments 
should be taken in addition to the biannual risk register and business continuity 
planning updates as well as the annual review of policies, frameworks and 
procedures.  Performance audits relating to re-allocation of risks could be conducted 
every second year.   
 
Business continuity planning modification 
Business continuity plans could be reviewed, tested and updated every six months in 
conjunction with the annual review of all related policies, frameworks and 
procedures.  In response to specific force majeure events and warnings, the public 
partner could, at a minimum, obtain from its private partner, the basis on which its 
opinions are formed, the services that are / likely to be affected, how long they are 
expected to be affected for, measures that the consortia has / will undertake to avoid 
or minimise disruption (including associated costs), insurance policy details as well 
as providing periodic updates on the situation.  This information could be used as a 
foundation for activating public partner business continuity plans (as well as 
documentation received from other relevant sources).  If separate from its business 
continuity planning efforts, government should initiate its communication plans to 
inform key stakeholders (including the public) of ongoing developments e.g. service 
availability and risks to public safety.   
 
Integrating arguments:   
 
− Modification of existing services. The quality of service delivery should be 
monitored against the operator’s contractual obligations to determine whether 
intended VfM outcomes are being met. Modifications may be required to 
improve service delivery. This establishes a link between risk and 
performance management. 
− Re-allocation of risk. Performance monitoring can be used to identify whether 
particular risks could be re-allocated to a party better placed to manage them.  
Performance data can therefore be used as a basis for decision-making. This 
establishes a link between risk and performance management. 
− Business continuity planning modification. Changing circumstances / new 
knowledge may lead to the alteration of business continuity plans.  
Operational performance should be monitored and adjustments made to plans 
where necessary to ensure they remain current. This establishes a link 
between risk and performance management. 
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6.4.3 Change of Consortium Members / Change to Public Partner’s Agency 
Authority 
 
Key issues: 
 
Sub-standard delivery of services or the failure to provide agreed services by a 
member of a private consortium may lead to its contract being terminated.  Such 
situations, for example, may lead to the replacement of that member within the 
existing consortium or an amended contract if the provision of those services is no 
longer required.  Changes to, or replacement of, a public partner’s agency authority 
may also expose government to new and un-intended risks, particularly during 
transition phases. See Table 6.14 for the identified sub-issue and case study 
example. 
 
Table 6.14 Sub-issues Arising From Change of Consortium Members / Change 
to Public Partner’s Agency Authority. 
 
Treatment actions: 
Exposure to new risks  
During transition, it is essential that the public partner closely monitors operator 
performance to track progress against its completion requirements (see ‘Project / 
integration challenges’, above).  With regard to internal considerations, regular 
management reporting should include, for example, recommendations to public 
partner decision-makers for developing further (or refining existing) risk management 
control actions including updating contingency measures, as appropriate (internal 
considerations could also apply during changes to the statutory obligations of the 
public partner).   
 
Integrating arguments: 
 
Performance should be monitored to track service delivery against requirements / 
contract management oversight accountabilities.  Different organisational structures, 
people (e.g. varying experience and perceptions) and processes (e.g. the way things 
are done) can lead to the creation of different risk profiles and potentially new 
challenges even when operating in similar environments. This establishes a link 
between risk and performance management. 
Sub-issues Generic case study findings 
− Exposure to new risks  − Sub-standard delivery of services or the 
failure to provide agreed services by a 
member of a consortium may lead to its 
contract being terminated.  This may lead 
to new and un-intended risks faced by the 
public partner  
− Re-structuring / transfer of statutory 
obligations could expose government to 
new and un-intended risks (including how 
existing risks are managed / resourced) 
and corporate memory loss due to staff 
transitioning during critical hand-over 
periods   
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A relationship has also been identified between change of consortium members / 
public partner’s agency authority and implementation of transition plan as new 
entities must integrate into existing partnering arrangements.   
 
6.4.4 Contract Termination 
 
Key issues: 
 
A purported key objective of contract management is to ensure that private partner 
obligations are met for the full contract term (Partnerships Victoria 2001: p.172).  
Although considered as a last resort, contract termination can be enforced if the 
service provider repeatedly fails to meet its contractual responsibilities (Partnerships 
Victoria 2001: p.172, p.25). In such situations, long-term government funding 
commitments and priorities may be put at risk unless an alternative service provider 
is found.  See Table 6.15 for the identified sub-issue.   
 
Table 6.15 Sub-issues Arising From Contract Termination. 
 
Treatment actions: 
Service provider failure 
Financial strength of consortia as well as operator performance should be proactively 
monitored by the public partner to detect circumstances or events that may ultimately 
result in contractual agreements being terminated.  This could occur, for example, 
from events that are beyond consortia capability e.g. a force majeure event (see 
‘Business continuity planning modification’ treatment actions above) that leads to un-
sustainability of contract, a risk event that exposes weaknesses in existing control 
actions or from service delivery under-performance.  For the latter example, it could 
therefore be imperative that failure event / output exception reports are reviewed 
monthly (and incorporated into ongoing trend analysis that is reported quarterly).    
 
For defaults that actually lead to a termination, a range of administrative  / change of 
control functions such as issuing a termination notice; calculating and making 
compensation payments; dealing with insurance, indemnities and intellectual 
property issues; and transferring responsibility / change of ownership should be 
undertaken.  Associated treatment actions may include enacting business continuity 
plans as well as conducting a final inspection of assets, transferring project 
documentation / knowledge, and orientating / up-skilling employees (see ‘6.4.5 End 
of concession hand-over’). Furthermore, the circumstances that led to the 
termination, including relevant risk and performance data, could be used to probe 
tenderers’ ability and readiness to manage similar situations (in conjunction with 
assessing all other accountabilities and service requirements – that is, if the public 
partner is involved in this process).  
 
As part of monitoring regimes and with regard to soft services, benchmarking and 
competitive market testing should be carried out periodically (the frequency will be 
Sub-issues Generic case study findings 
− Service provider failure  − None identified   
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stipulated in service agreements e.g. conducted every fifth year).  The findings of 
such analyses may be an effective way for the public partner to identify suitable, 
alternative service providers (based both on cost and capability) who could 
temporarily deliver required services during the re-tendering process or to undertake 
the delivery of these services more permanently during the contract term.   
 
Integrating arguments:   
 
The ability of consortia partners to deliver services should be monitored to ensure 
intended VfM outcomes are being met.  Operators may need to be replaced if they 
cannot deliver their contractual obligations. In certain circumstances, the private 
partner may need to enact business continuity plans to ensure service delivery is not 
disrupted.  Performance monitoring for this reason is therefore vital. This establishes 
a link between risk and performance management. 
 
A relationship has also been identified between contract termination and end of 
concession hand-over as there are responsibilities that need to be fulfilled before 
change of ownership can be completed.   
 
6.4.5 End of Concession Hand-over  
 
Key issues: 
 
The ‘Skills transfer’ issue that is discussed in Chapter 3 has been merged into ‘End 
of Concession hand-over’.    
 
The usability (condition) of assets over their entire lifecycles can become a serious 
issue for government (Edwards et al 2004: p.123) if they are not properly managed 
or physically maintained.  Assets could thus deteriorate prematurely and be rendered 
‘unfit for purpose’.  This can reduce VfM outcomes particularly if the public partner 
has to absorb the cost of major repairs or replacements soon after the project hand-
over stage (expiry of concession) is complete.  Furthermore, the failure to transfer 
knowledge and skills from the private to the public partner in a timely manner may 
result in the payment of fees to external advisers for longer than necessary and may 
reduce opportunities for broadening public sector knowledge that could drive down 
costs and increase skill levels over the long-term, or be applied to other PPPs.  See 
Table 6.16 for identified sub-issues and case study examples.   
 
Table 6.16 Sub-issues Arising From End of Concession Hand-over. 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub-issues Generic case study findings 
− Asset monitoring  
− Transfer of documentation / knowledge 
− Orientation / up-skilling employees  
− Service delivery performance may falter 
during transfer of PPP assets from 
consortia ownership to public partner 
control if hand-over packages are not 
effective 
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Treatment actions: 
Asset monitoring 
PPP assets should be monitored and reported upon periodically.  Although the 
frequency of reporting may depend on specific contractual arrangements, public 
partner contract managers could review findings / recommendations on a quarterly 
basis.  It is likely that such reporting frequency could be used as an ‘early warning 
detection system’ for alerting contract managers of potential or actual problems e.g. 
the condition of assets.  Contract managers should seek assurance that any 
irregularities / adverse findings identified in the asset management reports have 
been resolved.   
 
Transfer of project documentation / knowledge 
Timing of transfer will depend upon the size and complexity of the PPP but typically, 
plans should be developed up to five years before the effective concession expiry 
date and aligned with public partner transition plans, business continuity plans and 
service provider short-fall plans.  Hand-over packages should be prepared quarterly 
and include the condition of assets (e.g. so the public partner can undertake medium 
to long-term technical assessments on how the impact of obsolescence / legacy 
systems will be managed); an agreed methodology for transferring project / 
operational knowledge from the private partner to the government client, its 
nominees or preferred bidder; and the actual transfer and reinforcement of 
knowledge between the parties (undertaken quarterly). For the public partner, 
transition planning may include the development of personnel plans (comprising, for 
instance, of incentive schemes for attracting and retaining high calibre employees or 
transfer of new staff to a preferred bidder (if applicable)), clear role and responsibility 
definition, skills appraisals and training plans – depending on the seniority of 
positions that need to be filled.  This process should commence at least six months 
in advance of hand-over.   
 
Orientation / up-skilling employees 
Care should be taken by public partner decision-makers (e.g. the project director and 
human resources personnel) to clearly define new employee roles and 
responsibilities (which should be commensurate with current skill levels and 
experience) and in identifying resources that will assist with their professional 
development / assimilation into new working environments. After the first three 
months of employment (and as per six-month cycle thereafter), employees could be 
assessed on their competency and adherence to governance, probity and 
compliance frameworks.  Shortfall plans and corresponding remedial action should 
be developed / undertaken to address areas of under-performance and non-
compliance.  Furthermore, all staff could be encouraged to keep ‘lessons learnt’ logs 
(updated weekly) that can potentially be shared with other employees and used by 
decision-makers, as appropriate, to guide future training programs (reviewed and co-
ordinated every third month).  It is anticipated that such activity could lead to the 
broadening of public sector knowledge particularly with regard to specialised roles 
and may assist in encouraging innovative behaviour to drive down costs and 
increase skill levels over the longer-term.  Succession planning for key roles should 
become mandatory and be incorporated into business continuity plans (updated 
every six months) including the production of ‘how to’ documentation for using 
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essential systems and processes, an agreed methodology for transferring knowledge 
to successor employees, periodic updates of hand-over packages (the frequency 
dependent upon role complexity) as well as conducting exit interviews (with relevant 
findings fed back into the employee development loop).   
 
Integrating arguments:   
 
− Asset monitoring. The condition of assets should be monitored during the 
hand-back period to ensure they are being maintained at agreed levels, with 
remedial action undertaken as necessary. This establishes a link between risk 
and performance management. 
− Transfer of project documentation / knowledge. This process should be 
regularly monitored to ensure it is being done in practice and thus establishes 
a link between risk, partnership and performance management. 
− Orientation / up-skilling of employees. Performance should be monitored to 
ensure that recipients of transfer develop the necessary knowledge and skills 
to increase the probability that intended outcomes will be achieved. This 
establishes a link between risk, partnership and performance management. 
 
6.4.6 Reputation Damage 
 
Key issues:  
 
Unanticipated events (Joyner 2007; Hodge and Greve 2005: p.110) during 
operations can have unexpected consequences for the public sector.  Even though 
its private partner is responsible for delivering services, there is potential for negative 
media attention (Karlsen 2002; Chung, Hensher and Rose 2010) to be misdirected to 
the public partner by ill-informed service users or journalists when things go wrong.  
Government may need to be proactive in order to protect its reputation through 
awareness raising initiatives or other means of direct action. Government’s 
reputation can also be damaged if governance, probity and compliance frameworks 
are not properly adhered to by its employees.  See Table 6.17 for identified sub-
issues and case study examples.   
 
Table 6.17 Sub-issues Arising From Reputation Damage. 
Sub-issues Generic case study findings 
− Governance, probity and compliance  
− Confidentiality  
− Un-anticipated / un-intended events  
 
− Government may choose to intervene in 
operational matters.  They may do so to 
avert negative media attention directed 
mistakenly towards the public sector for 
issues or mistakes that the private partner 
is legally accountable for resolving 
− The government’s reputation can be 
tarnished if PPP benefits are not fully 
realised and / or the deliverables fail to 
meet service user expectations   
− Sensitive financial and commercial 
information relating to PPPs such as cost 
structures, profit margins and intellectual 
property tend to be protected by 
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Treatment actions: 
Governance, probity and compliance 
Although it is unlikely that governance, probity and compliance policies, frameworks 
and procedures will prevent all occurrences of negligence, fraud and / or corruption, 
they may act as a deterrent and be used to inform public partner employees about 
their own accountabilities and responsibilities. Policies, frameworks and procedures 
could be reviewed and updated annually, with changes clearly communicated to 
staff.  All public partner employees (and contractors / consultants) connected to the 
PPP could sign (as per 12 month cycle) a declaration of conflict of interest as well as 
disclosing any acceptance of a gift, benefit and / or hospitality received from 
consortia representatives (or other acceptances of offers made by parties outside of 
government).  The private partner should attest to the public partner that their own 
employees have made similar declarations.   
 
Confidentiality 
Confidentiality agreements should be signed by all government employees (and 
contractors / consultants) that have access to, or are expected to get access to, 
commercial-in-confidence / cabinet-in-confidence material.  Such material should not 
be divulged to any third party unless otherwise exempted under specific contractual 
arrangements e.g. disclosures required by law, disclosures by a department’s project 
director (or statutory authority depending on the nature of the agreement), to 
government departments and their agencies and / or disclosures to prospective 
shareholders or other investors.  An organisational culture fostered on trust between 
employees could underpin the use of confidentiality agreements.  Any incidence of 
non-compliance, however, should be escalated to government decision-makers e.g. 
senior human resources personnel or legal counsel for appropriate action.   
 
Un-anticipated / un-intended events 
The public partner may intervene in operational matters that do not require contract 
variation or the activation of business continuity plans e.g. public criticism of service 
delivery quality.  An annual contingency budget for these types of events could be 
set aside to cover the costs of communication and issue management planning by 
government.   
 
Integrating arguments:  
 
− Governance, probity and compliance.  Organisational cultures should promote 
adherence to governance, probity and compliance policies and frameworks to 
reduce the likelihood of incidences of negligence, fraud and / or corruption. 
This establishes a link between risk and partnership management. 
− Confidentiality. Organisational cultures should support the use of 
confidentially agreements by all employees (and contractors / consultants) to 
protect commercial-in-confidence / cabinet-in-confidence material. This 
establishes a link between risk and partnership management. 
‘commercial in confidence’ arrangements.  
This can lead to criticism by public 
commentators  
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− Un-anticipated / un-intended events.  No significant relationships have been 
established with either partnership or performance management for this sub-
issue.       
 
 
6.5 Performance Management  
 
Outlined in Table 6.18 below, from a public sector perspective, is a set of generic 
performance management propositions that may contribute towards achieving VfM 
outcomes during the operational phase.   
 
Table 6.18 Proposed Contributors to Performance Management VfM. 
 
The documentation and / or actions presented in Table 6.19 can potentially be used 
as a foundation to build a generic performance management evidence-base to 
assess whether VfM outcomes are being achieved in practice.   
 
Table 6.19 Proposed Evidence-base Foundations for Performance 
Management VfM. 
 
As discussed in earlier chapters, a range of performance management issues have 
been identified that have the potential to detract from the achievement of planned 
VfM outcomes. These are: performance management systems modification; KPI 
modification; availability and integrity of performance data and metrics; performance 
monitoring and adjustment; and penalties and abatements. This section re-states the 
main tenets of each issue and proposes possible treatment actions that may 
contribute to improved operational outcomes (in conjunction with examples provided 
in Table 6.18). ‘External’ considerations for sub-issues focus upon the 
accountabilities of service providers i.e. how consortia performance may be 
VfM contributors 
− Public sector agency / departmental project obligations are delivered within budget and on 
time 
− Services are delivered in line with business case / project brief objectives, concession deed, 
service specifications and subsequent contract amendments 
− Agreed changes to service delivery is aligned / re-aligned with business case / project brief 
objectives, concession deed, service specifications and subsequent contract amendments 
− Consistently high levels of service user and wider community satisfaction is reported  
− Incidences of negligence, fraud and / or corruption are appropriately dealt with  
VfM evidence-base foundation 
− Project expenditure remains within prescribed budgetary limits  
− Achievement of VfM outcomes as defined by the business case / project brief objectives, 
concession deed, service specifications and subsequent contract amendments 
− Incident rates / KPI performance failure rates decline  
− Public partner accountabilities and responsibilities relating to the contract administration 
manual are satisfactorily discharged 
− Outputs comply with relevant industry standards e.g. those that may relate to process 
improvement and facilities management 
− Relevant audit findings / recommendations are implemented   
− Implementation of opportunity risk proposals e.g. innovations that lead to improved VfM 
outcomes 
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improved through public partner intervention.  An ‘internal’ focus relates to the 
responsibilities of government in holding consortia accountable for delivering 
contracted services, as well as attempting to improve the capability of its employees, 
systems and / or processes.  The rationale for integrating issues for the model is also 
presented.   
 
6.5.1 Performance Management Systems Modification 
 
Key issues: 
 
This category has evolved from ‘Contract monitoring systems modification’ 
presented in Chapter 4. Performance management systems modification 
incorporates broader performance systems considerations.   
 
Poorly designed performance management systems (or ineffective application of 
these systems) could make it difficult for public partner contract managers when 
assessing service delivery performance i.e. determining whether contracted 
obligations of service providers have actually been met i.e. due to different 
interpretation of wording in contractual clauses and KPIs, for instance.  Over time, 
and in extreme circumstances, this may lead to difficulties in establishing if there is 
likely to be sustainability of contract (Partnerships Victoria 2003: p.47).  See Table 
6.20 for identified sub-issues and case study example.  
 
Table 6.20 Sub-issues Arising From Performance Management  
Systems Modification. 
 
Treatment actions: 
Performance management systems improvement 
Public partner performance systems should be designed to monitor consortia outputs 
against KPIs (the types of KPIs are specified in services and development 
agreements and service specifications).  It is therefore imperative that performance 
systems capability is reviewed in conjunction with planned modification of KPIs that 
arise from annual or more frequent periodic review (unless performance data is self-
reported by the operator).  At a minimum, systems should be capable, or have the 
capacity to: a) measure outputs and outcomes (lagging indicators) as well as 
performance drivers (leading indicators) e.g. so data can be used as a basis for 
public partner decision-makers to enforce penalties and / or abatement for service 
under-performance, and b) analyse trends e.g. previous monthly and quarterly 
performance outputs to determine whether performance is / has been consistently 
improving (or not) over a specified timeframe (such as over a 12 or 18-month 
period).   
 
 
 
Sub-issues Generic case study findings 
− Performance management systems 
improvement  
− Performance management systems 
documentation 
− Contract monitoring regimes should be 
regularly reviewed to identify and manage 
performance / systems shortfalls   
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Performance management systems documentation 
The currency of performance systems user guides should be updated when 
performance management systems are modified (as stated above) to ensure 
performance continues to be effectively monitored.  Manuals should be used to 
assess documented outputs against actual employee performance (e.g. for contract 
managers) to help determine their competence and can also be useful for 
succession planning purposes.   
 
Integrating arguments:   
 
No significant relationships have been established with either partnership or risk 
management for these sub-issues.       
 
6.5.2 KPI Modification 
 
Key issues: 
 
The need for KPI modification may arise due to a number of reasons.  They include 
that KPIs may not be ‘fit for purpose’ (Mandri-Perrott 2010: p.152; Brenninkmeijer in 
Urio 2010: p.93), there may be too many (or too few) KPIs that need to be evaluated 
as part of service delivery arrangements (Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 
2005: p.36), changes to service delivery requirements, and a lack of KPI clarity 
(Edwards et al 2004: p.45; Cambridge Economic Policy Associates 2005: p.36).  See 
Table 6.21 for identified sub-issues and case study example.  
 
Table 6.21 Sub-issues Arising From KPI Modification. 
 
Treatment actions: 
Annual KPI review 
Where appropriate, KPIs could be reviewed with proposed modifications (including 
costing) being agreed between public and private partners prior to the 
commencement of each contract year.  From a public partner perspective, the need 
for change may arise, for example, over governance structure inadequacies e.g. 
weaknesses in risk management frameworks (which should be addressed as part of 
scheduled annual policy, framework and procedural reviews as stated in section 
6.4.3), trend analysis findings e.g. patterns identified in failure event reports / output 
exception reports (reported monthly), service user complaints, audit findings, 
alterations to contractual agreements i.e. contract variations and / or from wider 
industry drivers e.g. an economic recession.  Changes made should be relevant, 
measurable, repeatable and achievable. The rationale for modifying KPIs should 
also be fully documented to protect against corporate memory loss in case of 
unexpected staffing changes and to provide justification from government clients e.g. 
to Auditors-General as to why these decisions were taken.   
Sub-issues Generic case study findings 
− Annual KPI review  
− Ongoing KPI review  
− If KPIs are difficult to measure, they can 
adversely impact on the public partner’s 
ability to successfully monitor and review 
service provider performance  
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Ongoing KPI review 
A more frequent review and update of KPIs may be necessary when a short turn-
around time is required to improve performance.  See treatment actions above.   
 
Integrating arguments: 
 
− Annual KPI review.  Progress made against modified KPIs should be regularly 
monitored to determine whether performance is delivering intended outcomes. 
This establishes a link between performance and risk management. 
− Ongoing KPI review.  See integrating argument above.   
 
A relationship has also been identified between KPI modification and performance 
monitoring and adjustment due to the importance of tracking actual progress against 
intended outcomes to establish whether performance is on track.   
 
6.5.3 Availability and Integrity of Performance Data and Metrics 
 
Key issues: 
 
This category has been expanded from ‘Availability and integrity of performance 
data’, discussed in Chapter 4.  It now includes reference to metrics.   
 
Performance data is information used for making informed decisions about 
operational progress and is linked to the construction of appropriate KPIs.  
Performance metrics provide the means of measuring performance. If KPIs are 
poorly designed, the data obtained from evaluating performance against these 
measures will be of limited or no value.  Moreover, performance outputs cannot be 
effectively managed if data is not accurately or honestly reported, or the metrics are 
not effectively applied. See Table 6.22 for identified sub-issues and case study 
examples.   
 
Table 6.22 Sub-issues Arising From Availability and Integrity of Performance 
Data and Metrics. 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub-issues Generic case study findings 
− Availability of performance data and metrics 
− Integrity of performance data and metrics 
 
− Inaccurate data can potentially give rise to 
undetected or unreported incidents as well 
as intentional fraud, all of which could 
detract from the achievement of VfM 
outcomes 
− Service providers use their own 
performance data as a basis for decision-
making.  Hence, there is potential that data 
will contain errors or omissions either 
through human error or from wrong-doing   
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Treatment actions: 
Availability of performance data and metrics 
Failure of the private partner to provide KPI performance data and metrics (including 
presenting the data in agreed formats) should be properly enforced by the public 
partner e.g. through abatement.  Exceptions should be properly justified and fully 
documented.  Depending on the seriousness of continued non-compliance, this 
should result in contract termination.   
 
Integrity of performance data and metrics 
If a public partner employee (e.g. a contract manager) suspects that the integrity of 
performance data has been compromised, the matter should be escalated to an 
appropriate authority e.g. the operations committee / working group or an external 
authority such as a protected disclosure co-ordinator for further consideration.  This 
should be done as soon as possible to minimise the potential for re-occurrence.  All 
credible accusations ought to be investigated either internally or externally 
depending on the nature of the discrepancies.  Confirmed instances of negligence, 
fraud and / or corruption should be dealt with through disciplinary / legal action, the 
issue of penalty notices and / or abatement, etc (as appropriate).  In the most serious 
of incidents, termination of contract may be warranted if a private party is deemed to 
be responsible for negligence, fraud and / or corruption.   
 
Integrating arguments: 
 
− Availability of performance data and metrics. These are required to assess 
whether service outputs are meeting intended outcomes and if penalties or 
abatement should be applied for under-performance. This establishes a link 
between risk and performance management. This establishes a link between 
performance and partnership management. 
− Integrity of performance data and metrics.  The veracity of performance data 
can lead to tensions, distrust and disputes between partners.  Inaccurate or 
falsified data may have serious consequences for the continuation of a 
partnering arrangement (e.g. in extreme circumstances, this could lead to 
contract termination).   
 
6.5.4 Performance Monitoring and Adjustment  
 
Key issues: 
 
Discussion of the ‘Contract management’ principle / issues outlined in Chapters 4 
and 5 has been re-fashioned to emphasise the public partner’s wider role in 
managing consortia performance as well as the dual nature of this undertaking – this 
relates to performance monitoring which can be described as a process of review 
(i.e. a passive function) and taking corrective action to address under-performance 
(i.e. an active function).   
 
An effective way for the public partner to hold its private partner accountable for their 
performance is through the continuous application of contract administration.  This is 
important because if performance is not well managed, it can put VfM outcomes at 
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risk.  Without a strong understanding of the service delivery environment, public 
partner contract managers may find it difficult to accurately evaluate operational 
performance (Edwards et al 2004: p.49).  See Table 6.23 for identified sub-issues 
and case study examples.   
 
Table 6.23 Sub-issues Arising From Performance Monitoring and Adjustment. 
 
Treatment actions: 
Performance evaluation 
From an internal perspective, the public partner has a responsibility to maintain 
minimum standards applied by its employees (or improve existing efforts to meet 
these standards) as part of its contract oversight role.  Employee deliverables could 
thus be benchmarked against their job descriptions as well as the relevant outputs 
and outcomes specified in contract management manuals in assessing the extent to 
which they are effectively discharging their duties.  Review could form part of the 
regular six-monthly staff appraisal process (however, the first appraisal could be 
conducted for new employees when they have completed their third month of 
service).  From an external point of view, and even if the private partner is 
accountable for monitoring its own performance, service delivery outputs should be 
tested / validated by the public partner (or its nominees) on a regular basis against 
the consortia’s contractual obligations.  This could include, for example, adherence 
to agreed policies, frameworks and procedures; progress made against work plans 
and technical assessments e.g. public safety reviews; the achievement of outputs 
and outcomes against KPIs and milestones; and improvement made to the delivery 
of services arising from stakeholder feedback, and the implementation of audit 
recommendations.  Other types of review could include five-year reviews to assess 
the level of progress made with regard to the achievement project business case 
objectives / justifications made for amending the contract; and overseeing 
benchmarking and competitive market testing that may also be conducted every fifth 
year to determine the relative quality and competitiveness of existing services with 
that of similar providers.   
 
Sub-issues Generic case study findings 
− Performance evaluation  
− Management reporting  
− Managing performance shortfalls  
− Opportunity (risk) implementation  
− Public partner performance management 
systems should be designed to capture 
outputs that do not meet stipulated 
standards as well as for complaints lodged 
against service operators  
− VfM outcomes may not be achieved to 
their full potential unless service outputs 
are regularly benchmarked against 
operational best practices  
− In circumstances where service operators 
are responsible for monitoring their own 
performance, service outputs should still 
be validated by the public partner to 
confirm delivery standards and compliance 
with policies, procedures and plans  
− The public partner has a responsibility to 
complete and keep its contract 
administration manuals up-to-date  
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Management reporting 
From an internal viewpoint, management reporting can be an effective method for 
informing decision-makers, for example, of work plan progress or performance 
shortfalls (including justifying the basis for arguing for additional resources).  
Although the frequency of reporting will likely be determined by individual PPP and 
personnel specifics, weekly or monthly reporting could take place to demonstrate 
how work plans are being managed and the progress made in achieving them.  For 
project directors, such reporting can be used as a foundation for interpreting strategy 
into work plans, measuring strategic objectives and conducting skills appraisals.  
From an external consideration, the reporting of service delivery performance to 
public partner decision-makers (via the public partner’s contract management team) 
could focus on the outcomes of performance reviews, progress made against output 
and outcome measures as well as key findings identified from trend reporting.  This 
could all link to strategic decision-making.  Reporting could include, for example, 
recommendations to decision-makers for developing further (or refining existing) 
control actions.   
 
Managing performance shortfalls 
Internally, shortfalls can be addressed through staff skills appraisals (undertaken six-
monthly or at the end of the three month probationary period for new employees).  
This could include the development and implementation of individual employee 
performance plans including the charting of monthly progress against these plans.  
Disciplinary action could also be taken against employees, if appropriate.  From an 
external perspective, managing shortfalls relate to consortia that fail to maintain 
expected delivery standards as stipulated under concession deeds.  Apart from 
applying penalties and abatement (see ‘Penalties and abatements’), shortfalls may 
potentially be mitigated through sub-contracting arrangements, the modification of 
KPIs (see ‘KPI modification’) or through contract amendment (see ‘modification of 
existing services’ and ‘re-allocation of risk’) – assuming that the implementation of 
one of these options will continue to deliver VfM outcomes for service users and tax 
payers.      
 
Opportunity (risk) implementation 
Although it is assumed that there is only a limited amount of scope for opportunity 
risk identification during the operational phase, the public and private partners could 
maintain an innovation register.  This register could be updated biannually with 
appropriate ‘value add’ ideas being presented to public partner decision-makers for 
further consideration.  The implementation of innovative ideas could be linked to 
incentive schemes to encourage better performance / improved VfM outcomes.  For 
public partner employees, this could translate to improved career development 
opportunities, paid study assistance, flexible working arrangements, the opportunity 
to perform higher duties or promotion into more senior roles, depending on the 
extent of their involvement in the idea generation / implementation processes.   
 
Integrating arguments: 
 
− Performance evaluation. Performance should be evaluated over time to 
assess if intended VfM outcomes are being met. This establishes a link 
between performance and risk management. 
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− Management reporting. Reporting should demonstrate the extent to which 
intended VfM outcomes are being achieved.  Decision-makers should make 
informed decisions e.g. about resourcing based on this type of information. 
This establishes a link between performance, partnership and risk 
management. 
− Managing performance shortfalls. Performance should be monitored to 
identify areas of under-performance. Shortfalls can typically be addressed 
through an investment in employee training, contract variation, KPI 
modification and / or the application of penalties or abatement. This 
establishes a link between performance, partnership and risk management. 
− Opportunity (risk) implementation. Given the right incentives, new and 
innovative ideas could be implemented during the operational phase which 
benefit both parties and may lead to better than intended VfM outcomes. This 
establishes a link between performance, partnership and risk management. 
 
6.5.5 Penalties and Abatements  
 
Key issues:  
 
KPIs can be used as a mechanism to calculate the level of payment that will be 
made by the public partner to its private partner, commensurate with the operator’s 
performance (Mandri-Perrott 2010: p.152).  If the desired levels of performance are 
not achieved, a warning notice or penalty points may be issued.  The accumulation 
of penalty points will typically lead to an abatement being applied although 
abatement can be enforced without consideration of points depending on the 
seriousness of the performance shortfall. However, evidence shows that few 
abatement penalties have been applied in practice for under-performance (National 
Audit Office 2009: p.56).  See Table 6.24 for identified sub-issues and case study 
example. 
 
Table 6.24 Sub-issues Arising From Penalties and Abatements. 
 
Treatment actions: 
Applying penalties and abatements 
Enforcement decisions taken by decision-makers should be consistent with relevant 
contractual clauses (i.e. penalty clauses) and be consistently applied to instances of 
under-performance, unless there is a properly justified case for not doing so (see 
below). Continued under-performance should result in the use of cure plans and 
production of default scenarios, as appropriate.   
 
Incentive revisions 
There may be occasions when public partner decision-makers decide not to abate 
their private partner for service delivery under-performance.  Penalties, for example, 
Sub-issues Generic case study findings 
− Applying penalties and abatements 
− Incentive revisions  
− Penalties and abatement should be 
consistently applied unless there is a 
properly justified case for not doing so 
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could be deferred to improve working relationships between the partners (i.e. by 
giving consortia more time to address issues), or by off-setting under-performing 
services with other services rendered.  Under appropriate circumstances, the private 
partner could be given sufficient time to address under-performance (e.g. two 
months depending on the nature of the shortfall).  Such situations should be closely 
monitored by the public partner with findings regularly reported to the project director 
(e.g. monthly).  Failure of the private partner to follow through on assurances within 
agreed timeframes typically mean that abatement should be applied retrospectively.  
Furthermore, the rationale leading to each instance of non-abatement should be fully 
documented to protect against corporate memory loss in case of unexpected staffing 
changes and to provide justification to government agencies e.g. Auditors-General 
as to why these decisions were taken.    
 
Integrating arguments: 
 
− Applying penalties and abatement. Performance should be regularly 
monitored to decide if penalties or abatement should be applied for under-
performance to encourage better future performance.   
− Incentive revisions.  Under specific circumstances, non-abatement for under-
performance could be considered in return for guarantees of improved 
productivity due to strategic reasons. Such decision-making should be 
underpinned by management commitment and support and be monitored over 
time to establish whether relaxation of abatement has achieved the desired 
outcome. This establishes a link between performance and partnership 
management. 
 
 
6.6 Summary 
 
This Chapter proposed the basis for a conceptual generic integrated PPP 
operational model for use by the public partner as part of its governance practices.  It 
identifies factors that may contribute towards achieving VfM outcomes along with a 
range of documentation and / or actions that can potentially be used as a foundation 
to assess whether VfM outcomes are being achieved in practice.  It re-states the 
issues and sub-issues outlined in previous chapters and associated treatment 
actions, and presents integrating arguments for the partnership, risk and 
performance management disciplines.   
 
The next Chapter introduces the integrating PPP operational model and provides a 
purpose and justification for its use; its significance; and the implications of 
implementing such a model.  The main design features of the model are also 
discussed.   
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Chapter 7: A Conceptual Integrated Management 
Model for Public Private Partnership 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter describes the concept for, and development of, an integrated 
management model for the public partner to use in the PPP operating phase. The 
model is developed from the issues / sub-issues and treatment actions discussed 
and tabulated in Chapter 6. The purpose and justification for use of the model is 
considered; together with its significance and the implications for implementation. 
The main design features of the model are presented and discussed.   
 
 
7.2 Purpose and Justification 
 
The public sector operating phase management model is referred to as the 
‘Integrated Management Model’ (IMM). It has been developed primarily for use by 
public partner decision-makers, e.g. project directors, responsible for contract 
oversight throughout the period during which the PPP concession is delivering public 
services.    
 
Its purpose is to assist decision-makers with allocating and making better use of 
public sector resources during the operational phase. It focuses upon considerations 
that may have significant and / or long-term consequences for achieving strategic 
objectives using an integrated partnership, risk and performance management 
approach.  These considerations are generic i.e. they are not tied to a specific type 
of PPP and include:  
− Establishing and maintaining effective partnership relations between 
government and service providers;  
− Identifying and managing public sector risks (both threat and opportunity risk); 
and  
− Modifying (improving) and then maintaining service delivery performance 
standards of operators, and where appropriate, the oversight role of 
government or its delegates.   
 
As discussed in Chapters 3 to 5, a review of literature identifies a need for an 
operating model that embraces “critical success factors” for partnership management 
(Yang, Shen and Ho 2009) – extending to partnership interactions and the types of 
competencies and skills (Weihe in Hodge, Greve and Boardman 2010: p.519) that 
improve VfM outcomes (Wilson, Pelham and Duffield 2010) involving a combination 
of formal and informal processes and the dynamic interplay between them (Bresnen 
and Marshall 2002).  Evidence also demonstrates a need for governments to 
improve their operational risk management practices, including aligning them more 
closely with corporate planning objectives (Department of Treasury and Finance 
2007b: p.3; Victorian Auditor-General 2007b: p.15-16; National Audit Office 2009b; 
and Edwards et al 2004: p.63). Furthermore, the literature review suggests 
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performance monitoring difficulties exist in the public sector, arguably due to a lack 
of management know-how (Domberger and Fernandez 1999) and because of a 
failure to consistently incorporate methods of achieving PPP benefits into realisable 
action plans (National Audit Office 2009b: p.20). 
 
 
7.3 Significance 
 
From a theoretical perspective, and in addressing gaps in the ‘Body of Knowledge’ 
on this topic (see ‘Chapter 1: 1.3 Research Problem’ and section 7.2, above), the 
IMM can be used as a tool for identifying and connecting critical success factors that 
may lead to the achievement of improved VfM outcomes, thus building upon existing 
partnership, risk and performance management policy and guidance for PPPs.   
 
From a practical point of view, it is anticipated that the IMM can be used as a tool – 
that supports the contract administration manual – to enhance the development of 
internal and external improvement plans (see section 7.5 below) as well as 
improving the operational management of partnership, risk and performance 
elements and managing current practices against VfM contributors and evidence-
bases, and through applying suggested treatment actions (see Chapter 6 and 
section 7.6) to mitigate risks and / or augment existing practices to improve 
partnering and performance (and hence VfM) outcomes.   
 
 
7.4 Implications for Implementation  
 
There is potential for the conceptual IMM to be aligned with any relevant existing 
operating policies, procedures and associated documentation e.g. national PPP 
policy and guidelines issued by Infrastructure Australia; by Australian state 
jurisdictions such as Victoria (Partnerships Victoria) (also extending to Gateway 
Reviews and adherence to the Department of Treasury and Finance’s Asset 
Management Framework, for example) and New South Wales (Working With 
Government) (see Chapters 3 and 4); contract management manuals (see Chapter 5 
for examples); as well as operating procedures that have been developed in-house 
to meet specific requirements of individual PPPs (including documentation that could 
be used to develop VfM ‘evidence-bases’, outlined in Chapter 6). It should thus 
prove to be a useful tool for developing operational improvement plans including 
maximising employee learning opportunities, and lead to improved VfM outcomes for 
public partners.   
 
The IMM has been designed to provide public partner decision-makers with a 
framework against which partnership, risk and performance management challenges 
can be addressed, and provides a reasonable level of detail to aid deeper 
contemplation of the issues.  Sound corporate and managerial judgement are likely 
to be influential factors in the successful application of the model, as will be the 
degree of conceptual and practical value placed on the IMM by project directors and 
/ or other senior public decision-makers. Therefore their understanding of, and 
endorsement of the model, as well as the ease of its assimilation will be crucial.  
Users’ ability to adapt the IMM to meet the specific requirements of each PPP 
operating perspective may also be pivotal.  
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Other factors that could prove to be critical to the successful implementation of the 
IMM relate to expectation management i.e. a belief that the model should offer 
satisfactory results for every possible outcome.  The IMM has been developed as a 
generic governance framework – not as a ‘one size fits all’ solution for public partner 
PPP oversight.  Although the IMM covers a wide range of public partner issues and 
more detailed sub-issues, there may be important issues that have not been 
identified or integrated using literature review findings. It is anticipated that some 
issues may be identified during interview and focus group testing (see Chapter 2 for 
research methodology, and Chapters 8 and 9 for interview and focus group findings 
and analysis). Also, the extent to which the model is effectively socialised into project 
environments by senior decision-makers could be key for realising and maximising 
the potential benefits of the IMM.  Moreover, wider industry drivers such as changing 
government / departmental / statutory authority objectives or a global financial crisis 
could impact upon operations (altering the role / obligations of the private partner, 
public partner, or both) or even lead to the modification of what constitutes a VfM 
outcome.   
 
 
7.5 Main Model Design Features  
 
In the IMM, each management perspective, in turn, is positioned as the ‘target’ 
discipline (situated in the central column of the corresponding relationship chart).  
This column contains the issues / sub-issues that have been identified in the 
literature review, case study and summary and integration of key issues and 
concepts chapters (Chapters 3 to 6) as important for active consideration and 
management.  The model then links issues from the remaining two management 
perspectives (left and right hand columns) with the sub-issues of the central target 
perspective for in-depth consideration and evaluation.  Where appropriate, issues 
that appear in each of the two outer columns also link together.    
 
Black arrows flow from the issues that appear in the left and right hand columns to 
the appropriate sub-issue(s) in the central column, whilst the red dotted arrows 
denote that there is a relationship between two or more issues / sub-issues within 
the target discipline.  It is expected that VfM outcomes will improve / be achieved 
when public partner decision-makers manage the PPP operational situation 
effectively by applying appropriate treatment actions to the corresponding issues / 
sub-issues.   
 
In terms of impact, each sub-issue is classified as ‘external’, ‘internal’ or ‘both’ 
(discussed in Chapter 6) and represented in the relationship charts as a square, 
circle or triangle, respectively.  ‘External’ considerations for sub-issues focus upon 
the accountabilities of the private partner – that is, how consortia performance may 
be improved through public partner intervention.  An ‘internal’ focus relates to the 
responsibilities of government in holding consortia accountable for delivering 
contracted services, as well as attempting to improve the capability of its employees, 
systems and / or processes.  ‘Both’ means that external and internal considerations 
are necessary (although not always to an equal extent).   
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The table that appears underneath each relationship chart (that corresponds with 
each target perspective) provides a summary of factors that may contribute towards 
achieving VfM outcomes, identifies an evidence-base (consisting of PPP 
documentation) that may support these realisations, and gives a précis of the key 
treatment actions that may be used to mitigate or resolve the issues.  This 
information has been derived from Chapter 6 material.  
 
 
7.6 The Integrated Management Model 
 
As implied above, the intended purpose of the IMM is to establish relationships and 
treatment actions for / between partnership, risk and performance management to 
improve operational VfM outcomes for the public partner.  These key concepts are 
outlined below and presented in Fig. 7.1 as the PPP operational phase ‘Value-for-
Money Triangle’.   
Termination DeliveryProcurement Operations
Partnership
Management
Risk
Management
Performance
Management
PPP phases
Value for
Money
 
Fig. 7.1 The PPP Operational Phase ‘Value-for-Money Triangle’. 
 
The IMM focuses upon the ‘Value-for-Money Triangle’ in the operational phase of 
PPP.  Each target public sector management perspective is presented along with its 
corresponding table that contains factors that may contribute towards achieving VfM 
outcomes, an evidence-base that may support such realisations and a summary of 
possible treatment actions.  
 
The IMM is presented through a series of figures and tables. Figures 7.3–7.5 are a 
diagrammatical representation of the issues and sub-issues identified for each 
management perspective in Chapters 4 to 6. Each figure has been developed to 
distil salient information from those chapters into a concise visual format, with arrows 
indicating connections between issues / sub-issues within a single management 
perspective or between one perspective and another, as appropriate. Following each 
figure, a corresponding table (Tables 7.1–7.3), is colour-coded in accordance with 
that management discipline (i.e. green for partnership management, orange for risk 
management and blue for performance management) which summarises the 
applicable VfM content and treatment actions relating to each public sector 
management perspective from the preceding Chapters (4 to 6). This simplifies cross-
referencing. The IMM is thus a representational model (figuratively and textually) of 
the identification and treatment of issues relating to partnership, risk and 
performance management by the public partner in the operational phase of PPP. 
This meets the objectives of the research. 
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Figure 7.2 illustrates the conceptual outline of the IMM. It is also an explanatory 
cover sheet that might be used for implementation and use of the IMM. It re-states 
the purpose of the model; the definitions adopted for key terms, and explains 
symbols used in the model perspectives.  
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 Integrated Management Model:  Cover sheet
Partnership issue / sub-issue
External consideration (service provider accountability)
Internal consideration (government responsibility)
External and internal consideration
Risk issue / sub-issue
Performance issue / sub-issue
Legend:Rationale / purpose of model:
Although it is the responsibility of private consortia to deliver agreed service(s), the public 
partner is ultimately responsible for ensuring that services are actually carried out and 
they (at least) meet minimum standards in order to achieve Value-for-Money outcomes.  
The purpose of this model is to assist public partner decision-makers to allocate and 
make better use of public sector resources during operational phases of PPP.  It focuses 
upon generic considerations that may have significant and / or long-term consequences 
for achieving strategic objectives using an integrated partnership, risk and performance 
management approach.  This includes: 
Establishing and maintaining effective partnership relations between    
public partner and service delivery providers 
 Identifying and managing public sector risks (both threat and opportunity risks)
Modifying (improving) and then maintaining service delivery performance 
standards of operators, and where appropriate, the oversight role of the public
partner or its nominees  
● 
● 
● 
Intended audience:
This model has been developed primarily for public sector project directors responsible 
for PPP oversight
Key definitions:
Value for Money (VfM) – “Getting the best possible outcome at the lowest possible 
price” (New South Wales Treasury in English 2006)
Risk management – A method that can be used by decision-makers to recognise, 
scrutinise, assess, treat and then monitor those risks that could impinge upon the 
realisation of defined goals from strategic, operational, financial and / or compliance-
related issues (Victorian Auditor-General 2007b: p.1) – and clearly contributes to the 
“demonstrable achievement of objectives and improvement of performance" (ISO 
31000, 2009: p.7)
Partnership management – “A relationship involving the sharing of power, work, 
support and / or information with others for the achievement of joint goals and / or 
mutual benefits” (Kernaghan in Trafford and Proctor 2006)
Performance management – “Performance management in the [public service] is 
the use of inter-related strategies and activities to improve the performance of 
individuals, teams and organisations” (Management Advisory Committee 2001: p.14)
Public Private Partnership (PPP) – A collaborative endeavour (Smyth and Edkins 
2006) involving the public and private partners that is developed through the 
expertise of each partner in order to meet identified public needs through appropriate 
resource, risk and reward allocation (The Canadian Council for Public Private 
Partnerships 2009)   
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Achievement of Value-for-Money (VfM) outcomes
Partnership managementRisk management
Penalties and abatements
Performance management
Personalities
Organisational culture
Team working
Performance monitoring and adjustment
Motivation / incentives
Negotiated outcomes
Management commitment and support
Acquisition and allocation of additional resources
Roles and responsibilities
Employee capability and expertise
Shared understanding
Clear and open communication
Trust building
Personal and professional influence
Relationship continuity
Resourcing
Conflict management
Values and beliefs
Subject matter knowledge and applicability
No risk issues for 
integration 
have been identified
 
Fig. 7.3 IMM Partnership Management Perspective. 
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Table 7.1 IMM Partnership Management PPP VfM Factors, Evidence-base and Treatment Options. 
 
Partnership management VfM contributors Partnership management VfM evidence-base foundation 
• Proposed corrective actions for under-performance are mutually agreed with the private partner and 
these actions are implemented as agreed   
• Development and continuation of productive relationships with service users, employees and 
applicable community groups  
• Consortia informs the public partner of emerging risks and performance issues that have the 
potential to impact upon the achievement of planned VfM outcomes 
• No occurrences of negligence, fraud and / or corruption  
• Public partner employees adhere to all accountabilities and responsibilities under governance, 
probity and compliance frameworks 
• Disputes are quickly resolved with little to no impact on service delivery obligations and litigation is 
avoided 
• Progress made against partnership / stakeholder management strategies and plans e.g. assessing 
whether key messages between the public and private partners or internal project teams and their 
project control groups have been properly understood and complied with  
• Assessing public partner employees behaviour through staff appraisals to ensure they are effectively 
discharging their duties in line with project accountabilities and responsibilities e.g. the contract 
administration manual 
• Outputs comply with relevant industry standards e.g. assessing partnership relations that may relate 
to people involvement and competence 
Partnership management treatments that may increase the likelihood of achieving VfM outcomes 
Organisational culture Employee capability and expertise Clear and open communication 
Personalities: 
• Personality compatibility testing for key interfacing roles 
• Employee development plans 
Team working: 
• Articulation and reinforcement of project objectives 
• Clearly defined team member roles and responsibilities 
• Effective discharge of duties against agreed accountabilities and 
governance requirements 
• Integration of employees into teams  
• Clear communication, dispute resolution and information sharing 
practices 
• Employee commitment to use established business processes  
Motivation / incentives: 
• Threat of / application of abatement 
• Employee consultation in design of new work programs  
• Staff KPIs relate to achievement of specific goals 
Roles and responsibilities: 
• Clearly defining employee accountabilities and 
responsibilities 
• Identify critical success factors 
• Align employee competencies with job requirements 
• Regularly reviewing work packages with employees to 
assess project business needs 
Subject matter knowledge and applicability: 
• Employee development programs  
• Compliance / remedial action against policies, frameworks 
and procedures  
• Distillation and documentation of key commercial and 
project learning  
 
 
Shared understanding: 
• Clear communication of organisational beliefs, values and 
behaviours  
• Adoption of common language 
Trust building: 
• Pursuit of common goals 
• Shared understanding 
• Management follow-through on agreed actions  
• Mandate / enforce project-wide adherence to governance, probity 
and compliance frameworks  
• Showing employees respect  
• Engage employees in decision-making processes 
• Delegate tasks or responsibilities to employees, as appropriate  
Relationship continuity Management commitment and support Conflict management 
Personal and professional influence: 
• Understand the situation from others’ point of view 
• Where possible, work towards a preferred outcome (win / win) 
• Communicate effectively with those who may be able to help 
Negotiated outcomes: 
• Relaxation of penalty clauses for strategic reasons with 
retrospective application of abatements for continued under-
performance 
Acquisition and allocation of additional resources: 
• Prioritisation of funding proposals  
• Financial cutbacks for less important initiatives to counter 
shortfalls 
Resourcing / values and beliefs: 
• Understand the situation from others’ point of view 
• Take advice, as appropriate, from subject matter experts, 
operations committees / working groups, legal counsel etc 
• Re-arrange project priorities 
• Re-allocate resources 
• Take disciplinary action / imposing training on under-performing 
employees 
• Use dispute resolution specialists, if needed  
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Achievement of Value-for-Money (VfM) outcomes
Risk managementPartnership management Performance management
Project / integration challenges
Implementation of transition plan
Service provider failure
Contract termination
Contract variation
Modification of existing services
Re-allocation of risk
Business continuity planning modification
End of concession hand-over
Asset monitoring 
Transfer of project documentation / knowledge
Orientation / up-skilling new employees
Employee capability and expertise
Organisational culture
Governance, probity and compliance
Reputation damage
Confidentiality
Un-anticipated / un-intended events
Performance monitoring and adjustmentExposure to new risks
Change of consortium members / public authority
 
Fig. 7.4 IMM Risk Management Perspective. 
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Table 7.2 IMM Risk Management PPP VfM Factors, Evidence-base and Treatment Options. 
 
Risk management VfM contributors Risk management VfM evidence-base foundation 
• Identified risks that may prevent business case or other defined strategic objectives from being met 
are appropriately managed   
• Service delivery is aligned / re-aligned with business case / project brief objectives, concession 
deed, service specifications and subsequent contract amendments 
• Service delivery is perceived by users and the wider community to represent VfM  
• Where appropriate, opportunity risk leading to improved VfM outcomes is implemented 
 
 
• Confidentiality agreements are put in place e.g. reduce the likelihood that public partner employees 
will divulge sensitive project information to third parties for personal gain  
• Public partner employee compliance with governance, probity and compliance frameworks 
• No occurrences of negligence, fraud and / or corruption  
• Outputs comply with relevant industry standards e.g. those relating to business continuity planning, 
public health and safety and fraud control   
• Assessing public partner employees behaviour to ensure they are effectively discharging their duties 
in line with project accountabilities and responsibilities e.g. against the contract administration manual 
• Transition, operations, environmental, quality improvement, performance shortfall, asset 
management, end of concession hand-over plans etc are developed and progress against them is 
monitored 
• Risk registers, business continuity plans, issue logs etc are developed, kept up-to-date and used to 
mitigate identified risks 
• Service usage (e.g. volume / demand) and failure event reports / exception reports are used for trend 
reporting to identify emerging risks  
• Benchmarking / competitive market testing is undertaken as scheduled  
• Relevant audit findings / recommendations are implemented   
• Lessons learned logs are used and disseminated as appropriate e.g. to facilitate the broadening of 
project-specific and wider public sector project knowledge  
• Innovation registers are used e.g. to facilitate ideas that could lead to service user improvements and 
/ or cost efficiencies   
Risk management treatments that may increase the likelihood of achieving VfM outcomes 
Implementation of transition plan Contract termination Change of consortium members / public authority 
Project / integration challenges: 
• Update / report on risk registers, business continuity plans, 
issue logs etc  
• Application of penalties / abatement for under-performance or 
delay 
 
 
Service provider failure: 
• Activation of business continuity plans  
• Stakeholder communication planning   
• Enact the termination administrative / change of control 
processes 
• Final asset inspection 
• Transfer project documentation / knowledge 
• Orientate / up-skill employees 
• Use benchmarking and competitive market testing findings for 
tendering process 
• Use circumstances that led to termination to probe tenderers’ 
ability and readiness to manage similar situations 
Exposure to new risks: 
• Update / report on risk registers, business continuity plans, issue 
logs etc  
Contract variation End of concession hand-over Reputation damage 
Modification of existing services: 
• Risk assessment  
• Scenario planning 
• Review, testing and update of business continuity plans 
• Review business continuity planning and risk management 
policies, frameworks and procedures 
Asset monitoring: 
• Asset management reports 
• Obtain assurance that irregularities / adverse findings are 
resolved 
Transfer of project documentation / knowledge: 
• Align transition plans with business continuity plans and 
Governance, probity and compliance: 
• Policy, framework and procedural changes clearly 
communicated to employees 
• Declarations of conflict of interest 
• Disclosure of acceptance of gifts, benefits and / or hospitality 
Confidentiality: 
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• Review identified opportunity risks 
• Performance audits  
Re-allocation of risk: 
• Risk assessment  
• Scenario planning  
• Review, testing and update of business continuity plans 
• Review business continuity planning and risk management 
policies, frameworks and procedures 
• Trend analysis 
• Performance audits 
Business continuity planning modification: 
• Review, test and update of plans 
• Review policies, frameworks and procedures 
• Force majeure events and warnings reports  
• Stakeholder communication planning  
service provider short-fall plans 
• Agree methodology for transferring project / operational 
knowledge 
• Distillation and documentation of key commercial and project 
learning  
• Reinforce knowledge between partners 
• Personnel plans 
• Clear role and responsibility definition 
• Skills appraisals / training plans 
Orientation / up-skilling of employees: 
• Clear role and responsibility definition 
• Skills appraisals, training plans, assimilation plans  
• Staff assessment on competency and adherence to 
governance, probity and compliance frameworks 
• Employee maintenance of project-based ‘lessons learnt’ logs  
• Succession planning 
• Production of ‘how to’ documentation for using essential 
systems and processes 
• Agree methodology for transferring project / operational 
knowledge 
• Regular updates of hand-over packages / exit interviews 
• Develop an organisational (project) culture fostered on trust 
• Agreements signed by all employees that have access to, or are 
expected to get access to, commercial-in-confidence and 
cabinet-in-confidence material 
• Incidences of non-compliance escalated to government decision-
makers, as appropriate  
Un-anticipated / un-intended events: 
• Annual contingency budget 
• Communication and issue management planning 
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Achievement of Value-for-Money (VfM) outcomes
Performance managementPartnership management Risk management
Performance management systems improvement
Performance management systems modification
Performance management systems documentation
Contract variation 
Management commitment and support
Annual KPI review
KPI modification
Ongoing KPI review
Availability of performance data and metrics
Availability and integrity of performance data
Performance evaluation
Performance monitoring and adjustment
Management reporting
Managing performance shortfalls
Applying penalties and abatements
Penalties and abatements
Incentive revisions
Conflict management
Opportunity (risk) implementation
Integrity of performance data and metrics
Employee capability and expertise
Organisational culture
 
Fig. 7.5 IMM Performance Management Perspective. 
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Table 7.3 IMM Performance Management PPP VfM Factors, Evidence-base and Treatment Options. 
 
Performance management VfM contributors Performance management VfM evidence-base foundation 
• Public sector agency / departmental project obligations are delivered within budget and on time 
• Services are delivered in line with business case / project brief objectives, concession deed, service 
specifications and subsequent contract amendments 
• Agreed changes to service delivery is aligned / re-aligned with business case / project brief objectives, 
concession deed, service specifications and subsequent contract amendments 
• Consistently high levels of service user and wider community satisfaction is reported  
• Incidences of negligence, fraud and / or corruption are appropriately dealt with 
• Project expenditure remains within prescribed budgetary limits  
• Achievement of VfM outcomes as defined by the business case / project brief objectives, concession 
deed, service specifications and subsequent contract amendments 
• Incident rates / KPI performance failure rates decline  
• Public partner accountabilities and responsibilities relating to the contract administration manual are 
satisfactorily discharged 
• Outputs comply with relevant industry standards e.g. those that may relate to process improvement and 
facilities management 
• Relevant audit findings / recommendations are implemented   
• Implementation of opportunity risk proposals e.g. innovations that lead to improved VfM outcomes 
Performance management treatments that may increase the likelihood of achieving VfM outcomes 
Performance management systems modification Performance monitoring and adjustment KPI review 
Performance management systems improvement: 
• Systems capability reviewed in conjunction with planned 
modification of KPIs  
• Systems have capability / capacity  to measure lagging and 
leading indicators 
• Systems have capability / capacity to analyse trends 
Performance management systems documentation: 
• User guides updated in line with systems modification  
• User guides used to assess documented outputs against actual 
employee performance 
Performance evaluation: 
• Benchmark employee deliverables against job descriptions 
including outputs and outcomes specified in contract 
management manuals  
• Adherence to agreed policies, frameworks and procedures 
• Progress made against work plans and technical assessments 
e.g. asset management plans, issues registers etc  
• Progress made against the achievement project business case 
objectives / justifications made for amending a contract 
• Benchmarking / competitive market testing  
Management reporting: 
• Project reporting used as a foundation for interpreting strategy 
into work plans, measuring strategic objectives and conducting 
skills appraisals 
• Developing further (or refining existing) control actions 
Managing performance shortfalls: 
• Employee skills appraisals 
• Disciplinary action taken against consistently under-
performance employees  
• Sub-contracting arrangements  
• Modification of KPIs 
• Contract amendment  
Opportunity (risk) implementation: 
• Maintenance of an innovation register  
• Linking innovative ideas to incentive schemes to encourage 
better performance  
Annual KPI review: 
• Agreed between partners prior to commencement of each contract 
year 
• Alterations are relevant, measurable, repeatable and achievable 
• Rationale for modification fully documented  
Ongoing KPI review: 
• As above (albeit with more regular review)  
 
Availability and integrity of performance data and metrics Penalties and abatements 
Availability of performance data and metrics: 
• Abatement for failure to provide data  
• Decisions not to abate are properly justified and fully documented 
• Continued non-compliance results in contract termination (as 
appropriate)  
Integrity of performance data and metrics: 
• Suspected wrong-doing, negligence, fraud and / or corruption 
escalated timely to an appropriate decision-maker 
• Investigation of all credible accusations  
• Confirmed instances dealt with through disciplinary / legal action, 
the issue of warning / penalty notices and / or abatement 
• In the most serious of incidents, termination of contract may be 
warranted 
Applying penalties and abatements: 
• Enforcement decisions are closely aligned with relevant contractual 
clauses 
• Consistent application of penalties / abatements for under-
performance (unless there is a properly justified case for not doing 
so) 
• Cure plans and default scenarios, as appropriate  
Incentive revisions: 
• Failure of to follow through on assurances lead to retrospective 
application of abatements 
• Off-setting under-performing services with other services rendered 
• Rationale for each instance of non-abatement fully documented to 
protect against corporate memory loss  
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 7.7 Summary 
 
The justification for the use of the IMM, its purpose and significance, and the 
implications for implementation are discussed. The main features of the model are 
described.   
 
The next chapter discusses the design, testing and administration of the data 
collection instrument required to verify the completeness of the IMM. It outlines the 
processes used for categorising and analysing the interview transcript data; and lays 
out the findings relating to the concept of ‘VfM’ as well as for the partnership, risk 
and performance management disciplines. A second iteration of the IMM will then be 
presented.   
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Chapter 8: Interview Data Collection, Analysis and 
Findings  
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter describes the design, testing and administration of the data collection 
instrument for use in semi-structured interviews. It outlines the processes used for 
categorising and analysing the interview transcript data; and presents findings 
relating to the concept of ‘VfM’ as well as for the partnership, risk and performance 
management disciplines. A second iteration of the IMM is presented, based on 
information gathered during the interview process.    
 
 
8.2 Design and Testing of the Data Collection Instrument  
 
Since the selection of research methods, described and justified in Chapter 2, 
involves the collection of primary data through semi-structured interviews, a data 
collection instrument must be prepared and tested. 
 
8.2.1 Design 
 
As stated in Chapter 2 (see ‘2.3.4 Method’), the process of using semi-formal 
instruments for data acquisition should begin with design, followed by pilot testing.   
 
As a means of commencing and pre-testing the design, the findings of the initial 
review of literature and case studies (Chapters 4 and 5) were first discussed with 
professional contacts comprising three executives and two senior managers from the 
Victorian State Government, each with extensive PPP experience. These interviews, 
conducted between June and July 2011, yielded informal feedback and guidance on 
the issues identified for partnership, risk and performance management in PPPs. A 
copy of the literature review findings (presented as structured questions and their 
justification) is appended as Attachment C.   
 
The pre-testing discussions then led to the development of a data collection 
instrument comprising three sections, each containing structured questions / prompts 
for a more formal pilot study. These are presented in Tables 8.1 to 8.3 below. It was 
intended that a number of unstructured topics would be covered in addition, 
depending on the responses received. Thus, while the data collection instrument 
followed a structured design, it was intended to be administered in a semi-structured 
fashion. 
 
Table 8.1 shows the material pertaining to PPP operational partnership 
management. 
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Table 8.1 Pilot Study Protocol: Partnership Management Issues. 
Partnership management questions 
 Organisational culture 
1 Do you think the organisational culture of the public partner influences Value-for-Money 
outcomes during PPP operational phases?   
2 Can: 
a) personality traits of individual public partner project team members 
b) the effectiveness of public partner project teams  
c) incentives provided to the public partner project team  
…contribute to the development of effective organisational culture, leading to improved 
Value-for-Money outcomes during PPP operational phases?  
3 In your experience, what other factors contribute to the achievement of an effective 
organisational culture? 
4 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve organisational 
culture in PPP projects? 
 Management commitment and support 
5 Do / does:  
a) negotiated outcomes between public partner decision-makers and the private 
partner over service delivery standards and outputs  
b) the acquisition and allocation of additional resources for under-resourced public 
partner project teams  
…always lead to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during PPP operational 
phases? 
6 In your experience, what other actions taken by public partner decision-makers lead to 
effective commitment and support during PPP project operations? 
7 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve existing levels of 
management commitment and support in PPP projects? 
 Employee capability and expertise 
8 How does: 
a) clear definition of public partner project team member roles and responsibilities  
b) the development of subject matter knowledge and the way this knowledge is 
applied by public partner project team members  
…contribute to the development of employee capability and expertise, leading to improved 
Value-for-Money outcomes during PPP operational phases?  
9 In your experience, what other factors influence the improvement of employee capability 
and expertise with respect to the public partner during the operational phase of PPPs? 
10 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve employee 
capability and expertise in PPP projects? 
 Clear and open communication 
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11 Is the development of: 
a) shared understanding between public and private sector partners     
b) trusting relationships  between public and private sector partners     
…essential to clear and open communication, leading to the achievement of Value-for-
Money outcomes during PPP operational phases?  If yes, in which way(s)?  If no, why not?   
12 In your experience, what other factors influence to clear and open communication during 
operations? 
13 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve the clarity and 
transparency of communication in PPP projects? 
 Relationship continuity 
14 Can: 
a) personal and professional influence exerted by public partner project team 
members on the private partner  
…contribute to relationship continuity, leading to improved Value-for-Money outcomes 
during PPP operational phases?  If yes, in which way(s)?  If no, why not? 
15 In your experience, what other factors influence relationship continuity during operations? 
16 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve relationship 
continuity in PPP projects? 
 Conflict management 
17 Can effective management of conflict, arising from:   
a) service delivery under-performance 
b) differences in organisational cultures between the public and private sector partners  
… contribute to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during operational phases? 
18 In your experience, what other factors lead to conflict during operations? 
19 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve conflict 
management in PPP projects? 
 Other (un-identified) factors 
20 Are there any other partnership management issues that have not been identified that could 
impact on PPP operations? 
21 If yes, what: 
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve partnership 
management? 
22 If you had to pick one partnership management experience that is most meaningful for you 
to share in context of this research, what would it be?   
 
Table 8.2 summarises the PPP operational risk management issues. 
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Table 8.2 Pilot Study Protocol: Risk Management Issues.   
Risk management questions 
 Implementation of transition plan 
1 Can: 
a) project / integration challenges during transition 
… impact on the achievement of planned operational phase of Value-for-Money outcomes? 
2 In your experience, what factors typically impact upon implementation of transition plans at 
the commencement of operational phases? 
3 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve the transition of 
implementation plans in PPP projects? 
 Contract variation 
4 Can: 
a) modification of existing services 
b) re-allocation of risk  
c) business continuity planning modification 
… contribute to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during operational phases? 
5 In your experience, what other factors can lead to contract variation during operations? 
6 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve the contract 
variation process in PPP projects? 
 Change of consortium members / change to public partner’s agency authority 
7 Do changes to consortium members or to the public partner’s agency authority lead to: 
a) exposure to new risks for the public partner in the operational phase of PPP 
b) changes in the management of risks by the public partner 
c) re-allocation of new risks 
If yes, in which way(s)?  If no, why not? 
8 In your experience, what other factors can: 
a) impact upon the change of consortium members 
b) lead to changes to the public partner’s agency authority 
…during PPP operations?   
9 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve the transition 
process of consortium members in PPP projects? 
...could be implemented by the public partner in making changes to its agency authority? 
 Contract termination 
10 Does: 
a) failure of a service provider  
…always lead to poor Value-for-Money outcomes? 
11 In your experience, what other factors can lead to contract termination during operations? 
12 What:  
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a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to reduce the impact of 
contract termination in PPP projects so that Value-for-Money outcomes are still achieved? 
 End of concession hand-over 
13 Can: 
a) asset monitoring  
b) transfer of project documentation / knowledge  
c) orientation / up-skilling new employees  
…contribute to the achievement of effective end of concession hand-over, leading to 
improved Value-for-Money outcomes towards the end of PPP operational phases? If yes, in 
which way(s)?  If no, why not? 
14 In your experience, what other factors can impact upon end of concession hand-over during 
operations? 
15 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve end of concession 
hand-over in PPP projects? 
 Reputation damage  
16 During PPP operations, can the public partner’s reputation be damaged by:  
a) issues / omissions that the private partner is legally accountable for resolving 
b) the failure to realise project benefits / criticism by service users 
c) a public perception that service operators are treating their customers unfairly 
d) criticism from public commentators due to the protection of sensitive and 
commercial information through ‘commercial in confidence’ arrangements 
What other situations / circumstances can lead to the public partner being criticised during 
operations?   
17 Can: 
a) the implementation and enforcement of governance, probity and compliance 
frameworks 
b) the use of confidentiality agreements for public partner project team members 
c) ‘commercial in confidence’ agreements 
d) responsive management of un-anticipated / un-intended events 
…reduce the impact of potential reputation damage to the public partner, therefore 
contributing to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during PPP operational 
phases? 
18 In your experience, what other factors can reduce the impact of reputation damage for the 
public partner during operations? 
19 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to reduce reputation damage 
for government in PPP projects? 
 Other (un-identified) factors 
20 Are there any other risk management issues that have not been identified that could impact 
on PPP operations? 
21 If yes, what: 
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve risk management? 
161 
 
22 If you had to pick one risk management experience that is most meaningful for you to share 
in context of this research, what would it be?   
 
Table 8.3 reflects the PPP operational performance management issues. 
 
Table 8.3 Pilot Study Protocol: Performance Management Issues. 
Performance management questions 
 Performance management systems modification  
1 Is: 
a) the ability to capture, monitor and measure all performance outputs and outcomes 
through performance management systems  
b) testing public partner project team members’ knowledge / skills in line with 
performance systems upgrades and associated documentation  
… essential to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during operational phases?   
2 In your experience, what other factors can affect Value-for-Money outcomes during 
transitioning of performance management systems?   
3 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve PPP performance 
management systems? 
 KPI modification 
4 Does: 
a) annual KPI review  
b) ongoing KPI review  
… always contribute to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during operational 
phases? 
5 In your experience, how often should KPIs be reviewed during operations?    
6 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers when deciding when to review 
and adjust KPIs in PPP projects? 
 Availability and integrity of performance data and metrics 
7 Is the: 
a) availability of performance data and metrics 
b) integrity of performance data and metrics  
… essential to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during operational phases? If 
yes, in which way(s)?  If no, why not?   
8 In your experience, what factors can impact upon availability and integrity of performance 
data and metrics during operations?  
9 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken to provide assurance that the availability and integrity of 
performance data is / remains intact?   
 Performance monitoring and adjustment 
10 Does: 
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a) performance evaluation 
b) management reporting  
c) managing performance shortfalls  
d) opportunity (risk) implementation  
… always contribute to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during operational 
phases?  If yes, in which way(s)?  If no, why not?   
11 In your experience, what other factors can impact upon performance monitoring and 
adjustment during operations? 
12 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve performance 
monitoring and improve the likelihood that corrective actions will lead to enhanced Value-
for-Money outcomes in PPP projects?   
 Penalties and abatements  
13 Does / do: 
a) applying penalties and abatements  
b) decisions taken to relax the application of penalty / abatement regimes 
…always lead to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during operational phases?  
If yes, in which way(s)?  If no, why not?   
14 In your experience, what factors should form the basis of decision-making leading to 
abatement / non-abatement for service under-performance during operations?   
15 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by the public partner when deciding not to abate that will 
increase the likelihood that private partner performance will improve in the future?   
 Other (un-identified) factors 
16 Describe any other performance management issues that have not been identified that 
could impact on PPP operations? 
17 If yes, what: 
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve performance 
management? 
18 If you had to pick one performance management experience that is most meaningful for you 
to share in context of this research, what would it be?   
 
In the pilot study, participants were asked to assess the pilot study protocol design 
(Tables 8.1 to 8.3) against the criteria outlined in Table 8.4. The document referred 
to as the ‘Research summary’, which appears as a footnote under Table 8.4, is 
appended as Attachment D.  
 
Table 8.4 Pilot Study Assessment Criteria. 
Pilot Study Assessment Criteria 
Are the questions aligned with the stated aim (purpose) and objectives 
(significance) of the research?* 
Are the individual questions supported by the main research question?*  
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Pilot Study Assessment Criteria 
Are the questions relevant, clear, unambiguous and effective?   
Are the questions presented in a logical order?  
Have the ‘right’ number of questions been asked i.e. not too many / few? 
Is the timeframe allocated for interview appropriate?  
Do gaps / omissions exist in the line of questioning?  
Do you have any other comments about the proposed method of data 
collection or the data collection instrument? 
*As stated in the ‘Research summary’ document: Attachment D. 
 
8.2.2 Pilot Testing 
 
Following the design of the data collection instrument protocol and the pilot study 
assessment criteria, the pilot study itself was conducted during October and 
November 2012. It involved two senior academic staff from RMIT University, 
knowledgeable in the field of PPP and two public sector PPP representatives from 
separate Australian state governments (the latter pair were identified from the 
research sample frame).  All pilot study interviewees agreed to take part in this 
process to test the suitability of the data collection instrument.   
 
Table 8.5 presents a summary of the discussion points and findings.    
 
Table 8.5 Pilot Study Feedback and Interviewer Responses. 
Interviewee 
Reference 
Number 
Interviewee 
 Questions / Comments 
Researcher’s  
Response / Actions 
PS01 
Asked if interview questions would 
be read to participants or if they 
would be asked to read them.  
Believes this could have a significant 
effect on the research outcome 
Stated interviewees would be given an 
opportunity to view the questions before 
the interview took place but the 
interviewer would ask a mixture of 
structured and semi-structured 
questions during the meetings 
PS01 
Argued that ‘shared understanding’ 
and ‘trust’ for ‘Clear and open 
communication (partnership 
questions 11-13) could be construed 
as being the same  
Reasoned that ‘shared understanding’ 
relates to top-down communication in 
organisations where messages get sent 
out, policies and procedures are 
followed etc, whereas ‘trust’ is more 
about human interaction.  No alterations 
were made to the interview questions 
on that basis  
PS01 
Believed it may be “too early” to 
discuss end of concession-handover 
(risk questions 13-15) with 
interviewees as very few PPP 
contracts, to date, have expired  
Discussed literature review and case 
study findings that cite the importance 
of timely hand-over consideration / 
transfer as a planning issue.  No 
alteration was made to these interview 
questions on that basis 
PS01 Deemed it was important to discuss 
the concept of ‘VfM’ and understand 
Suggestion was accepted and added as 
an interview question for each of the 
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Interviewee 
Reference 
Number 
Interviewee 
 Questions / Comments 
Researcher’s  
Response / Actions 
this concept from each participant’s 
point of view 
three management disciplines 
PS02 
Thought interview questions should 
be less structured.  Suggested using 
a ‘filtering’ technique e.g. start with 
broad questions then hone in on 
specifics   
Emphasised that the interviews would 
be semi-structured.  Suggestion for 
using the filtering technique was 
adopted 
 
The only design change required for the data collection instrument protocol involved 
the addition of a question relating to the definition of VfM in the PPP context. 
 
Selected extracts from the full PS01 and PS02 interviewee transcripts are included in 
excerpts 8.1 and 8.2 below, to provide context for the inclusion of a VfM question 
and a rationale for altering the researcher’s interview style. 
 
Excerpt 8.1 Value-for-Money Question. 
PS01: Have you defined what your definition of what value for money is?  
Researcher:  I haven’t defined this in the set of questions, although I do have a set of key definitions. 
PS01:  Will they be able to see this before-hand? 
Researcher:  No. 
PS01: There could be a lot of discussion about this.   
Researcher:  Using phenomenology, I think we need to define what value for money means to them?  
PS01:  You could use your definition and ask them for theirs.  But it’s good that you start the 
discussion with value for money.  It’s better that you get them to tell you what their understanding is 
so you see their starting point. 
 
Excerpt 8.2 Interviewing Technique. 
PS02:  I would start like this – my first question is about the implementation of transition plan.  In your 
experience, what factors typically have an impact on implementation of transition plan?  Start the 
discussion then ask the question.  Once this has happened, you can say good, thank you very much.  
My next question is about contract variation – so what factors lead to contract variation during 
operations?  When you have some story, you might find they have already answered the A, B and C 
questions.  Or you can ask about modification of services, reallocation of risk, business continuity, or 
one of these.  So let them speak and if you are not getting what you’re after then use specific 
questions.  And what policies and principles… – continue the discussion.  I feel it has to be a running, 
continuous discussion. 
Researcher:  This makes sense.     
 
Pilot interviews involving the two public sector participants (PS03 and PS04) were 
more content-focused.  These interviews produced relevant responses to each of the 
main research questions and no new subject-matter was identified for inclusion in 
the research instrument.  Both transcripts were used to inform the following phase of 
the research. In critically reviewing the interview materials, all participants were 
asked to assess the pilot study protocol against selected criteria (see Table 8.4). In 
each instance, interviewees stated that the assessment criteria had been met.   
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In addition to the pilot interviews, the researcher delivered a formal presentation in 
October 2012 based on his PhD progress, organised by RMIT University’s School of 
Property, Construction and Project Management.  Staff, students and industry guests 
were invited to provide feedback on the conceptualisation and design of the 
research.  
 
A further feature of the design process was the development of an online 
communications platform to direct potential interviewees to the research materials 
after the pilot stage was completed.  This involved the preparation of a covering 
letter template (see Attachment E) that was customised and sent to the research 
population with a link to the following webpage: http://about.me/steven.mccann via 
email. The webpage was intended to provide an overview of the purpose and 
significance of the research; web links to a single page summary of the research 
(appended as Attachment F) and the finalised set of interview questions (see 
Attachment G); as well information about taking part in an interview.  A Senior 
Stakeholder Engagement Advisor from the Victorian Government provided feedback 
on the web materials before the research sample was contacted for interview. 
 
Following the data collection instrument design and modification through the pre-
testing and pilot study stages, and the implementation of the web-platform, the actual 
interviews were organised and undertaken. 
 
 
8.3 Interview Participants  
 
The interviewing process was conducted between October 2012 and March 2013. 
Fifty invitations were distributed and 34 people (68% response rate) agreed to 
participate in the formal process.  Of the remaining 16, eight invitees declined to 
participate and a further eight did not respond. Twenty-three participants (68%) were 
from the public sector and 11 (32%) from the private sector.  Seven respondents 
took part in a second interview involving a different management discipline i.e. 
partnership, risk or performance management, bringing the total to 38 interviews 
(three interviews involved interviewing two participants at the same time and one of 
these respondents took part in a second interview). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (see ‘2.3.4 Method’), the sample size for this research 
was determined retrospectively through identifying the ‘saturation point’ i.e. whereby 
saturation occurs when no new significant issues and diversity of answers are 
revealed during interview (Richards 2005: p.135-136; O’Leary 2005: p.114).  This 
point was revealed through categorisation and analysis of transcript data e.g. by 
comparing and contrasting the findings for the possibility of developing new issues 
and sub-issues. The data analysis processes that were used are outlined in section 
8.4 (‘Data Analysis Processes’), below.   
 
The majority of the public sector interview participants were project directors.  They 
have responsibility for administering the public partner’s interests in a PPP. 
However, a range of other government employees were invited to take part as it was 
anticipated that their experiences would impact on the design / refinement of the 
IMM. This included senior executives from central agencies, government 
departments and statutory authorities; a commercial manager; as well as a small 
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number of PPP contract managers and a contract administrator. The research 
sample was drawn from eligible persons from the Australian Government, three 
Australian state jurisdictions and the UK Government. Furthermore, selected private 
sector participants were invited to offer insights into what they think the public 
partner should be mindful of during the operational phase of PPPs. The types of 
private sector participants included senior executives and managers responsible for 
PPP service delivery; project engineers; and partners from top-tier advisory and legal 
firms.  Many of these participants have substantial experience working in Australian 
and international PPP markets.  
 
Figure 8.1 below provides a summary display of the interviews by sector and by 
management discipline. The dominance of public sector interviewees is justified by 
their relevance to the thesis, which focuses upon the role of the public partner in the 
operational phase of PPP.    
  
 
Fig. 8.1 Interviews by Sector and by Management Discipline. 
 
The interviews consist of 15 meetings (40%) dealing with partnership management, 
10 meetings (26%) about risk management and 13 meetings (34%) for performance 
management.  For the public sector, 11 Participants (29%) spoke about partnership 
management, six (16%) about risk management and nine (24%) about performance 
management. From the private sector, 12 (30%) participants spoke about their 
experiences (four interviews each per management discipline).   
 
Table 8.6 displays the interview administration demographics comprising interviewee 
identification code, interview duration and distinction between public and private 
sector PPP representation. Abbreviations in identification codes are as follows:  pilot 
study (PS); partnership management focus (PT); risk management focus (RK); and 
performance management focus (PF).  
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 Table 8.6 Interview Administration Demographics. 
Reference  
Number 
Public or Private 
Participant 
Participant  
Status 
Interview 
Length (mins) 
Subsequent 
Interview 
PS03^ Public Senior Manager  60 - 
PS04^ Public Contract Manager 60 - 
PT01-PT02 Private Senior Manager (both) 90 RK03 
PT03 Public Director  75 RK05 
PT04 Public Executive Director 45* RK08 
PT05 Public Deputy Secretary 60 - 
PT06 Public Director 60 RK11 
PT07 Public Director  60 - 
PT08 Public Director  90 - 
PT09 Private Partner 60 - 
PT10 Public Director 55 PF08 
PT11 Public Director  75 - 
PT12 Private Group Executive  75 - 
PT13 Private Partner 75 - 
PT14 Public Director 60 PF13 
RK01-RK02 Public General Manager (both) 60 - 
RK03 Private Senior Manager 90 PT01 
RK04 Private Group Executive 60 - 
RK05 Public Director  75 PT03 
RK06 Private Partner  60 PF01 
RK07 Public Director  75 - 
RK08 Public Executive Director 25* PT04 
RK09 Public Director  90 - 
RK10 Private Partner  75 - 
RK11 Public Director 60 PT06 
PF01 Private Partner  60 RK06 
PF02 Private Director  60 - 
PF03-PF04 Public Director (both)  90 - 
PF05 Private General Manager 75 - 
PF06 Public Commercial Manager 60 - 
PF07 Public Contract Administrator 75 - 
PF08 Public Director 35 PT10 
PF09 Public Contract Manager 75 - 
PF10 Private Partner 60 - 
PF11 Public Director  75 - 
PF12 Public Director  75 - 
PF13 Public Director 60 PT14 
PF14 Public Director  60 - 
^PS03 and PS04 – These pilot transcripts have been included as part of the partnership management 
data set.  
*Two additional interviews were conducted immediately after the primary interviews took place, in a 
single session, hence the shorter duration.     
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With participant-focussed research, an aim of the researcher should be to gain 
“cultural empathy” of interviewees, by attempting to understand phenomena and 
events from their perspectives (O’Leary 2005: p.172).  To this end, the researcher 
made a conscious effort to adopt techniques to put interviewees at ease and to 
establish rapport between himself and the participants (Crowther and Lancaster 
2008: p.150).  This included using the filtering approach suggested by PS02 during 
piloting; probing interviewees’ answers to test the researcher’s understanding of their 
context; applying an active listening technique i.e. being attentive to interviewee’s 
responses (Crowther and Lancaster 2008: p.150-151); and where appropriate, 
mirroring the body language of participants to increase engagement with them 
(Wilson 2012: p.39).   
 
Furthermore, the researcher aimed to provide more certainty and confidence about 
the intent of the research by providing access to the single page summary of the 
research and finalised set of interview questions in advance of meetings (via the 
online communications platform); participants were given a conceptual overview of 
the IMM prior to the commencement of each face-to-face meeting to show what this 
research outcome might ‘look like’, as well as requesting that each interviewee 
validate their transcript(s) for inclusion in the research project (Patton 2002: p.104; 
Sanders 1982) (see Chapter 2: ‘2.3.4 Method’).   
 
 
8.4 Data Analysis Processes 
 
This section outlines a two-step analytical process for interview data. The first step 
involved categorising and analysing the interview transcript data; and the second 
step provides an overview of the process used to identify findings used to guide the 
second iteration of the IMM.  Each step is discussed below.   
 
8.4.1 Step 1   
 
Despite the structured and sequenced format of the interview protocol, interviewees 
treated several areas as open topics, thus complicating the data analysis. To make 
the transcript data analysis manageable, the table formats of the structured 
questions / prompts for pilot study participants outlined in Tables 8.1 to 8.3 were 
used as a template so that the raw data from each interview transcript could be 
reorganised and excerpts placed into pre-defined categories and sub-categories for 
the partnership, risk and performance management disciplines.  
 
NVivo 10 software was then used to conduct a thematic analysis of transcript data to 
identify important themes, using a hierarchical data coding process of ‘parent’ nodes 
(open codes); and ‘child’ nodes (axial codes). See Attachment H for the nodes 
created for each of the issues and sub-issues. This part of the process also involved 
screening data to determine what would later be subjected to more in-depth analysis.  
A similar process was used to categorise content relating to VfM.  
 
Table 8.7 presents an overview of VfM categorisation and provides the basis for 
developing the main themes for this topic.   
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Table 8.7 Re-categorisation of  
NVivo Data: VfM Content. 
Node Number of References 
Different approaches for achieving VfM 15 
Nature of PPP agreements 6 
Performance VfM definition 4 
Risk VfM definition 5 
Partnership VfM definition 4 
Full project lifecycle VfM definition 24 
PSC 7 
Broader VfM considerations 9 
 
Corresponding tables for partnership, risk and performance management (Table 8.8 
to Table 8.10) are outlined, below. 
 
Table 8.8 Re-categorisation of NVivo Data: Partnership Management Content. 
Parent Node Child Nodes Number of References 
Organisational culture   
 Personalities and abilities 7 
 Team working 7 
 Motivation and incentives 29 
 Organisational culture (general) 27 
Mgt commitment and support   
 Mgt commitment and support (general)  9 
Employee capability and expertise   
 Centralisation of contract management 12 
 Oversight by Treasury - PPP units 18 
 Consultancies 12 
 Employee capability / expertise (general)  33 
Clear and open communication   
 Clear and open communication (general) 9 
Relationship continuity   
 Relationship continuity (general) 12 
Conflict management   
 Values and beliefs 14 
 Under-performance / non-performance 4 
 Conflict management (general) 7 
 
Table 8.9 Re-categorisation of NVivo Data: Risk Management Content. 
Parent Node Child Nodes Number of References 
Implementation of transition plan   
 Implementation of transition plan (general) 6 
Contract variation   
 Modification of existing services 12 
 Re-allocation of risk 7 
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Parent Node Child Nodes Number of References 
 Business continuity planning modification 5 
Consortium/agency authority   
 Consortium/agency authority (general) 13 
Managed termination   
 Service provider failure 3 
 Voluntary termination 5 
 Managed termination (general) 9 
End of concession hand-over   
 End of concession hand-over (general) 5 
Reputation damage   
 Confidentiality 9 
 Reputation damage (general) 20 
 
Table 8.10 Re-categorisation of NVivo Data: Performance Management 
Content. 
Parent Node Child Nodes Number of References 
Performance mgt systems modification   
 System types 8 
 Performance mgt systems (general) 3 
KPI modification   
 KPI modification (general)  13 
Availability/integrity of data   
 Availability/integrity of data (general) 7 
Performance monitoring and evaluation   
 Performance evaluation 20 
 Opportunity (risk) implementation 8 
Penalties and abatements   
 Applying penalties and abatements 8 
 Incentive revisions 20 
 
Thus, the Step 1 analysis configured the qualitative interview transcript data into the 
IMM framework, and facilitated the emergence of further sub-issues affecting the 
model and the potential for a second iteration of the IMM. 
 
8.4.2 Step 2   
 
In Step 2, the outcomes from Step 1 were used as the foundation for identifying new 
sub-issues and treatments as well as new relationships between partnership, risk 
and performance management disciplines. These were identified by manually 
scanning the reorganised content. Excerpts 8.3 to 8.5 provide examples of the 
process used for identifying components for inclusion in the second iteration of the 
IMM.  Further consideration was given as to whether or not potential treatments 
should become actual treatments in the second iteration of the IMM.   
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Excerpt 8.3 Example Partnership Management Treatment Considerations. 
Subject matter knowledge and applicability  
Researcher:  What about knowledge management – clearly people come and go on projects.  You 
might be able to keep quality staff for a certain period of time… 
PT10:  This is one of the things that government doesn’t do well and I think there’s a lack of 
recognition in government around the value of capturing corporate knowledge in a systematic way.  In 
the projects that we’ve delivered, we have done the best we can with the resources that we’re 
provided with to ensure that we don’t just have documented, but sensible strategies around transfer 
and retention of the knowledge.  That starts at a high level with continuous involvement with 
personnel from procurement through to design and ultimately to commissioning and service 
commencement.  That can be on a single project in that phase or follow project-to-project in the same 
cycle.  You can do simple things like creating and maintaining a proper document library from when 
you start planning.  There was 10 years advanced planning on this project before it was procured.  
We’ve got a complete collection that has been converted to a very user-friendly searchable format of 
documents that are available in a single online repository.  The current versions are available to 
anyone involved in this project and this is the first time we’ve really done that in a systematic way.  It’s 
critical – I don’t know how many times whether on this side of the fence or the other, or on both sides, 
you go looking for something that someone did three years ago, and you start by going back to a file 
archive electronically or in the worst case, go back to the transaction documents to dig it out.  You 
shouldn’t have to do that. 
[Policies / principles / actions:  Documentation of corporate and project knowledge]   
 
Excerpt 8.4 Example Risk Management Treatment Considerations.   
Exposure to new risks 
Researcher:  What about in terms of, for example, statutory authority changes that they may undergo 
through periods of internal re-structuring? 
RK05:  Do you mean like machinery of government changes? 
Researcher:  Yes, that’s a good way to put it.  The things that jump out at me are continuity of 
knowledge and experience that’s lost through these changes.  Does this have a big impact on 
projects?  
RK05:  Yes, it can.  If you look at CityLink, it originally was a stand-alone authority and then it got 
converted into an office in the Department of Infrastructure and then that office got wound up and the 
people there managing the contract got moved into VicRoads.  Through that process, from Treasury’s 
perspective, they put a lot of effort into making sure there was going to be adequate continuity of 
personnel and retention of knowledge.  It was viewed as a significant risk.  Similarly when the 
Southern Cross Station Authority was wound up, management of the contract went back into the 
Department of Transport.  Treasury went through a process with steering committee oversight to 
ensure knowledge was being captured and was effectively handed-over.  I’m sure there are things 
that have fallen between the cracks – it’s inevitable, just as it is with personnel changes.  There is 
potentially quite a lot of risk with these processes.   
[Policies/ principles / actions:  Succession plans; Documentation of corporate and project knowledge] 
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Excerpt 8.5 Example Performance Management Treatment Considerations.   
Performance evaluation 
Researcher:  Is the collection and analysis of operational data the only real way of determining 
whether value for money outcomes have been achieved?   
PF12:  You should include social outcomes in the data analysis such as customer satisfaction.  If it’s a 
school PPP, for example, you should link operational data where possible to educational outcomes – 
using data that’s available directly from schools.  You should take into account non-contractual 
outcomes such as any extra things you get. 
Researcher:  What about reviewing the business case objectives against current progress?   
PF12:  Yes, this should be done.  You should also undertake post-occupancy reviews, if applicable; 
post-delivery reviews with a follow-up 12 months later; conduct a review of operational objectives; 
milestone reviews; periodic reviews every five years; as well as feedback from key stakeholders.   
[Policies / principles / actions:  Service user experience surveys; Reviewing business case objectives 
against current performance (including post-delivery and milestone reviews); Performance audits; Key 
stakeholder feedback] 
 
The findings derived from this process are supplemented by the wider PPP 
experiences of participants which are presented in sections 8.5 to 8.8, below.    
 
 
8.5 Exploration and Validation of PPP Value-for-Money Issues  
 
In reporting aspects of the primary interview data analysis in this section, references 
to the responses of individual interviewees are made in the present verb tense (i.e. 
what they say, rather than what they said). This is done deliberately, in order to more 
closely mirror the dynamics of the actual interviews. 
 
For interviewees PF11, PT08, PT03 and PF01, a precursor to defining ‘VfM’ is to 
highlight the criticality of satisfactorily understanding social welfare problems before 
attempting to solve them through the use of capital asset investment or by other 
means (which should be determined before a Public Sector Comparator instrument 
is designed and applied and before a procurement method chosen). For instance, 
PF11 states that governments ought to be more considered when determining “why 
projects should become projects”, including identifying the opportunity cost of what 
they deliver, and perhaps as importantly, what partnerships will not solve. PT03 
asserts that in some instances, government departments fail to effectively address 
these issues, including adequately identifying broader investment and project 
benefits.  The rationale used in project proposals and business cases should thus be 
properly defensible on these wider grounds with all legitimate options being 
considered.  These views are echoed by PF01: 
 
“The first decision on any piece of infrastructure isn’t how to procure it. The 
first decision is ‘what’s the problem?’…It’s all too easy to say that the answer 
is to build something. It’s not so easy to say the answer is not to build 
something. Sometimes people look to infrastructure and then for a problem to 
solve whereas it should be that the problem comes first and then an 
intervention comes second. The intervention may or may not include capital 
asset investment. It’s not until much later down the path that you start talking 
about how you’re going to buy this from the marketplace”.  
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Allied to these views, and to deliver VfM outcomes, project proposals and business 
cases should be considered in context of delivering infrastructure assets for their 
intended purpose as well as the value they will provide to existing networks (PF11, 
PT08 and PF01) e.g. how a PPP-procured asset will connect to electrical, hydraulic, 
transportation networks, etc (although it is acknowledged that this cannot not always 
be the case, particularly with Social Infrastructure projects e.g. schools and hospitals 
– there may be merit in delivering these types of projects, in isolation to, or in the 
absence of, existing networks). This type of strategic thinking (including adequately 
defining the benefits derived from it) is identified as a key area for improvement for 
the public sector (PF11) as poorly conceived projects could ultimately result in 
government paying its private partner hundreds of millions (or even billions) of 
dollars for under-utilised assets and through regular service payments for delivering 
agreed services that do not fully address intended social needs.  
 
PF01 believes that as soon as a contract is signed between the public and private 
partners, there may be an “uphill battle” for the public partner to maintain the 
intended value of the agreement. The attainment of VfM, according to PF01, is 
dependent upon the quality of the individuals involved in discharging their contract 
management responsibilities, defined as the ability to interrogate, question and push-
back against the commercially-driven private partner. Thus, attempting to improve 
expected VfM outcomes during the operating phase may be just as challenging, 
since co-operation between the public and private partners may depend upon the 
extent to which change will benefit each partner, the motivation of the public partner 
to revisit value propositions over time, or the capability and resourcing of both 
partners to manage new requirements. Moreover, PT06 questions the rationale for 
seeking VfM enhancements during the operational phase over and above what is 
contracted for, and commented that, assuming the private partner is meeting all of its 
KPIs, it is not contractually required to do anything more unless it wishes to do so.   
 
Interviewees tend to associate with, to varying degrees, one of two practical 
approaches for PPP contract oversight: ‘black letter’ (i.e. to the ‘letter of the law’) 
contract enforcement and ‘give and take’ relationship management. For those 
interview participants who lean towards a point-by-point black letter view (PT13, 
PF11 and PT08), a concern is that failure to comply with contractual requirements 
could lead to unanticipated changes in organisational culture and behaviour (PF11) 
which may, over time, run the risk of eroding the basis of the contract (PT08) or 
create an opportunity for someone to refer to informal precedent over something 
dealt with that was different from what had been stipulated in the concession deed 
(PT13) – all of which may have a significant financial cost implication for government 
and expose public sector decision-makers to criticism by Auditors-General (PF11). 
Taken to an extreme, failure to abide by financial management and audit legislation 
(PT08) breaches public sector codes of conduct and undermines accountability in 
the contract management process. This interview outcome is an important finding for 
the research, since it does not arise in the extant literature.   
 
Generally speaking, the interviewees who are inclined to adopt a give and take 
approach (PF03, PT10, RK09, RK05, PT11, PF14, PF06, PF07 and PF10), 
acknowledge the need for starting with the contract but emphasise the significance 
of partners ‘working together’ to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes (PF06), 
particularly when there is something in the contract that cannot be easily enforced 
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e.g. loosely worded KPIs that are subject to different interpretations. In such 
circumstances, PF07 suggests that the best course of action may be to take a co-
operative, solutions-orientated approach; an approach that engenders “commercial 
fairness” and mutual gain rather than trying to force an outcome where one party 
benefits at the other’s expense (PF10).  Working together in this way may lead to 
issues being resolved more easily and flexibly (PT11) without the need for formal 
dispute resolution clauses in concession agreements to be enacted.  As PT10 
explains:   
 
“In this department, it’s traditionally been that the contract is important but it’s 
only used as a last resort.  We’re interested in the 25-30 year partnership 
element – that’s what the public sector client tends to go into these 
for…strategic relationships. We’re looking for a long-term partner for long-
term service delivery.”  
 
For the interviewees, having a view on how to achieve VfM seems easier to them 
than trying to provide an interpretation of what it means.  As a consequence, only a 
few participants (RK10, PT05, PT03 and PT08) offered explanations. For RK10, VfM 
involves price, performance and quality, whereby VfM is obtained when “the solution 
drives the best price for the best performance for the best outcome”. This differs from 
the view of PT05 who talks about strategic fit and quantification of additional benefits 
obtained from a partnership beyond the financial elements: “VfM is quantifying the 
added extras of a partnership over and above the dollars in terms of quality and 
there is also an element of strategic fit”. The other interviewees frame their 
definitions by referencing the procurement arrangements of two Australian state 
governments.  With regard to the jurisdictional aspects, PT03 is inclined to view VfM 
from a Victorian Government Purchasing Board-style characterisation where VfM is 
achieved through a “balanced assessment of benefits and costs over the whole of 
life of the investment” and for PT08, VfM is defined by the New South Wales Public 
Authorities Financial Arrangements Act 1987, “when the winning bid beats all others 
and beats the PSC”. 
 
Interview participants also found it challenging to define ‘VfM’ from partnership, risk 
and performance management perspectives that relate solely to the operational 
phase of PPPs as it is generally considered that the VfM concept is rooted in the 
entire lifecycle of the asset. With that said, some participants offer VfM 
considerations that can apply to each of the three perspectives during operations:   
− Partnership management. VfM may be achieved using the principle of 
reciprocity (PT06) i.e. through give and take where both partners may, from 
time to time (and for the right reasons), go ‘above and beyond’ the ‘black 
letter’ approach for each other to attain a desired outcome.  In such 
circumstances where relationships work well and the right sorts of people are 
involved in managing the contract, it may be possible to add additional value 
over time e.g. by introducing new technology that has been developed outside 
of the PPP in order to get a better outcome (PT03). Furthermore, VfM can be 
demonstrated when the private partner identifies issues or potential issues 
and brings them to the attention of its public partner before they become 
major challenges that could severely impact upon government business 
(PF03).   
175 
 
− Risk management. Known risks should be continually monitored and 
managed during the operational phase because risk appetite can change over 
time and existing risk positions may not be broken down or be static (RK04).  
Equally, it is important to identify the source of new risks, their drivers and to 
whom the consequences (or benefits) flow (RK04). On a separate note, RK06 
emphasises the need for the public partner to effectively manage its 
accountabilities in overseeing the concession deed (e.g. to reduce the risk of 
informal precedent being enacted).   
− Performance management. For the public partner, VfM is sought and obtained 
from its private partner through consistent delivery of contracted services e.g. 
delivering services on time and to agreed standards (PF07) and through 
efficient and effective public sector contract management oversight (PT05).  
PF09 provides a broader view that embraces the management of PPP assets: 
“VfM is…about [the] quality of services offered, performance history, service 
delivery program, operational support, skilled personnel, ongoing 
maintenance and whole of life programs”. 
 
As part of the wider VfM discussion, a number of interviewees spoke about VfM 
drivers. Some of those relate predominantly to the procurement and delivery phases, 
whilst others are aimed more at the operational phase.  Table 8.11 outlines each of 
these drivers. 
 
Table 8.11 PPP VfM Drivers Identified by Interview Participants. 
VfM drivers 
Cost savings / return 
on investment 
− [VfM is] about getting a competitive rate for what [government] 
receive[s], which needs to take into account the payment of 
management fees…and locking down…maintenance costs (PF12) 
− [VfM is securing] the lowest cost option for the highest benefit…it 
doesn’t necessary mean the cheapest cost (PT02) 
− VfM isn’t necessarily driven by the dollar…price comes into it because 
[government needs] to buy something – a ten million dollar investment 
may potentially lead to twenty million dollars of value in terms of 
prestige or improvements…you have to look at price in context. It 
cannot be the sole driver (RK10) 
Additional benefits  − There are cases where we certainly look for a minimum set of 
requirements and where that might be exceeded as part of an offer of 
the outcome of the procurement process. For example on Social 
Infrastructure PPPs, there may be additional commercial elements to 
the project – it might be retail, it might be food and beverage, it might 
be services that we didn’t brief on, didn’t ask for but may be offered by 
the private partner as a VfM enhancement. We do value that.  For us, it 
is VfM because it’s something that we didn’t ask for but it’s something 
that we could actually like or want (PT10) 
Productivity gains  − The dynamic VfM equation is what you do with the building – it’s the 
function of what you perform out of the building. With office blocks, it’s 
a relatively simple equation. A hospital, prison, court building or school 
is a much more dynamic environment where you’re actually delivering 
quite sophisticated outcomes that are single-purpose…the function is 
the bigger element (RK06) 
− Having a facility that’s more innovative and creative…actually drives 
performance of a facility.  The [VfM] debate ought to be about the 
productivity of the facility (PT12) 
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VfM drivers 
Service expectations 
/ outcomes 
− [VfM is about] service standards and how well [the private partner] 
meet[s] them and whether they meet higher service standards than 
would otherwise occur in the public system (PT11)  
− [VfM is assuring] private sector parties are meeting their obligations 
that are set out under the project agreement…and there isn’t slippage 
or re-framing of issues, or weaselling out of payment issues (PF13) 
− VfM is about not having [performance or availability] failures (PF03)  
 
Strategic underpinning of partnering not only extends to the parameters, definition 
and drivers of VfM but also to its measurement. For example, in describing VfM as a 
long-term proposition, PT13 states, in relative terms, value cannot solely be 
determined by calculating a dollar spend on a year-by-year basis during the 
operational phase (although measuring VfM, say over the first five years and then 
assessing how that period relates to the next 25 years of the concession, may be a 
better predictor of VfM (PF11)) using both quantitative and qualitative assessments.  
Over and above analysing the financial benefits quantitatively, using qualitative 
assessments may provide greater certainty in terms of appraising the quality of 
relationship between the partners (as it should have become well established at that 
point) e.g. judging how supportive the private partner may be in interpreting 
ambiguous service standards.  Such assessment may provide useful for public 
partner decision-making with regard to the potential for improving existing VfM 
outcomes and / or avoiding costly partnering disputes.   
 
 
8.6 Exploration and Validation of Partnership Management Issues  
 
This section outlines the key partnership management issues / challenges identified 
during interview. Findings are used to inform the development of the next iteration of 
the IMM for PPP.   
 
8.6.1 Organisational Culture 
 
Key issues / challenges:  
 
There is clearly a link between the choice of decision-makers’ practical approach for 
achieving VfM through contract management oversight (see VfM section above) and 
the organisational culture shared between public and private sector partners. For 
instance, the give and take-type approach accords with a culture that places a 
premium on quality of the contract management function as well as embracing a 
solutions-based approach (PT03 and PT13) fostered through a strong belief in the 
value of relationship management (PF07 and PF01) – one where partners are likely 
to be flexible (PT05) and pull together for mutual benefit when things go wrong or 
when unexpected issues arise (PT13 and PT03).  This contrasts with a ‘black letter’ 
approach which is likely to manifest in a strong compliance-orientated culture. 
According to PF06, establishing such a culture is acceptable if government is “100 
per cent” certain that the contract is correct; however, in practice, this is unlikely to 
be the case as the interviewee acknowledges that there is often room for wider 
interpretation of contractual clauses.   
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Despite the goodwill that can be generated by PPP partners and the co-operative 
intentions they may have, it is also argued that “you get what you pay for”, i.e. that 
money drives behaviour (RK01). This suggests that organisational culture may not 
always be driven primarily by the preferred contract management style of the public 
partner and can be influenced by the size of the private partner’s financial margins, 
which could then influence the extent to which the concessionaire may ‘go the extra 
mile’ (or perhaps alternatively, the degree to which ‘corners could be cut’ by the 
operator).  The wider point is elucidated by PF13:   
 
“If you’ve got a deal where the private sector is basically making dollars but is 
still delivering VfM, then there’s probably a greater willingness to do things 
together. But if the assumptions that the private sector has made around the 
cost of delivering the services and the services are actually under pressure 
and it becomes a bit of a loss, then their motivation to work in flexible ways is 
going to diminish”. 
 
This is what PF01 may have been referring to with regard to the expression, “uphill 
battle”, in context of the public partner attempting to deliver the full value of a PPP 
contract over time.  There is also potential for these types of difficulties to be 
exacerbated, for instance, by budgetary pressures and changing departmental 
priorities that can impact on the quality of the public partner’s contract management 
function e.g. where cost-cutting may lead to the replacement of highly qualified staff 
by less skilled and experienced employees. As a consequence, the dynamics of the 
relationship between the parties may change and the strategic relationships may 
even become more of a routine administrative process (PF07 and PT03).  
 
For Social Infrastructure projects, interviewees also identify the importance of 
effective internal government stakeholder management with public sector operators.  
For example, and in terms of the provision of health services, a “conduit” (PF09) is 
employed by a hospital (as a representative of the state) to work with the private 
sector facility manager to resolve day-to-day maintenance issues under the 
concession agreement (PT10). This type of role essentially involves regularly 
meeting with hospital team leaders, communicating problems to the facility manager 
and monitoring the facility manager’s progress in resolving these matters. This differs 
from the function of the public partner’s contract management team which ought to 
be largely concerned with dealing with strategic partnering issues such as suspected 
or confirmed instances of private partner under-performance (PF09). From a public 
partner perspective, challenges for the contact management team may arise if these 
ancillary stakeholders do not have a sufficient grasp of the contractual framework 
and how they should best deal with private partner representatives (PT03). RK05 
offers the following hypothetical example:   
 
“If there is a government operator moving from an environment that they are 
used to into a PPP building, they won’t understand very well the nature of the 
PPP and the fact that if ‘the light is not working’: a) you don’t actually have to 
fix it yourself. You can call the helpdesk and the PPP [facility manager] will 
take care of that; and b) in fact if you try and fix it yourself, in a small way, you 
are potentially undermining the contract. There can be a bit of behavioural 
change needed from that perspective”.   
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Key findings for IMM development:  
 
Interview outcomes from consideration of organisational culture in PPP relationship 
management have led to modification of this IMM element discipline. The 
‘Personalities’ sub-category has been modified to incorporate ‘abilities’ as a 
differentiation is made between people’s characteristics (personality) and the talent / 
capacity needed to effectively discharge their duties (ability). Table 8.12 compares 
the treatments identified in Chapter 6 and new treatments identified from the 
interview process for motivation / incentives. No new treatments are identified for 
personality / ability or team working.   
 
Table 8.12 Treatments for Organisational Culture. 
Treatments Identified in Previous  
Chapters 
New Treatments Identified From  
Interviews  
Motivation / incentives 
− Threat of / application of abatement (Chapter 
4 - 4.2) 
− Employee consultation in the design of new 
work programs (Chapter 6 - 6.3) 
− Staff KPIs relate to the achievement of 
specific goals (Chapter 4 - 4.4, Chapter 6 - 6.3) 
− Formal recognition of superior private 
partner performance (PF03-PF04, PF05, PT01-
PT02) 
− Staff reward and recognition programs 
(PF08, RK06, PS03, PS04, PT04, PT06, PT10, PT11, 
PT13, PT14) 
 
Treatment actions  
− Formal recognition of superior private partner performance.  PF05 states that 
in addition to applying mechanisms for reducing negative behaviour e.g. 
abatement, public partner decision-makers should encourage positive 
behaviour in their partners through incentives that drive the “right 
performance” culture. An example of this type of behaviour is provided by 
PF03 and defined as where the private partner performs “above and beyond 
the call of duty” – by beating minimum response times for asset maintenance. 
Such behaviour fosters a stronger ‘working together’ culture between 
partners, and if consistently displayed by the private partner and sufficiently 
recognised by the public partner, this type of value add could be formally 
recorded e.g. in a performance register, and used as part of wider criteria for 
assessing future project tenders.   
− Staff reward and recognition programs.  Examples provided include:  
o Flexible working conditions. PF08 emphasises the importance of 
flexible working conditions for retaining high calibre employees, in 
particular, the younger workforce. In addition to offering flexible working 
hours (many governments do already provide such conditions although 
not necessarily for high performing staff), decision-makers could give 
high achievers more control over how they plan and structure their 
work (PF08).   
o Training and professional development. Training courses (PT14) and 
certifications may incentivise employees to perform better as formal 
recognition of skills can lead to enhanced career prospects and 
increased market value of recipients.  Moreover, staff that do well could 
be given higher levels of exposure (PS03) such as the chance to 
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engage professionally with senior operators (as appropriate) to further 
develop their capabilities (PT04).   
o Financial incentives.  PF08, RK06, PS03, PS04, PT10, PT13 and PT14 
raise the subject of monetary reward for high performance.  PT06 
states that for government to obtain and then retain experienced and 
capable project directors, for example, remuneration ought to be 
competitive with that offered by the private sector. However, in 
practice, this may not be the case. Although talking more broadly about 
public sector contract management teams, PT11 observes that at an 
Australian state level, pay levels do vary significantly. This implies 
differences between jurisdictions as well as staff awards in different 
contract management environments within the same state.  PS03 
believes that remuneration levels could be boosted through overtime 
provision and other benefits such as travel allowance and subsidised 
parking.   
 
Integrating arguments   
Relationships involving ‘organisational culture’ have been identified in context of the 
following partnership management issues: ‘Employee capability and expertise’, ‘clear 
and open communication’, ‘relationship continuity’ and ‘conflict management’.  Detail 
is provided under those corresponding headings, below.  
 
8.6.2 Management Commitment and Support 
 
Key issues / challenges:  
 
As alluded to above (see ‘Organisational culture’), a concern is raised about aspects 
of public sector departmental oversight e.g. where PPP working committees (PT14 
and PF09) could be more supportive of the contract management function (PF07) by 
recognising that in order to obtain better VfM outcomes, contract management teams 
should be provided with adequate resources (such as providing greater funding for 
employing suitably qualified staff to fulfil contractual requirements who have the 
ability to respond appropriately to strategic risks and opportunities (PT03)) in addition 
to managing routine contract management functions.  Not only is this an inter-
departmental concern with respect to providing the right level of funding for their 
contract management teams, it also extends upwards to commitment and support 
from treasury and finance departments that approve agency budget allocations. In 
discussing public partner under-resourcing, PF04 implicitly points to a possible 
source of power imbalance between PPP partners:    
 
“We put in a lot of resources into doing the deal and you know that the private 
sector company in the operational phase has its lawyers, its accountants and 
it is very conscious of its cost structures and all that, and we’re trying to 
manage with relatively cheap junior staff and without lawyers and accountants 
backing you up… [we cannot afford those types of] resources”. 
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In contrast, PT10 offers a different perspective:   
 
“In the first year of operations, the commitment was 100 million dollars to the 
private partner for service, for maintenance and for the assets being 
delivered. We should be managing that with quality resources and we should 
have funding for the right personnel to do it”. 
 
Several participants (PF03, PF04, PT05, PF08 and PF07) emphasise that Australian 
departments of treasury and finance ought to engage more and provide better levels 
of support and funding to host departments (i.e. the client) for contract management.  
Reality might dictate that choices are made in terms of budget priorities, but if 
genuine VfM outcomes are to be achieved, suitable resources must be allocated to 
PPP projects (that have already been committed to) for increasing the likelihood that 
services will be delivered as intended and that expectations, as set out in business 
cases, are met. The other side of the coin is that public departments that manage 
PPPs have a responsibility to accurately relay information about the nature of “the 
business” to the relevant treasury and finance departments in order to improve 
informed decision-making for the allocation of future expenditure lines (PT05).   
 
Key findings for IMM development:  
 
No IMM development requirements, in terms of new treatments or integrating 
arguments, are identified; nor for negotiated outcomes or for acquisition and 
allocation of additional resources.     
 
8.6.3 Employee Capability and Expertise 
 
Key issues / challenges:  
 
The profile of the public partner’s PPP management workforce typically comprise a 
mixture of permanent and temporary public servants (employees) and private sector 
contractors and consultants (externals) that are engaged on a fixed-term basis to 
augment available skill-sets. PT14 asserts that, in some cases, there is potential to 
improve VfM propositions e.g. through productivity efficiencies and capability building 
by using highly skilled contractors and consultants to fulfil specific requirements or to 
deal with particular issues.  However, a potential risk for the public partner of relying 
too heavily on external contractors and consultants is that they may not adequately 
(or be requested to) transfer appropriate technical knowledge to public employees 
(PT05), nor in a timely way, which may result in the public partner paying high 
market rates for longer than necessary or be left unexpectedly to deal with skills-
gaps if the external providers should leave suddenly. It is therefore important that the 
public partner develops an appropriate level of in-house expertise at an individual 
PPP project level to lessen the impact of such risks. Taking management of 
corporate knowledge as an example, PT05 opines:   
 
“Corporate knowledge and continuity of that corporate knowledge [needs] to 
be maintained [better]…the current structure within the Victorian government 
doesn’t recognise and give enough value to that”.  
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Apart from providing formal learning opportunities, on the job training and other types 
of professional development (e.g. attending contract management forums) (PT08, 
PT03 and PT10) for employees to improve their commercial, legal and negotiating 
knowledge and skills, etc (PT05, PF12, PT04, RK07 and PT03), the public partner 
can bolster its contract management capabilities by:  
− Developing better knowledge continuity between project phases e.g. by 
having an operations specialist involved in procurement and delivery decision-
making and for understanding the key background issues and relationships 
(PT04, PT10 and PF13);  
− Creating and maintaining a document library for corporate and commercial 
documents (PT10, PF08, PT11 and PS04) e.g. through a single online 
repository; 
− Applying the contract management / administration manual more effectively 
and ensuring its currency (PF13 and PT14); 
− Improving succession planning (PT10 and PF07) and the hand-over process 
more generally, including intellectual property matters (PT12); and  
− Implementing and maintaining a detailed ‘calendar of deliverables’ tool based 
on contractual outputs for monitoring performance (PF12).   
 
Although weighted towards a compliance-orientated approach to contract 
management (see ‘Organisational culture’ above), PF12 points to the merit of using 
a calendar of deliverables to support junior public partner contract managers in 
managing tasks as specified under a concession deed.  This recommendation is 
borne from PF12’s direct experience in designing and implementing an Access 
database for employees to use that links each task with a corresponding delivery 
date – a systematic approach that also involves assessing and then reporting on the 
extent to which each obligation is met using a pre-defined methodology.  According 
to PF12, such a system can easily be configured to meet the requirements of 
individual PPP contracts in a way that “takes users step-by-step through what they 
need to do, how it should be done and when to do it”. Furthermore, this type of 
approach is beneficial for mitigating some of the knowledge and experiential risks 
that the public partner faces; it can be used to build corporate, commercial and 
project knowledge; and be used to raise levels of accountability (and performance) of 
both contract management team members and the private partner (PF12).   
 
In addition to improving employee capability and knowledge within individual PPP 
projects, there was discussion with interviewees (PT10, PF12, PF04, PF11, PT03, 
PF06, RK10, PT13 and PT12) about the potential of the public sector to develop 
economies of scale across multiple projects. Interviewee PF11 points to a lack of 
curiosity and a failure of successive governments to take a long-term view of 
contracted PPPs including committing resources that are necessary to truly 
understand the commonalities that exist across projects that could ultimately improve 
quality outcomes and drive down recurrent expenditure.  With regard to the role of 
the Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance under its current structure, and in 
relation to the operating phase, PT10 comments:   
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“Treasury is an absolutely critical stakeholder but are they well geared to 
managing or facilitating that pool, that resource, or that function? Their 
traditional role is being…the source of advice around, not just budget settings, 
but procurement and risk. Don’t confuse it with service delivery – absolutely 
be a stakeholder, be an owner or be a client for that but not the source or host 
for that type of thing”. 
 
Supporting this view, PF12, PF06 and RK10 see value in the creation of a new 
centralised public sector model for managing PPP business i.e. a dedicated 
business unit, that would, for example, manage the spectrum of agency contracts, 
thus making it easier to develop the requisite depth of employee knowledge and 
capability in a more structured and standardised way whilst reducing costs of having 
to rely on expensive contractors and consultants that may otherwise be paid to 
deliver similar requirements or deal with comparable issues across a number of 
projects.  Although this may be a potentially effective solution in principle, there is a 
challenge over how such a unit would be governed, in practice.  For instance, PF04 
raises questions about how the unit would relate to individual departmental and 
statutory authority heads who have responsibility under financial management acts 
for activities within their portfolio and who would be given precedence in decision-
making. The feasibility of such a unit could be further complicated by a lack of critical 
mass of PPP projects within individual Australian jurisdictions, including Victoria, 
meaning that there may not be sufficient skill-sets to develop and then maintain 
necessary expertise (PF04) due to the number of projects currently in the pipeline – 
unless the unit were to be established at the federal level and applied to all projects 
across all states and territories (PT13). 
 
Issues relating to the locus of governance for the public partner in the operational 
phase of PPP, are an important finding for this research, and there is limited 
coverage of this topic in the extant literature.   
 
Key findings for IMM development:  
 
See Table 8.13 for a comparison between the treatments identified in Chapter 6 and 
the new treatments relating to subject matter knowledge and applicability. No new 
treatment requirements are identified for roles and responsibilities.   
 
Table 8.13 Treatments for Employee Capability and Expertise. 
Treatments Identified in Previous  
Chapters 
New Treatments Identified From  
Interviews 
Subject matter knowledge and applicability 
− Employee development programs (Chapter 4 -  
4.2, 4.3, Chapter 5 - 5.2, Chapter 6 - 6.3) 
− Compliance / remedial action in conjunction 
with policies, frameworks and procedures 
(Chapter 4 - 4.2, 4.3, Chapter 5 - 5.2, Chapter 6 - 6.3) 
− Distillation and documentation of key 
commercial and project learning (Chapter 4 - 
4.2, 4.3, Chapter 5 - 5.5, Chapter 6 - 6.3) 
− Succession planning (PF07, PT10)  
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Treatment actions  
Succession planning. Departmental downsizing (PF07) and other circumstances that 
lead to personnel changes (PT10) can result in a loss of capability within teams.  
PT10 states that key person risks can be mitigated (at least to some extent) through 
careful succession planning.   
 
Integrating arguments  
Organisational culture (motivation / incentives) and employee capability and 
expertise (subject matter knowledge and applicability). Adequate resourcing of 
contract management teams can be critical for achieving intended outcomes. It is 
thus important to provide staff with essential resources to get the job done (PT10).   
 
8.6.4 Clear and Open Communication 
 
Key issues / challenges:  
 
Communication is identified as a critical enabler for achieving desired cultural 
outcomes, both within contract management teams and between PPP partners 
(PT10).  According to PF11, this is traditionally an area that the public partner can 
improve upon e.g. through expressing the importance of delivering services in line 
with public sector values and beliefs more clearly, as part of achieving desired 
partnership outcomes. PF01 states that trust is integral to good communication and 
understanding between partners:   
 
“Ultimately, I think business relationships are based on trust and that people 
will do the right thing and that behaviours can be predicted. It’s un-predictable 
behaviour that’s difficult to deal with”. 
 
Developing trust can be useful in other ways. For example, by building a trusting 
relationship, the public partner may be able to engage its private partner in informal 
dialogue about contract variations before initiating formal contractual processes 
(RK05). The benefit of this is both partners will have had more time to consider 
benefits and risks of different approaches before a formal variation notice under the 
contract is issued (RK05), potentially leading to better VfM.   
 
Key findings for IMM development:  
 
See Table 8.14 for a comparison between treatments identified in Chapter 6 and 
new treatments obtained from the interview process for shared understanding and 
trust building.     
 
Table 8.14 Treatments for Clear and Open Communication. 
Treatments Identified in Previous  
Chapters 
New Treatments Identified From  
Interviews 
Shared understanding 
− Clear communication of organisational 
beliefs, values and behaviours (Chapter 4 - 4.3, 
Chapter 5 - 5.2, 5.6, Chapter 6 - 6.3) 
− Adoption of common language (Chapter 6 - 
6.3) 
− Regular discussion about future 
organisational direction with private partner 
(RK05, PF02, PT03) 
− Document agreed project decisions for 
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Treatments Identified in Previous  
Chapters 
New Treatments Identified From  
Interviews 
future reference (PT10) 
Trust building 
− Pursuit of common goals (Chapter 5 - 5.2, 
Chapter 6 - 6.3) 
− Shared understanding (Chapter 4 - 4.2, Chapter 5 
- 5.6, Chapter 6 - 6.3) 
− Management follow-through on agreed 
actions (Chapter 4 - 4.2, Chapter 6 - 6.3) 
− Mandate / enforce project-wide adherence 
to governance, probity and compliance 
frameworks (Chapter 4 - 4.2, 4.3, Chapter 6 - 6.3) 
− Showing employees respect (Chapter 6 - 6.3) 
− Engage employees in decision-making 
processes (Chapter 6 - 6.3) 
− Delegate tasks or responsibilities to 
employees, as appropriate (Chapter 6 - 6.3) 
− Highlight progress / celebrate successes 
with staff (PS03) 
− Document agreed decisions for future 
reference (PT10) 
 
Treatment actions  
− Regular discussion about future organisational direction with the private 
partner. This implies performance is about more than just focussing on 
historical data (PF02).  Having occasional or periodic discussions with senior 
representatives of the private partner is valuable for keeping an open dialogue 
to understand what its long-term intensions are, that have the potential to 
impact on the contract (PT03, RK05 and PF02). This may be desirable, for 
example, if the public partner is contemplating a major variation to the 
concession deed and wants to know at an early stage the degree to which the 
private partner is open to such an opportunity.   
− Document agreed decisions for future reference. PT10 talks about the 
criticality of documenting agreed outcomes. The benefit of effective 
documentation extends to clearer lines of accountability, fewer 
misunderstandings between partners and reducing the potential for conflict.   
− Highlight progress / celebrate successes with staff. PS03 states that by 
highlighting progress and celebrating successes with their contract 
management staff, project directors can build trust between themselves and 
other team members.   
 
Integrating arguments 
− Organisational culture and clear and open communication (shared 
understanding). Communication is a “significant contributor” for achieving 
good cultural outcomes (PT10). From a public partner perspective, for 
example, this can relate to developing a better understanding of its private 
partner i.e. how the PPP fits into its wider business and how future decision-
making could potentially impact upon the contract (PT03), or developing a 
better understanding of internal stakeholder drivers and requirements (PT10).   
− Organisational culture (team working) and clear and open communication 
(shared understanding). Shared understanding is integral to effective team 
working.  For example, ongoing dialogue between public and private partners 
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can potentially improve understanding of one-another’s perspectives (RK05) 
and thus, lead to improved outcomes (PF11).  
 
8.6.5 Relationship Continuity 
 
Key issues / challenges:  
 
Several interviewees emphasise the importance of relationship continuity in terms of 
valuable knowledge that is built up over time and used by employees to successfully 
discharge their responsibilities under the contract.  This not only relates to historical 
project and technical knowledge (see ‘Employee capability and expertise’ above) but 
also to understanding people and their personalities (PT01).  The latter can be useful 
for exerting personal influence for resolving issues without having to resort to more 
formal means.  Moreover, understanding people can provide context as to why 
certain decisions are taken and how they impact on future outcomes e.g. why a 
clause is negotiated in a certain way (PT06). However, this type of information is not 
always sufficiently documented for future reference, particularly for the benefit of new 
staff.  This is an area that PT06 identifies for better management by the public 
partner. In discussing the consequence of relationship (and hence) knowledge 
discontinuity, PT14 states:   
 
“It worries me that over a 25 year deal, inevitably, you’re going to have the 
original people drop away and get new people, where the deal may suddenly 
shift and you may not get the best value from the project”. 
 
Key findings for IMM development:  
 
No new treatments are identified for personal and professional influence.     
 
Integrating arguments   
Organisational culture and relationship continuity (personal and professional 
influence).  PT01 shares an observation that in this person’s experience, most 
employees prefer to work with people with whom they have developed a professional 
relationship with over a period of time. This means these employees appear to be 
less conscious of their relationships and more focused on the technical work: “it’s 
about having one barrier instead of two”.   
 
8.6.6 Conflict Management 
 
Key issues / challenges:  
 
Notwithstanding the potential benefits of the ‘give and take’ contract management 
approach embraced by many of the interview participants (see the ‘Value-for-Money’ 
and ‘Organisational culture’ sections above), conflict is almost certain to occur during 
a 25 to 30 year concession period. Broadly speaking, two key sources of conflict are 
identified for this research by interviewees PT05, PF04, PF12, PT06, RK11, PT03, 
PT11, PT14, PF13, PT13 and PF10.   
 
The first source of conflict relates to situations that arise where there is potential for 
significant financial impacts / unforeseen cost burdens that can shape public partner 
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VfM outcomes. Examples of these types of disputes, relating particularly to the 
delivery of services for Social Infrastructure projects, including where the public 
partner rigidly applies abatement for delay or under-performance during the 
transition phase into operations i.e. when systems and processes are still being 
bedded-down which results in push-back by the private partner (PT14); where 
decisions taken by the state hinder the private partner in some way e.g. double-
bunking in prison cells due to overcapacity that leads to higher operational costs 
(such as energy consumption) being absorbed by the private partner (PT11); and 
where there is non-performance or under-performance by the private partner for the 
delivery of defined services (PT05).   
 
The second source of conflict relates to failure of one party to meet the expectations 
of the other e.g. where the intent of a service specification has been misunderstood 
or where a KPI has not been adequately defined (PT05 and PT11).  Put differently, 
disputes can occur because the private partner has a different idea of the service it is 
supposed to be delivering (PT06) or how wording contained in contractual clauses 
should be interpreted.  Different perceptions and interpretations can therefore have a 
profound effect on achieving VfM outcomes where the ‘word’ can outlive the ‘intent’ 
in agreements (PT13, PF12 and PT12).  PF04 provides the following example:    
 
“We [currently] have a case in the Full Court of the Supreme Court over which 
forum should hear a dispute about whether ‘may’ means ‘must’. Yes, it’s 
pedantic but it’s the kind of detail that we’re spending hundreds of thousands 
of dollars, in our case, to find out”.  
 
Before enacting formal dispute resolution mechanisms, partners should make 
sufficient attempts to resolve the issue (PT05) and at least develop a shared 
understanding of what the facts are and what the consequences should be under the 
contractual framework (PT03). The degree to which the partners are able to do this 
may come down to the type (or quality) of relationship that the partners have (PT03) 
and the level of confidence and capability that employees possess in dealing with 
their private partner counterparts (PT05). Within this context, RK11 believes that 
having the right experience can be crucial to achieving good outcomes as in this 
participant’s opinion, less experienced employees tend to seek expensive legal 
advice too often without first taking a view over what the public partner’s position 
should be and attempting to reach that desired outcome through negotiation with the 
private partner’s representatives. Furthermore, it may be that the legal opinion 
offered does not actually address the problem at hand and instead is geared towards 
a view of what lawyers think the court would take if it had to answer the question 
(PT13).  PF12 has a similar opinion:   
 
“If [contract managers] rely too heavily on legal advice to interpret clauses, it 
will be costly and they might get advice that’s not always in their best 
interests. A contract is a guide and if contract managers need an additional 
guide to interpret the guide, then they’re in trouble”.  
 
Key findings for IMM development:  
 
The ‘Resourcing’ sub-category was incorporated into the new sub-category, ‘Under-
performance / non-performance’ as a lack of resources can lead to service delivery 
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failure.  See Table 8.15 for a comparison between treatments identified in Chapter 6 
and new treatments identified from the interview process for values and beliefs. No 
treatments are identified for under-performance / non-performance.   
 
Table 8.15 Treatments for Conflict Management. 
Treatments Identified in Previous  
Chapters 
New Treatments Identified From  
Interviews 
Values and beliefs 
− Understand the situation from others’ point 
of view (Chapter 4 - 4.2, Chapter 5 - 5.2, 5.6, Chapter 
6 - 6.3) 
− Take advice, as appropriate, from subject 
matter experts, operations committees / 
working groups, legal counsel etc (Chapter 4 - 
4.2, Chapter 5 - 5.4, Chapter 6 - 6.3) 
− Re-arrange project priorities (Chapter 5 - 5.2, 
Chapter 6 - 6.3) 
− Re-allocate resources (Chapter 6 - 6.3) 
− Take disciplinary action / imposing training 
on under-performing employees (Chapter 6 - 
6.3) 
− Use dispute resolution specialists, if needed 
(Chapter 5 - 5.4, Chapter 6 - 6.3) 
− Operate a “No blame” culture (PS03)  
− Document agreed decisions for future 
reference (PT10) 
 
Treatment actions  
− Operate a ‘no blame’ culture. In the experience of PS03, “no blame” 
behaviour is widely encouraged. This implies such a mindset can be a more 
efficient and effective way to overcome obstacles compared with apportioning 
blame to a particular person or party. Issues that are not easily resolved 
should be escalated and managed (as appropriate) with relevant contractual 
clauses and dispute resolution mechanisms (PS03).   
− Document agreed decisions for future reference. See treatment for ‘Clear and 
open communication: Shared understanding / trust building’, above.   
 
Integrating arguments   
− Organisational culture (team working) and conflict management (values and 
beliefs).  Litigation should be a course of action of last resort.  Apart from time 
and cost implications, a reason why litigation should be avoided is because it 
produces winners and losers.  Moreover, resentment, for example, can impact 
on the effectiveness of team working, particularly if the parties have to work 
together over long periods of time (RK10).  
− Organisational culture (personalities / abilities) and conflict management 
(under-performance). RK10 states that poor cultural fit between individual 
employees and their wider teams has the potential to erode intended 
outcomes e.g. where different values and attitudes lead to the breakdown of 
productive relationships or where under-developed skills lead to significant 
omissions or errors in managing contracts (which may also lead to informal 
precedent being set).  
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8.7 Exploration and Validation of Risk Management Issues  
 
This section outlines the key risk management issues / challenges identified during 
interview. Findings have also been used to inform the development of the next 
iteration of the IMM.   
 
8.7.1 Implementation of Transition Plan 
 
Key issues / challenges:  
 
Two challenges could impinge upon a successful transition (from project delivery to 
operational management) for the public partner: setbacks arising from 
commissioning failure and ineffective knowledge management practices prior to the 
operational phase. PT14, for instance, points to technical and operational 
commissioning failures that may result in the delay of commercial acceptance, and 
hence, impact on planned commencement of service delivery. RK11 states this can 
be particularly consequential for large and / or complex projects such as PPP 
hospitals due to the volume of testing (and any defect rectification) that must be 
undertaken: 
 
“There can be an awful lot of commission tests – hundreds or thousands in some 
cases if you’re dealing with a big hospital…[and] defects [may need to be dealt 
with] at the same time…Until [the facility is] properly commissioned, the state 
doesn’t start paying so there’s a hell of a lot of pressure to get the commissioning 
exercise done”. 
 
The loss of critical project knowledge that could occur when transitioning from 
commissioning to operations is identified as a key risk by RK05.  In discussing this 
(including emphasising the importance of early transition planning), RK05 spoke 
about a situation that occurred in connection with the Ararat Prison project in 
Victoria, Australia (now known as the Hopkins Correctional Centre); although the 
loss of knowledge, in this case, occurred between project tendering and constructing 
the facility.  Despite the public partner’s decision to recruit its operational team early 
(mid-way through construction stage) thus providing additional time for the team to 
design and imbed its operational processes, important project knowledge was lost as 
an unintended consequence of the prison’s builder being unexpectedly put into 
administration (RK05). Construction delays resulted in the role of the operational 
team being substantially pushed back, and during this period of uncertainty, one 
member of the team decided to retire (RK05). Not only did this situation result in 
significant knowledge loss, it exposed a lack of adequate succession planning by the 
public partner.   
 
Key findings for IMM development:  
 
No new treatments or integrating arguments are identified for project / integration 
challenges.     
 
 
 
 
189 
 
8.7.2 Contract Variation 
 
Key issues / challenges:  
 
Contracts get varied due to changes in scope (RK11).  Variations may therefore be 
sought and agreed because: technically something is found to be wrong in the 
contract (RK02); expectations do not match the nature of agreed outputs (RK05); 
there are changes in law or government policy (RK10); there is a need to introduce 
an additional service (RK11); or there is an opportunity to “future-proof” existing 
assets (PF04 and RK05) e.g. to meet rising / projected service demand.   
 
For the public partner, regardless of the driver of a variation, a crucial factor in 
achieving VfM is the ability of its employees to effectively assess and select the best 
course of action, and not inadvertently (through failing to understand the commercial 
and legal underpinnings of the concession deed) give away “something which 
undermines value for the state over the longer-term or leads to [an adverse] change 
in [its] risk profile” (PT14). Inadequate levels of skills and experience (see ‘Employee 
capability and expertise’, above) can therefore have a detrimental effect on achieving 
desired outcomes through planning for and administering contract variations (PF12).  
This can be further compounded by dealing with uncertainty (e.g. ‘unknowns’) when 
trying to future-proof assets e.g. arising from unexpected changes or a rapid pace in 
technological advancement (PF04) or population growth (RK05).   
 
Only four interview participants (RK11, PF14, PT12 and PF10) provided in-depth 
insights into risk re-allocation between partners. It appears this is not currently a 
significant concern for Australian PPPs (even though there are numerous examples 
of ‘failed’ ventures – most notably toll roads – stemming arguably from the use of 
contemporary risk allocation and forecasting models).  Within an Australian context, 
RK11 asserts that the most likely scenario involving the state taking back risk or 
altering the contract during operations (in terms of facility management) would be 
due to mispricing the provision of soft services e.g. catering, cleaning and other 
people services, where the public partner is faced with a choice between re-
negotiating the deal or permitting the operator to walk away from the contract (or go 
into voluntary administration or liquidation).  
 
However, anecdotal evidence emerging from the UK suggests that, in some 
instances, public partners in PFI projects are deciding to take-back risks associated 
with the provision of soft services (PF14, PT12 and PF10), particularly in schools, 
whilst allowing the private partner to continue to maintain and operate the assets.  
PF14 explains why: 
 
“A review of PFI was undertaken in 2012. It concluded that there is [little] 
value in [the private partner providing] soft services…These types of services 
should be decided on a case-by-case basis but people have tended to add 
them in without much consideration. The exceptions are health because it’s 
heavily unionised…and you’re buying services and not just an asset…and 
prisons which have complete services including rehabilitation and training. It’s 
not practical with schools because the soft services aren’t intensive and the 
schools are small and typically only need a part-time caretaker”. 
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The public partner should therefore actively manage its risk profile, including 
developing business continuity plans to minimise potential disruption to government 
business.  Although PT11 and RK05 emphasise the importance of having these 
plans in place, they question the value of investing resources into detailed planning 
efforts if the chance of having to enact plans is typically low. Instead, the 
interviewees state that sufficient resourcing should be provided to deal with actual 
issues as they begin to emerge.  RK05 opines:   
 
“Contingency planning needs to be an emergent process...rather than 
something [they] sit down and do from day one of the contract.  As issues 
emerge, I would expect them to be thinking ahead about where the issues 
may lead to and what type of plans should be developed”. 
 
Such an approach is reactive and contrary to contemporary risk management which 
is predicated upon taking a proactive view of risks by identifying them, assessing 
their relative severity and deciding upon appropriate response treatments in a 
systematic process implemented well before issues actually ‘begin to emerge’. It 
seems that striking the right balance in developing contingency plans for individual 
PPPs may come down to the likelihood, consequence, and anticipated pace of 
disruptive activity occurring, as highlighted by various examples outlined in this and 
other chapters.   
  
Key findings for IMM development:  
 
No new treatments or integrating arguments are identified for modification of existing 
services, re-allocation of risk, or business continuity planning modification.   
 
8.7.3 Change of Consortium Members / Change to Public Partner’s Agency 
Authority 
 
Key issues / challenges:  
 
With respect to the impact of changes to consortia partners, PF14 states that, in 
practice, there is often little adverse risk exposure to government (although such 
changes may be challenging for the private partner) even if the departure of a 
consortium member is enforced due to under-performance or default. RK11 
elaborates:   
 
“...usually the difficulties in PPP actually demonstrate how strong the model is 
rather than the opposite, even with what’s happening now at BrisConnections 
where the SPV or the equity provider loses money, the state is beautifully 
protected. All of that [financial] risk is transferred – that’s the reason why we 
do PPPs. So rather than it showing that the PPP model is flawed, it shows 
you how strong the model is. The losses are quarantined – it’s superb”.  
 
A change to the composition of a consortium (e.g. the introduction of a new equity 
investor) – a fairly common occurrence (PT11) – can potentially present an 
opportunity to improve VfM outcomes (RK06) depending on the organisation’s 
tolerance to risk (RK05) and its ability to manage change situations i.e. the 
willingness of its decision-makers to enter into contract variations requested by the 
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state. Conversely, a new consortium member may be less receptive to the notion of 
taking on additional risk because it may have different organisational drivers and / or 
internal policies compared with its predecessor (RK10), as RK05 explains:   
 
“A passive investor might want to basically sit back and lead a quiet life and 
collect dividends out of the project company. They will be concerned that a 
high level of performance is maintained but they will be unwilling to entertain 
variations and the like. Government always has the right to require variations 
but if you are going through those processes with a reluctant party that 
doesn’t have the right capacity and capability to deal with those issues then, 
potentially, this can detract from VfM outcomes”.  
 
Typically, pension funds have a conservative risk profile and are attracted to PPPs 
that are likely to produce a stable return on investment over the long-term e.g. 
regular income that can be generated from patient care and cleaning in hospitals 
(PT11 and PT07). As a result, pension funds are more likely to be ‘passive 
investors’, and generally speaking, less likely to seek higher exposures to risk.  
 
On the public sector-side, ‘machinery of government’ changes that affect a public 
authority, for example, can be disruptive to effective PPP oversight (PT03). These 
events may be further exacerbated due to uncertainty in decision-making and poor 
communication (PF08) with employees and other stakeholders during change 
processes. Such developments may also heighten the risk of failing to achieve 
intended VfM outcomes because of staff turn-over and / or the loss of critical 
knowledge (PT03) (see ‘Organisational culture’ and ‘Employee capability and 
expertise’, above) unless these risks are adequately managed. 
 
Changes to the public authority tasked with governance of PPPs during the 
operational phase are not comprehensively dealt with in the literature. The case 
studies (see Chapter 5) show that this may occur more frequently than might be 
expected.  While changes may reflect the outcomes of larger structural ‘machinery of 
government’ changes, there also appears to be a principle of locating operational 
governance according to PPP type e.g. health facility PPPs in a hospital authority or 
health department; correctional facility PPPs in a justice department; and transport 
infrastructures in a road or rail authority. The PPP case studies in Chapter 5 show 
that, in such examples, the public governance in PPP development and delivery 
phases may emanate from a specialised government major projects unit. The 
governance re-location principle justifies the need for a generic integrated 
operational management model for PPP which can be adopted and tailored to suit 
different types of projects. The benefit of this principle is that specialised knowledge 
is brought to bear on operational management.  The downside is the potential effect 
on the maturity of partnership management, and the risk that the transfer of PPP 
governance skills and knowledge may not be fully effective. These are important 
findings for this research.     
 
Key findings for IMM development:  
 
See Table 8.16 for comparison between treatments identified in Chapter 6 and new 
treatments identified from the interview process for exposure to new risks.   
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Table 8.16 Treatments for Change of Consortium Members / Change to Public 
Partner’s Agency Authority. 
Treatments Identified in Previous  
Chapters 
New Treatments Identified From  
Interviews 
Exposure to new risks 
− Update / report on risk registers, business 
continuity plans, issue logs etc (Chapter 4 - 4.2, 
4.3, Chapter 5 - 5.2, Chapter 6 - 6.4) 
− Distillation and documentation of key 
commercial and project learning (PT03, RK05, 
RK06)  
− Probity checks (PT11, PT14)  
− Succession planning (RK05) 
− Stakeholder management planning (RK07) 
− Communication planning (RK07) 
− Issues management planning (RK07)  
 
Treatment actions  
− Distillation and documentation of key commercial and project learning. RK06 
states that the likelihood of government agencies being restructured over a 
20-30 period is high (which, in turn, is likely to affect governance 
arrangements of agencies responsible for PPP contract oversight).  
Therefore, effective knowledge management (PT03, RK05 and RK06) e.g. 
commercial and project information, and succession planning practices, can 
mitigate the impact of disruption to the public partner’s contract management 
function (also see ‘Succession planning’ (treatment for ‘Employee capability 
and expertise: Subject matter knowledge and applicability’).  
− Probity checks. For new bidders that want to buy into a PPP consortium, 
probity checks will be undertaken by the public partner to ascertain whether 
company executives are of good faith / character as part of change of control 
processes (PT11). The requirement to undertake probity checks may also 
extend to consultancy firms and their employees who wish to tender for the 
delivery of bespoke services (PT14).   
− Stakeholder management planning (RK07). These plans are developed to 
specify the level and type of engagement required with stakeholders. 
− Communication planning (RK07). This relates to developing plans that identify 
the methods for how various audiences / stakeholders will be communicated 
with and outlines specific messaging with or between stakeholder groups. 
− Issues management planning (RK07). This type of planning is used for 
controlling responses to issues as they arise for particular audiences. These 
are used to manage specific issues identified in stakeholder management or 
communication planning processes.   
 
8.7.4 Managed Termination 
 
Key issues / challenges:  
 
If the state terminates an agreement with a consortium, then presumably, it is left 
without what it set out to achieve (RK06). However, despite obvious risks of contract 
termination e.g. take-back of assets or services, or negotiating with another party to 
provide the services possibly at a higher cost to government or delivered to a lower 
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standard (RK05), termination events may not always result in poor VfM outcomes 
(RK11, RK05, PT11 and PF14), if the asset can be secured at a discounted price by 
the state (PT11). A favourable outcome may, however, depend on a range of factors 
specific to each PPP including the cost of financial settlement (RK11) (including 
making an adjustment to employment conditions of staff under new pay awards, if 
applicable (PT11)) and the amount of value left in the life of the contract (RK05).  
PT11 offers further insights:   
 
“If they go bust, then government should get the facility back a few years 
earlier than it would have otherwise done without payment, in theory...They 
don’t default normally if the contract has value. If the contract is worth money 
then the banks and others, the sponsors, will try to recoup the value in the 
contract by replacing the operator”.  
 
Taking a broader view of VfM for the state, RK05 comments:   
 
“If you terminate the contract…, you may still have got a VfM outcome 
because you may have a fantastic piece of infrastructure, it may be better 
than what government would have built if it had not been a PPP, or you may 
have had lower costs”.  
 
Key findings for IMM development:  
 
‘Contract termination’ has been changed to ‘Managed termination’ because the latter 
implies early termination of an agreement e.g. through default, as opposed to a 
contract being wound-up at the end of an agreed concession period. A new sub-
category, ‘Voluntary termination’, has been developed due to the possibility that a 
consortium partner may wish to withdraw its services because of financial distress or 
other reasons.    
 
No new treatments or integrating arguments are identified for service provider failure 
or voluntary termination.   
 
8.7.5 End of Concession Hand-over 
 
Key issues / challenges:  
 
Although concession deeds contain hand-over clauses, transition arrangements 
must be effectively managed by the public partner (including maximising the use of 
these periods for developing detailed tender specifications, running procurement 
processes, obtaining government approvals, etc) otherwise VfM outcomes could be 
put at risk.  As RK05 explains:     
 
“The danger is because you have left the planning too late, you end up in a 
position where you have to negotiate with the incumbent at least for an initial 
period for them to stay on.  Even if it’s not negotiating with the PPP company, 
but with the facility management sub-contractor, it’s [still] not an optimum 
situation”.  
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Thorough planning is essential even if it is highly likely that an existing facility 
manager, for instance, will be retained – as the state is obligated to demonstrate that 
whatever decision is taken, it represents the best VfM option (RK05).  Moreover, by 
going to tender under such circumstances, it may increase the prospect that the 
incumbent will provide a more competitive price for delivering services (RK05), 
therefore increasing the client’s level of bargaining power.  
 
Key findings for IMM development:  
 
See Table 8.17 for comparison between treatments identified in Chapter 6 and new 
treatments identified from the interview process for performance monitoring and 
adjustment. No new treatments are identified for either transfer of project 
documentation / knowledge or orientation / up-skilling new employees.    
 
Table 8.17 Treatments for End of Concession Hand-over. 
Treatments Identified in Previous  
Chapters 
New Treatments Identified From  
Interviews 
Asset monitoring 
− Asset management reports (Chapter 5 - 5.2, 5.4, 
Chapter 6 - 6.4) 
− Obtain assurance that irregularities / 
adverse findings are resolved (Chapter 5 - 5.2, 
Chapter 6 - 6.4) 
− End of concession audits (PT11)  
− Withhold payment for under-performance / 
non-performance (PT11)  
 
Treatment actions  
− End of concession audits. To assess the level of risk to the state, PT11 
explains that asset inspections get commissioned by the public partner prior 
to concession expiry date (perhaps five years before termination, depending 
on how contracts are structured) and then periodically (perhaps at six monthly 
intervals after that), until handover is complete.  The aim of this process is to 
give assurance that government will receive the asset in agreed condition or 
provide a basis to consider and then implement a preferred option if 
requirements are not being / are unlikely to be met.   
− Withhold payment for under-performance / non-performance. In connection 
with the above treatment, withholding payment through applying the 
contractual mechanisms, designed to deter the private partner from 
transferring assets at contractual close that fail to meet agreed schedules of 
maintenance and repair can be effective (PT11). Depending on 
circumstances, financial penalties can be applied by the public partner to 
meet the expense of refurbishing the asset to its agreed handover condition 
plus associated costs.   
 
8.7.6 Reputation Damage 
 
Key issues / challenges:  
 
Although the PPP model is designed to transfer financial risk to the private partner, 
the moral hazard associated with operational failure remains with the state (PF04, 
PT04, PT05, PT11, RK05 and RK10). Taking prison services as an example, 
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government is accountable for setting policy objectives and structures under 
ministerial direction for maintaining prison assets (PT05) (although the private 
partner is obligated to deliver agreed services under the contract). If a prisoner 
escapes, government is still responsible for public safety and bears the reputational 
consequences of this (PT11). With economic infrastructure projects, RK08 and RK10 
claim that government has a moral responsibility to protect users against inflated 
prices i.e. imposition of ‘unreasonable’ service levies by operators, as well as 
guarding consumers against “parochial interests [that may attempt] to drive costs up 
for their own benefit” (RK08). Furthermore, and with regard to change of consortium 
partners, government may find it necessary to proactively manage reputation risk 
relating to large returns on initial investment won by exiting equity partners. Whilst 
this does not necessarily impact negatively on the provision of services, there may 
be a perception that the public partner has not demonstrated VfM.  If things go wrong 
or if there are perceived inequities in delivering such services, these types of 
situations have the potential to spark public condemnation including criticism from 
the media, special interest groups, etc about the choice of delivering ‘public services’ 
using a PPP mechanism.      
 
Arguably, confidence and trust between government, consumers and other 
stakeholders can be enhanced through better communication about PPPs (PT07). 
Not only should the quality of public sector engagement about the workings and 
benefits of PPP be improved, there should be a greater level of transparency 
regarding the actual achievement of VfM outcomes (PT07, PF11, PT13, PT11 and 
PF02) in terms of government policy objectives. This should include compelling 
private partners to release performance and other related data for public scrutiny 
(PT13 and PF11). With this said, PF02, PT13 and PT11 assert that, proportionally, a 
higher level of scrutiny is already applied to PPPs (e.g. by Auditors-General) 
compared with other forms of procurement e.g. design and construct (PF02). In 
discussing this trend, PT13 comments:  
 
“I actually think the other side of the coin is probably what needs to be 
opened-up – that’s the detail on the other procurement models including full 
public procurement, which [PPP] should be contrasted with. To an extent, the 
Auditor-General will cast some light on those but in a full comparable way, I 
think that’s the sort of information that’s going to be needed to rebut some of 
those emotional arguments that keep getting brought up”. 
 
Key findings for IMM development:  
 
No new treatments or integrating arguments are identified for governance, probity 
and compliance; confidentiality; or un-anticipated / un-intended events.     
 
 
8.8 Exploration and Validation of Performance Management Issues  
 
This section outlines the key performance management issues / challenges identified 
during interview. Findings have also been used to inform the development of the 
next iteration of the IMM.   
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8.8.1 Performance Management Systems Modification 
 
Key issues / challenges:  
 
In context of this research, and apart from the use of electronic document 
management systems such as Affinitext (PF07) (e.g. used for cataloguing PPP 
documentation and related reference material), there is little evidence that integrated 
PPP contract management systems are being used in the public sector, both within 
Australia and internationally. Two notable exceptions to this finding are calendars of 
deliverables (PF12) (see ‘Employee capability and expertise’, above) and the use of 
a ‘Performance Management Program’ (PMP). This latter system has been 
developed between a private partner and one particular state government 
department to support regular assessment of hard services (i.e. infrastructure) to 
determine if the state has received what it is paying for (PF09). 
 
The PMP (PF09), comprises the following components: 
− KPIs (as defined under the concession deed); 
− Business rules (provide the scope and definition for KPIs); 
− Assessment methodology (derived from supporting project documentation and 
used as the basis of measuring KPI attainment); and  
− Assessment criteria (for a pass or fail test).   
 
The use of this system is endorsed by the operations and working committees that 
comprise a membership group representing both the public and private partners. It is 
regularly reviewed to ensure currency (PF09) and effectiveness.   
 
Key findings for IMM development:  
 
‘Performance management systems documentation’ was absorbed into ‘Employee 
capability and expertise’ as on reflection, this is perceived to be part of wider PPP 
documentation practices. No new treatments are identified for performance 
management systems improvement.   
 
8.8.2 KPI Modification 
 
Key issues / challenges:  
 
Operational KPIs are developed during the procurement phase. This means 
generally, KPIs are designed at a time where the least amount of information is 
known about the service delivery specifics of PPPs, by lawyers and project teams 
that have limited operational experience (PF10 and PF12). It is therefore important to 
have flexibility (PF08) between the partners to review KPIs to ensure the services 
being delivered actually match that which was intended as part of the business case 
(PF05) and to take necessary steps to address consequential misalignment between 
expectation and practice. Moreover, and if KPIs are not well constructed, for 
example, it may be difficult for the public partner to hold operators to account for 
under-performance (PT06):   
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“If the KPIs are [ineffective], then you’re going to have trouble holding your 
facility manager accountable, without doubt…If you get that wrong, if you 
don’t have people that are of the calibre that you need, you pay for it big time 
in PPPs”. 
 
Modifying KPIs usually means they are adjusted to their ‘right’ level (PF12).  
However, the extent to which the modification contributes towards the achievement 
of VfM may depend upon a range of factors including the timing of negotiations, how 
much leverage the public partner has over its private partner and the level of 
employee ability to broker the best deal for the state.  As PF02 explains:   
 
“When you’re modifying an existing contract [or specification], you’re doing it 
non-competitively. As government, you’re going to have to test and look really 
closely at what’s changing and what the value was that you were getting...It 
[also] depends on the balance of power in a particular negotiation. If the 
contractor is bleeding, and if they need you to do something to avoid some 
kind of default, then you might have the negotiating advantages as the public 
sector, whereas if you’re under specified performance, then the negotiating 
leverage is on the other foot. It just depends on where the balance of power 
lies”. 
 
Key findings for IMM development:  
 
No new treatments or integrating arguments are identified for either annual KPI 
review or ongoing KPI review.     
 
8.8.3 Availability and Integrity of Performance Data and Metrics 
 
Key issues / challenges:  
 
For the public partner, the ability to obtain operator performance data quickly can be 
crucial for dealing with situations that may be in breach of contract or for verifying 
performance output levels (PF06 and PF07) before the “power of the stick is lost” 
(PF07) (e.g. applying abatement for instances of non- or under-performance before 
too much time lapses or before informal precedent is claimed by the private partner – 
see ‘Performance monitoring and evaluation’, below).   
 
Feedback into performance is often self-generated by operators.  Even if a trusting 
relationship exists between the partners (PT03), it is prudent for the public partner – 
as custodian of VfM for the state – to ensure that the declared level of performance 
actually matches what has been delivered. PF13 provides the following rationale:    
 
“...one of the downsides [to self-reporting] is that you’ve got to be on the ball 
and actually test what it is they’re reporting on – that they haven’t either gilded 
the lily or that they’re not doing performance things and then using words that 
imply they’re still following the contract”.  
 
 
 
 
198 
 
Key findings for IMM development:  
 
See Table 8.18 for comparison between treatments identified in Chapter 6 and new 
treatments identified from the interview process for integrity of performance data and 
metrics. No new treatments are identified for availability of performance data and 
metrics.   
 
Table 8.18 Treatments for Availability and Integrity of Performance Data and 
Metrics. 
Treatments Identified in Previous  
Chapters 
New Treatments Identified From  
Interviews 
Integrity of performance data and metrics  
− Suspected negligence, fraud and / or 
corruption escalated timely to an 
appropriate decision-maker (Chapter 5 - 5.2, 
Chapter 6 - 6.5) 
− Investigation of all credible accusations 
(Chapter 5 - 5.2, Chapter 6 - 6.5) 
− Confirmed instances dealt with through 
disciplinary / legal action, the issue of 
warning / penalty notices and / or abatement 
(Chapter 5 - 5.2, Chapter 6 - 6.5) 
− In the most serious of incidents, termination 
of contract may be warranted (Chapter 5 - 5.6, 
Chapter 6 - 6.5) 
− Performance audits (PT03, PF03-PF04, PF06, 
PF07)  
 
Treatment actions  
Performance audits. PT03 and PF07 state that, in their experience, performance 
data is regularly audited / independently verified by independent facilities 
management specialists.  However, this practice does not appear to be consistent 
across all Australian jurisdictions.  In discussing one particular project, PF06 asserts 
that although the right to audit exists, it is not done: “It comes back to value for 
money for government…if you spend the money, will it improve the system if the 
current performance of the contractor is good?” Another participant states although 
the monthly service provider performance reports are reviewed, they are not 
independently verified. When questioned about whether this should occur, the 
following response was offered: “…maybe we should.  We’ve just assumed that no 
news is good news” (PF03).     
 
8.8.4 Performance Monitoring and Adjustment 
 
Key issues / challenges:  
 
Failure to enforce private partner obligations under terms of contract may undermine 
the attainment of planned VfM outcomes. This may result, for example, if an operator 
successfully claims informal precedent (PF08, PF13 and RK06) over something the 
public partner has failed to manage as part of its oversight responsibility.  In practice 
however, such a scenario is more likely to occur if the private partner alters informal 
processes without agreement, and where the changes are not detected by the public 
partner (PF13); or where, for instance, the private partner proposes a modification to 
a contract and that modification is accepted by the public partner without giving due 
consideration to the wider ramifications of that particular change. PF13 elaborates: 
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“You’ve got to always look at why you would do something different than 
what’s in the contract…Issuing something that could inadvertently be used as 
a precedent – or that may change the project risk profile – is always 
something you’ve got to be alert to over a 25 year deal. Agreeing to 
something that seems relatively minor can be used to say ‘you signed-off on 
that basis so we’ve assumed that all of these other things flow from it’ and 
then you say ‘how the hell did that happen?’”   
 
In separate discussions, interview participants PF12, PF08, PT11, PF14, PT12, 
PF02, PF05 and RK10 all point to a variety of ways that performance / progress can 
be measured against the attainment of stated PPP outcomes during operations. 
These include:   
− Reviewing progress against the public interest template. Although these types 
of assessments are normally undertaken during conceptualisation and 
business case development, PT11 argues that such analysis could extend to 
the operational phase for determining whether the rights of users and 
consumers are still being protected as intended;  
− Reviewing progress against business case objectives / justifications for 
contract amendments. Despite being potentially effective ways to assess 
performance (PF12, PT11, PF02 and PF05), PT11 and PT12 assert that 
government is not always proficient at conducting these types of appraisals. 
PPPs are, however, subject to the Gateway Review Process in Victoria 
(including Gate Six: Benefits Realisation – see Department of Treasury and 
Finance 2009a) as well as other Australian states;    
− Reviewing progress against operational objectives. There may be, for 
instance, certain objectives that have not been set in business cases or 
contracts that government wants to track (PF12, PT11 and PF02) such as 
user satisfaction levels (PF08 and RK10) e.g. monitoring and measuring the 
quality of users’ experiences; and    
− Ex-post evaluations.  In the UK, PPPs should undergo ex-post evaluations, for 
example, to assess the quality of the contract management function after 
hand-back.  However, this rarely happens in practice (PF14).  This means that 
valuable lessons learned that could be applied to other PPPs are being lost 
and that avoidable, costly mistakes are probably being repeated in other 
PPPs.   
 
Key findings for IMM development:  
 
See Table 8.19 for comparison between treatments identified in Chapter 6 and new 
treatments identified from the interview process for performance evaluation. No new 
treatments are identified for management reporting, managing performance 
shortfalls or opportunity (risk) implementation.   
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Table 8.19 Treatments for Performance Monitoring and Adjustment. 
Treatments Identified in Previous  
Chapters 
New Treatments Identified From  
Interviews 
Performance evaluation  
− Benchmark employee deliverables against 
job descriptions including outputs and 
outcomes specified in contract management 
manuals (Chapter 4 - 4.4, Chapter 6 - 6.5) 
− Adherence to agreed policies, frameworks 
and procedures (Chapter 4 - 4.2, Chapter 5 - 5.2, 
5.4, Chapter 6 - 6.5) 
− Progress made against work plans and 
technical assessments e.g. asset 
management plans, issues registers etc 
(Chapter 4 - 4.2, 4.4, Chapter 5 - 5.2, 5.4, 5.6, Chapter 
6 - 6.5) 
− Progress made against the achievement 
project business case objectives / 
justifications made for amending a contract 
(Chapter 4 - 4.2, 4.4, Chapter 5 - 5.6, Chapter 6 - 6.5) 
− Benchmarking / competitive market testing 
(Chapter 4 - 4.2, 4.4, Chapter 5 - 5.3, 5.6, Chapter 6 - 
6.5) 
− Monitor the financial strength of consortia 
(RK07, PF02)  
− Review and implement findings from 
service user experience surveys (RK10, PF08, 
PF12)  
− Regular discussion about future 
organisational direction with private partner 
(PF02)  
− Document agreed project decisions for 
future reference (PF08)  
− Review insurance policies (PF09)  
− Performance audits (PF12)  
 
Treatment actions  
− Monitor the financial strength of consortia.  This treatment is often over and 
above contractual requirements that the private partner submit its annual 
audited accounts, etc to the public partner for review – this is about strategic 
evaluation of “financial health” i.e. sustainability of contract and the delivery of 
services through taking a “no surprises” i.e. proactive approach to contract 
management (RK07) (also see ‘Regular discussion about future 
organisational direction with private partner’ (treatment for ‘Clear and open 
communication: Shared understanding’)).  
− Review and implement findings from service user experience surveys.  RK10, 
PF08 and PF12 state that, in assessing VfM outcomes for Social 
Infrastructure projects, surveys should be utilised to assess the extent to 
which services are meeting the needs and expectations of users (i.e. by 
focussing on the quality of their experiences). This type of qualitative testing 
can also be useful for monitoring trends e.g. changes of attitude in service 
users where the data can be used as a justification for making adjustments to 
existing services (RK10 and PF08).  
− Regular discussion about future organisational direction with private partner.  
See treatment for ‘Clear and open communication: Shared understanding’.  
− Document agreed project decisions for future reference. See ‘Clear and open 
communication: Shared understanding / trust building’).  
− Review insurance policies (PF09).  Some PPPs have shared operating phase 
insurances. Such policies should be regularly reviewed to reduce the risk of 
paying higher than necessary insurance premiums over the remainder of the 
operating term.   
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− Performance audits (PF12). Within the context of performance monitoring and 
adjustment, this can relate to audits that are undertaken to assess the 
effectiveness of teams that oversee contract management (also see treatment 
for ‘Availability and integrity of performance data and metrics: Integrity of 
performance data and metrics’).   
 
8.8.5 Penalties and Abatements 
 
Key issues / challenges:  
 
Although abatement (including the threat of abatement) can be an effective method 
for driving private partner behaviour (PF13) by providing a strong incentive to 
perform under the contractual framework (PT06), interviewees PT06, PT10 and 
PF07 reason that the decision to apply abatement for under-performance is a matter 
of professional judgement. For example, and in the experience of PT10, abatement 
should only be applied if there is an intractable problem between the partners i.e. 
after all reasonable avenues for resolving the issue have been exhausted. Although 
this may be a contentious view (see ‘Value-for-Money’ and ‘Organisational culture’ 
sections above), PF08 provides context in support of PT10’s perspective:  
 
“One needs to be careful [about applying] abatement given that you need to 
nurture a 25 year relationship with [a] project company. For this reason, 
abatement should be [used as] an [enforcement tool] of last resort, not [as a] 
first resort”.  
 
Interviewee PT06 provides insights along a similar line:   
 
“If you know that the facility manager is doing everything he can to alleviate or 
address whatever issues are cropping up, then why would you abate, even if 
you’re entitled to under the contract? It doesn’t serve any purpose. You have 
a right to abate, and…the state has a very big stick, but you want to use it 
wisely. If you abate them, it hurts them financially but the relationship is 
important and it’s about give and take”.  
 
In other words, knowing when to apply abatement and when to allow flexibility can 
be strategically important with respect to building and maintaining effective 
partnership relations (PF13, PF07, PF02, RK05 and RK11). Moreover, there is some 
anecdotal evidence within Australia, that instead of applying abatement, partners 
occasionally do deals to off-set under-performance, for instance, where the private 
partner may informally consent to do other things to compensate (PT04 and PF02) 
e.g. agreeing to scope changes (PT04). However, taking these types of decisions is 
likely to reduce transparency in decision-making (PF02) as well as reduce the 
effectiveness of threatening abatement for future instances of under-performance 
(PT04). Other consequences of such decision-making may manifest in informal 
precedent being claimed (PF13) and could potentially lead to intended VfM 
outcomes being compromised (PT04).   
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Key findings for IMM development:  
 
See Table 8.20 for comparison between treatments identified in Chapter 6 and new 
treatments identified from the interview process both for applying penalties and 
abatements; and incentive revisions.   
 
Table 8.20 Treatments for Penalties and Abatements. 
Treatments Identified in Previous  
Chapters 
New Treatments Identified From  
Interviews 
Incentive revisions 
− Failure of to follow through on assurances 
lead to retrospective application of 
abatements (Chapter 4 - 4.2, Chapter 5 - 5.2, 
Chapter 6 - 6.5) 
− Off-setting under-performing services with 
other services rendered (Chapter 6 - 6.5) 
− Rationale for each instance of non-
abatement fully documented to protect 
against corporate memory loss (Chapter 6 - 
6.5) 
− Rationale for each instance of non-
abatement fully documented to protect 
against departmental / external agency 
criticism (PT10, RK05)  
 
Treatment actions  
Rationale for each instance of non-abatement should be fully documented to protect 
against departmental / external agency criticism. Although the concession deed is 
the reference point and is considered as the “line in the sand” that parties come back 
to when agreement cannot be reached, PT10 states that it should be routine to 
document decisions that vary the administration or implementation of the contract.  
This can be important, for example, during transition (i.e. from commissioning to 
operations) where adjustments to business processes may need to be made for 
practical reasons (RK05). Documenting this type of information can provide a 
justification for change and leave an audit trail, and thus may protect decision-
makers from potential criticism (also see ‘Document agreed project decisions for 
future reference’ (treatment for ‘Clear and open communication: Shared 
understanding / trust building’)).   
 
 
8.9 Integrated Management Model: Second Iteration  
 
Key findings identified in this Chapter (specifically sub-sections ‘8.6.1 Organisational 
Culture’, ‘8.6.3 Employee Capability and Expertise’ and ‘8.7.4 Managed 
Termination’) have been incorporated into second iteration of the IMM.  These are 
shown diagrammatically, below in Figures 8.3 to 8.4; and in Tables 8.21 to 8.22.   
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 Integrated Management Model:  Cover sheet
Partnership issue / sub-issue
External consideration (service provider accountability)
Internal consideration (government responsibility)
External and internal consideration
Risk issue / sub-issue
Performance issue / sub-issue
Legend:Rationale / purpose of model:
Although it is the responsibility of private consortia to deliver agreed service(s), the public 
partner is ultimately responsible for ensuring that services are actually carried out and 
they (at least) meet minimum standards in order to achieve Value-for-Money outcomes.  
The purpose of this model is to assist public partner decision-makers to allocate and 
make better use of public sector resources during operational phases of PPP.  It focuses 
upon generic considerations that may have significant and / or long-term consequences 
for achieving strategic objectives using an integrated partnership, risk and performance 
management approach.  This includes: 
Establishing and maintaining effective partnership relations between    
public partner and service delivery providers 
 Identifying and managing public sector risks (both threat and opportunity risks)
Modifying (improving) and then maintaining service delivery performance 
standards of operators, and where appropriate, the oversight role of the public
partner or its nominees  
● 
● 
● 
Intended audience:
This model has been developed primarily for public sector project directors responsible 
for PPP oversight
Key definitions:
Value for Money (VfM) – “Getting the best possible outcome at the lowest possible 
price” (New South Wales Treasury in English 2006)
Risk management – A method that can be used by decision-makers to recognise, 
scrutinise, assess, treat and then monitor those risks that could impinge upon the 
realisation of defined goals from strategic, operational, financial and / or compliance-
related issues (Victorian Auditor-General 2007b: p.1) – and clearly contributes to the 
“demonstrable achievement of objectives and improvement of performance" (ISO 
31000, 2009: p.7)
Partnership management – “A relationship involving the sharing of power, work, 
support and / or information with others for the achievement of joint goals and / or 
mutual benefits” (Kernaghan in Trafford and Proctor 2006)
Performance management – “Performance management in the [public service] is 
the use of inter-related strategies and activities to improve the performance of 
individuals, teams and organisations” (Management Advisory Committee 2001: p.14)
Public Private Partnership (PPP) – A collaborative endeavour (Smyth and Edkins 
2006) involving the public and private partners that is developed through the 
expertise of each partner in order to meet identified public needs through appropriate 
resource, risk and reward allocation (The Canadian Council for Public Private 
Partnerships 2009)   
References:
English, L.M. (2006), “Public Private Partnerships in Australia: An overview of their nature, 
purpose, incidence and oversight”, University of New South Wales Law Journal, Vol. 29 No. 3, 
pp. 250-262
Victorian Auditor-General, (2007b), “Managing Risk Across the Public Sector: Toward Good 
Practice”, Victorian Government Printing Office 
ISO, (2009), “International Standard ISO/FDIS 31000:  Risk management — Principles and 
guidelines”, SAI Global
Trafford, S., Proctor, T. (2006), “Successful joint venture partnerships: public-private 
partnerships”, International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 19 No. 2, pp. 117-129
Management Advisory Committee (2001), “Performance Management in the Australian Public 
Service:  A Strategic Framework”, Australian Government Printing Service
Smyth, H., Edkins, A. (2006), “Relationship management in the management of PFI/PPP projects 
in the UK”, International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 25 pp. 232-240
Canadian Council for Public Private Partnerships (2009), “About PPP”, Canadian Council for 
Public Private Partnerships, http://www.pppcouncil.ca/aboutPPP_definition.asp [date last 
accessed: 03.11.09]
 
 
Fig. 8.2 Conceptual Overview of the IMM. 
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Achievement of Value-for-Money (VfM) outcomes
Partnership managementRisk management
Penalties and abatements
Performance management
Personalities / abilities
Organisational culture
Team working
Performance monitoring and adjustment
Motivation / incentives
Negotiated outcomes
Management commitment and support
Acquisition and allocation of additional resources
Roles and responsibilities
Employee capability and expertise
Shared understanding
Clear and open communication
Trust building
Personal and professional influence
Relationship continuity
Values and beliefs
Conflict management
Under-performance / non-performance
Subject matter knowledge and applicability
No risk issues for 
integration 
have been identified
 
Fig. 8.3 IMM Partnership Management Perspective. 
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Table 8.21 IMM Partnership Management VfM Factors, Evidence-base and Treatment Options. 
Partnership management VfM contributors Partnership management VfM evidence-base foundation 
• Proposed corrective actions for under-performance are mutually agreed with the private partner and 
these actions are implemented as agreed   
• Development and continuation of productive relationships with service users, employees and 
applicable community groups  
• Consortia informs the public partner of emerging risks and performance issues that have the 
potential to impact upon the achievement of planned VfM outcomes 
• No occurrences of negligence, fraud and / or corruption  
• Public partner employees adhere to all accountabilities and responsibilities under governance, 
probity and compliance frameworks 
• Disputes are quickly resolved with little to no impact on service delivery obligations and litigation is 
avoided 
• Progress made against partnership / stakeholder management strategies and plans e.g. assessing 
whether key messages between the public and private partners or internal project teams and their 
project control groups have been properly understood and complied with  
• Assessing public partner employees behaviour through staff appraisals to ensure they are effectively 
discharging their duties in line with project accountabilities and responsibilities e.g. the contract 
administration manual 
• Outputs comply with relevant industry standards e.g. assessing partnership relations that may relate 
to people involvement and competence 
Partnership management treatments that may increase the likelihood of achieving VfM outcomes 
Organisational culture Employee capability and expertise Clear and open communication 
Personalities / abilities: 
• Personality compatibility testing for key interfacing roles 
• Employee development plans 
Team working: 
• Articulation and reinforcement of project objectives 
• Clearly defined team member roles and responsibilities 
• Effective discharge of duties against agreed accountabilities and 
governance requirements 
• Integration of employees into teams  
• Clear communication, dispute resolution and information sharing 
practices 
• Employee commitment to use established business processes  
Motivation / incentives: 
• Threat of / application of abatement 
• Formal recognition of superior private partner performance 
• Employee consultation in design of new work programs  
• Staff KPIs relate to achievement of specific goals 
• Staff reward and recognition programs  
Roles and responsibilities: 
• Clearly defining employee accountabilities and 
responsibilities 
• Identify critical success factors 
• Align employee competencies with job requirements 
• Regularly reviewing work packages with employees to 
assess project business needs 
Subject matter knowledge and applicability: 
• Employee development programs  
• Compliance / remedial action against policies, frameworks, 
performance systems and procedures  
• Distillation and documentation of key commercial and 
project learning  
• Succession planning  
 
 
 
 
Shared understanding: 
• Clear communication of organisational beliefs, values and 
behaviours  
• Adoption of common language 
• Document agreed project decisions for future reference 
• Regular discussion about future organisational direction with 
private partner  
Trust building: 
• Pursuit of common goals 
• Shared understanding 
• Management follow-through on agreed actions  
• Mandate / enforce project-wide adherence to governance, probity 
and compliance frameworks  
• Showing employees respect  
• Engage employees in decision-making processes 
• Document agreed project decisions for future reference  
• Delegate tasks or responsibilities to employees, as appropriate 
• Highlighting progress / celebrating successes with employees  
Relationship continuity Management commitment and support Conflict management 
Personal and professional influence: 
• Understand the situation from others’ point of view 
• Where possible, work towards a preferred outcome (win / win) 
• Communicate effectively with those who may be able to help 
 
Negotiated outcomes: 
• Relaxation of penalty clauses for strategic reasons with 
retrospective application of abatements for continued under-
performance 
Acquisition and allocation of additional resources: 
• Prioritisation of funding proposals  
• Financial cutbacks for less important initiatives to counter 
shortfalls 
Under-performance – non-performance / values and beliefs: 
• Operate a “no blame” culture 
• Document agreed project decisions for future reference  
• Understand the situation from others’ point of view 
• Take advice, as appropriate, from subject matter experts, 
operations committees / working groups, legal counsel etc 
• Re-arrange project priorities 
• Re-allocate resources 
• Take disciplinary action / imposing training on under-performing 
employees 
• Use dispute resolution specialists, if needed 
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Achievement of Value-for-Money (VfM) outcomes
Risk managementPartnership management Performance management
Project / integration challenges
Implementation of transition plan
Service provider failure
Contract variation
Modification of existing services
Re-allocation of risk
Business continuity planning modification
End of concession hand-over
Asset monitoring 
Transfer of project documentation / knowledge
Orientation / up-skilling new employees
Employee capability and expertise
Organisational culture
Governance, probity and compliance
Reputation damage
Confidentiality
Un-anticipated / un-intended events
Performance monitoring and adjustmentExposure to new risks
Change of consortium members / public authority
Managed termination
Voluntary termination
 
 
Fig. 8.4 IMM Risk Management Perspective. 
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Table 8.22 IMM Risk Management VfM Factors, Evidence-base and Treatment Options. 
Risk management VfM contributors Risk management VfM evidence-base foundation 
• Identified risks that may prevent business case or other defined strategic objectives from being met 
are appropriately managed   
• Service delivery is aligned / re-aligned with business case / project brief objectives, concession 
deed, service specifications and subsequent contract amendments 
• Service delivery is perceived by users and the wider community to represent VfM  
• Where appropriate, opportunity risk leading to improved VfM outcomes is implemented 
 
 
 
• Confidentiality agreements are put in place e.g. reduce the likelihood that public partner employees 
will divulge sensitive project information to third parties for personal gain  
• Public partner employee compliance with governance, probity and compliance frameworks 
• No occurrences of negligence, fraud and / or corruption  
• Outputs comply with relevant industry standards e.g. those relating to business continuity planning, 
public health and safety and fraud control   
• Assessing public partner employees behaviour to ensure they are effectively discharging their duties 
in line with project accountabilities and responsibilities e.g. against the contract administration manual 
• Transition, operations, environmental, quality improvement, performance shortfall, asset 
management, end of concession hand-over plans etc are developed and progress against them is 
monitored 
• Risk registers, business continuity plans, issue logs etc are developed, kept up-to-date and used to 
mitigate identified risks 
• Service usage (e.g. volume / demand) and failure event reports / exception reports are used for trend 
reporting to identify emerging risks  
• Benchmarking / competitive market testing is undertaken as scheduled  
• Relevant audit findings / recommendations are implemented   
• Lessons learned logs are used and disseminated as appropriate e.g. to facilitate the broadening of 
project-specific and wider public sector project knowledge  
• Innovation registers are used e.g. to facilitate ideas that could lead to service user improvements and 
/ or cost efficiencies   
Risk management treatments that may increase the likelihood of achieving VfM outcomes 
Implementation of transition plan Managed termination Change of consortium members / public authority 
Project / integration challenges: 
• Update / report on risk registers, business continuity plans, 
issue logs etc  
• Application of penalties / abatement for under-performance or 
delay 
 
 
Service provider failure / voluntary termination: 
• Activation of business continuity plans  
• Communication / issues / stakeholder management planning    
• Enact the termination administrative / change of control 
processes 
• Final asset inspection 
• Transfer project documentation / knowledge 
• Orientate / up-skill employees 
• Use benchmarking and competitive market testing findings for 
tendering process 
• Use circumstances that led to termination to probe tenderers’ 
ability and readiness to manage similar situations 
Exposure to new risks: 
• Update / report on risk registers, business continuity plans, issue 
logs etc  
• Distillation and documentation of key commercial and project 
learning  
• Succession planning  
• Communication / issues / stakeholder management planning  
• Probity checks  
 
 
Contract variation End of concession hand-over Reputation damage 
Modification of existing services: 
• Risk assessment  
• Scenario planning 
• Review, testing and update of business continuity plans 
• Review business continuity planning and risk management 
policies, frameworks and procedures 
• Review identified opportunity risks 
• Performance audits  
Asset monitoring: 
• Asset management reports 
• Obtain assurance that irregularities / adverse findings are 
resolved 
• End of concession audits  
• Withhold payment for under-performance / non-performance  
Transfer of project documentation / knowledge: 
Governance, probity and compliance: 
• Policy, framework and procedural changes clearly 
communicated to employees 
• Declarations of conflict of interest 
• Disclosure of acceptance of gifts, benefits and / or hospitality 
Confidentiality: 
• Develop an organisational (project) culture fostered on trust 
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Re-allocation of risk: 
• Risk assessment  
• Scenario planning  
• Review, testing and update of business continuity plans 
• Review business continuity planning and risk management 
policies, frameworks and procedures 
• Trend analysis 
• Performance audits 
Business continuity planning modification: 
• Review, test and update of plans 
• Review policies, frameworks and procedures 
• Force majeure events and warnings reports  
• Communication / issues / stakeholder management planning    
• Align transition plans with business continuity plans and 
service provider short-fall plans 
• Agree methodology for transferring project / operational 
knowledge 
• Distillation and documentation of key commercial and project 
learning  
• Reinforce knowledge between partners 
• Personnel plans 
• Clear role and responsibility definition 
• Skills appraisals / training plans 
Orientation / up-skilling of employees: 
• Clear role and responsibility definition 
• Skills appraisals, training plans, assimilation plans  
• Staff assessment on competency and adherence to 
governance, probity and compliance frameworks 
• Employee maintenance of project-based ‘lessons learnt’ logs  
• Succession planning 
• Production of ‘how to’ documentation for using essential 
systems and processes 
• Agree methodology for transferring project / operational 
knowledge 
• Regular updates of hand-over packages / exit interviews 
• Agreements signed by all employees that have access to, or are 
expected to get access to, commercial-in-confidence and 
cabinet-in-confidence material 
• Incidences of non-compliance escalated to government decision-
makers, as appropriate  
Un-anticipated / un-intended events: 
• Annual contingency budget 
• Communication / issues / stakeholder management planning    
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Achievement of Value-for-Money (VfM) outcomes
Performance managementPartnership management Risk management
Performance management systems improvement
Performance management systems modification
Contract variation 
Management commitment and support
Annual KPI review
KPI modification
Ongoing KPI review
Availability of performance data and metrics
Availability and integrity of performance data
Performance evaluation
Performance monitoring and adjustment
Management reporting
Managing performance shortfalls
Applying penalties and abatements
Penalties and abatements
Incentive revisions
Conflict management
Opportunity (risk) implementation
Integrity of performance data and metrics
Employee capability and expertise
Organisational culture
 
Fig. 8.5 IMM Performance Management Perspective. 
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Table 8.23 IMM Performance Management VfM Factors, Evidence-base and Treatment Options. 
Performance management VfM contributors Performance management VfM evidence-base foundation 
• Public sector agency / departmental project obligations are delivered within budget and on time 
• Services are delivered in line with business case / project brief objectives, concession deed, service 
specifications and subsequent contract amendments 
• Agreed changes to service delivery is aligned / re-aligned with business case / project brief objectives, 
concession deed, service specifications and subsequent contract amendments 
• Consistently high levels of service user and wider community satisfaction is reported  
• Incidences of negligence, fraud and / or corruption are appropriately dealt with 
• Project expenditure remains within prescribed budgetary limits  
• Achievement of VfM outcomes as defined by the business case / project brief objectives, concession 
deed, service specifications and subsequent contract amendments 
• Incident rates / KPI performance failure rates decline  
• Public partner accountabilities and responsibilities relating to the contract administration manual are 
satisfactorily discharged 
• Outputs comply with relevant industry standards e.g. those that may relate to process improvement and 
facilities management 
• Relevant audit findings / recommendations are implemented   
• Implementation of opportunity risk proposals e.g. innovations that lead to improved VfM outcomes 
Performance management treatments that may increase the likelihood of achieving VfM outcomes 
Performance management systems Performance monitoring and adjustment KPI review 
Performance management systems improvement: 
• Systems capability reviewed in conjunction with planned 
modification of KPIs  
• Systems have capability / capacity  to measure lagging and 
leading indicators 
• Systems have capability / capacity to analyse trends 
Performance evaluation: 
• Benchmark employee deliverables against job descriptions 
including outputs and outcomes specified in contract 
management manuals  
• Adherence to agreed policies, frameworks and procedures 
• Progress made against work plans and technical assessments 
e.g. asset management plans, issues registers etc  
• Documents agreed project decisions for future reference 
• Performance audits   
• Benchmarking / competitive market testing  
• Monitor the financial strength of consortia  
• Review insurance policies  
• Progress made against the achievement project business case 
objectives / justifications made for amending a contract 
• Review and implement findings from service user experience 
surveys  
• Regular discussion about future organisational direction with 
private partner  
Management reporting: 
• Project reporting used as a foundation for interpreting strategy 
into work plans, measuring strategic objectives and conducting 
skills appraisals 
• Developing further (or refining existing) control actions 
Managing performance shortfalls: 
• Employee skills appraisals 
• Disciplinary action taken against consistently under-
performance employees  
• Sub-contracting arrangements  
• Modification of KPIs 
• Contract amendment  
Opportunity (risk) implementation: 
• Maintenance of an innovation register  
Annual KPI review: 
• Agreed between partners prior to commencement of each contract 
year 
• Alterations are relevant, measurable, repeatable and achievable 
• Rationale for modification fully documented  
Ongoing KPI review: 
• As above (albeit with more regular review) 
Availability and integrity of performance data and metrics Penalties and abatements 
Availability of performance data and metrics: 
• Abatement for failure to provide data  
• Decisions not to abate are properly justified and fully documented 
• Continued non-compliance results in contract termination (as 
appropriate)  
Integrity of performance data and metrics: 
• Performance audits  
• Suspected wrong-doing, negligence, fraud and / or corruption 
escalated timely to an appropriate decision-maker 
• Investigation of all credible accusations  
• Confirmed instances dealt with through disciplinary / legal action, 
the issue of warning / penalty notices and / or abatement 
• In the most serious of incidents, termination of contract may be 
warranted 
Applying penalties and abatements: 
• Enforcement decisions are closely aligned with relevant contractual 
clauses 
• Consistent application of penalties / abatements for under-
performance (unless there is a properly justified case for not doing 
so) 
• Cure plans and default scenarios, as appropriate  
Incentive revisions: 
• Failure of to follow through on assurances lead to retrospective 
application of abatements 
• Off-setting under-performing services with other services rendered 
• Rationale for each instance of non-abatement fully documented to 
protect against corporate memory loss 
• Rationale for each instance of non-abatement fully documented to 
protect against departmental / external agency criticism  
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• Linking innovative ideas to incentive schemes to encourage 
better performance 
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8.10 Summary  
 
This Chapter has presented the design, testing and administration of the main 
primary data collection instrument. It reports the processes used for categorising and 
analysing the interview transcript data; and presents findings relating to the concept 
of ‘VfM’ as well as for the partnership, risk and performance management 
disciplines.  A second iteration of the IMM is then developed and presented.   
 
The most significant changes in the development of this iteration of the IMM include 
(for ‘Organisational culture’) modifying the ‘Personalities’ sub-category to incorporate 
‘abilities’; and identifying relationships between ‘Organisational Culture’ with 
‘Employee capability and expertise’, ‘Clear and open communication’, ‘Relationship 
continuity’ and ‘conflict management’.   
 
‘Contract termination’ has been changed to ‘Managed termination’. A new sub-
category, ‘Voluntary termination’, has also been introduced.    
 
‘Performance management systems documentation’ has been absorbed into 
‘Employee capability and expertise’.   
 
The next Chapter discusses the presentation of the developed IMM to a focus group 
tasked to consider the completeness of the model.   
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Chapter 9: Finalising the Integrated Management 
Model 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter deals with the design and administration of materials for a focus group, 
tasked to consider the completeness of the second iteration of the IMM. It describes 
the process used for categorising and analysing participant feedback, and discusses 
the findings. A third and final iteration of the model, incorporating a major structural 
change, is presented.   
 
 
9.2 Design and Administration of Focus Group Materials 
 
An online web platform was initially considered for obtaining focus group opinion on 
the revised IMM (the second model iteration), but this approach was abandoned due 
to technical design limitations and data confidentiality constraints associated with an 
expensive out-sourced web design and hosting process. It was then decided to 
conduct a focus group using individual email and paper-based communication.   
 
Ten public sector PPP experts (selected from interviewees in Phase 1 of the 
research) were contacted in June 2013 by email (template appended as Attachment 
I) to elicit their interest in taking part in this second phase.  Of the 10 contacts, seven 
respondents agreed to participate in the focus group exercise. This was considered 
sufficient for the task. Private sector focus group participation is not required, since 
the model is intended for public partner use, and private partner views on the 
intrinsic content of the model have already been garnered.   
 
Prior to proceeding with focus group activity, a Senior Stakeholder Engagement 
Advisor from the Victorian Government provided feedback on the adequacy of the 
proposed materials before they were distributed. Each focus group participant was 
then sent a paper-based document pack consisting of: 
− A covering letter (see Attachment J for the template used); 
− An assessment / feedback matrix (see Attachment K);  
− A summary of the IMM design features (see Attachment L);  
− A copy of a peer-reviewed conference paper describing the background and 
context to this research (see McCann, S., Aranda-Mena, G., Edwards, P.J., 
2013); and  
− The second iteration of the IMM (see Chapter 8: ‘8.9 Integrated Management 
Model: Second Iteration’).  
 
No changes were made to the focus group materials following the pilot test feedback 
given by the Senior Stakeholder Engagement Advisor. 
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Participants were asked to examine the second IMM; then reflect and offer their 
perceptions / suggestions relating to the relevance and accuracy of the model in 
terms of: VfM contributors; VfM evidence-base factors; relationships identified 
between issues and sub-issues; and possible treatment actions. They were 
requested to undertake this separately for each centrally-positioned management 
discipline shown in the second IMM and then subsequently for combinations 
between the different disciplines. The intention of using this iterative method was to 
induce better participant focus through repeated opportunities to engage with the 
IMM, leading to more considered and comprehensive feedback. 
 
The focus group members were known only to the researcher, and not to one 
another. Their individual feedback data were collected as single submissions 
between July and October 2013. The submissions were then analysed.  
 
 
9.3 Data Analysis Process 
 
The open coding technique, as discussed in Chapter 2 (see ‘2.4 Data Analysis 
Method’), was used to categorise participant feedback. Phenomenological analysis 
was used to further develop and refine elements of the IMM (see ‘Table 2.3 
Phenomenological Analysis of Data’).  The findings are considered first in terms of 
structural considerations for the model; then for partnership and performance 
management; and finally for other considerations. These are presented in sections 
9.4 to 9.7, below. The major change to the second IMM, in terms of risk 
management, arises from the structural considerations. 
 
 
9.4 Structural Considerations for the IMM 
 
Table 9.1 shows focus group participant feedback in relation to structural 
considerations for the IMM. The right hand column indicates the researcher’s 
responses.   
 
Table 9.1 Structural Considerations. 
Participant Feedback Researcher Response 
FG01 Risk management is not a separate 
element of the management of a PPP. 
Rather, it is (or should be) an inherent 
part of how a party goes about 
partnership management and 
performance management. Consistent 
with the International Standard on risk 
management, risk management must 
be built upon an understanding of the 
context in which risk is being managed 
Accepted. The importance of 
establishing the context of risk in this 
way is acknowledged. The IMM will be 
redeveloped to accommodate this 
perspective. This constitutes a major 
change 
 
FG04 For each VfM contributor, the identified 
treatments have been grouped under 
headings and there are some common 
items between them.  You might want 
to think about allocating them to the 
Not accepted. This would require an 
evidence base (i.e. established through 
testing treatments to determine which 
have the greatest impact) and is outside 
of the scope of this research. In any 
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Participant Feedback Researcher Response 
group where this action / treatment has 
the greatest impact 
event, groups and impacts are likely to 
differ between PPPs; whereas the IMM 
is intended to be generic 
FG07 The model could benefit from using a 
flowchart – a yes / no assessment 
through a gated approach, relating to 
PPP procurement, delivery, operations 
and termination (including a 3-year 
continuity plan after PPP hand-back) 
Not accepted.  Although operations 
cannot be viewed in isolation to the 
other PPP phases, ‘governance’, for the 
purposes of this research, is primarily 
focused on the operational phase. The 
length of a continuity plan will largely 
depend on specifics that relate to each 
PPP. Depending on how individual 
contracts are structured, post-end of 
concession hand-over continuity 
arrangements may already exist and be 
linked to ‘claw-back’ provisions   
 
Participant FG01 raises a fundamental question as to whether it is appropriate for 
the risk management issues and sub-issues to be considered as a distinct and 
separate element within the IMM. This feedback is predicated upon an assertion 
made by FG01 that the context of risk for the IMM be re-examined, for instance, in 
line with the ISO 31000 (2009) risk management standard (see Chapter 4: ‘4.3.2 
Theoretical Frameworks’).  This industry standard advocates that risk management 
be built upon an understanding of the context in which risk is managed (ISO 2009: 
p.15) and may include, for example, the relationship that a government agency has 
with its private partner (ISO 2009: p.15), the organisational culture it wishes to 
promote, as well as “the way performance and effectiveness is evaluated in the 
management of risk” (ISO 2009: p.16).  The ISO 31000 perspective essentially 
argues that, since risk pervades projects in all that is undertaken in the achievement 
of their objectives, it is better to infuse risk management into the appropriate context. 
For the IMM, this would mean considering and managing risk within partnership 
management and within performance management.    
 
Edwards and Bowen (2007), in supporting this view, further argue the essential 
context-driven nature of project risk, asserting that it is not a self-sufficient concept. 
Risks are most often closely associated with the decision-making undertaken in the 
task, technology, resourcing and organisational aspects of projects, across the 
lifecycle of their delivery, operational and disposal environments. In this way, 
therefore, risk management is not seen as a stand-alone element in the IMM, but 
becomes a means of dealing with risks identified and associated with either PPP 
partnership or PPP performance issues (or a combination of both).  This would apply 
to positive (opportunity) risks as well as to negative (threat) risks. 
 
Modifying the IMM on this basis also reflects a key finding of this research – that in 
attempting to achieve VfM outcomes, there is likely to be tension between 
partnership management i.e. ‘give and take’ relationship management, and 
performance management i.e. applying a ‘black-letter’ approach to managing the 
contract (see Chapter 8 – in particular, sections ‘8.5 Exploration and Validation of 
PPP Value-for-Money Issues’ and ‘8.6.1 Organisational Culture’).  FG01 offers a 
similar view:  
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“Focusing on managing the contract to the exclusion of managing the 
relationship is likely to result in a loss of opportunities to improve VfM 
outcomes. Conversely, focusing on managing the relationship to the exclusion 
of managing the contract is likely to undermine a party's legal position and 
hence also detract from VfM. The key is to manage both the contract and 
relationship in a way that promotes VfM outcomes”.  
 
As such, FG01 argues that by repositioning the risk context to reflect this tension, the 
IMM risk management issues and sub-issues can be “reframed” either as 
partnership or performance management issues and sub-issues.  Thus, ‘Reputation 
damage’ has been absorbed into partnership management and the remaining issues 
were incorporated into performance management. This is because ‘Reputation 
damage’ is considered to occur as a result of governance, probity and / or 
compliance failure; or failure to adhere to confidentiality arrangements e.g. where an 
employee has not done something that he / she was supposed to do but it is not 
construed as a performance issue. Furthermore, ‘un-anticipated / un-intended 
events’ may harm government’s reputation with key stakeholder groups or the 
community at large. It is acknowledged that such issues can manifest either as a 
partnership or performance issue (or potentially both).  On balance, these sub-issues 
point towards partnership management for this research. 
 
Typically, ‘Implementation of transition plan’, ‘Contract variation’, ‘Managed 
termination’ and ‘End of concession hand-over’ are issues that are managed as part 
of PPP agreements between government and its private partner. It is reasoned that 
these mechanisms exist in order to improve or maintain performance levels in 
delivering specified services.  Taking ‘Contract variation’ as an example, a 
consortium partner may propose a variation because it seeks a different level or form 
of performance than currently provided.  ‘Change of consortium members’ can occur 
due to poor performance (see Chapter 5: ‘5.6.2 Risk Management’) and ‘Change to 
public partner’s agency authority’ may result from machinery of government 
changes, where resources are re-allocated to another public entity considered best 
placed to effectively manage PPP arrangements. 
 
In accepting this argument, a change to the structural concept of the IMM is required. 
Procedurally, the model application could commence with either partnership or 
performance management. In practice, partnership management is likely to take 
precedence simply because in the early stages of PPP operations, few performance 
data are likely to be available, whereas both public and private partners will be 
attempting to establish their working relationship during this early period. 
 
Now each identified issue pertaining to partnership management is considered in 
terms of its associated risks, VfM implications, and management intervention action. 
Where relevant, cross-connections with performance management would also be 
dealt with. Performance management issues would be dealt with in a similar manner. 
 
The outcomes of the structural change to the IMM are presented in Section 9.8.   
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9.5 Partnership Management Considerations 
 
This section outlines the feedback received from focus group participants relating to 
partnership management, and its influence for the final version of the IMM.   
 
9.5.1 Management Commitment and Support 
 
Table 9.2 shows participant feedback for management commitment and support and 
the researcher’s response to the comments.   
 
Table 9.2 Management Commitment and Support. 
Participant Feedback Researcher Response 
FG03 It would be good to link ‘Negotiated 
outcomes’ to an agency’s or 
department’s governance delegation 
e.g. for decisions taken to relax 
penalty clauses 
Accepted. The participant’s experience 
confirms the existence of a relationship 
between ‘Management commitment and 
support’ (‘Negotiated outcomes’) and 
‘Incentive revisions’ 
FG04 I was surprised to see ‘Acquisition 
and allocation of additional resources’ 
coded for internal consideration only 
Accepted.  A new external and internal 
consideration has been identified based 
on the participant’s experience  
 
Participant FG03 states that as abatements can involve significant financial sums, 
decisions to relax penalty clauses should conform with agency governance capacity / 
authority arrangements including escalating these decisions to appropriate levels / 
delegates for approval.   
 
Participant FG04 asserts there can be public partner reconsideration of whether or 
not the private partner should provide commercial opportunities that are additional to 
the services required under the concession deed (see Chapter 8: ‘Table 8.9 PPP 
VfM Drivers Identified by Interview Participants’ – ‘Additional benefits’).  The 
provision of these services may be dependent upon the private partner having a 
suitable resource profile.   
 
9.5.2 Employee Capability and Expertise 
 
Table 9.3 shows participant feedback for employee capability and expertise and the 
researcher’s response to the comment.  
 
Table 9.3 Employee Capability and Expertise. 
Participant Feedback Researcher Response 
FG07 You may wish to elaborate on the risk 
of internal management of the PPP 
operator. People are replaced or leave 
without knowledge being sufficiently 
captured 
Accepted.  See ‘Employee capability 
and expertise’ sections in Chapters 4-6 
and Chapter 8 
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9.5.3 Conflict Management 
 
Table 9.4 shows participant feedback for conflict management and the researcher’s 
response to the comment.   
 
Table 9.4 Conflict Management. 
Participant Feedback Researcher Response 
FG04 ‘Reputation damage’ deserves to be 
integrated / considered with ‘Conflict 
management’, however, this is 
probably a subjective view rather than 
evidence-based 
Accepted. Even though the link is 
anecdotal, the loss of reputation can lead 
to conflict.  Equally, conflict can result in 
damage to reputation 
 
9.5.4 Reputation Damage 
 
Table 9.5 shows participant feedback for reputation damage and the researcher’s 
response to the comments.   
 
Table 9.5 Reputation Damage. 
Participant Feedback Researcher Response 
FG05 There is a relationship between 
‘Reputation damage’ and ‘Under-
performance / non-performance’ 
Accepted. This establishes a new 
relationship based on the participant’s 
experience   
FG05 There is a relationship between 
‘Reputation damage’ and ‘Motivation / 
incentives’   
Accepted. This establishes a new 
relationship based on the participant’s 
experience  
FG05 ‘Confidentiality’ is both an internal 
and external consideration  
Accepted.  A new external and internal 
consideration has been identified based 
on the participant’s experience  
FG05 ‘Un-anticipated / un-intended events’ 
are both internal and external 
considerations  
Accepted. A new external and internal 
consideration has been identified based 
on the participant’s experience  
 
 
9.6 Performance Management Considerations  
 
This section outlines the feedback received from focus group participants relating to 
performance management that may influence the final version of the IMM.   
 
9.6.1 Performance Management VfM Contributor 
 
Table 9.6 shows participant feedback relating to an additional performance 
management VfM contributor and the researcher’s response to the comment.   
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Table 9.6 Performance Management VfM Contributor. 
Participant Feedback Researcher Response 
FG05 Consider adding ‘continuous 
improvement’ as part of wider 
performance management practices  
Accepted. Continuous improvement can 
lead to better results and enhanced VfM 
outcomes through re-engineering 
processes and systems, etc  
 
9.6.2 Finance and Budget Management 
 
‘Finance and budget management’ is a new sub-issue identified by FG02.  Table 9.7 
shows participant feedback and the researcher’s response to the comments.   
 
Table 9.7 Finance and Budget Management. 
Participant Feedback Researcher Response 
FG02 The financial aspects may be somewhat lightly 
expressed in the model.  I am thinking about 
activities like: 
− Managing the contract management budget 
including its update over time and considering 
corrective actions 
− Managing the impact of owner's and supplier’s 
modifications on the budget, asset 
management plan, quarterly service fees and 
financial model  
− Ensuring that warranty or fit-for-purpose 
issues are appropriately managed 
− Managing the financial implications of disputes 
and potential settlements 
− Refinancing with consortia partners during the 
life of the PPP or when the circumstances of 
the financial market are favourable  
Accepted. The IMM is not 
designed as a financial model, 
however, this feedback 
impacts upon performance 
management practices and 
therefore, the achievement of 
VfM outcomes 
 
With regard to refinancing, FG02 informs that contracts can contain benefit-sharing 
mechanisms that may benefit both public and private partners e.g. renegotiating the 
consortia’s original capital structure or debt for more favourable terms.  FG02 implies 
refinancing by the private partner ought to be “handled carefully” as although there is 
potential for mutual gain, there is equally potential for mutual loss. The impact of 
significant downside risk being realised for the public partner is, for example, that 
additional (replacement) funding has to be secured from government to cover its 
operating costs, and perhaps be obtained at the expense of other public services or 
programs that are being delivered outside of the PPP.  
 
Shared insurance policies should also be reviewed regularly to reduce the risk of 
paying higher than necessary insurance premiums over the remainder of the 
operating term. Therefore, the ‘review insurance policies’ treatment identified in 
Chapter 8 (see ‘Table 8.19 Treatments for Performance Monitoring and Adjustment’) 
has been absorbed into the treatments for ‘Finance and budget management’, 
above.  
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More broadly, FG02’s feedback is accepted in terms of the treatment actions for this 
new sub-issue, and therefore establishes relationships between ‘Finance and budget 
management’ and: 
− ‘Management commitment and support’;  
− ‘Conflict management’;  
− ‘Modification of existing services’;  
− ‘Performance monitoring and adjustment’; and  
− ‘Penalties and abatements’.   
 
9.6.3 KPI Review 
 
Table 9.8 shows participant feedback for KPI review and the researcher’s response 
to the comments.   
 
Table 9.8 KPI Review. 
Participant Feedback Researcher Response 
FG05 ‘Annual KPI review’ is both an internal 
and external consideration 
Accepted.  A new external and internal 
consideration has been identified based 
on the participant’s experience  
FG05 ‘Ongoing KPI review’ is both an 
internal and external consideration 
Accepted.  A new external and internal 
consideration has been identified based 
on the participant’s experience   
 
9.6.4 Penalties and Abatements 
 
Table 9.9 shows participant feedback for penalties and abatements and the 
researcher’s response to the comments.   
 
Table 9.9 Penalties and Abatements. 
Participant Feedback Researcher Response 
FG05 ‘Applying penalties and abatements’ 
is both an internal and external 
consideration 
Accepted.  A new external and internal 
consideration has been identified based 
on the participant’s experience   
FG05 ‘Incentive revisions’ is both an 
internal and external consideration 
Accepted.  A new external and internal 
consideration has been identified based 
on the participant’s experience   
 
9.6.5 Change of Consortium Members / Change to Public Partner’s Agency 
Authority 
 
Table 9.10 shows participant feedback for change of consortium members / change 
to public partner’s agency authority and the researcher’s response to the comments.   
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Table 9.10 Change of Consortium Members / Change to Public Partner’s 
Agency Authority. 
Participant Feedback Researcher Response 
FG05 There is a relationship between ‘Change 
of consortium members / change to public 
partner’s agency authority and ‘Acquisition 
and allocation of additional resources’ 
Accepted. This establishes a new 
relationship based on the 
participant’s experience   
FG05 There is a relationship between ‘Change 
of consortium members / change to public 
partner’s agency authority and ‘Personal 
and professional influence’ 
Accepted. This establishes a new 
relationship based on the 
participant’s experience  
 
9.6.6 Managed Termination 
 
Table 9.11 shows participant feedback for managed termination and the researcher’s 
response to the comments.   
 
Table 9.11 Managed Termination. 
Participant Feedback Researcher Response 
FG05 Could give more consideration to 
commercial models to make this 
section of the IMM more robust e.g. 
default management / major default 
management treatments 
Accepted.  A review of literature will be 
conducted to identify additional 
treatments 
FG07 Termination does not require repeated 
offences to invoke termination, as 
stated in the conference paper  
Accepted.  A single major default has 
the potential to trigger termination. A 
PPP concession can also be terminated 
by mutual agreement between the 
partners (see Chapters 5-6 and 8) 
 
The Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply (2013b) offers generic advice 
which could apply to managing the termination process of PPPs, building upon 
treatments already identified for this research (see Chapters 6 to 8):   
− Governance should require the outgoing private partner to co-operate with the 
new incumbent during hand-over.  It is likely that some interaction during this 
period between consortia will be necessary. Interaction could extend to 
establishing an understanding of the outgoing partner’s capabilities, 
processes, assets, documentation, etc that will not be handed-over to the new 
consortium or public partner, and / how these should be sourced to ensure the 
provision of public services are not disrupted; and    
− Manage intellectual property issues.  Issues or concerns may be raised by the 
outgoing private partner that the new incumbent may use its intellectual 
property in delivering services through accessing sensitive commercial 
documentation, etc. Such situations can potentially result in costly legal action 
unless effectively managed. 
 
Although these issues may be viewed primarily as a private sector matter (to be 
resolved between consortia with limited public partner involvement or interference), 
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the public partner as the PPP client can be adversely affected by non-cooperative 
behaviour (e.g. delays and / or costs) that impact upon public sector business, as 
ultimately, the moral hazard associated with operational failure remains with the 
state (see Chapter 8: ‘8.7.6 Reputation Damage’).  This scenario thus establishes a 
new relationship for the IMM between ‘Managed termination’ and ‘Organisational 
culture’ as the public partner may need to be proactive in trying to influence the 
timely exchange of information, etc between consortia to maintain intended VfM 
outcomes.   
 
9.6.7 End of Concession Hand-over 
 
Table 9.12 shows participant feedback for end of concession hand-over and the 
researcher’s response to the comment.   
 
Table 9.12 End of Concession Hand-over. 
Participant Feedback Researcher Response 
FG04 For ‘Transfer of project 
documentation / knowledge’, I query 
whether the impact is just internal – 
maybe it is internal and external 
Accepted.  This point was overlooked in 
the development of earlier versions of the 
IMM.  Some contracts contain clauses 
that require the private partner to 
maintain documentation to a prescribed 
level with this being oversighted by the 
public partner (for example, see Chapter 
5: ‘5.6.3 Performance Management’) 
 
 
9.7 Other Considerations 
 
This section outlines other feedback received from focus group participants relating 
to the final version of the IMM.   
 
9.7.1 Terms and Definitions  
 
Table 9.13 shows participant feedback relating to terms and conditions and the 
researcher’s response to the comments.   
 
Table 9.13 Terms and Definitions. 
Participant Feedback Researcher Response 
FG01 The definition of VfM in your 
conceptual overview is perhaps not the 
best available definition. The Victorian 
Government Purchasing Board policy 
and guidance material contains a better 
definition 
Accepted. The Victorian Government 
Purchasing Board definition is more 
comprehensive than the current 
definition, and refers both to the need 
for managing risk and performance   
FG04 On the coversheet of the IMM, it is 
stated that the intended audience is for 
‘public sector project directors 
responsible for PPP oversight’, yet in 
the peer reviewed conference paper 
and other documents it suggests the 
Accepted. The term ‘project director’ 
was used to refer to the senior public 
partner officer responsible for contract 
oversight of PPP ‘projects’. The cover 
sheet will be amended to read ‘contract 
director’ as this relates more directly to 
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focus for the IMM is the operational 
term of PPPs? In my experience, the 
role of PPP project director exists and 
is resourced in the planning and 
procurement / delivery phases of PPPs 
and typically ceases at or around 
commencement of the operating term 
the operational phase of PPPs 
FG04 On the coversheet, ‘Rationale / 
purpose of model’ could be tightened 
up to provide a better linkage to the 
pages that follow. Alternatively, you 
may wish to consider how to distil the 
main points of your conference paper 
into an expanded ‘Rationale / purpose 
of model’ section on the coversheet 
Not accepted. The rationale / purpose of 
the model reflect the intended outcomes 
of this research.  Therefore no change 
has been made 
 
Apropos the comments of FG01, the Victorian Government Purchasing Board 
defines VfM in the following terms:  
 
“VfM denotes, broadly, a balanced benefit measure covering quality levels, 
performance standards, risk exposure, other policy or special interest measures, 
as well as price. Generally, VfM is assessed on a ‘whole of life’ or ‘total cost of 
ownership’ basis” (Department of Treasury and Finance 2011a: p.19).  
 
This is contrasted with the previously adopted definition for this research (see 
Chapter 3: ‘3.3.4 Public Private Partnership’): 
 
“getting the best possible outcome at the lowest possible price” (New South 
Wales Treasury in English 2006).  
 
In addition to the justifications outlined in Table 9.13, this definition has been 
adopted for this research due to:  
− The Victorian Government Purchasing Board definition closely aligning with 
key VfM findings of this research (see Chapter 8: ‘8.5 Exploration and 
Validation of PPP Value-for-Money Issues’) including that the VfM concept is 
rooted in the entire lifecycle of the asset, and that price should only be one 
factor when making a VfM determination; and   
− FG01’s observation that it is unclear how “getting the best possible outcome 
at the lowest possible price” can be successfully applied in situations where 
there are several options under consideration and where the preferred option 
(that is believed to provide the best possible outcome) does not offer the 
lowest possible price.  
 
9.7.2 Presentational Changes 
 
Table 9.14 shows participant feedback relating to presentational changes for the 
IMM and the researcher’s response to the comments.   
 
 
 
 
224 
 
Table 9.14 Presentational Changes. 
Participant Feedback Researcher Response 
FG04 I would suggest for each element of 
the model (partnership, risk and 
performance), the pages with tables 
should be presented before the 
figures, particularly for users that are 
not familiar with, or had the benefit of, 
your excellent conference paper for 
background   
Accepted. The tables contain information 
on VfM that may provide useful, ‘upfront’ 
context for some users i.e. factors that 
may contribute to the achievement of VfM 
outcomes and how the VfM evidence-
base might link with individual treatments 
 
 
9.8 Final IMM  
 
The final version of the IMM, is shown diagrammatically, below in Tables 9.15 to 
9.18; and in Figures 9.1 to 9.3. 
 
It will be noted that risk management no longer has a sequential central place in the 
model, but is situated on the left-hand side when it is associated with partnership 
management (as the central discipline under consideration); and on the right-hand 
side of performance management when the latter takes its central place. 
 
The IMM cover sheet, showing the conceptual outline of the model, is depicted in 
Fig. 9.1. Table 9.15 then presents the VfM factors, evidence-base and treatment 
options for partnership issues in the IMM.  Fig. 9.2 places partnership management 
in the central place, flanked by its associated risk management and by cross-over 
issues of performance management. Table 9.16 outlines example partnership 
management risks and re-states the treatment options for ease of reference. Here 
precise risk statements are attempted (for typical risk examples only), each dealing 
with the trigger event and its likelihood of occurrence, the consequence(s) of the 
event, and usually with some reference to duration of exposure to the event and / or 
consequences. Edwards and Bowen (2005) advocate precise risk statements as 
important for fully understanding each identified risk; informing evaluation processes 
and risk treatment decisions; and guiding monitoring and control procedures.  Table 
9.17, Fig. 9.3 and Table 9.18 position performance management as the central 
focus. 
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 Integrated Management Model:  Cover sheet
Partnership issue / sub-issue
External consideration (service provider accountability)
Internal consideration (government responsibility)
External and internal consideration
Risk issue / sub-issue
Performance issue / sub-issue
Legend:Rationale / purpose of model:
Although it is the responsibility of private consortia to deliver agreed service(s), the public 
partner is ultimately responsible for ensuring that services are actually carried out and 
they (at least) meet minimum standards in order to achieve Value-for-Money outcomes.  
The purpose of this model is to assist public partner decision-makers to allocate and 
make better use of public sector resources during operational phases of PPP.  It focuses 
upon generic considerations that may have significant and / or long-term consequences 
for achieving strategic objectives using an integrated partnership, risk and performance 
management approach.  This includes: 
Establishing and maintaining effective partnership relations between    
public partner and service delivery providers 
 Identifying and managing public sector risks (both threat and opportunity risks)
Modifying (improving) and then maintaining service delivery performance 
standards of operators, and where appropriate, the oversight role of the public
partner or its nominees  
● 
● 
● 
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Key definitions:
Value for Money (VfM) – “VfM denotes, broadly, a balanced benefit measure 
covering quality levels, performance standards, risk exposure, other policy or special 
interest measures, as well as price. Generally, VfM is assessed on a ‘whole of life’ or 
‘total cost of ownership’ basis” (Department of Treasury and Finance 2011a: p.19))
Risk management – A method that can be used by decision-makers to recognise, 
scrutinise, assess, treat and then monitor those risks that could impinge upon the 
realisation of defined goals from strategic, operational, financial and / or compliance-
related issues (Victorian Auditor-General 2007b: p.1) – and clearly contributes to the 
“demonstrable achievement of objectives and improvement of performance" (ISO 
31000, 2009: p.7)
Partnership management – “A relationship involving the sharing of power, work, 
support and / or information with others for the achievement of joint goals and / or 
mutual benefits” (Kernaghan in Trafford and Proctor 2006)
Performance management – “Performance management in the [public service] is 
the use of inter-related strategies and activities to improve the performance of 
individuals, teams and organisations” (Management Advisory Committee 2001: p.14)
Public Private Partnership (PPP) – A collaborative endeavour (Smyth and Edkins 
2006) involving the public and private partners that is developed through the 
expertise of each partner in order to meet identified public needs through appropriate 
resource, risk and reward allocation (The Canadian Council for Public Private 
Partnerships 2009)   
This model has been developed primarily for public sector contract directors 
responsible for PPP oversight
Intended audience:
 
 
Fig. 9.1 Conceptual Overview of the IMM. 
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Table 9.15 IMM Partnership Management VfM Factors, Evidence-base and Treatment Options. 
Partnership management VfM contributors Partnership management VfM evidence-base foundation 
• Proposed corrective actions for under-performance are mutually agreed with the private partner and 
these actions are implemented as agreed   
• Development and continuation of productive relationships with service users, employees and 
applicable community groups  
• Consortia informs the public partner of emerging risks and performance issues that have the 
potential to impact upon the achievement of planned VfM outcomes 
• No occurrences of negligence, fraud and / or corruption  
• Public partner employees adhere to all accountabilities and responsibilities under governance, 
probity and compliance frameworks 
• Disputes are quickly resolved with little to no impact on service delivery obligations and litigation is 
avoided 
• Progress made against partnership / stakeholder management strategies and plans e.g. assessing 
whether key messages between the public and private partners or internal project teams and their 
project control groups have been properly understood and complied with  
• Assessing public partner employees behaviour through staff appraisals to ensure they are effectively 
discharging their duties in line with project accountabilities and responsibilities e.g. the contract 
administration manual 
• Outputs comply with relevant industry standards e.g. assessing partnership relations that may relate 
to people involvement and competence 
Partnership management treatments that may increase the likelihood of achieving VfM outcomes 
Organisational culture Employee capability and expertise Clear and open communication 
Personalities / abilities: 
• Personality compatibility testing for key interfacing roles 
• Employee development plans 
Team working: 
• Articulation and reinforcement of project objectives 
• Clearly defined team member roles and responsibilities 
• Effective discharge of duties against agreed accountabilities and 
governance requirements 
• Integration of employees into teams  
• Clear communication, dispute resolution and information sharing 
practices 
• Employee commitment to use established business processes  
Motivation / incentives: 
• Threat of / application of abatement 
• Formal recognition of superior private partner performance 
• Employee consultation in design of new work programs  
• Staff KPIs relate to achievement of specific goals 
• Staff reward and recognition programs  
Roles and responsibilities: 
• Clearly defining employee accountabilities and 
responsibilities 
• Identify critical success factors 
• Align employee competencies with job requirements 
• Regularly reviewing work packages with employees to 
assess project business needs 
Subject matter knowledge and applicability: 
• Employee development programs  
• Compliance / remedial action against policies, frameworks, 
performance systems and procedures  
• Distillation and documentation of key commercial and 
project learning  
• Succession planning  
Shared understanding: 
• Clear communication of organisational beliefs, values and 
behaviours  
• Adoption of common language 
• Document agreed project decisions for future reference 
• Regular discussion about future organisational direction with 
private partner  
Trust building: 
• Pursuit of common goals 
• Shared understanding 
• Management follow-through on agreed actions  
• Mandate / enforce project-wide adherence to governance, probity 
and compliance frameworks  
• Showing employees respect  
• Engage employees in decision-making processes 
• Document agreed project decisions for future reference  
• Delegate tasks or responsibilities to employees, as appropriate 
• Highlighting progress / celebrating successes with employees  
Management commitment and support Conflict management  Relationship continuity 
Negotiated outcomes: 
• Relaxation of penalty clauses for strategic reasons with 
retrospective application of abatements for continued under-
performance 
Acquisition and allocation of additional resources: 
• Prioritisation of funding proposals  
• Financial cutbacks for less important initiatives to counter 
shortfalls 
Under-performance – non-performance / values and beliefs: 
• Operate a “no blame” culture 
• Document agreed project decisions for future reference  
• Understand the situation from others’ point of view 
• Take advice, as appropriate, from subject matter experts, 
operations committees / working groups, legal counsel, etc 
• Re-arrange project priorities 
• Re-allocate resources 
• Take disciplinary action / imposing training on under-
performing employees 
• Use dispute resolution specialists, if needed 
 Personal and professional influence: 
• Understand the situation from others’ point of view 
• Where possible, work towards a preferred outcome (win / win) 
• Communicate effectively with those who may be able to help 
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Fig. 9.2 IMM Partnership Management Perspective.
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Table 9.16 IMM Partnership Management Risk and Treatment Option  
Examples (not a complete list). 
Example Risk Statements Treatment Options  
Organisational culture 
Personalities / abilities 
There is a chance that ineffective recruitment practices will lead 
to poor employee fit and result in low productivity   
 
There is a chance that a lack of employee skills will lead to 
inability to fulfil contractual responsibilities and result in poor 
outcomes  
• Personality compatibility testing for key interfacing roles 
• Employee development plans 
Team working 
There is a chance that duplication of employee efforts will occur 
and result in ineffective knowledge management practices 
• Articulation and reinforcement of project objectives 
• Clearly defined team member roles and responsibilities 
• Effective discharge of duties against agreed accountabilities and 
governance requirements 
• Integration of employees into teams  
• Clear communication, dispute resolution and information sharing 
practices 
• Employee commitment to use established business processes  
Motivation / incentives 
There is a chance that a lack of career development 
opportunities will lead to employee disengagement and result in 
failure to meet performance targets  
 
There is a chance that failure by management to acknowledge 
employee achievements will occur, leading to weakening of 
organisational culture 
• Threat of / application of abatement 
• Formal recognition of superior private partner performance 
• Employee consultation in design of new work programs  
• Staff KPIs relate to achievement of specific goals 
• Staff reward and recognition programs 
Management commitment and support  
Negotiated outcomes 
There is a chance that budget cut-backs will occur, leading  to 
reduced funding for skilled staff and result in failure of the public 
partner to respond to risks and opportunities  
 
There is a chance that a lack of management support will lead to 
minor concerns escalating into serious issues and result in costly 
disputes with the private partner  
• Relaxation of penalty clauses for strategic reasons with 
retrospective application of abatements for continued under-
performance 
Acquisition and allocation of additional resources 
There is a chance that Machinery of Government changes are 
poorly implemented and result in uncertainty in decision-making 
• Prioritisation of funding proposals  
• Financial cutbacks for less important initiatives to counter shortfalls 
Employee capability and expertise 
Roles and responsibilities 
There is a chance that poorly defined roles and responsibilities 
will lead to employee efforts being duplicated and result in 
productivity losses  
 
There is a chance that poorly defined accountabilities will 
discourage skilled candidates applying for project roles and result 
in increased workloads for existing staff  
• Clearly defining employee accountabilities and responsibilities 
• Identify critical success factors 
• Align employee competencies with job requirements 
• Regularly reviewing work packages with employees to assess 
project business needs 
Subject matter knowledge and applicability 
There is a chance that turnover of key staff will lead to disruption 
of business continuity and in failure to deliver intended outcomes  
 
There is a chance that a lack of public partner experience will 
lead to failure to understand service delivery requirements and 
poor strategic outcomes  
• Employee development programs  
• Compliance / remedial action against policies, frameworks, 
performance systems and procedures  
• Distillation and documentation of key commercial and project 
learning  
• Succession planning 
Clear and open communication  
Shared understanding 
There is a chance that poor communication will occur, leading to 
misunderstanding with the private partner and possible delivery 
of unintended outcomes  
• Clear communication of organisational beliefs, values and 
behaviours  
• Adoption of common language 
• Document agreed project decisions for future reference 
• Regular discussion about future organisational direction with 
private partner  
Trust building 
There is a chance that unpredictable behaviour between partners 
will occur, leading to distrust and damage to the strategic 
• Pursuit of common goals 
• Shared understanding 
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relationship  
 
There is a chance that the introduction of new processes will lead 
to a lack of trust in the public partner’s motives  and result in 
informal precedent being claimed by the private partner  
 
• Management follow-through on agreed actions  
• Mandate / enforce project-wide adherence to governance, probity 
and compliance frameworks  
• Showing employees respect  
• Engage employees in decision-making processes 
• Document agreed project decisions for future reference  
• Delegate tasks or responsibilities to employees, as appropriate 
• Highlighting progress / celebrating successes with employees 
Relationship continuity  
Personal and professional influence 
There is a chance that staff departures will lead to the loss of 
vital project knowledge and result in delays to achieving intended 
outcomes  
• Understand the situation from others’ point of view 
• Where possible, work towards a preferred outcome (win / win) 
• Communicate effectively with those who may be able to help 
Conflict management  
Under-performance / non-performance 
There is a chance that irreconcilable differences in interpreting 
contractual requirements will occur and result in litigation with the 
private partner  
 
• Operate a “no blame” culture 
• Document agreed project decisions for future reference  
• Understand the situation from others’ point of view 
• Take advice, as appropriate, from subject matter experts, 
operations committees / working groups, legal counsel, etc 
• Re-arrange project priorities 
• Re-allocate resources 
• Take disciplinary action / imposing training on under-performing 
employees 
• Use dispute resolution specialists, if needed 
Values and beliefs 
There is a chance that misinterpretation of agreed project actions 
will occur  leading to disputes and result in long-term damage to 
relations with the private partner  
• Operate a “no blame” culture 
• Document agreed project decisions for future reference  
• Understand the situation from others’ point of view 
• Take advice, as appropriate, from subject matter experts, 
operations committees / working groups, legal counsel, etc 
• Re-arrange project priorities 
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Table 9.17 IMM Performance Management VfM Factors, Evidence-base and Treatment Options. 
Performance management VfM contributors Performance management VfM evidence-base foundation 
• Public sector agency / departmental project obligations are delivered within budget and on time 
• Services are delivered in line with business case / project brief objectives, concession deed, service 
specifications and subsequent contract amendments 
• Agreed changes to service delivery is aligned / re-aligned with business case / project brief objectives, 
concession deed, service specifications and subsequent contract amendments 
• Consistently high levels of service user and wider community satisfaction is reported  
• Incidences of negligence, fraud and / or corruption are appropriately dealt with 
• Continuous improvement practices are adopted and maintained 
• Project expenditure remains within prescribed budgetary limits  
• Achievement of VfM outcomes as defined by the business case / project brief objectives, concession 
deed, service specifications and subsequent contract amendments 
• Incident rates / KPI performance failure rates decline  
• Public partner accountabilities and responsibilities relating to the contract administration manual are 
satisfactorily discharged 
• Outputs comply with relevant industry standards e.g. those that may relate to process improvement and 
facilities management 
• Relevant audit findings / recommendations are implemented   
• Implementation of opportunity risk proposals e.g. innovations that lead to improved VfM outcomes 
Performance management treatments that may increase the likelihood of achieving VfM outcomes 
Performance management systems Performance monitoring and adjustment KPI review 
Performance management systems improvement: 
• Systems capability reviewed in conjunction with planned 
modification of KPIs  
• Systems have capability / capacity  to measure lagging and 
leading indicators 
• Systems have capability / capacity to analyse trends 
Performance evaluation: 
• Benchmark employee deliverables against job descriptions 
including outputs and outcomes specified in contract 
management manuals  
• Adherence to agreed policies, frameworks and procedures 
• Progress made against work plans and technical assessments 
e.g. asset management plans, issues registers etc  
• Documents agreed project decisions for future reference 
• Performance audits   
• Benchmarking / competitive market testing  
• Monitor the financial strength of consortia  
• Review insurance policies  
• Progress made against the achievement project business case 
objectives / justifications made for amending a contract 
• Review and implement findings from service user experience 
surveys  
• Regular discussion about future organisational direction with 
private partner  
Management reporting: 
• Project reporting used as a foundation for interpreting strategy 
into work plans, measuring strategic objectives and conducting 
skills appraisals 
• Developing further (or refining existing) control actions 
Managing performance shortfalls: 
• Employee skills appraisals 
• Disciplinary action taken against consistently under-
performance employees  
• Sub-contracting arrangements  
• Modification of KPIs 
• Contract amendment  
Opportunity (risk) implementation: 
• Maintenance of an innovation register  
Annual KPI review: 
• Agreed between partners prior to commencement of each contract 
year 
• Alterations are relevant, measurable, repeatable and achievable 
• Rationale for modification fully documented  
Ongoing KPI review: 
• As above (albeit with more regular review) 
Availability and integrity of performance data and metrics Penalties and abatements 
Availability of performance data and metrics: 
• Abatement for failure to provide data  
• Decisions not to abate are properly justified and fully documented 
• Continued non-compliance results in contract termination (as 
appropriate)  
Integrity of performance data and metrics: 
• Performance audits  
• Suspected wrong-doing, negligence, fraud and / or corruption 
escalated timely to an appropriate decision-maker 
• Investigation of all credible accusations  
• Confirmed instances dealt with through disciplinary / legal action, 
the issue of warning / penalty notices and / or abatement 
• In the most serious of incidents, termination of contract may be 
warranted 
Applying penalties and abatements: 
• Enforcement decisions are closely aligned with relevant contractual 
clauses 
• Consistent application of penalties / abatements for under-
performance (unless there is a properly justified case for not doing 
so) 
• Cure plans and default scenarios, as appropriate  
Incentive revisions: 
• Failure of to follow through on assurances lead to retrospective 
application of abatements 
• Off-setting under-performing services with other services rendered 
• Rationale for each instance of non-abatement fully documented to 
protect against corporate memory loss 
• Rationale for each instance of non-abatement fully documented to 
protect against departmental / external agency criticism  
Finance and budget management 
Cost management:  
• Managing the contract management budget including its update 
over time and considering corrective actions 
• Managing the impact of owner's and supplier’s modifications on 
the budget, asset management plan, quarterly service fees and 
financial model 
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• Ensuring that warranty or fit-for-purpose issues are appropriately 
managed 
• Managing the financial implications of disputes and potential 
settlements 
• Refinancing with consortia partners during the life of the PPP or 
when the circumstances of the financial market are favourable 
• Linking innovative ideas to incentive schemes to encourage 
better performance 
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Fig. 9.3 IMM Performance Management Perspective. 
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Table 9.18 IMM Performance Management Risk and Treatment Option 
Examples (not a complete list). 
Example Risk Statements Treatment Options  
Performance management systems  
Performance management systems improvement 
There is a chance that the introduction of a new performance 
management system will not be supported by established project 
practices and result in failure to measure private partner 
performance data in a meaningful way  
 
• Systems capability reviewed in conjunction with planned 
modification of KPIs  
• Systems have capability / capacity  to measure lagging and 
leading indicators 
• Systems have capability / capacity to analyse trends 
KPI review 
Annual KPI review / ongoing KPI review  
There is a chance that failure of the private partner to agree to 
re-negotiate poorly designed KPIs will result in ongoing service 
user / consumer dissatisfaction in service delivery  
 
There is a chance that failure by the public partner to understand 
the service delivery environment will lead to poorly revised KPIs 
and result in the achievement of unintended outcomes  
• Agreed between partners prior to commencement of each contract 
year (albeit with more frequently for ongoing KPI review)  
• Alterations are relevant, measurable, repeatable and achievable 
• Rationale for modification fully documented  
Availability and integrity of performance data and metrics 
Availability of performance data and metrics 
There is a chance that a lack of performance data will impede the 
public partner’s ability to determine whether or not its private 
partner is delivering agreed performance targets 
 
• Abatement for failure to provide data  
• Decisions not to abate are properly justified and fully documented 
• Continued non-compliance results in contract termination (as 
appropriate)  
Integrity of performance data and metrics 
There is a chance that private partner human error or negligence 
will occur, leading to mistakes or omissions in safeguarding 
project asses and result in reduced VfM outcomes  
 
There is a chance that theft of project assets by public or private 
partner employees will occur resulting in reduced VfM outcomes  
 
• Performance audits  
• Suspected wrong-doing, negligence, fraud and / or corruption 
escalated timely to an appropriate decision-maker 
• Investigation of all credible accusations  
• Confirmed instances dealt with through disciplinary / legal action, 
the issue of warning / penalty notices and / or abatement 
• In the most serious of incidents, termination of contract may be 
warranted 
Performance monitoring and adjustment  
Performance evaluation 
There is a chance that public partner failure to enforce corrective 
actions will occur  leading to private partner under-performance 
and continued acts of non-compliance  
 
There is a chance that the public partner will fail to detect 
changes in informal processes made by its private partner,  
resulting in informal precedent being claimed 
 
• Benchmark employee deliverables against job descriptions 
including outputs and outcomes specified in contract management 
manuals  
• Adherence to agreed policies, frameworks and procedures 
• Progress made against work plans and technical assessments e.g. 
asset management plans, issues registers etc  
• Documents agreed project decisions for future reference 
• Performance audits   
• Benchmarking / competitive market testing  
• Monitor the financial strength of consortia  
• Review insurance policies  
• Progress made against the achievement project business case 
objectives / justifications made for amending a contract 
• Review and implement findings from service user experience 
surveys  
• Regular discussion about future organisational direction with 
private partner  
Management reporting 
There is a chance that  inaccurate private partner performance 
reporting will occur, leading to sub-optimal critical decisions and  
ineffective use of internal project resources  
 
• Project reporting used as a foundation for interpreting strategy into 
work plans, measuring strategic objectives and conducting skills 
appraisals 
• Developing further (or refining existing) control actions 
Managing performance shortfalls 
There is a chance that public partner inexperience will occur, 
leading to failure to manage private partner under-performance 
and poor VfM outcomes  
 
 
• Employee skills appraisals 
• Disciplinary action taken against consistently under-performance 
employees  
• Sub-contracting arrangements  
• Modification of KPIs 
• Contract amendment  
Opportunity (risk) implementation 
There is a chance that a lack of employee incentives to drive 
change will occur, resulting in missed opportunities to introduce 
innovative practices  
• Maintenance of an innovation register  
• Linking innovative ideas to incentive schemes to encourage better 
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 performance 
Penalties and abatements  
Applying penalties and abatements 
There is a chance that public partner employee error will occur 
leading to inaccurate abatement calculations and reduced VfM 
outcomes  
 
There is a chance that the public partner will fail to consistently 
apply abatement for private partner under-performance,  
resulting in reduced VfM outcomes 
• Enforcement decisions are closely aligned with relevant 
contractual clauses 
• Consistent application of penalties / abatements for under-
performance (unless there is a properly justified case for not doing 
so) 
• Cure plans and default scenarios, as appropriate  
Incentive revisions 
There is a chance that any occurrence of public partner decisions 
to relax the application of penalty clauses to encourage better 
private partner performance will result in public criticism by the 
Auditor-General  
 
There is a chance that failure by the public partner to follow 
through on retrospective application of abatement for continued 
under-performance by the private partner will result in public 
criticism by the Auditor-General  
• Failure to follow through on assurances leads to retrospective 
application of abatements 
• Off-setting under-performing services with other services rendered 
• Rationale for each instance of non-abatement fully documented to 
protect against corporate memory loss 
• Rationale for each instance of non-abatement fully documented to 
protect against departmental / external agency criticism 
Finance and budget management  
Cost management 
There is a chance that public partner budgeting / forecasting data 
will be inaccurate or incomplete, and result in delay to achieving 
intended outcomes  
 
There is a chance that human error or negligence will occur, 
leading to private partner financial records / statements being 
misstated, and result in costly partnership disputes  
• Managing the contract management budget including its update 
over time and considering corrective actions 
• Managing the impact of owner's and supplier’s modifications on 
the budget, asset management plan, quarterly service fees and 
financial model 
• Ensuring that warranty or fit-for-purpose issues are appropriately 
managed 
• Managing the financial implications of disputes and potential 
settlements 
• Refinancing with consortia partners during the life of the PPP or 
when the circumstances of the financial market are favourable 
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9.9 Summary  
 
This Chapter has presented the design and administration of materials for the 
process of focus group evaluation of the second IMM. The focus group members 
individually explored its completeness in terms of public sector governance of PPPs 
in the operational phase. The analysis of their feedback informed further 
development of the model. A major change to the IMM argues for the treatment of 
risk as integral to both partnership management and performance management in 
PPP. The revised model has now effectively become a risk-based partnership and 
performance IMM. A third and final iteration of the IMM is developed and presented.   
 
The next Chapter presents the conclusions of this study and recommendations for 
practice and for further research.     
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Chapter 10: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
In this Chapter, the main research findings are presented. The contribution of an 
integrated management model, towards achieving VfM for the public partner in PPP, 
is discussed. Recommendations are made for practice, in terms of public 
governance of PPPs, and for further research. The achievement of the research 
objectives is considered through the processes by which the research questions 
have been addressed.  Finally, the contribution to knowledge made by the research 
is shown and the research journey is reviewed.     
 
 
10.2 Main Research Findings 
 
The main research findings are presented under each management discipline that 
underpins the proposed IMM. 
 
10.2.1 Partnership Management 
 
The research findings relating to partnership management derive from consideration 
of organisational culture; management commitment and support; employee 
capability and expertise; clear and open communication; relationship continuity; and 
conflict management.  
 
Organisational culture:  
− There is a link between the public partner’s contract management style for 
achieving VfM and organisational culture i.e. ‘give and take’ relationship 
management and ‘black letter’ contract enforcement. The give and take-type 
approach accords with a culture that places a premium on quality of the 
contract management function as well as embracing a solutions-based 
approach fostered through a strong belief in the value of relationship 
management. This contrasts with a black letter approach which is likely to 
manifest in a strong compliance-orientated culture.  
− Organisational culture, however, is not always driven by the preferred contract 
management style of the public partner: ‘you get what you pay for’. This 
suggests public partner’s decision-making can be influenced by the size of the 
private partner’s financial margins, which could then influence the extent to 
which the concessionaire may ‘go the extra mile’, or alternatively, the degree 
to which ‘corners could be cut’ by the operator.  
 
Management commitment and support: 
− Generally, PPP working committees and departments of treasury and finance 
could be more supportive of the contract management function by recognising 
that, in order to obtain better VfM outcomes, contract management teams 
should be provided with improved resourcing, such as additional funding for 
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employing suitably qualified staff with the ability to respond appropriately to 
strategic risks and opportunities. 
− Reality might dictate that choices are made in terms of budget priorities, but if 
genuine VfM outcomes are to be achieved, suitable resources must be 
allocated to PPP projects to which the public partner is already committed, in 
order to increase the likelihood that services will be delivered as intended, and 
that expectations, as set out in business cases, are met. 
 
Employee capability and expertise:  
− A potential risk for the public partner, in relying too heavily on external 
contractors and consultants, is that they may not adequately (or be requested 
to) transfer appropriate technical knowledge to public employees, nor do so in 
a timely way, which may result in the public partner paying high market rates 
for longer than necessary or being left unexpectedly to deal with skills-gaps if 
external providers should leave suddenly. 
− The public partner can bolster its contract management capabilities by: 
developing better knowledge continuity between project phases; creating and 
maintaining a document library for corporate and commercial documents; 
applying the contract management / administration manual more effectively; 
improving succession planning and hand-over processes; and implementing 
and maintaining a detailed calendar of deliverables tool to support contract 
managers in managing concession deeds. On a wider scale, sharing of PPP 
information, knowledge and wisdom between public sector bodies would 
enhance public governance capability for PPP.  
  
Clear and open communication: 
− Occasional or periodic discussions with senior representatives of the private 
partner are valuable for keeping an open dialogue so that the public partner 
understands the private partner’s long-term intensions that have the potential 
to impact on the contract. This may be desirable, for example, if the public 
partner is contemplating a major variation to the concession deed and wants 
to know at an early stage the degree to which the private partner is open to 
such an opportunity.   
 
Relationship continuity:  
− Relationship continuity is important in terms of valuable knowledge that is built 
up over time and used by the public partner to successfully discharge its 
governance responsibilities under the concession deed. This not only relates 
to historical project information and technical knowledge but also to 
understanding people and their personalities. The latter can be useful for 
exerting personal influence to resolve issues without having to resort to more 
formal means.  
− Understanding people can provide context as to why certain decisions are 
taken and how they impact on future outcomes; e.g. why a clause was 
negotiated in a certain way.  However, this type of information is not always 
sufficiently documented for future reference by the public partner, particularly 
for the benefit of new staff. 
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Conflict management:  
− Two key sources of conflict are identified in this research.  The first relates to 
situations that arise where there is potential for significant financial impacts / 
unforeseen cost burdens that can shape public partner VfM outcomes. The 
second relates to failure on the part of one party to meet the expectations of 
the other; e.g. where the intent of a service specification has been 
misunderstood or where a KPI has not been adequately defined.  
− Inexperienced public partner employees may seek expensive legal advice, 
concerning PPP concession agreement and governance issues, too often 
without first taking a view on what the public partner’s position should be. 
Furthermore, it may be that the legal opinion offered does not directly address 
the merits of the problem at hand but is instead slanted towards a view that 
lawyers think the court might take if it had to deal with the issue.   
 
10.2.2 Risk Management  
 
The findings relating to risk management in the public partner’s governance of PPPs 
relate to implementation of transition plans; contract variations; change of consortium 
members / change to public partner’s agency authority; managed termination; end of 
concession hand-over; and reputation damage.   
 
Implementation of transition plan:  
− Two risk challenges could impinge upon a successful transition (from project 
delivery to operational management) for the public partner: setbacks arising 
from commissioning failure and ineffective knowledge management practices 
prior to the operational phase. 
 
Contract variation: 
− Regardless of the source of a variation, a crucial factor in achieving VfM is the 
ability of public sector governance staff to effectively assess and select the 
best course of action, and not inadvertently (through failing to understand the 
commercial and legal underpinnings of the concession deed) give away 
something which undermines value for the state over the longer-term or leads 
to an adverse change in its risk profile. Inadequate levels of skill and 
experience in the public partner’s governance team can therefore have a 
detrimental effect on achieving desired outcomes through planning for and 
administering contract variations.   
 
Change of consortium members / change to public partner’s agency authority:  
− A change to the composition of a consortium (e.g. the introduction of a new 
equity investor) can potentially present an opportunity to improve VfM 
outcomes depending on the private sector organisation’s tolerance to risk and 
the private partner’s ability to manage change situations i.e. the willingness of 
its decision-makers to enter into contract variations requested by the state.  
− ‘Machinery of government’ changes that affect a public authority can be 
disruptive to effective PPP management by the public partner. The impacts of 
these events may be further exacerbated due to uncertainty in decision-
239 
 
making and poor communication with employees and other stakeholders 
during change processes. Such developments may also heighten the risk of 
failing to achieve intended VfM outcomes because of staff turn-over and / or 
the loss of critical knowledge, unless this risk is adequately managed.  
 
Managed termination: 
− Termination events arising during the PPP concession period may not always 
result in poor VfM outcomes, if the asset can be secured at a discounted price 
by the state. A favourable outcome may, however, depend on a range of 
factors specific to each PPP, such as the cost of financial settlement including 
making an adjustment to employment conditions of staff under new pay 
awards, if applicable and the residual value left in the life of the concession.  
 
End of concession hand-over: 
− Even though concession deeds will contain clauses relating to hand-over 
requirements at the end of the concession period, prior transition 
arrangements should be effectively managed by the public partner. This is 
essential even if it is highly likely that an existing facility manager, for 
instance, will be retained. The public partner is obligated to demonstrate that 
whatever decision is taken represents the best VfM option for the public. Re-
tendering a concession, under such circumstances, may increase the 
prospect that the incumbent concessionaire will offer a more competitive price 
for delivering the services, therefore increasing the public partner’s level of 
bargaining power.  
 
Reputation damage: 
− Although PPPs are intended and designed to transfer financial risk to the 
private partner, the moral hazard associated with operational failure remains 
with government. Taking prison services as an example, government is 
accountable for setting policy objectives and structures under ministerial 
direction for maintaining prison assets (although the private partner is 
obligated to deliver agreed services under the contract). If a prisoner escapes, 
government is still responsible for public safety and bears the reputational 
consequences of this.   
− Confidence and trust between government, consumers and other 
stakeholders can be enhanced through better communication about PPPs. 
Not only should the quality of public sector engagement about the workings 
and benefits of PPP be improved, there should be a greater level of 
transparency regarding the actual achievement of VfM outcomes in terms of 
government policy objectives. 
  
10.2.3 Performance Management  
 
For performance management in PPP, the research findings (with respect to the 
public partner’s management role) comprise: performance management systems 
modification; KPI modification; availability and integrity of performance data and 
metrics; performance monitoring and adjustment; penalties and abatements; and 
finance and budget management.   
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Performance management systems modification: 
− There is little evidence that integrated PPP contract management systems are 
being used by the public sector, in Australia and internationally, nor that 
extant systems are subject to periodic review and modification. Template (or 
model) systems, together with regular review, have the potential to improve 
public sector governance for PPP. 
 
KPI modification: 
− Operational KPIs are developed during the procurement phase. This means 
generally, KPIs are designed at a time where little information is known about 
the service delivery specifics of PPPs, by lawyers and project teams alike, 
especially where they have limited operational experience. It is therefore 
important to have flexibility between the partners to review KPIs to ensure the 
services being delivered actually match that which was intended as part of the 
business case, and to take necessary steps to address consequential 
misalignment between expectation and practice. 
− Modifying KPIs should mean that they are adjusted to their ‘right’ level.  
However, the extent to which the modification contributes towards the 
achievement of VfM may depend upon a range of factors including the timing 
of negotiations, how much leverage the public partner has over its private 
partner, and the level of public employee ability to broker the best deal for the 
state.   
 
Availability and integrity of performance data and metrics: 
− PPP performance feedback is often self-generated by private partner 
operators.  Even if a trusting relationship exists between the partners, it is 
prudent for the public partner – as custodian of VfM for the state – to ensure 
that the declared level of performance actually matches what has been 
delivered. Metrics must be appropriate and reliable in application. 
Performance data must be verifiable by the public partner. 
 
Performance monitoring and adjustment: 
− Failure to enforce private partner obligations under terms of contract may 
undermine the attainment of planned VfM outcomes by the public partner. 
This may occur, for example, where the private partner alters informal 
processes without agreement, and where the changes are not detected by the 
public partner; or where the private partner proposes a modification to a 
contract and that modification is accepted by the public partner without giving 
due consideration to its wider ramifications. 
 
Penalties and abatements: 
− Although abatement (including the threat of abatement) can be an effective 
means of driving private partner behaviour by providing a strong incentive to 
perform under the contractual framework of the concession deed, the decision 
to apply abatement for under-performance can be a matter of professional 
judgement. Knowing when to apply abatement and when to allow 
performance or compliance flexibility can be strategically important in 
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achieving desired outcomes over the long term, but at the risk of endangering 
sustainable public partner management control.  
 
Finance and budget management:  
− The IMM is a management tool, not a financial model. However, finance and 
budget management decisions impact upon its design and application, and 
therefore, the achievement of VfM outcomes.  
 
These findings have influenced the structure and scope of the proposed Integrated 
Management Model for public sector governance of PPPs. It is now possible to 
consider recommendations for practice. 
 
 
10.3 Recommendations for Practice  
 
To improve current levels of public partner capability and expertise, leading to better 
VfM outcomes, it is recommended that:  
1. Centrally managed, multi-agency online information repositories are 
implemented to broaden public employee knowledge. This could drive down 
costs and increase learning over the long-term, therefore reducing the need 
for public partners to rely on expensive external contractors and consultants 
across a number of PPPs;   
2. The IMM should be customised and beta-tested on a live PPP project with an 
aim that public partner contract directors then adopt the model as a tool for 
developing operational improvement plans as part of the use of standard PPP 
operating policies, procedures and associated documentation in other 
projects;   
3. A calendar of deliverables tool is developed and implemented to support 
junior public partner contract managers in managing tasks as specified under 
a PPP concession deed. This type of approach may be beneficial for 
mitigating some of the capability risks that the public partner faces; it can be 
used to build corporate, commercial and project knowledge; and be used to 
raise levels of accountability and performance of the public sector contract 
management team;   
4. Public partner employees should keep ‘lessons learnt’ logs that can be shared 
with other staff and used by decision-makers, as appropriate, to guide future 
training programs. It is anticipated that such activity could lead to the 
broadening of public sector knowledge; and  
5. Succession planning for key roles in public partner PPP governance teams 
should become mandatory and be incorporated into business continuity plans, 
including the production of ‘how to’ documentation for using essential systems 
and processes, an agreed methodology for transferring knowledge to 
successors and periodic updates of hand-over packages (if appropriate). Staff 
exit interviews should be conducted.   
6. Although it is assumed that there is only a limited amount of scope for 
opportunity risk identification during the operating phase, the public and 
private partners should maintain an innovation register. This register could be 
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updated with appropriate ‘value adding’ ideas being presented to public 
partner decision-makers for further consideration on a regular basis. The 
implementation of innovative ideas should be linked to incentive schemes to 
encourage better performance and / or improved VfM outcomes. For public 
partner employees, this could translate to improved career development 
opportunities, paid study assistance, flexible working arrangements, the 
opportunity to perform higher duties or promotion into more senior roles, 
depending on the extent of their involvement in the idea generation / 
implementation processes. Such incentives should also increase staff 
retention.   
 
 
10.4 Recommendations for Further Research 
 
It is recommended that further research is undertaken to establish:  
1. Whether there are jurisdictional patterns between the adoption of the public 
partner’s preferred contract management style for achieving VfM and 
organisational culture in separate projects, particularly in mature PPP markets 
e.g. in Australian states and territories, or between local authorities and 
National Health Service trusts in the UK. This recommendation stems from 
the interview findings, where a link was established between the choice of 
decision-makers’ approach for achieving VfM as part of the contract 
management function. As such, individual governments may take a strategic 
view on which approach should be adopted for managing contractual 
oversight across all PPPs under that jurisdiction. Further research should 
focus on identifying critical success factors and their drivers, and the evidence 
that points towards achievement of VfM outcomes for each PPP for 
comparison; 
2. The extent to which incentives offered to public employees in PPPs, meet 
performance expectations in practice i.e. the degree that incentives are 
actually used to shape desired public employee behaviour, increase 
motivation and improve overall productivity. This should include examining 
which incentives work best and under what circumstances, and which 
incentives are most cost-effective to implement and maintain for each PPP. 
This should be examined because it is likely that better employee 
performance will lead to better project outcomes; 
3. How public partner employees obtain their knowledge of the commercial and 
legal underpinnings of PPP contract management processes e.g. formal 
qualifications or on-the-job training (or a combination of both), and how the 
knowledge and skill levels of public partner PPP teams can be raised to 
improve VfM outcomes for the state. This may be important as the research 
findings point towards the need for strong public sector contract management 
knowledge and skills; and 
4. The extent to which restructuring of public partner agency authorities (e.g. the 
transfer of project or statutory obligations from one public sector entity to 
another) presents value to government. This should include reviewing the 
longer-term impacts of decision-making relating to the effectiveness of revised 
governance for affected PPPs, against their previous arrangements, and to 
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assist with the identification of ‘better practice’ governance models, where 
economies of scale can be found and applied across multiple projects.   
   
Future (as distinct from further) research could consider PPP operational 
management from a private sector perspective. The current research has not 
attempted this, since it is likely that the private partner in PPP will face different 
management issues; particularly since the private partner (the concession-holder) 
will comprise multiple stakeholders each needing to deal with their own issues. 
 
 
10.5 Achievement of Research Objectives  
 
The research objectives stated in Chapter 1 were: 
− To examine how PPP operational phase partnership, risk and performance 
management practices can be improved to achieve better VfM outcomes. This 
will involve developing a generic conceptual integrated model intended to 
assist government decision-makers to allocate and make better use of public 
sector resources during the operational phase of PPPs that may have 
significant and / or long-term consequences for achieving strategic objectives 
using an integrated partnership, risk and performance management approach.  
This includes: 
o Establishing and maintaining effective partnership relations between 
public and private partners;  
o Identifying and managing public sector risks (both threat and 
opportunity risk); and  
o Modifying (improving) and then maintaining service delivery 
performance standards of operators, and where appropriate, the 
oversight role of government or its delegates.  
− To test the logic and sufficiency of the model by exposing it to industry 
practitioner review and comment. 
 
The questions developed to achieve the research objectives were as follows: 
1. “How can partnership, risk and performance management practices be 
better utilised by the public sector to improve the operational performance of 
PPP, leading to improved VfM outcomes?” 
2. “What is privatisation?” 
3. “What are PPPs?” 
4. “What is VfM?” 
5a. “What are the principles, processes and problems associated with 
partnership management?” 
5b. “How does partnership management relate to PPP?”  
6a. “What are the principles, processes and problems associated with risk 
management?” 
6b. “How does risk management relate to PPP?” 
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7a. “What are the principles, processes and problems associated with 
performance management? 
7b. “How does performance management relate to PPP?” 
8. “How can partnership, risk and performance management be synthesised 
into a model of better practice management that will lead to improved VfM 
outcomes in the operational phase of PPP?” 
 
The research questions were answered through: 
− Undertaking a comprehensive review of literature. This provided a foundation 
for answering each research question (except Question 8) including 
identifying and selecting key definitions, principles, processes and problems 
within the context of PPP.  Chapters 3 and 4 comprise the main aspects of 
literature review. 
− Developing case studies. This was undertaken to allow issues identified in the 
literature review to be considered in context of real-world situations. This 
relates to answering Questions 1 and 5a to 7b and augments the literature 
review with analysis of real PPP examples to further focus the relevant issues. 
Chapter 5 comprises the case studies. 
− Designing the IMM. After the preliminary iteration was developed from 
literature review, the IMM content was then offered for consideration by PPP 
experts via interview, thus leading to the fulfilment of Questions 1 and 4 to 8. 
The model design and its development are dealt with in Chapters 6 to 8.  
− Refining the IMM. This was achieved through focus group review by 
subjecting the model to more intensive scrutiny by PPP experts. This 
approach was instrumental for testing the propositions inherent in answering 
Questions 1 and 4 to 8.  Chapter 9 reports on this process. 
 
It is also appropriate to consider the contribution to knowledge made by the research 
and its findings. 
 
 
10.6 Contribution to Knowledge  
 
This research contributes to the advancement of the ‘body of knowledge’, with 
respect to public partner governance of PPP in the operating phase, by:  
− Identifying critical success factors that lead to the achievement of VfM 
outcomes, thus building upon existing partnership, risk and performance 
management knowledge, policy and guidance for PPPs; and  
− Developing an Integrated Management Model as a tool – that supports the 
contract administration manual – to enhance the development of internal and 
external improvement plans as well as improving the operational management 
of partnership, risk and performance elements.  
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10.7 Research Journey  
 
The most notable aspects (positive and negative) of the research journey are 
summarised below:   
− Prior to designing the pilot study protocol, findings of the initial review of 
literature and case studies were discussed with professional contacts from the 
Victorian State Government, each with extensive PPP experience. This 
yielded informal feedback and guidance on the issues identified for 
partnership, risk and performance management in PPPs; 
− PPP case study information was sourced from mainly publicly-available 
internet sources. While this yielded appropriate descriptive material, it was 
frustrating to find little access to real PPP performance data for any of the 
cases, due to the blanket imposition of ‘commercial-in-confidence’ restrictions. 
This prevented any reliable quantitative performance data analysis;  
− Another feature of the design process was the development of an online 
communication platform to direct potential interviewees to the research 
materials. It is believed this approach contributed to a high response rate 
(68%) for those who officially agreed to take part in the interview process.  
This is a result, given the calibre of the research sample; but does assume 
that all potential participants are sufficiently IT-competent; and  
− An online web platform was initially considered for obtaining focus group 
opinion on the revised IMM (the second model iteration), but this method was 
abandoned due to technical design limitations and data confidentiality 
constraints associated with an expensive out-sourced web design and hosting 
process. It was then decided to conduct a focus group using individual email 
and paper-based communication. Cross-consultation opportunities between 
focus group members were lost due to the adoption of the latter approach. 
However, this proved to be no great loss, since the focus group process then 
more closely resembled Delphi technique (but without an iterative ‘rounds’ 
procedure).     
 
Overall, the research journey was a positive, albeit intensive experience. 
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Attachment A: Memo – Analytical Plan for Findings and 
Analysis Chapter   
 
Date:  25.03.13 
Overview: 
Chapter may be best tackled using a three-tier approach, consisting of the following: 
• Reporting / analysis on the interview process 
• Developing an analysis based on the wider experiences of interview participants in context of 
the issues that were identified during interview 
• Validating / refining the IMM (developing the technical aspects of the model). 
Each tier is outlined in more detail below.   
 
Reporting / analysis on the interview process: 
• Reporting / analysis on pilot study 
• Reporting / analysis on the interviews (see ‘Memo: Interview Participant Analysis’ 20.03.13).   
 
Wider account of interview participants: 
• Report on how decisions taken during other project phases may impact on operational phase 
success 
• Report on and categorise similarities / differences in experiences, as appropriate e.g. by 
sector (i.e. public or private), project type (i.e. economic or social infrastructure), etc 
• Report on and categorise public sector concerns and potential solutions that may lead to 
improved public sector outcomes 
• Report on and categorise private sector views on what the public sector should do or could do 
better 
• Report on limitations regarding the views expressed by participants and their implications for 
this research.     
 
Data could be presented in summary tables or as NVivo node screen grabs, as appropriate, as well 
as providing fuller descriptions and analytical accounts.  
 
Validating / refining the IMM: 
• Validate the issues / identify and justify new issues for inclusion  
• Identify new relationships between the three management disciplines and justify for inclusion  
• Validate VfM contributors / identify new VfM contributors and justify for inclusion  
• Validate VfM evidence-base foundation / identify new evidence-bases and justify for inclusion 
• Validate possible treatment actions / identify new possible treatment actions and justify for 
inclusion.   
 
This phase should involve three steps.  The first would involve identifying relevant content (as outlined 
above) from all interview transcripts.  The second step would involve presenting the findings from step 
one to selected participants via an expert focus group for review and comment.  The third step would 
involve collating the findings and incorporating them into a second iteration of the IMM.   
Data could be presented in tables, flow charts or as NVivo node screen grabs, as appropriate. 
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Attachment B: Endorsed Application for Ethics Approval of 
Research Involving Human Participants  
 
 
 
 
Human Research Ethics Sub-Committee 
Office of the Pro Vice-Chancellor 
Phone:  9925-2974 
 
16 June 2011 
 
Steven McCann 
8/84 Grey Street 
 
Dear Steven, 
 
Re: Human Research Ethics Application – Register Number CHEAN A—2000504-05/11 
 
The Deputy Chair of the Design and Social Context College Human Ethics Advisory Network 
(CHEAN), Prof Joseph Siracusa, assessed your ethics application titled: 
 
How can better partnership, risk and performance management practices from a public 
sector perspective be utilized to improve the operational performance of PPP, leading to 
better value for money outcomes? 
 
I am pleased to advise that your application has been approved at a Low Risk classification. This 
approval will be ratified at the meeting on 16 June 2011 and reported to the University Human 
Research Ethics Committee for noting. 
 
Your ethics approval expires on 31 December 2014. 
 
Please note that all research data should be stored on University Network systems.  These 
systems provide high levels of manageable security and data integrity, can provide secure remote 
access, are backed on a regular basis and can provide Disaster Recover processes should a large 
scale incident occur.  The use of portable devices such as CDs and memory sticks is valid for 
archiving, data transport where necessary and some works in progress.  The authoritative copy of 
all current data should reside on appropriate network systems; and the Principal Investigator is 
responsible for the retention and storage of the original data pertaining to the project for a 
minimum period of five years. 
 
You are reminded that an Annual /Final report is mandatory and should be forwarded to the 
College Ethics Subcommittee Secretary by mid-January 2012. This report is available at 
http://www.rmit.edu.au/browse;ID=6sqqx7sd0wkp or can be located by following the link under 
Policy at http://www.rmit.edu.au/dsc/chean.  
 
Should you have any queries regarding your application please seek advice from the Deputy 
Chair of the College Human Ethics Advisory Network (CHEAN) Prof Joseph Siracusa on (03) 
9925 1744, joseph.siracusa@rmit.edu.au or contact Lisa Mann on (03) 9925 2974, 
lisa.mann@rmit.edu.au 
 
On behalf of the DSC College Human Ethics Advisory Network I wish you well in your research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Ethics Officer 
DSC College Human Ethics Advisory Network (CHEAN)  
 
   
Attachment C: Pre-pilot Interview Questions 
 
Element Question 
No. 
Issue Structured Question Justification for Asking the 
Question 
Partnership 
Management 
1 A number of elements have been 
identified as essential in creating a 
strong foundation for partnership 
success.  They relate to: 
• Management commitment and 
support 
• Capability and continuity of key 
personnel 
• Establishing and maintaining a 
positive working culture 
• Clear and open communication  
• Use of effective incentives  
To what extent is: 
a) Management commitment and 
support 
b) Capability and continuity of key 
personnel 
c) Establishing and maintaining a 
positive working culture 
d) Clear and open communication 
e) Use of effective incentives  
...needed to create a strong foundation 
for partnership success between the 
government and private sector 
operators? How is each achieved in 
practice?  
To understand what essential 
elements are considered by 
government for achieving successful 
outcomes 
 2 A number of elements have been 
identified that may lead to relationship 
difficulties.  They relate to:  
• Differing goals and priorities between 
the sectors  
• Contrasting organisational cultures  
• Contrasting value-sets  
• Tension arising between the lines of 
autonomy and accountability  
To what extent does the private sector’s:  
a) Goals and priorities  
b) Organisational culture 
c) Value-sets 
d) Lines of autonomy and accountability  
…cause relationship difficulties for the 
government? How are these issues 
resolved? Practical examples?   
To understand relationship difficulties 
experienced between the 
government and private sector 
operators  
 3 A range of issues have been identified 
that potentially, if better partnership 
management practices had been 
applied, better value for money 
outcomes could have been achieved.  
They relate to:  
• Deciding against applying 
abatements for failing to delivery 
Why and to what extent have private 
sector operators not been held fully 
accountable for underperformance in an 
attempt by government to foster positive 
working relationships with them, in terms 
of:  
a) Deciding against applying 
abatements for failing to deliver projects 
To understand why private sector 
operators have not been consistently 
penalised for underperformance and 
what issues could be better 
managed that may lead to improved 
value for money outcomes  
 
 
   
Element Question 
No. 
Issue Structured Question Justification for Asking the 
Question 
projects to schedule or completing 
agreed remedial action 
• Generating adverse media attention 
for the government  
to schedule or completing agreed 
remedial action? 
b) Generating adverse media attention 
for the government? 
To what extent do these 
decisions/outcomes arise from policy 
interpretation or governance 
practicalities? 
Risk 
Management 
4 A range of issues have been identified 
that potentially, may lead to higher 
than projected operating costs.  They 
relate to:  
• Higher production costs 
• Higher input costs 
• Reduced input quality 
• Unsuitable design 
• Reduced equipment reliability 
• Higher maintenance costs 
• Occupational health and safety 
issues  
• Unplanned equipment / plant 
upgrades 
• Inherent defects 
• Technical obsolescence 
• Lower than expected service user 
demand / volume 
• Contractual disputes 
 
Although inherent operating risks tend to 
be borne by private sector operators, to 
what extent is: 
a) Higher production costs 
b) Higher input costs 
c) Reduced input quality 
d) Unsuitable design 
e) Reduced equipment reliability 
f) Higher maintenance costs 
g) Occupational health and safety issues  
h) Unplanned equipment / plant 
upgrades  
i) Inherent defects 
j) Technical obsolescence  
k) Lower than expected service user 
demand / volume 
l) Contractual disputes  
...of concern to the government and in 
which way could this risk impact directly 
on government? Can direct examples 
for any of these be provided? Can any 
practical remedial measures be 
described?  
To identify what type of inherent 
operating  risks or elements of these 
risks that if realised may have a 
detrimental impact on government  
 
 5 A range of issues have been identified 
that may present residual risk to 
To what extent is the government 
prepared to accept residual risk, relating 
To identify what types of activities 
are undertaken or have been 
   
Element Question 
No. 
Issue Structured Question Justification for Asking the 
Question 
government.  They relate to:  
• Higher production costs 
• Higher input costs 
• Reduced input quality 
• Unsuitable design 
• Reduced equipment reliability 
• Higher maintenance costs 
• Occupational health and safety 
issues  
• Unplanned equipment / plant 
upgrades 
• Inherent defects 
• Technical obsolescence 
• Lower than expected service user 
demand / volume 
 
 
to:  
a) Higher production costs 
b) Higher input costs 
c) Reduced input quality 
d) Unsuitable design 
e) Reduced equipment reliability 
f) Higher maintenance costs 
g) Occupational health and safety issues  
h) Unplanned equipment / plant 
upgrades  
i) Inherent defects 
j) Technical obsolescence  
k) Lower than expected service user 
demand / volume 
...and what types of further treatments 
should be undertaken to minimise the 
likelihood / consequence of these risks 
being realised for government?   
planned by government to reduce 
the likelihood of the risks occurring or 
to lessen the impact of events on 
operations, should they be realised 
 6 Although risk management leading to 
innovation has been discussed in the 
preceding chapters, there have been 
no clear or tangible examples identified 
in the operational setting  
In which ways has effective risk 
management led to operational 
innovation and how do you think the 
government will benefit from this over 
time? Can direct examples for any of the 
risks arising from 5 (a) to (k) be 
provided? Can any practical risk 
response measures be described? 
To discover if operational innovation 
is given adequate consideration and 
if it is realistically factored into the 
concept of achieving ‘value for 
money’ outcomes  
Performance 
Management  
7 A number of elements have been 
identified where the government may 
be falling short in providing advice and 
in enforcing abatements.  This relates 
to: 
• Providing critical evaluation and 
advice in the design of effective 
performance measures / 
To what extent, to date, has the 
government fallen short with regard to 
its private sector partners in:    
a) Providing critical evaluation and 
advice in the design of effective 
performance measures / management 
systems 
b) Ensuring abatements are applied for 
To understand the reasons why / 
difficulties of not holding private 
sector operators fully to account and 
what could be done to improve the 
situation  
 
   
Element Question 
No. 
Issue Structured Question Justification for Asking the 
Question 
management systems 
• Ensuring abatements are applied for 
failing to provide performance data 
or supplying incomplete or poor 
quality data 
• Consistently applying abatements for 
operational underperformance 
failing to provide performance data or 
supplying incomplete or poor quality 
data 
c) Consistently applying abatements for 
operational underperformance 
…and what more should be done to 
improve current practices?  
Can examples be cited and 
improvements described? 
 8 A review of the literature demonstrates 
that there are circumstances where the 
government does not apply 
abatements to private sector operators 
for underperformance.  By not 
publically disclosing the rationale for 
doing so, the actions of the 
government are perceived to be 
inconsistent and thus do not lead to 
value for money outcomes  
Describe any circumstances where 
‘payment for performance’ should not be 
enforced and what could be done in 
these instances to achieve better value 
for money outcomes?  
To establish if there are limitations of 
the ‘payment for performance’ 
principle and if so, what else could 
be done to achieve better value for 
money outcomes  
 
 9 A range of qualitative issues have 
been identified are difficult to measure.  
They are: 
• Effectiveness 
• Quality 
• Relationships 
• Outcomes 
How can the government ensure that 
qualitative factors such as:  
a) Effectiveness 
b) Quality 
c) Relationships 
d) Outcomes  
…are managed more effectively that 
lead to better to value for money 
outcomes?  
Provide examples and describe how 
measures are developed and 
implemented in practice? 
How are the measures directly 
linked/translated to VFM assessment 
To discover if there is value in 
attempting to measure highly 
subjective factors, and if so, how this 
could be done successfully  
 
 
 
 
 
   
Attachment D: Research Summary  
 
Pilot study feedback summary sheet 
 
Please complete the table below when assessing the interview materials.  Specific criticisms or suggestions should be written under the ‘Comments’ column 
or on additional sheets of paper as required.  Your feedback is highly appreciated as it will help to ensure that the data collection method is appropriate and 
sufficient; and that the collected data are valid and reliable.  
 
Criteria  Yes No Comments 
Are the questions aligned with the stated aim (purpose) and objectives 
(significance) of the research?* 
 
 
 
 
 
Are the individual questions supported by the main research question?*  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are the questions relevant, clear, unambiguous and effective?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are the questions presented in a logical order?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Have the ‘right’ number of questions been asked i.e. not too many / few? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is the timeframe allocated for interview appropriate?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do gaps / omissions exist in the line of questioning?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you have any other comments about the proposed method of data collection or the data collection instrument? 
 
Do you know anyone who is knowledgeable about PPP and who might be willing to take part in the interview process?  If yes, please provide names and 
 
 
 
Steven McCann BBus(BusAdm) 
PhD Candidate 
School of Property, Construction and Project Management 
RMIT University 
 
   
contact details. 
 
*As stated in the ‘Research summary’ document  
   
Attachment E: Interview Covering Letter Template 
 
Dear [Name], 
 
Development of a PPP operational phase management model  
 
I am undertaking PhD research at RMIT University to increase understanding of the issues that 
impact upon public sector management of Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects by developing a 
generic integrated partnership, risk and performance management model.  
 
I am contacting you because [insert reason].   
 
After conducting an extensive review of existing literature on the research topic, it is clear that there is 
a limited amount of empirical research that focuses directly on the operational phase of PPP projects.   
 
I would therefore like to invite you to take part in an interview process as your input will shed light on 
this under-developed area.  All information that you provide will remain anonymous and treated in the 
utmost confidence.  It is expected that interviews will last 60-90 minutes and will ideally take place 
during January 2013 at a place of your choosing.   
 
To participate, please respond to this invite with a time / date preference as well as the choice of 
management discipline(s) that you would like to be interviewed for i.e. partnership, risk and / or 
performance management.   
 
In return for your support, I would be happy to disseminate the findings of the research to you through 
presentation, informal meeting, by summary report and / or by publication.  
 
I have included a link to a webpage that contains additional information on the research.  This 
includes a one page overview of the research and the interview questions.  Please click on this link: 
 to access the page.   
 
If you have any questions, please contact me by telephone or return by email.   
 
I look forward to meeting you soon.   
 
Yours sincerely, 
  
   
Attachment F: Single Page Summary of Research 
 
 
RESEARCH PURPOSE 
 
The aim of this research is to increase understanding of the issues that impact upon public sector 
management of PPP projects by developing a generic integrated partnership, risk and performance 
management model.  
 
SIGNIFICANCE 
 
It is anticipated that the model will be used by project directors during operations to identify:  
− Issues that may prevent intended Value-for-Money outcomes;  
− Factors that may contribute to improved Value-for-Money outcomes; 
− Project documents that can be used for developing improvement plans; and   
− Treatment actions. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION  
 
The main research question is:  
“How can partnership, risk and performance management practices be better utilised by the public 
sector to improve the operational performance of PPP, leading to better Value-for-Money outcomes?” 
 
DATA COLLECTION  
 
PPP practitioners are invited to share their subject matter knowledge / experience in the development 
of the model.  This will be achieved through semi-structured interviews and then refined through the 
use of a focus group.  
 
INTERVIEWEE SELECTION AND TIMING 
 
Potential interviewee participants have been sourced from the researcher’s personal, professional 
networks and from PPP publications.   
It is expected that interviews will last 60-90 minutes and will ideally take place between mid-October 
and the end of November 2013 at a place of the interviewees’ choosing.   
 
FINDINGS DISSEMINATION  
 
On completion, the researcher will disseminate the findings on request by means such as 
presentations, informal meetings, summary reports and publications.  
 
  
 
 
Steven McCann BBus(BusAdm) 
PhD Candidate 
School of Property, Construction and Project Management 
RMIT University 
 
   
Attachment G: Final Interview Questions 
 
 
 
Please read this coversheet before agreeing to participate in the research  
 
 
What is the title of this research project?  
“How can partnership, risk and performance management practices be better utilised by the public 
partner to improve the operational performance of PPP, leading to improved Value-for-Money 
outcomes?” 
 
If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do? 
This research requires participants to commit to an interview that will last 60-90 minutes.  It is 
expected that this timeframe will be sufficient for answering questions relating to partnership, risk or 
performance management.  As part of the interviewing process, the researcher will record the 
interview and return the edited transcript to you for validation before including it as part of the 
research project.   
Participants are encouraged to share their views in answering questions relating to more than one 
management discipline.  This will involve a longer session or subsequent meeting, depending on your 
availability.   
 
What are the risks or disadvantages associated with participation?  
The researcher will strictly follow current and relevant RMIT University ethics standards in conducting 
the research and interviews.  You have the right to contact the investigator's supervisor, Dr Guillermo 
Aranda-Mena (ph: 9925 9512, email: guillermo.aranda-mena@rmit.edu.au) and / or the RMIT College 
of Design and the Social Context Human Ethics Advisory Network Chair to lodge a question and / or 
complaint, and seek advice on how your concern will be dealt with. 
 
What will happen to the information you provide?  
All electronic data will be stored in secure folders (e.g. password protected or hidden folders with a 
selected user group) at the School of Property, Construction and Project Management at RMIT 
University.  The data will be retained for five years upon completion of the project after which time the 
electronic data will be deleted / destroyed in a secure manner. 
 
What are my rights as a participant?  
Your rights as a participant include the following:   
− interviewees partake in this research voluntarily and have the right to withdraw from the 
interviewing process at any time; 
− interviewees have the right to have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed on request;  
− the research process will ensure that interviewees’ confidentiality and anonymity will be protected 
at all times. Only generic identifiers will be used in the final thesis and other publications; and 
− the research will not involve the use of deception.  
 
 
Steven McCann BBus(BusAdm) 
PhD Candidate 
School of Property, Construction and Project Management 
RMIT University 
 
   
The interview questions / prompts 
 
Contextual notes:   
− The interview questions outlined below have been developed as discussion prompts that relate to 
key areas of PPP operations from a public sector perspective.   
− Generally, the first question relating to each of the partnership / risk / performance management 
sub-issues e.g. ‘management commitment and support’ is asked as a way to test (support or 
refute) the theoretical underpinning and case study findings of the research project against real-
world PPP experiences. 
− The purpose of asking the second question is to identify additional factors that have not been 
uncovered during literature review and case study development that may impact on the 
achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during PPP operational phases. 
− The aim of the third question is to identify policy measures, principles and / or treatment actions 
that may improve management of the sub-issues within PPP operating environments. 
 
Partnership management questions 
 Value-for-Money definition 
1 How do you define the concept of ‘Value-for-Money’ from a ‘partnership management’ 
perspective within PPP projects?  
 Organisational culture 
2 Do you think the organisational culture of the public partner influences Value-for-Money 
outcomes during PPP operational phases?   
3 Can: 
a) personality traits of individual public partner project team members 
b) the effectiveness of public partner project teams  
c) incentives provided to the public partner project team  
…contribute to the development of effective organisational culture, leading to improved 
Value-for-Money outcomes during PPP operational phases?  
4 In your experience, what other factors contribute to the achievement of an effective 
organisational culture? 
5 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve organisational 
culture in PPP projects? 
 Management commitment and support 
6 Do / does:  
a) negotiated outcomes between public partner decision-makers and the private partner 
over service delivery standards and outputs  
b) the acquisition and allocation of additional resources for under-resourced public 
partner project teams  
…always lead to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during PPP operational 
phases? 
7 In your experience, what other actions taken by public partner decision-makers lead to 
effective commitment and support during PPP project operations? 
8 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve existing levels of 
   
management commitment and support in PPP projects? 
 Employee capability and expertise 
9 How does: 
a) clear definition of public partner project team member roles and responsibilities  
b) the development of subject matter knowledge and the way this knowledge is applied 
by public partner project team members  
…contribute to the development of employee capability and expertise, leading to improved 
Value-for-Money outcomes during PPP operational phases?  
10 In your experience, what other factors influence the improvement of employee capability and 
expertise with respect to the public partner during the operational phase of PPPs? 
11 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve employee capability 
and expertise in PPP projects? 
 Clear and open communication 
12 Is the development of: 
a) shared understanding between public and private sector partners     
b) trusting relationships  between public and private sector partners     
…essential to clear and open communication, leading to the achievement of Value-for-Money 
outcomes during PPP operational phases?  If yes, in which way(s)?  If no, why not?   
13 In your experience, what other factors influence to clear and open communication during 
operations? 
14 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve the clarity and 
transparency of communication in PPP projects? 
 Relationship continuity 
15 Can: 
a) personal and professional influence exerted by public partner project team members 
on the private partner  
…contribute to relationship continuity, leading to improved Value-for-Money outcomes during 
PPP operational phases?  If yes, in which way(s)?  If no, why not? 
16 In your experience, what other factors influence relationship continuity during operations? 
17 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve relationship 
continuity in PPP projects? 
 Conflict management 
18 Can effective management of conflict, arising from:   
a) service delivery under-performance 
b) differences in organisational cultures between the public and private sector partners  
… contribute to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during operational phases? 
19 In your experience, what other factors lead to conflict during operations? 
20 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
   
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve conflict management 
in PPP projects? 
 Other (un-identified) factors 
21 Are there any other partnership management issues that have not been identified that could 
impact on PPP operations? 
22 If yes, what: 
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve partnership 
management? 
23 If you had to pick one partnership management experience that is most meaningful for you to 
share in context of this research, what would it be?   
 
Risk management questions 
 Value-for-Money definition 
1 How do you define the concept of ‘Value-for-Money’ from a ‘risk management’ perspective 
within PPP projects?  
 Implementation of transition plan 
2 Can: 
a) project / integration challenges during transition 
… impact on the achievement of planned operational phase of Value-for-Money outcomes? 
3 In your experience, what factors typically impact upon implementation of transition plans at 
the commencement of operational phases? 
4 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve the transition of 
implementation plans in PPP projects? 
 Contract variation 
5 Can: 
a) modification of existing services 
b) re-allocation of risk  
c) business continuity planning modification 
… contribute to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during operational phases? 
6 In your experience, what other factors can lead to contract variation during operations? 
7 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve the contract variation 
process in PPP projects? 
 Change of consortium members / change to public partner’s agency authority 
8 Do changes to consortium members or to the public partner’s agency authority lead to: 
a) exposure to new risks for the public partner in the operational phase of PPP 
b) changes in the management of risks by the public partner 
c) re-allocation of new risks 
If yes, in which way(s)?  If no, why not? 
9 In your experience, what other factors can: 
a) impact upon the change of consortium members 
   
b) lead to changes to the public partner’s agency authority 
…during PPP operations?   
10 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve the transition 
process of consortium members in PPP projects? 
...could be implemented by the public partner in making changes to its agency authority? 
 Contract termination 
11 Does: 
a) failure of a service provider  
…always lead to poor Value-for-Money outcomes? 
12 In your experience, what other factors can lead to contract termination during operations? 
13 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to reduce the impact of contract 
termination in PPP projects so that Value-for-Money outcomes are still achieved? 
 End of concession hand-over 
14 Can: 
a) asset monitoring  
b) transfer of project documentation / knowledge  
c) orientation / up-skilling new employees  
…contribute to the achievement of effective end of concession hand-over, leading to 
improved Value-for-Money outcomes towards the end of PPP operational phases? If yes, in 
which way(s)?  If no, why not? 
15 In your experience, what other factors can impact upon end of concession hand-over during 
operations? 
16 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve end of concession 
hand-over in PPP projects? 
 Reputation damage  
17 During PPP operations, can the public partner’s reputation be damaged by:  
a) issues / omissions that the private partner is legally accountable for resolving 
b) the failure to realise project benefits / criticism by service users 
c) a public perception that service operators are treating their customers unfairly 
d) criticism from public commentators due to the protection of sensitive and commercial 
information through ‘commercial in confidence’ arrangements 
What other situations / circumstances can lead to the public partner being criticised during 
operations?   
18 Can: 
a) the implementation and enforcement of governance, probity and compliance 
frameworks 
b) the use of confidentiality agreements for public partner project team members 
c) ‘commercial in confidence’ agreements 
d) responsive management of un-anticipated / un-intended events 
…reduce the impact of potential reputation damage to the public partner, therefore 
contributing to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during PPP operational 
   
phases? 
19 In your experience, what other factors can reduce the impact of reputation damage for the 
public partner during operations? 
20 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to reduce reputation damage for 
government in PPP projects? 
 Other (un-identified) factors 
21 Are there any other risk management issues that have not been identified that could impact 
on PPP operations? 
22 If yes, what: 
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve risk management? 
23 If you had to pick one risk management experience that is most meaningful for you to share 
in context of this research, what would it be?   
 
Performance management questions 
 Value-for-Money definition 
1 How do you define the concept of ‘Value-for-Money’ from a ‘performance management’ 
perspective within PPP projects?  
 Performance management systems modification 
2 Is: 
a) the ability to capture, monitor and measure all performance outputs and outcomes 
through performance management systems  
b) testing public partner project team members’ knowledge / skills in line with 
performance systems upgrades and associated documentation  
… essential to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during operational phases?   
3 In your experience, what other factors can affect Value-for-Money outcomes during 
transitioning of performance management systems?   
4 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve PPP performance 
management systems? 
 KPI modification 
5 Does: 
a) annual KPI review  
b) ongoing KPI review  
… always contribute to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during operational 
phases? 
6 In your experience, how often should KPIs be reviewed during operations?    
7 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers when deciding when to review 
and adjust KPIs in PPP projects? 
   
 Availability and integrity of performance data and metrics 
8 Is the: 
a) availability of performance data and metrics 
b) integrity of performance data and metrics  
… essential to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during operational phases? If 
yes, in which way(s)?  If no, why not?   
9 In your experience, what factors can impact upon availability and integrity of performance 
data and metrics during operations?  
10 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken to provide assurance that the availability and integrity of 
performance data is / remains intact?   
 Performance monitoring and adjustment 
11 Does: 
a) performance evaluation 
b) management reporting  
c) managing performance shortfalls  
d) opportunity (risk) implementation  
… always contribute to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during operational 
phases?  If yes, in which way(s)?  If no, why not?   
12 In your experience, what other factors can impact upon performance monitoring and 
adjustment during operations? 
13 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve performance 
monitoring and improve the likelihood that corrective actions will lead to enhanced Value-for-
Money outcomes in PPP projects?   
 Penalties and abatements  
14 Does / do: 
a) applying penalties and abatements  
b) decisions taken to relax the application of penalty / abatement regimes 
…always lead to the achievement of Value-for-Money outcomes during operational phases?  
If yes, in which way(s)?  If no, why not?   
15 In your experience, what factors should form the basis of decision-making leading to 
abatement / non-abatement for service under-performance during operations?   
16 What:  
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by the public partner when deciding not to abate that will increase 
the likelihood that private partner performance will improve in the future?   
 Other (un-identified) factors 
17 Describe any other performance management issues that have not been identified that could 
impact on PPP operations? 
18 If yes, what: 
a) policies / principles 
b) actions  
…could be applied / taken by public partner decision-makers to improve performance 
   
management? 
19 If you had to pick one performance management experience that is most meaningful for you 
to share in context of this research, what would it be?   
 
 
 
  
   
Attachment H: Initial Categorisation of NVivo Data 
 
Initial Categorisation of NVivo Data: Partnership Management Content. 
Parent Node Child Node(s) Number of References 
Value for money definition 
  
 
 Value for money definition (general) 13 
Organisational culture 
  
 
 
Personality – ability 11 
 
 
Team working 14 
 
 
Motivation – incentives 34 
 
Management commitment 
and support 
 
 
 
Negotiated outcomes 7 
 
 
Acquisition and allocation of 
additional resources 
6 
 
Employee capability and 
expertise 
 
 
 
Roles and responsibilities 4 
 
 Subject matter knowledge and applicability 35 
Clear and open 
communication 
  
 
 
Shared understanding 5 
 
 
Trust building 4 
 
Relationship continuity 
  
 
 Personal and professional influence 5 
Conflict management 
  
 
 
Values and beliefs 18 
 
 Under-performance - non-performance 8 
Other (un-identified) 
factors 
  
 
 
Internal government stakeholder 
management 
3 
 
 
Involvement of operations expert in 
all project phases 
2 
 
 
Interpretation 3 
 
   
 
Initial Categorisation of NVivo Data: Risk Management Content. 
Parent Node Child Node(s) Number of References 
Value for money definition   
 Value for money definition (general)  11 
Implementation of transition 
plan 
 
 
 Project - integration challenges 11 
Contract variation 
  
 
 Modification of existing services 19 
 
Re-allocation of risk 5 
 
 Business continuity planning modification 8 
Consortium members / public 
partner's agency authority 
 
 
 
Exposure to new risks 14 
 
Managed termination 
 
 
 
 
Service provider failure 14 
 
 
Voluntary termination 4 
 
End of concession hand-over 
  
 
 
Asset monitoring 6 
 
 Transfer of project documentation - knowledge 1 
 Orientation - up-skilling new employees 1 
Reputation damage 
  
 
 Governance, probity and compliance 8 
 
Confidentiality 8 
 
 Un-anticipated - un-intended events 13 
Other (un-intended) factors   
 
Other (un-intended) factors 
(general)  1 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Initial Categorisation of NVivo Data: Performance Management Content. 
Parent Node Child Node(s) Number of References 
Value for Money definition 
  
 
 Value for Money definition (general)  13 
Performance management 
systems modification 
 
 
 Performance management systems improvement 4 
 Performance management systems documentation 1 
KPI modification 
  
 
 
Annual KPI review 3 
 
 
Ongoing KPI review 5 
 
Availability and integrity of 
performance data and metrics 
 
 
 Availability of performance data and metrics 4 
 Integrity of performance data and metrics 8 
Performance monitoring and 
adjustment 
 
 
 
Performance evaluation 19 
 
 
Management reporting 4 
 
 Managing performance shortfalls 3 
 Opportunity (risk) implement. 16 
Penalties and abatements 
  
 
 Applying penalties and abatements 17 
 
Incentive revisions 24 
 
Other (un-identified) factors 
  
 
 
Payment mechanisms 4 
 
 Governance process for non-abatement decisions 2 
 Internal government stakeholder management 2 
 
Informal precedent 2 
 
 Involvement of operations expert in all project phases 2 
   
Initial Categorisation of NVivo data: Content for Other Relevant Issues. 
Node Number of References 
Social benefits should strongly influence use of PPP procurement 8 
Why PPP projects can fail 9 
PSC 4 
Favourable conditions for PPP projects 2 
Benefits of PPP projects 5 
Power imbalances 8 
Contract flexibility 7 
Benchmarking 5 
Innovation 10 
Profit sharing 6 
Follow the dollar powers 4 
Nature of PPP arrangements 15 
Centralisation of contract management - super statutory authority 12 
Project oversight by Treasury - PPP units 19 
Individual project failure vs. systemic model failure 9 
Government economic priorities - consequences 6 
Unions 4 
Competition for incumbents - competitive tension 2 
Auditors-General 3 
Super profits - windfalls 3 
Contract re-tendering (soft and hard services) 3 
 
  
   
Attachment I: Focus Group Covering Email Template  
 
PhD research – stage two 
 
Dear [x], 
 
Thank you once again for the opportunity to interview you.  I appreciate the time you spared for me 
and for the deeper insights you provided into PPP projects.   
 
I would like to invite you, along with a small group of other experts, to take part in the next stage of my 
research.  This will involve examining and reflecting upon the documents that comprise a second 
iteration of a draft public sector governance model for PPP (the Integrated Management Model).  Your 
scrutiny can be undertaken in your own time without any need for further meetings. 
 
During this stage I am seeking reflective feedback from you regarding the relevance and accuracy of 
particular aspects of the Model.  The reflective process is deliberately intended to deal with each of 
the separate elements of the Integrated Management Model in turn, and then subsequently, with the 
relevant combinations of Model elements (i.e. the integrating aspects).  
 
The data collection process adheres to the same RMIT University ethical standards that applied to the 
earlier interview stage of this research.  Personal identifiers will not be used in analysing and 
interpreting any information received.  Therefore your confidentiality is assured.  In return, you are 
requested to observe the confidentiality of the IMM material in accordance with the usual 
arrangements for intellectual property associated with research at RMIT University.   
 
If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me. 
 
Kind regards, 
 
  
   
 
Attachment J: Focus Group Covering Letter Template 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Name] 
[Title] 
[Address 1] 
[Address 2] 
[Address 3] 
[Address 4] 
 
 
[XX] June 2013 
 
                                      © Steven McCann June 2013 – All Rights Reserved 
 
 
 
Dear [X], 
 
Thank you for supporting this second stage of the Integrated Management Model (IMM) research 
project.  
 
The research activity involves the collection of data through a small focus group made up of public 
sector PPP experts.  The purpose of the focus group review is to obtain reflective feedback on an 
operational phase governance model that forms the topic of my current doctoral research at RMIT 
University.  The IMM has been developed from a comprehensive analysis of PPP literature and from 
findings of earlier individual research interviews.   
 
I would like to receive feedback from you regarding your perceptions and suggestions about the IMM, 
particularly relating to the relevance and accuracy of the: VfM contributors; VfM evidence-base 
factors; relationships identified between issues and sub-issues; and possible treatment actions. These 
should first be considered separately for each centrally-positioned management discipline shown in 
the Model (Partnership; Risk; and Performance Management), and then for combinations between the 
different disciplines.  
 
I have included a summary of the main IMM design features and the governance framework 
document developed to date, together with a table that indicates the feedback areas sought from you.  
Also attached is a copy of a recent peer-reviewed conference paper that describes the background of 
the research.  
 
Your reflective feedback will assist in the finalisation of the IMM development in terms of the current 
research.  No personal identifiers will be used in the analysis and interpretation of the feedback data.  
Therefore your confidentiality is assured.  In return, you are requested to observe the confidentiality of 
the enclosed IMM material in accordance with the usual arrangements for intellectual property 
associated with research at RMIT University. 
 
   
I will appreciate it if you could provide feedback (either written or by email) and return the 
documentation in the stamped, self-addressed envelope included in this document pack by 31 July 
2013.   
 
Kind regards, 
 
 
 
Steven McCann 
BBus(BusAdm) 
PhD Candidate 
 
 
   
Attachment K: Assessment / Feedback Matrix  
 
Please reflect and provide feedback against each coded aspect relating to the IMM – separately for each management discipline and then for each 
management discipline combination. 
 
 
Partnership 
Management 
Partnership 
Management  
> 
Risk 
Management 
Partnership 
Management  
> 
Performance 
Management 
Risk 
Management 
Risk 
Management  
> 
Partnership 
Management 
Risk 
Management  
> 
Performance 
Management 
Performance 
Management 
Performance 
Management  
> 
Partnership 
Management 
Performance 
Management  
> 
Risk 
Management 
VfM contributors 
(PTM01) 
 
VfM contributors 
(PTM-RKM01) 
 
VfM contributors 
(PTM-PFM01) 
 
VfM contributors 
(RKM01) 
 
VfM contributors 
(RKM-PTM01) 
 
VfM contributors 
(RKM-PFM01) 
 
VfM contributors 
(PFM01) 
 
 
VfM contributors 
(PFM-PTM01) 
 
VfM contributors 
(PFM-RKM01) 
 
VfM inhibitors 
(PTM02) 
 
VfM inhibitors 
(PTM-RKM02) 
 
VfM inhibitors 
(PTM-PFM02) 
 
VfM inhibitors 
(RKM02) 
 
VfM inhibitors 
(RKM-PTM02) 
 
VfM inhibitors 
(RKM-PFM02) 
 
VfM inhibitors 
(PFM02) 
 
 
VfM inhibitors 
(PFM-PTM02) 
 
VfM inhibitors 
(PFM-RKM02) 
 
VfM evidence-
base factors 
(PTM03) 
VfM evidence-
base factors 
(PTM-RKM03) 
VfM evidence-
base factors 
(PTM-PFM03) 
VfM evidence-
base factors 
(RKM03) 
VfM evidence-
base factors 
(RKM-PTM03) 
VfM evidence-
base factors 
(RKM-PFM03) 
VfM evidence-
base factors 
(PFM03) 
 
VfM evidence-
base factors 
(PFM-PTM03) 
VfM evidence-
base factors 
(PFM-RKM03) 
Relationships 
between issues 
and sub-issues 
(PTM04) 
Relationships 
between issues 
and sub-issues 
(PTM-RKM04) 
Relationships 
between issues 
and sub-issues 
(PTM-PFM04) 
Relationships 
between issues 
and sub-issues 
(RKM04) 
Relationships 
between issues 
and sub-issues 
(RKM-PTM04) 
Relationships 
between issues 
and sub-issues 
(RKM-PFM04) 
Relationships 
between issues 
and sub-issues 
(PFM04) 
Relationships 
between issues 
and sub-issues 
(PFM-PTM04) 
Relationships 
between issues 
and sub-issues 
(PFM-RKM04) 
Potential 
treatments by 
public manager 
(PTM05) 
Potential 
treatments by 
public manager 
(PTM-RKM05) 
Potential 
treatments by 
public manager 
(PTM-PFM05) 
Potential 
treatments by 
public manager 
(RKM05) 
Potential 
treatments by 
public manager 
(RKM-PTM05) 
Potential 
treatments by 
public manager 
(RKM-PFM05) 
Potential 
treatments by 
public manager 
(PFM05) 
Potential 
treatments by 
public manager 
(PFM-PTM05) 
Potential 
treatments by 
public manager 
(PFM-RKM05) 
   
Attachment L: Summary of IMM Design Features   
 
In the IMM, each management perspective is positioned in turn as the ‘target’ discipline (situated in 
the central column of the corresponding relationship chart).  This column contains the issues / sub-
issues that have been identified (through literature review, case study, interviews, thesis chapter 
summary and integration of key issues and concepts) as important for active consideration and 
management.  The Model then links issues from the remaining two management perspectives (left 
and right hand columns) with the sub-issues of the central target perspective for in-depth 
consideration and evaluation.  Where appropriate, issues that appear in each of the two outer 
columns also link together.    
 
Black arrows flow from the issues that appear in the left and right hand columns to the appropriate 
sub-issue(s) that appear in the central column; red dotted arrows denote that there is a relationship 
between two or more issues / sub-issues within the target discipline.  It is expected that VfM 
outcomes will be achieved or improved when public partner decision-makers manage the PPP 
operational situation effectively by applying appropriate treatment actions to the corresponding issues 
/ sub-issues.   
 
In terms of impact, each sub-issue is classified as ‘external’, ‘internal’ or ‘both’ – represented in the 
relationship charts as a square, circle or triangle, respectively.  ‘External’ considerations for sub-
issues focus upon the accountabilities of service providers – that is, how consortia performance may 
be improved through public partner intervention.  An ‘internal’ focus relates to the responsibilities of 
government in holding consortia accountable for delivering contracted services, as well as attempting 
to improve the capability of its employees, systems and / or processes.  ‘Both’ means that external 
and internal considerations are necessary (although not always to an equal extent).   
 
The table that appears underneath each relationship chart (that corresponds with each target 
perspective) provides a summary of factors that may contribute towards achieving VfM outcomes, 
identifies an evidence-base that may support these realisations and gives a précis of the key 
treatment actions that may be used to mitigate or resolve the issues.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
